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Abstract 
The end of the post-World War II ‘long boom’ in the mid-1970s proved the beginning 
of a process of political-economic change that has fundamentally transformed 
Australian labour law.  Given the centrality of labour law to the production/reproduction 
of the commodity labour-power and the class struggle, the dramatic changes in labour 
law are a matter of tremendous importance, particularly for organised labour, which has 
found itself operating in an ever more hostile legal climate.  However, the nature of 
labour law change in Australia remains poorly theorised.  The traditional disciplines of 
labour law and industrial relations are primarily beholden to empiricist methods, whilst 
work on Australian political economy has typically paid scant attention to the issue of 
law beyond the descriptive account that neoliberalism has been associated with legal 
change.  The result is a lack of a theoretically rigorous account of the evolution of 
Australian labour law. 
It is in to this lacuna that this thesis steps.  Utilising the methodology of the Parisian 
Regulation Approach (PRA), I periodise Australian capitalism since World War II into 
two models of development, which are historically specific crystallisations of capitalist 
social relations unifying an industrial paradigm, accumulation regime and mode of 
regulation.  The ability of the PRA to explain the role of a labour law regime within 
these models of development is crucially buttressed by its synthesis with a Marxist 
jurisprudence I have constructed, drawing upon the best work of scholars in this field.  
In particular, I argue that law is best conceived as a juridic form of capitalist production 
and exchange relations, rather than as a fundamentally a-capitalist institution 
determined by an economic base.  Such a construction allows us to appreciate that law 
not only performs certain functions within a model of development, but also helps 
constitute its physiology and character.   
The two models identified are antipodean Fordism (1945-early 1970s) and liberal-
productivism in Australia (late 1980s to the present), separated by a period of crisis 
characterised by ‘institutional searching’ to navigate an escape therefrom.  Each model 
possesses a unique regime of labour law which both executes key roles within it and 
helps constitute its fabric.  Both regimes reflect a particular configuration of the ‘law-
administration’ continuum, a balance point between the abstraction and de-classed, 
II 
juridically equal citizen-subject of law and the collective subject and specific subject 
matter of administration.   
The labour law regime of antipodean Fordism was unique in the way it precociously 
enshrined the Fordist wage-labour nexus in the form of the compulsory conciliation and 
arbitration system.  This system was absolutely central in undergirding the key features 
of the regime, which included a permissive attitude towards organised labour, 
bargaining between capital and labour at a broad occupational level, wage and 
conditions flow-on through the award structure from lead sectors, the diffusion of the 
standard employment model and the growth of administrative fixes to heightened 
worker power.  In terms of the law-administration continuum, administration was 
predominant, with the purer legal form largely submerged (but not extinguished).  
Whilst this labour law regime did ensure the temporary coherence of antipodean 
Fordism, reinforcing the ‘virtuous cycle’ that powered it, it nevertheless was laden with 
its own set of contradictions, particularly the degree to which it institutionally 
entrenched trade union power, was dependent upon moderate unionism, and facilitated 
destabilisation of the wage structure through large, leap-frogging wage claims when 
unions pressed against and outside the system. 
From the mid-1970s and throughout the 1980s, a process of institutional searching for 
ways out of crisis developed and deepened.  This was a deeply contradictory process, in 
which efforts to intensify the institutions of antipodean Fordism co-existed with, and 
grated against, developments corrosive of the established order.  Over time, the latter 
came to predominate, such that by the late 1980s/early 1990s, the new liberal-
productivist model of development was coming into existence.  Its labour law regime 
differed fundamentally from its predecessor, reflecting its own unique dynamic and the 
way in which it provisionally answered the crisis tendencies of antipodean Fordism.  Its 
fundamental essences include the destruction of the conciliation and arbitration system, 
hostility to trade unionism, a severing of the institutional links homogenising the wage 
structure and associating productivity and wage growth, the erosion of the standard 
employment model with a concomitant explosion of precarious employment forms, and 
intensified juridification. 
The result of this analysis, which also employs case studies in the metals, food 
processing and retail sectors to sharpen key claims, is an account of labour law 
III 
 
 
evolution in Australia which is theoretically rigorous yet empirically concrete.  The 
union of the PRA with a Marxist jurisprudence creates a powerful analytical model 
which, with appropriate modification, could be used in exploring broader legal change 
in the transition between Fordism and liberal-productivism, both in Australia and 
elsewhere. 
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1 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
‘The ever-changing forces of society incessantly mould and transform the law and yet it 
pretends to stand aloof and prides itself on its immutability in a tumultuous world. 
While it seems to be a spectator of the great social drama, serene and imperturbable, it 
suffers all the agonies and fights all the struggles of an actor in the play.’1 
 
There are few components of a capitalist society that penetrate as deeply and profoundly 
into the lives of the people as law.  Capitalism is legalised to a degree that is historically 
unprecedented.  The very form of bourgeois law is premised on its universality and 
abstraction, a reality grasped by Kahn-Freund.  In a society where everyone is 
considered an abstract, de-classed juridical citizen, law becomes the medium through 
which these citizens relate to each other and to the state.  Within this pervasive and 
immensely powerful social force, labour law forms an especially crucial segment.  The 
fact that within capitalism labour assumes a generalised commodity form means that the 
sale and purchase of labour power, together with the conditions on which it is exploited, 
becomes an explicitly legal matter.  The resultant body of labour law is a most complex 
amalgam, with the law of ‘things,’ namely property and contract law, attempting to 
commodify and regulate a living, breathing and thinking subject, the proletarian.  This 
domain of law is an object of class struggle in its own right, as labour and capital 
attempt to impress their own competing political economies on the legal form. 
Given this centrality of labour law to the production and reproduction of the commodity 
labour-power and the class struggle, the dramatic changes in Australia’s labour law 
regime since the 1980s is a matter of tremendous importance, particularly for organised 
labour, which has found itself operating in an ever more hostile legal climate.  Despite 
its importance, however, the nature of labour law change in Australia remains poorly 
theorised.  The disciplines of labour law and industrial relations are largely beholden to 
an empiricist method, with the result that they are usually unable to explain why labour 
law has changed in the way it has, or elucidate the abstract functions it fulfils within 
                                                          
1 Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘Introduction’ in Karl Renner, The Institutions of Private Law and their Social 
Functions (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949) 43. 
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different models of development.  By contrast, the considerable body of political-
economic work dealing with the evolution of Australian capitalism over the past several 
decades typically pays scant attention to the issue of law beyond the descriptive account 
that neoliberalism has been associated with legal change.  This myopia is often a 
function of a lack of a sophisticated theory of law as a specific form of capitalist social 
relations.  The role of labour law in helping constitute the process of capitalist 
transformation, together with its own distinctive contributions to the nature of crisis, is 
elided in such accounts. 
It is in to this lacuna that this thesis steps.  Utilising the methodology of the Parisian 
Regulation Approach (PRA), I periodise Australian capitalism since World War II into 
two models of development, which are historically specific crystallisations of capitalist 
social relations unifying an industrial paradigm, accumulation regime and mode of 
regulation.  The ability of the PRA to explain the role of a labour law regime within 
these models of development is crucially buttressed by its synthesis with a Marxist 
jurisprudence that I have constructed, drawing upon the best work in the field.  In 
particular, I argue that law is best conceived as a juridic form of capitalist production 
relations, rather than as a fundamentally a-capitalist institution determined by an 
economic base.  Such a construction allows us to appreciate that law not only performs 
certain functions within a model of development, but also helps constitute its fabric.   
Throughout this thesis I seek to restore to the study of labour law the engine of capitalist 
social relations and their evolution through class struggle.  By the end, I will have 
demonstrated that labour law ‘suffers all the agonies and fights all the struggles of an 
actor in the play,’2 precisely because it is an actor in the capitalist ensemble.  The 
waxing and waning of the class struggle, together with the historically variant character 
of capitalism’s crisis tendencies, ensures that demands are made of the legal form that 
consistently threaten its integrity and mould its contours.  Given its historically novel 
labour law system, these processes can be seen in particularly sharp relief in Australia.  
Indeed, there are few better examples of the intimate link between labour law and 
capitalist coherence, crisis and transformation.  Focussing in particular on the period of 
1964-2009, I will demonstrate how labour law simultaneously helps constitute the 
coherence of particular models of development whilst at the same time contributing 
towards the particular crisis tendencies of those models.  This is demonstrated through a 
                                                          
2 Ibid. 
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rigorous hierarchy of abstraction, beginning with the most abstract roots of law in 
capitalist social relations, proceeding through a general history of labour law evolution 
in Australia using a regulationist periodisation schema, to particular case studies centred 
on the metals, food processing and retail sectors.   
Structure of the thesis 
My departure point is chapter 2, where the PRA is introduced and analysed.  This 
chapter explores the historical origins of the approach, as well as elucidating some of its 
key concepts, including ‘industrial paradigm,’ ‘accumulation regime,’ ‘mode of 
regulation’ and ‘model of development.’  I argue that a model of development, the most 
embracing regulationist concept, is ideally placed to deliver the PRA’s promise of a 
sophisticated intermediate-level account of capitalist development and crisis, cognisant 
of the abstract, long-run tendencies of capitalism identified by Marx yet able to account 
for stabilising forces in the short to medium term.  The criticisms of the approach are 
discussed and addressed.  The most serious of these, namely an increasingly eclectic 
theoretical framework cut free from its Marxist foundations and an inadequate treatment 
of the state and law, are given special attention.  Through a reconnection with its 
Marxist heritage and an acknowledgment of capital as having juridic, as well as 
economic, forms, these challenges can be met. 
The conception of capitalism as having a multi-faceted economic and juridical existence 
is the platform for chapter 3.  The chapter begins by tracing the treatment of law in the 
works of Marx and Engels.  Although they never focussed on law in a systematic way, 
their best accounts of it demonstrate that they regarded law as a strange creature, whose 
form and content is structured by capitalist relations of production and exchange, and 
the class struggle underpinning them.  Building upon the work of scholars such as 
Pashukanis, Fine, and Kay and Mott, I argue that the most basic cell of the legal form, 
the owner of private property, is common to all societies, capitalist or pre-capitalist, 
with large-scale commodity exchange.  However, it is only with the development of 
capitalist production relations that there emerges the specifically bourgeois legal form, 
an axiomatic system of abstract, universal and formal norms regulating juridically equal 
citizen-subjects.  Most importantly, the commodification of labour-power ensures that 
law becomes a proper object of class struggle in its own right, as the competing political 
economies of labour and capital attempt to impress themselves on the legal form.  As a 
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result of this process, the fabric of the legal form, woven out of abstract equality and the 
de-classed juridical citizen, can become rent and torn, unable to contain the collective 
interests of workers.  Proletarian struggle can force the state to plug these gaps with 
administrative solutions, producing institution and practices which take as their 
reference point collective subjects such as industrial organisations, and whose subject 
matter is often specific.  I argue law and administration form two poles of a law-
administration continuum, whose exact configuration is intimately tied to a model of 
development.  In particular, the method in which the latter handles and orders the 
contradictions of capitalism, derives coherence and embeds or excludes working-class 
power to varying degrees fixes the nexus point of this continuum. 
Chapter 4 takes the theoretical union of the PRA and Marxist legal theory established in 
the preceding chapters and applies them to the Australian context.  I periodise post-
World War II Australian capitalism into two distinct models of development, separated 
by a period of profound crisis and institutional searching: antipodean Fordism, 
stretching from 1945 to the early 1970s; and liberal-productivism, which had begun to 
cohere in the late 1980s and early 1990s and remains on foot today.  I elucidate the way 
in which each model of development handles the abstract crisis tendencies of 
capitalism, hierarchises different institutional forms, achieves coherence and carries 
latent within it fresh seeds of crisis.  In these processes, labour law is absolutely central.  
I argue that both antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism are characterised by 
unique labour law regimes that not only perform certain abstract functions within their 
models of development, but in fact help constitute their physiology.  Labour law 
features here not as a passive reflection of an economic base, but as a specific juridic 
form of capital that imparts its own logic and crisis tendencies within a model of 
development. 
Chapters 5 and 6 provide the concrete legal history necessary to flesh out the abstract 
framework of labour law produced in chapter 4.  In both chapters I explore labour law 
change over four key themes: wage fixation, forms of employment/flexibility, 
collectivism/individualism together with the scale of industrial relations, and the 
broader legal matrix.  A ‘slice’ approach is then employed, building upon the 
periodisation of post-World War II Australian capitalism advanced in chapter 4.  
Certain key years are selected as a snapshot and are analysed according to the state of 
labour law vis-à-vis the four themes identified.  Each period represents a crucial point in 
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the process of political-economic transformation.  Chapter 5 focusses on the nature of 
the antipodean Fordist labour law regime, both en régulation and in crisis.  I will 
demonstrate that it helped constitute and maintain the coherence of antipodean Fordism, 
but at the cost of generating its own crisis tendencies.  Chapter 6, by contrast, traces the 
development of the liberal-productivist labour law regime, which emerged out of a long 
and often contradictory process of institutional searching in the 1980s.  Although 
pregnant with its own contradictions, it provisionally answered the dysfunctionalities of 
its antipodean Fordist predecessor. 
A series of case studies in chapters 7, 8 and 9 sharpens some of the key claims made in 
chapters 4, 5 and 6.  In chapter 7, I trace the ascent and decline of the antipodean Fordist 
cycle of wage and conditions flow-on centred on the metal trades sector, one of the 
central dynamics of the antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus.  Labour law played an 
absolutely crucial role in constituting this cycle through institutionalising the metal 
awards at the apex of the award pyramid and facilitating flow-on between different 
sectors through ‘comparative wage justice’ claims.   The growing dysfunctionality of 
this circuit proved to be one of the key levers of antipodean Fordist crisis in the 1970s 
and early 1980s.  As the economic dynamism of the metals sector waned, its continued 
institutional role as a leader helped stoke large wage rounds that destabilised the wage 
structure and ate into the profit share of capital.  The destruction of this cycle is a key 
moment in the formation of a liberal-productivist labour law regime, which instead 
separates the industrially strong from the weak and stymies industry-level bargaining.  
The Accord between the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Labor government 
in the 1980s and the movement to enterprise bargaining in the early 1990s proved key 
forces in this process. 
In chapter 8, the content of award restructuring and enterprise bargaining in the food 
processing sector is investigated.  This sector has been selected for study precisely 
because it has been one of the most affected by liberal-productivist norms of precarity 
and international competition.  After a more-or-less archetypical pattern of industrial 
regulation within antipodean Fordism, the industry was hit hard by forces fundamental 
to the new liberal-productivist model of development, including intensified international 
competition, rationalisation of production and the increasing domination of multi-
national corporations.  In such an environment, award restructuring and enterprise 
bargaining effected profound change in the sector.  Of particular importance is the 
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extent to which both processes served to implant the precarity, intensified managerial 
prerogative and work reorganisation central to the liberal-productivist wage-labour 
nexus and industrial paradigm.   
Chapter 9 explores much the same processes as chapter 8, but in the context of the New 
South Wales retail sector.  Unlike the case of the food processing sector, retail proved a 
laggard when it came to crystallising an antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus, 
particularly given that the working-time arrangements characterising the standard 
employment model were only achieved on the cusp of Fordist crisis.  However, by dint 
of this fact and the broader economic restructuring of Australian capitalism, the retail 
sector precociously enshrined the liberal-productivist wage-labour nexus of increased 
precarity and intensification of labour stripped of the quid pro quo of job security, rising 
remuneration and internal labour markets of antipodean Fordism (making it a 
particularly important object of regulationist study).  In the early to late 1980s, these 
impulses were refracted through the still-dominant award system, with the process of 
institutional searching generating a new quasi-administrative tribunal combining the 
juridical structure of arbitration with a corporatist practice.  In the late 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s, however, award restructuring, enterprise bargaining and statutory individual 
contracts effected much the same outcomes as in the food processing sector, namely 
precarity, heightened managerial control over the labour process and deployment of 
labour and increasingly fragmented and polarised wage and conditions outcomes.  The 
fact that such similar outcomes and patterns emerge in two completely different 
industries strengthens the theory of transition forwarded in this thesis, demonstrating 
that liberal-productivist tendencies have taken hold of the workforce at large. 
Finally, in chapter 10, I conclude by summarising my findings, discussing the 
usefulness of the approach I have taken, and exploring some potential political 
implications. 
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Chapter 2 
THE PARISIAN REGULATION APPROACH 
In the endeavour to theorise and describe the transformation of Australian labour law 
between 1964 and 2009, it quickly becomes clear that the ambit of this thesis cannot 
help but be multi-disciplinary.  If we take seriously the need to locate labour law within 
the broader spectrum of capitalist economic, social and political relations, then four 
broad areas of inquiry for a Marxist perspective are of signal importance.  These are: 
1. The operation of the circuit of capital, with particular emphasis upon the 
inherently contradictory and unstable process of accumulation this sets in train;1 
2. The form, functions and operation of the state in capitalist society; 
3. The organisation of the capitalist labour process, particularly how it is arranged 
to beget surplus value and how, to use Goodrich’s term, it is riven by a ‘frontier 
of control’ between capital and labour;2 and, most importantly, 
4. The role of law in the constitution, regulation and maintenance of capitalist 
society, both in terms of its content and the specificity of the legal form.3 
 
It is important to note that these distinctions are to an extent arbitrary and a product of 
the balkanization of economics, politics and law that evolved throughout the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  This was not always so.  Indeed, the early 
proponents of classical jurisprudence were in many cases the same pioneers of classical 
political economy, such as Smith, Hegel and Rousseau.4 
A reification of the disciplinary boundaries arising around these themes is also 
antithetical to a genuinely Marxist analysis of law.  As Lebowitz states of Marx’s 
                                                          
1 The description of which was the central preoccupation of Marx in Capital.  See: Karl Marx, Capital: A 
Critique of Political Economy Volume I (Ben Fowkes trans, Penguin Classics, 1990); Karl Marx, Capital: 
A Critique of Political Economy Volume II (David Fernbach trans, Penguin Classics, 1992); Karl Marx, 
Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume III (David Fernback trans, Penguin Classics, 1991). 
2 Carter Goodrich, The Frontier of Control: A Study in British Workshop Politics (G. Bell and Sons Ltd, 
1920). 
3 An important distinction that, as we shall see in the next chapter, is often elided in practice, almost 
always to the disadvantage of analysis of the legal form.  For a useful discussion of the prevalence and 
dangers of this elision, see: China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International 
Law (Haymarket Books, 2006) 79-84. 
4 Bob Fine, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Marx’s Critique of the Legal Form (The Blackburn Press, 
2002) 10-65. 
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methodology, ‘[f]irstly, it is an emphasis on the “whole.”  Marx’s goal was to 
understand bourgeois society as a totality, as an inter-connected whole.’5  Lukács goes 
even further, elucidating the core of the revolutionary method Marx pioneered: ‘The 
category of totality, the all-pervasive supremacy of the whole over the parts is the 
essence of the method which Marx took over from Hegel and brilliantly transformed 
into the foundations of a wholly new science.’6 
The Marxist political economy that underlies this thesis thus demands an integration of 
capital, the state, the labour process and law as analytic categories.  These must not be 
thought of as discrete, internally coherent and externally delimited fields, but as 
complex, emergent and ultimately interdependent structures, part of a basket of 
invariant features of the capitalist mode of production.  It is in addressing this need for 
explanatory coherence that the Parisian Regulation Approach (PRA) proves its utility.   
The PRA goes further than most alternative approaches (though not far enough, as we 
shall see) in theorising the interconnections between these four areas to provide a wide-
ranging account of how the circuit of capital, particular state forms, a dominant labour 
process model and forms of regulation including law combine to produce and reproduce 
distinctive capitalist social formations. 
Given the centrality of law to this thesis, the entire following chapter will be dedicated 
to unfolding the form and function of law in a capitalist society, ascertaining the 
particular status of labour law, and pulling together the threads of various scholars into a 
coherent Marxist theory of labour law.  The current chapter will focus on discussing 
relevant work on capital, the state and the labour process so far as it affects the 
theoretical orientation of this study.  In keeping with the need to move along the 
hierarchy of the abstract to the concrete, and in so doing generate conclusions of both 
theoretical rigour and empirical sensitivity, it is necessary to first outline the basic 
ontological and methodological parameters of the Marxist political economy on which 
the PRA has historically been grounded.  I will then explicate the concepts used by 
regulationists to explain the articulations between capital, the state and the labour 
process, which form an effective and hierarchically coherent model in the movement 
from abstract to concrete.  With this understanding in hand, I will then broaden the 
                                                          
5 Michael Lebowitz, Beyond Capital (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 52. 
6 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics (Rodney Livingstone 
trans, Merlin Press, 1971) 27. 
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focus to take into account the relevant contributions of Australian scholars working 
within the regulationist paradigm. 
The political economy of capitalism 
The PRA was founded on an essentially Marxist political economy.  Thus, in the study 
of capitalist social formations, a theoretically informed regulationist analysis must begin 
with the contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production. 
Before further analysis, it is necessary to put in hand a working, albeit incomplete, 
definition of capitalism.  The capitalist mode of production is characterised by a basket 
of invariant core elements, in the absence of which it would be incorrect to speak of a 
capitalist society.  Following Marx’s method (which is to abstract invariant elements of 
a mode of production across all its stages in a logical, rather than necessarily historical, 
manner),7 Neilson states: 
As a rational abstraction, private ownership, wage dependence, and the market 
define key institutions and norms that govern core capitalist production 
relations.  In turn, these relations can be expressed as the exploitative capital-
wage-labor relation, plus competition-based market coordination of production.8 
 
I will have occasion to add to this definition later in the chapter, but it will suffice for 
now as the basis for deeper exploration. 
At the most abstract level, Marx identifies that capitalism is erected on the 
fundamentally contradictory character of the commodity as a (dis-) unity of use value 
and exchange value.9  This tension, which underwrites real and fictitious commodities 
(e.g. labour) alike,10 manifests itself in different forms at various stages in the circuit of 
capital, as it transitions between money, fixed capital and commodities.11  Jessop and 
Sum observe the full play of this process: 
                                                          
7 Karl Marx, Grundrisse (Martin Nicolaus trans, Allen Lane in association with New Left Review, 1973) 
85-88. 
8 David Neilson, ‘Remaking the Connections: Marxism and the French Regulation School’ (2012) 44(2) 
Review of Radical Political Economics 160, 163. 
9 Marx, Capital Volume I, above n 1, 125-131. 
10 See, for example: Marx, Capital Volume III, above n 1, 525-542; Jamie Peck, Work-Place: The Social 
Regulation of Labor Markets (The Guilford Press, 1996) 40. 
11 Marx, Capital Volume II, above n 1, 109-229. 
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The commodity is both an exchange value and a use value; the worker is both an 
abstract unit of labour power replaceable by other such units (or, indeed, other 
factors of production) and a concrete individual with specific skills, knowledge 
and creativity; the wage is both a cost of production and a source of demand; 
money functions both as an international currency and as national money; 
productive capital is both abstract value in motion (notably in the form of 
realized profits available for reinvestment) and a concrete stock of time-and-
place-specific assets in the course of being valorized; and so forth.12 
 
Like preceding class societies (such as those founded on the slave or feudal modes of 
production), capitalism is based on exploitative class relations characterised by 
differential ownership of the surplus that human labour produces once a certain level of 
economic and social development is attained.  Capitalism, however, is governed by a 
radically different modality of both producing and appropriating this surplus.  Unlike, 
say, feudal peasants, who effectively possessed their own means of production,13 the 
capitalist labour process is premised upon the private ownership of these means of 
production by a class minority, the bourgeoisie.  In turn, the majority of the population 
has no access to the means of production except through the medium of wage-labour.  
This makes for a system that formally demands both the present and continued 
compulsion of an essentially propertyless, wage-earning class to sell their labour-power 
in exchange for money and an inability of that class to reproduce itself except through 
purchasing commodities in the marketplace. 
These requirements are intimately related to the method by which surplus labour is 
obtained and the form it takes.  Feudal and slave exploitation was direct and specific, 
premised upon an explicit union of economic and political/legal coercion.14  At the 
height of feudalism, the feudal lord extracted primarily surplus goods (such as 
agricultural products), which in turn was dependent upon the military strength they 
could muster under their banner;15 the moments of economic and extra-economic 
coercion constituted a unity.16  Mature capitalism, by contrast, is historically unique, in 
                                                          
12 Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum, Beyond the Regulation Approach: Putting Capitalist Economies in 
their Place (Edward Elgar, 2006) 329. 
13 Absolutely, in the case of objects, such as a weaving loom. In the case of land, peasants exercised 
substantial real control, even though the land legally belonged to the lord: Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, 
Socialism (Patrick Camiller trans, NLB, 1978) 86-87. 
14 Ellen Meiksins Wood, Empire of Capital (Verso, 2003) 9-25. 
15 The field of economic exploitation was, in this sense, politically constituted, unlike the ideally 
boundless existence of capitalist markets: Neil Faulkner, A Marxist History of the World: From 
Neanderthals to Neoliberals (Pluto Press, 2013) 23-24. 
16 Ibid. 
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that these moments are formally distinct (rooted in the divorce of the proletariat from 
the means of production) whilst the appropriation of surplus value (the difference 
between what workers are paid by employers and the value which they produce for 
them)17 is mediated through a formally free contract operating in a labour market.  This 
separation of economic and extra-economic coercion forms the basis of the distinction 
between the economic and political spheres that arises under capitalism and is the basis 
of the alienated, formally neutral, capitalist state.18 
Given the contradictory character of the commodity (particularly in an economy of 
generalised commodity production) and the power asymmetry between workers and 
capital, Jessop and Sum’s characterisation of the paradoxical nature of the circuit of 
capital is no surprise.19  These contradictions are exacerbated by various other 
tendencies that bedevil the capitalist mode of production.  Key among these is the 
corrosive competition between many separate, atomised capitals competing for surplus 
value in a market founded on highly interdependent but privately-made economic 
decisions (which is the form in which the logic of capital as a whole is played out).20  In 
such a fragmented system, what is best for collective capital, such as a high level of 
working-class consumption, often grates against the interests of individual capitalists, 
who will often attempt to limit their outlay in wages.  Another tendency is that towards 
over-accumulation, whereby too much capital is available for profitable investment, 
such that profitability falls (either relatively or in absolute terms).21  Yet, given the 
desire to maximise surplus value appropriation and outcompete other units of capital, 
the fundamental drive of individual capitalists, as well as the system as a whole, is to 
accumulate, to continually produce on an expanded scale.22  Coterminious with this 
drive to accumulate is the tendency towards ever greater concentration and 
centralisation of capital (larger units of productive capital under the control of fewer 
capitalists respectively).  These processes aid various capitals to rationalise production, 
provide insulation from competition, vest a greater ability to monopolise resources and 
                                                          
17 Marx, Capital Volume I, above n 1, 251-252, 317. 
18 Geoffrey Kay and James Mott, Political Order and the Law of Labour (Macmillan Press, 1982) 81-83. 
19 Jessop and Sum, above n 12, 329. 
20 Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience (David Fernbach trans, NLB, 
1979) 280, 289. 
21 Jessop and Sum, above n 12, 22. 
22 A reality Marx captured graphically in describing the creed of classical political economy; 
‘Accumulate, accumulate!  That is Moses and the prophets! … [a]ccumulation for the sake of 
accumulation, production for the sake of production’: Marx, Capital Volume I, above n 1, 742. 
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mobilise a counter to Marx’s much-debated observation of the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall.23  These crisis tendencies, which will be discussed in greater detail where 
they are relevant in the following chapters, are just that – tendencies, in the face of 
which counter-tendencies can be mobilised.24  They do not operate as iron historical 
laws (despite the fact that this impression has often been gleaned from Marx’s work) 
beyond the tautological point that amongst capitalist society’s aforementioned invariant 
features is private ownership, creation of surplus value by wage-labour and competition. 
Most important for our discussion here is the fact that the class distinctions that both 
constitute and are reproduced by capitalism, and the class struggle which they beget, 
throw the sustainability of the circuit of capital into constant peril.  Lebowitz crucially 
notes that the fundamental labour-capital divide in a capitalist society, and the wage-
labour relationship which drives it, leads to two disparate and competing political 
economies, with the capitalist’s valorisation and profit creation objections grating 
against the proletariat’s desire for the full product of its labour and the fulfilment of 
concrete needs.25   
Taking all these tendencies into account, it is clear that the circuit of capital is wrought 
with structural contradictions which render continued capital accumulation in the long 
term not only difficult but inherently improbable.26  The result, as Marx and Engels 
vividly described, is that ‘[m]odern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of 
exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of 
production and of exchange, is like a sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the 
powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells.’27 
Given the fact that, despite a litany of failed experiments and horrendous creations, the 
sorcerer remains at work, the question posed by Boyer becomes both obvious and 
logically necessary in understanding the evolution of capitalist social formations: ‘If one 
                                                          
23 Marx, Capital Volume III, above n 1, 319; Nikolai Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy (Merlin 
Press, 1972) 116-117; Ernest Mandel, An Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory (Pathfinder, 1973) 
63-65. 
24 Marx, Capital Volume III, above n 1, 339-348. 
25 Lebowitz, above n 5, 77-100. 
26 Robert Boyer, The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction (Craig Charney trans, Columbia 
University Press, 1990) 34-35; Alain Lipietz,, ‘Accumulation, Crises, and Ways Out: Some 
Methodological Reflections on the Concept of “Regulation”’ (1988) 18(2) International Journal of 
Political Economy 10, 22-26; Alain Lipietz, Towards a New Economic Order: Postfordism, Ecology and 
Democracy (Malcolm Slater trans, Polity Press, 1992) vix-xiv. 
27 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Samuel Moore trans, Penguin Classics, 
2002) 225. 
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accepts Marx’s intuitions regarding capitalism, the central question then takes the form 
of a paradox: how can such a contradictory process succeed over a long period of 
time.’28 
The dominant economic paradigm of our time, neoclassicism, and its political 
stablemate, neoliberalism, are particularly ill-suited to answering this question.29  
Geared towards a highly abstract, vacuous conception of general equilibrium and a 
methodological individualism based on a transhistorical homo economicus, mainstream 
economics is incapable of explaining crisis as anything other than a temporary 
aberration resulting from market imperfections; the work of irrational consumers, 
workers or interest groups (such as trade unions or the state) with a vested interest in 
blocking market mechanisms.30   The history of capitalism, littered as it is with crisis, 
breakdown, and ‘crippled monstrosities,’31 simply cannot be explained by reference to 
neoclassical theory.  By extension, its future is also beyond the ability of the 
neoclassical school to chart. 
It was partly in response to both the theoretical poverty of neoclassicism and the 
fossilisation of post-World War II orthodox Marxism that the PRA first stepped on to 
the scene.32 
Enter the regulationists 
The Parisian school is dominant within the broader regulationist project and ‘enjoys the 
greatest international impact.’33  Notable scholars who kick-started the approach, 
including Michel Aglietta, Robert Boyer and Alain Lipietz, were heavily influenced by 
Althusserian structuralism, even if they rejected its problematic construction of 
reproduction as quasi-automatic and its piecemeal treatment of contradiction.34  Neilson 
                                                          
28 Boyer, The Regulation School, above n 26, 34. 
29 For a devastating critique of these as useful tools for understanding the real world, see: Peck, above n 
10, 1-5. 
30 Boyer, The Regulation School, above n 26, xxv-xxvi. 
31 Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism (David Macey trans, Verso, 1987) 
15. 
32 For a useful account of the intellectual reaction of the Left against Stalinism, of which the PRA was 
part, see: Alain Lipietz, ‘Rebel Sons: the Regulation School – An Interview with Alain Lipietz, conducted 
by Jane Jenson’ (1987) 5(4) French Politics and Society 17.  
33 Jessop and Sum, above n 12, 23. 
34 For a detailed overview, see: Alain Lipietz, ‘From Althusserianism to “Regulation Theory”’ in E. Ann 
Kaplan and Michael Sprinkler (eds), The Althusserian Legacy (Verso, 1993) 99-138. 
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continues: ‘Central to the appeal of Althusser’s French Regulation School (FRS) “rebel 
sons” was the implicit promise of a mid-range theory of capitalist development that 
could complement Marx’s long-range account.’35 
The focus on generating an intermediate account of capitalist development entailed a 
development of concepts and methods to achieve four primary goals (shared with other 
schools which Jessop and Sum locate within a more broadly construed Regulation 
Approach):36 
1. ‘Describe the institutions and practices of capitalism;’37 
2. ‘Explain the various crisis tendencies of modern capitalism and/or likely sources 
of crisis resolution;’38 
3. ‘Analyse different stages … of capitalism and compare accumulation regimes 
and modes of regulation in a given period of capitalist development;’39 and 
4. ‘Examine the social embedding and social regularization of economic 
institutions and conduct.’40 
 
Implicit in these questions is both an historical and logical acknowledgement that, 
despite the crisis tendencies of capitalism, strong accumulation and stability can be 
achieved in the short to medium term.  The thirty-year post-World War II Fordist boom 
(the elucidation of which is the subject of chapter 4) presented the first regulationists 
with a reality that defied explanation in orthodox Marxist terms.41  The boom had been 
an epoch of unrivalled growth and stability in the West, with increased production, 
productivity improvements and high profit margins being complemented by full 
employment, rising real incomes and a redistributive welfare state.42  Mainstream 
economics, dominated by Keynesianism, spoke of the demise of the traditional business 
                                                          
35 Neilson, above n 8, 160.  
36 Jessop and Sum, above n 12, 18-19. 
37 Ibid 14. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid 14-15. 
40 Ibid 15. 
41 For a concise account of the shortcomings of Marxism in this regard, see: Alain Noël, ‘Accumulation, 
regulation, and social change: an essay of French political economy’ (1987) 41(2) International 
Organization 303, 306. 
42 See, for example: Lipietz, Towards a New Economic Order, above n 26, 3-7; Mark Elam, ‘Puzzling out 
the Post-Fordist Debate: Technology, Markets and Institutions’ in Ash Amin (ed), Post-Fordism: A 
Reader (Blackwell Publishers, 1994) 43, 62-63; Matt Vidal, ‘Postfordism as a dysfunctional 
accumulation regime: a comparative analysis of the USA, the UK and Germany’ (2013) 27(3) Work, 
Employment and Society 451, 458. 
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cycle and the crises of overproduction Marxism holds dear.43  Although the early 
regulationists witnessed the demise of this system and the emergence of a new structural 
crisis in the 1970s, they nevertheless had to grapple with the reality that capitalism 
could be comparatively stable and prosperous for a period of time.  This situation 
highlighted the need for an intermediate account of capitalist development that, whilst 
employing a Marxist methodology and cognisant of Marx’s long-run observations, was 
able to account for stabilising forces in the short to medium term.   
The answer, for the Parisians, lay in the notion of regulation.  Capital accumulation, and 
the tendential laws governing it, could be guided and regularised through a contingent, 
historically variant combination of economic and extra-economic factors in a distinctive 
institutional matrix, handling, to varying degrees, the different crisis tendencies of 
capitalist social relations.  Aglietta, one of the leading pioneers of the school, eloquently 
states: 
To speak of the regulation of a mode of production is to try to formulate in 
general laws the ways in which the determinant structure of society is 
reproduced … [A] theory of social regulation is a complete alternative to the 
theory of general equilibrium … The study of capitalist regulation, therefore, 
cannot be the investigation of abstract economic laws.  It is the study of the 
transformation of social relations as it creates new forms that are both economic 
and noneconomic, that are organized in structures and themselves reproduce a 
determinant structure, the mode of production (my emphasis).44 
 
This definition pays clear homage to the structural Marxist roots of the PRA, and is 
echoed by Lipietz who, recognising the dialectical link between regulation and crisis,45 
notes that the former describes a situation where there is a temporary, relative primacy 
of unity over struggle in a deeply contradictory society.46  Neilson adds that ‘regulation 
politically modifies the economic process to temporarily stabilize, or contain, the 
contradictory core of capitalism.’47  Whilst there is a certain danger, latent in this 
statement, in seeing capitalism as a fundamentally economic concern regulated by an 
autonomous realm of politics (a danger that will be explored later), the acknowledgment 
that capitalism must be regulated if it is to succeed through time is well-made. 
                                                          
43 Boyer, The Regulation School, above n 26, xxiii. 
44 Aglietta, above n 20, 13, 16. 
45 Lipietz, ‘Accumulation Crises, and Ways Out’, above n 26, 15. 
46 See, for example: Alain Lipietz, ‘Reflections on a Tale: The Marxist Foundations of the Concepts of 
Regulation and Accumulation’ (1988) 26 Studies in Political Economy 7.  
47 Neilson, above n 8, 161. 
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A critical precondition of the attempt to create a mid-range account of capitalist 
development shaped through regulation is a theory that is armed with a range of 
concepts of varying compass occupying different locations on the plane from abstract to 
concrete.  This is certainly evident in the spiralling method of analysis advocated by the 
regulationists, which employs a dialectical movement along the plane from abstract-
simple to concrete-complex.48  This is similar to Jessop’s ‘method of articulation’49 and 
involves a dynamic interaction between the abstract and the empirical. 
Aglietta describes this spiral thus: 
It follows that concepts are not introduced once and for all at a single level of 
abstraction.  They are transformed by the characteristic interplay which 
constitutes the passage from the abstract to the concrete and enables the concrete 
to be absorbed within theory.  Theory, for its part, is never final and complete, it 
is always in the process of development.50 
 
This method flows from the refusal of Marx to attribute an immutable, transhistorical 
essence to humans which must be distilled in order to explain the development of 
society (unlike neo-classicism).51  In its place, the regulationists approve of Marx’s 
understanding that people make their history, but not under conditions of their 
choosing.52 
In generating these spiralling, intermediate-level accounts of the trajectory of capitalist 
development, it follows that the PRA must be equipped with concepts of a lower level 
of abstraction that, whilst taking their methodological lead from Marx, must 
nevertheless be more concrete and historically sensitive in their operation.  Broadly 
speaking, four such concepts are apparent within the school.  They are: 
 Industrial paradigm; 
 Accumulation regime; 
 Mode of regulation; and 
 Model of development. 
                                                          
48 Gerry Treuren, ‘State theory and the origins of federal arbitration legislation in Australia’ (1997) 13 
Policy, Organisation and Society 56, 60-61. 
49 Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods (New York University Press, 1982) 
213-219. 
50 Aglietta, above n 20, 15. 
51 Ibid; Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Beacon Press, 1944) 151. 
52 Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Electric Book Company, 2001) 7. 
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These four concepts traverse the analytical categories of capital, the state, the labour 
process and law that were introduced at the beginning of this chapter.53  The conceptual 
breadth and the opportunity for careful, incremental movement along the plane from 
abstract to concrete which these concepts open is what vests the Parisian school with its 
exceptional ability to combine theoretical rigour with empirical sensitivity (although, as 
will be explored later, the theoretical sophistication of the approach is suffering from an 
increasing eclecticism and dissociation with a Marxist political economy).  These 
notions thus require further unpacking and articulation as distinct moments of that 
hierarchy. 
Industrial paradigm 
Absolutely central to the early work of Aglietta and Lipietz is a dominant ‘industrial 
paradigm’ or labour process model.  The organisation of the labour process, particularly 
the manner in which it produces surplus value for the capitalist, has a powerful 
influence on the architecture of a capitalist society, a reality Lukács grasped when he 
stated that the organisation of the factory ‘contained in concentrated form the whole 
structure of capitalist society.’54  In this light, it is somewhat surprising that an industrial 
paradigm does not generally assume the status of a discrete concept in later regulationist 
work,55 although there are promising signs of a renewed emphasis on the labour 
process.56 
                                                          
53 Essentially, I regard an accumulation regime as a concrete arrangement of the circuit of capital as an 
economic process, a mode of regulation as the concrete extra-economic struts to this circuit, and a model 
of development as a stable historical instantiation of the capitalist mode of production (a reading 
supported by Elam: Elam, above n 42, 57).  I am aware that this concept would prima facie grate against 
Jessop’s contention that an accumulation regime and mode of regulation are of a different analytical 
scope (macro- verus meso-level respectively). However, Jessop’s comments are equally concerned with 
documenting the historical usage of these concepts, noting, for example, how the term ‘Fordism’ has been 
used in all four senses.  The disagreement as to scope becomes less relevant once the term is restricted to 
one level (model of development) and form-analysis is extended to the state and the law, thus reducing 
the tendency to conceive them as in any sense ‘meso-level’ or derivative.  See: Bob Jessop, ‘Survey 
Article: The Regulation Approach’ (1997) 5(3) Journal of Political Philosophy 287, 291. 
54 Lukács, above n 6, 90. 
55 M. Dunford, ‘Theories of regulation’ (1990) 8(3) Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 297, 
306. 
56 See, for example: Matt Vidal, ‘Reworking Postfordism: Labor Process Versus Employment Relations’ 
(2011) 5(4) Sociology Compass 273. 
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Generally speaking, early regulationist labour process analysis was closely related to 
Braverman’s influential account.57  Aglietta thus neatly describes how: 
Capitalist production is the unity of a labour process and a process of 
valorization, in which the valorization is dominant … On the one hand, we have 
defined the wage relation, the appropriation of labour-power as a commodity, as 
the fundamental relation of production.  On the other hand, we said that 
capitalist relations of production present a dual character of antagonism and 
cooperation.  In showing how the labour process is transformed under the 
impulse of the struggle for surplus-value, we must acquit a task that is essential 
for the transition from the abstract to the concrete in any theory of accumulation: 
namely to demonstrate that the transformation of the labour process creates 
relationships within production that adapt the cooperation of labour-power to the 
domination of the wage relation.58  
 
The particular nexus point between valorisation and production, together with the state 
of technology, results in an industrial paradigm, which can be thought of as a dominant 
model of labour process organisation, governing the social and technical division of 
labour, such as mass production on semi-automatic production lines.59  This does not 
necessarily imply that all branches of the economy are organised according to the same 
principles; it is enough that the leading sectors (the role of which will be explored in 
later chapters) revolve around them.60 
Accumulation regime 
Boyer describes an accumulation regime as ‘a set of regularities that ensure the general 
and relatively coherent progress of capital accumulation.’61  It is a structure of economic 
and social patterns governing the composition of social demand corresponding to 
productive capacity, the time horizons of capital valorisation and the distribution of 
value within and between classes.62  Such a regime is necessary in the attempt to 
contain capitalism’s contradictions.  Of particular importance is the reality that within 
capitalist social formations the factors that favour profitability in the sphere of 
                                                          
57 Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century 
(Monthly Review Press, 1974). 
58 Aglietta, above n 20, 111. 
59 Ibid 116-122. 
60 Bob Jessop, ‘Thatcherism and flexibility: the white heat of a post-Fordist revolution’ in Bob Jessop, 
Hans Kastendiek, Klaus Nielsen and Ove Kai Pedersen (eds) The Politics of Flexibility: Restructuring 
State and Industry in Britain, Germany and Scandinavia (Edward Elgar, 1991) 135, 136-137. 
61 Boyer, The Regulation School, above n 26, 35. 
62 Ibid. 
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production are the same factors which impinge upon the realisation of surplus value in 
the sphere of circulation.63  In a very general sense, a viable accumulation regime must 
then articulate production and consumption at the macro-level in a stable, reproducible 
fashion.64  As mentioned above, I essentially conceive this structure of production and 
consumption as a concrete arrangement of the economic forms of capital (conceptually 
distinct, that is, from its juridic forms, which will be explored below). 
In Volume II of Capital, Marx identified the difficulties facing the achievement of such 
stability, due in part to the restricted nature of working-class purchasing power and the 
disjunction between the two great departments of the economy (namely, Department I, 
producing means of production, and Department II, producing means of 
consumption).65  Unless surplus value were reduced to nought, workers could never 
have the purchasing power to procure all they had made, whilst the interlocking demand 
of capitalists in one department for the products of the other was beset by a host of 
temporal irregularities and discontinuities.66 
Aglietta, using Marx’s reproduction schemas, demonstrated how an accumulation 
regime could help combat this tendency towards instability by the development of 
particular linkages between the two departments.67  Specifically, he developed a notion 
of extensive versus intensive accumulation.  Whilst the former revolved around 
transformations of the labour process narrowly construed, the latter involves a 
simultaneous development of both the labour process and the proletariat’s conditions of 
existence through a commodification of individual consumption.68  Put another way, 
extensive accumulation (which characterised capitalism in America and other capitalist 
countries up to the 1920s) was, in the face of continued petty-bourgeois production of 
working-class subsistence goods and the poverty of the proletariat, dependent primarily 
upon increasing the scale of production in Department I, resulting in recurrent obstacles 
to the pace of accumulation.69  Intensive accumulation, through extending the field of 
                                                          
63 Ibid 34. 
64 Bob Jessop, ‘Revisiting the regulation approach: Critical reflections on the contradictions, dilemmas, 
fixes and crisis dynamics of growth regimes’ (2013) 37(1) Capital & Class 5, 8. 
65 Marx, Capital Volume II, above n 1, 565-599. 
66 Ibid; Marx, Capital Volume III, above n 1, 615. 
67 Aglietta, above n 20, 71-72. 
68 Ibid 79-82. 
69 Ian Clark, Governance, the State, Regulation and Industrial Relations (Routledge, 2000) 16; Stavros 
Mavroudeas, ‘The regulation approach’ in Ben Fine, Alfredo Saad-Filho and Marco Boffo (eds), The 
Elgar Companion to Marxist Economics (Edward Elgar, 2012) 304, 305. 
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capitalist production to the very necessities of life, permitted a more organic series of 
linkages between the two departments, allowing the creation of a social consumption 
norm, a more rapid and regular increase in the rate of accumulation and the destruction 
of remaining enclaves of non-capitalist production.70  Intensive accumulation thus 
denotes more than the link between rapid technological change and surplus value; it is a 
specific mechanism by which social reproduction is mediated.71   
This outwardly simple typology of regimes of accumulation has become increasingly 
nuanced and complicated, particularly as the school has expanded its ambit of study 
beyond advanced industrialised economies.  Boyer in particular notes the profusion of 
regimes of accumulation in the developing world, including those of pre-industrial, 
rentier and inward-looking industrialising states.72   
Mode of regulation 
An accumulation regime cannot in isolation secure the continued reproduction of 
capital. For this, it requires an attendant mode of regulation, which Jessop and Sum 
have described as an ‘emergent ensemble of norms, institutions, organizational forms, 
social networks and patterns of conduct that can temporarily stabilize an accumulation 
regime.’73  Typically, this includes coherent and compatible structures of wage 
relations, state forms, enterprise forms and linkages, money and (arguably) international 
relations.74  A functioning mode of regulation both channels the crisis tendencies of a 
particular capitalist society through institutional pathways and modifies the behaviour 
of actors (both individual and collective) to accord with the rhythms of the 
accumulation regime.  In containing, ameliorating or deferring the contradictions of an 
accumulation regime (and their root in capitalist social relations) a mode of regulation 
                                                          
70 Aglietta, above n 20, 79-82; Nick Heffernan, Capital, Class & Technology in Contemporary American 
Culture: Projecting Post-Fordism (Pluto Press, 2000) 25. 
71 It is significant to note at this point that I use the term intensive accumulation to refer to a pattern of 
production and consumption which revolves around capitalist conditions of production in both 
Department I and Department II, most clearly expressed in the system of mass production and 
consumption.  There is another thread of regulationist scholarship which relies much more explicitly on 
the balance between absolute and relative surplus value.  The significance of this distinction will be made 
clear in chapter 4 when we come to define the accumulation regime of liberal-productivism. 
72 Boyer, The Regulation School, above n 26, 132-133. 
73 Jessop and Sum, above n 12, 42. 
74 Jessop, ‘Survey Article: The Regulation Approach’, above n 53, 297.  Jessop has argued that 
international relations are so closely tied to the other four structural forms that it is better to analyse it as it 
affects those forms, as opposed to treating it as a structural form in its own right.  Given my contention 
that a mode of regulation is essentially a concrete order of capital’s juridic forms, I agree with Jessop’s 
construction.  See: Jessop, ‘Revisiting the regulation approach’, above n 64, 14. 
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can ensure a period of relative stability and growth in capital accumulation.75  
Alternatively, to the extent that modes of regulation contain certain capitalist 
contradictions at the expense of others and shape economic and social relations in a 
path-dependent manner, they routinely undermine the very source of their success, and 
become barriers to new modalities of capitalist growth.76  Moreover, if we move beyond 
a reductionist conception of capitalism as a purely economic concern, and instead 
perceive capitalist social relations as assuming both economic and extra-economic 
forms, then it follows that a political handling of capitalism’s contradictions does not 
dispel them; they merely assume a different form.  
It is worth reiterating at this point my contention above, that a mode of regulation can 
equally be regarded as a concrete hierarchy of capital’s juridic forms.  The abstract state 
and legal forms, as root juridic forms, are absolutely key in constituting the particular 
structural forms making up a mode of regulation.  This conception best captures the 
reality that capital has a juridic, as well as economic, existence.  Elam hits upon this 
truth when he states of the regulation approach: 
The result of this marriage between Marxist political economy and 
institutionalist tradition is a conceptualization of qualitative change within 
capitalism which posits the existence of not one, but two, fundamental dynamics 
forcing change.  Two dynamics growing out of the same discordant soil of 
capitalist social relations.  One giving rise to specific regimes of accumulation, 
the other to particular modes of regulation.77 
 
Elam’s conception is correct, and dovetails with my view that accumulation regimes 
and modes of regulation, as concrete orders of economic and juridic forms respectively, 
                                                          
75 Adam Tickell and Jamie A. Peck, ‘Social regulation after Fordism: regulation theory, neo-liberalism 
and the global-local nexus’ (1995) 24(3) Economy and Society 357, 360.  It is worth noting here that 
Neilson disputes whether stability and growth are necessary features of a working mode of regulation, or 
were instead a historical quirk of Fordism.  Vidal goes further, saying that the PRA must be revitalised by 
shearing off the mode of regulation concept, believing that the coherence of its constituent institutional 
forms is highly unlikely empirically.  Neilson is right to the extent that a successful mode of regulation 
need not necessarily ensure a Fordist-style stability and growth pattern; it is enough that it answers, in a 
provisional way, the crisis tendencies placed before it and clears the ground for accumulation.  On this 
score, the mode of regulation of liberal-productivism faces different crisis tendencies and exhibits 
different modalities of growth, but is for all that successful in resolving the contradictions of its Fordist 
predecessor.  Space precludes me from answering Vidal at length; suffice it to say I think that Vidal’s 
answer of simply dissolving the mode of regulation constituent forms into a more broadly conceived 
accumulation regime does not solve the alleged problem he identifies, but merely displaces it.  See: 
Neilson, above n 8; Vidal, ‘Postfordism as a dysfunctional accumulation regime’, above n 42.  
76 Tickell and Peck, above n 75, 360. 
77 Elam, above n 42, 57. 
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cannot be viewed as ‘macro’ or ‘meso’ vis-à-vis each other.78  As will be demonstrated 
in the next chapter, this construction is necessary if a fruitful union between the PRA 
and a sophisticated Marxist theory of law is to be achieved.  
The notion of a mode of regulation is directly tied to explicating the relationships 
between capital and the state, given that the state in this conception is, both in terms of 
form and content, a vital force in stabilizing the inherently contradictory and crisis-
prone march of the circuit of capital (and the accumulation regime into which it viably 
crystallises).   
Model of development 
A model of development is the most embracing regulationist concept outside of the 
capitalist mode of production, which is common to Marxist political economy at large.  
Neilson describes a model of development as ‘a stable regime of accumulation or 
virtuous cycle of production, investment, and consumption engineered by the stabilizing 
regulation of unstable tendencies of the capitalist mode of production.’79  Boyer and 
Saillard proffer a somewhat more dynamic definition that recognises the dialectical 
unfolding of regulation and crisis, describing a ‘mode’ of development as ‘the way in 
which an accumulation regime and a type of régulation stabilize themselves over the 
long term and how they enter into a period of crisis and then renew themselves’.80  
Lipietz’s conception is perhaps the most embracing, defining a model of development 
as a coherent combination of an industrial paradigm, accumulation regime and mode of 
regulation.81 
I find this definition of Lipietz’s the most holistic and most useful, particularly as it 
conceives of a structured totality of economic, political and social forms (thus allowing 
the PRA to escape a perceived economistic bias).  Given this, it is odd that his concept 
                                                          
78 A useful example of this distinction can be seen in the work of Chester, where a mode of regulation is 
essentially treated as a more concrete manifestation of an accumulation regime, which is in turn discussed 
sparingly.  See: Lynne Chester, ‘The Australian variant of neoliberal capitalism’ in Damien Cahill, Lindy 
Edwards and Frank Stilwell (eds), Neoliberalism: Beyond the Free Market (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2012) 153. 
79 Neilson, above n 8, 162. 
80 Robert Boyer and Yves Saillard, ‘A summary of régulation theory’ in Robert Boyer and Yves Saillard 
(eds), Régulation Theory: The State of the Art (Carolyn Shread trans, Routledge, 2002) 36, 41. 
81 Lipietz, Towards a New Economic Order, above n 26, 1-7. 
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has not really achieved broader traction.82  In chapter 4, when I come to define 
antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism as models of development, it is 
specifically in the sense indicated by Lipietz.83  Also in chapter 4, it will be argued that 
the model of development concept can be pitched at varying levels of abstractions, 
depending upon the generality or specificity accorded to the model. 
With this basket of concepts (summarised in Table 1 at the end of this chapter) and a 
spiralling method of theory construction, the PRA is ideally placed to deliver 
theoretically sophisticated yet empirically rigorous mid-range accounts of the 
development of capitalist societies, accounts that both recognise the presence of 
entrenched structures whilst affirming the role of human agency.  
Criticisms  
The school has, nevertheless, faced a host of criticisms and critiques.  Of chief 
importance here are those targeted at the regulationist theoretical matrix and 
methodology.  These must be addressed if the utility of the approach is to be 
maintained. 
Lack of commitment to a Marxist political economy 
The most serious matter with which I am concerned is the weakening relationship with 
Marxism which the school currently exhibits.   
I have already noted the influence of Althusserian structuralism upon the early 
regulationists.  The key innovation of structural Marxism was that it opened new 
pathways to conceptualising relations between the economic, political and social 
moments of capitalism in a way that avoided the crude ‘base-superstructure’ dichotomy 
of orthodox Marxism (deformed as it was by Stalinism).84  A strict observance of this 
latter framework led in no small part to the ‘fossilisation’ of post-World War II 
                                                          
82 An oddity that has been observed before; Brett Heino and James Dahlstrom, ‘War Crimes and the 
Parisian Régulation Approach: Representations of the Crisis of Antipodean Fordism’ (2014/15) 74 
Journal of Australian Political Economy 95, 101. 
83 As I have done elsewhere.  See, for example: Brett Heino, ‘Capitalism, regulation theory and 
Australian labour law: Towards a new theoretical model’ (2015) 39(3) Capital & Class 453. 
84 For the interested reader, key texts in this tradition include: Louis Althusser, For Marx (Ben Brewster 
trans, NLB, 1977); Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, Reading Capital (Ben Brewster trans, NLB, 
1977). 
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orthodox Marxism as both an academic discipline and political programme.  It also 
hampered efforts to develop an organically Marxist conception of the law.85 
Structuralism was explicitly concerned with how the economic, political and social 
spheres combine to produce and reproduce capitalism.  Although they sought to analyse 
and problematise this process of reproduction more intimately, the continuities between 
structuralists and the early regulationists are manifest in the latter’s desire to understand 
and articulate, in a non-reductionist manner, both the economic and extra-economic 
aspects of a capitalist society. 
Over time, however, the distinctly Marxist provenance and calling of the approach has 
been neglected.  In the 1980s divisions emerged within the school in relation to the 
standing of the Marxist theory of value.86  Although Aglietta, one of the founders of the 
school, based his influential book A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US 
Experience on a fundamentally Marxist labour theory of value, he abandoned it in later 
work.  In concert with Orléan,87 he embarked upon an innovative application of the 
work of René Girard to explain qualitatively the violent origins of money within a 
market society.88  Whilst still rejecting a neoclassical economic conception of 
rationality, this approach nonetheless loses touch with a founding concept of Marxist 
political economy.  Other authors, such as Boyer and Mistral, don’t specify their 
conception of the theory of value.89   
Lipietz, widely recognised as the regulationist most influenced by Marxist political 
economy, continues to take the labour theory of value seriously, whilst recognising 
practical issues regarding the theory’s relationship to real world phenomena, such as the 
level of prices.  In his innovative book The Enchanted World: Inflation, Credit and the 
World Crisis he develops an elegant theoretical model that contrasts the ‘esoteric’ world 
of value and the ‘exoteric’ world of prices and everyday economic life.90  In this way, 
account is taken of the perennial ‘transformation problem’ in Marxist economics whilst 
retaining the conceptual framework of the labour theory of value. 
                                                          
85 Hugh Collins, Marxism and Law (Clarendon Press, 1982) 9-16. 
86 Jessop and Sum, above n 12, 39-41. 
87 Michel Aglietta and Andre Orléan, La violence de la monnaie (Presses Universitaires de France, 1982). 
88 Henri Nadel, 'Régulation and Marx' in Robert Boyer and Yves Saillard (eds), Régulation Theory: The 
State of the Art (Carolyn Shread trans, Routledge, 2002) 28, 30. 
89 Boyer, The Regulation School, above n 26, 23-24. 
90 Alain Lipietz, The Enchanted World: Inflation, Credit and the World Crisis (Ian Patterson trans, New 
Left Books, 1985). 
 
 
25 
The divergence within the Parisian school regarding the place of Marx’s theory of value 
within the approach is symptomatic of a broader movement away from an explicitly 
Marxist political economy.91  It is no accident that in a recent regulationist 
compendium, Régulation Theory: The State of the Art, Keynes, Kalecki and Kaldor 
feature as heavily as Marx.  Out of some forty-two chapters, only one is reserved for an 
explicit treatment of the influence of Marx, both historically and in terms of the current 
research agenda, and that is as much concerned with distancing the school from its 
Marxist roots as with embracing them.92 
Neilson attributes the sources of this estrangement to a ‘focus on national difference, 
linked with a de-emphasis of the Fordist model of development and the absence 
altogether of a model of development in the analysis of the contemporary era.’93  He 
cites as a key example the efforts of regulationist doyen Robert Boyer to seek 
rapprochement with other heterodox currents, such as the Varieties of Capitalism 
school, which are not necessarily theoretically commensurable.94  The corrosive effect 
of such theoretical eclecticism is a danger that has already been recognised,95 one that 
stymies the approach in delivering on its initial promise of a powerful mid-range 
Marxist analysis of capitalist development.  The result is that the PRA is increasingly at 
odds with its Marxist heritage.96 
The two key issues seem to be a lack of commitment to a holistic theory of the 
dynamics of the capitalist mode of production and a growing confusion as to the 
relationship of regulationist concepts to concrete history.  On the first score, whereas 
early regulationist work located its mid-range analysis explicitly within Marx’s 
conception of the capitalist mode of production, and the more abstract, general and 
long-term trends he identified therein, later work left these links unstated, neglected, 
                                                          
91 For criticism on this score from a hostile perspective, see: Stavros Mavroudeas, ‘Regulation Theory: 
The Road from Creative Marxism to Postmodern Disintegration’ (1999) 63(3) Science & Society 310. 
92 Nadel, above n 88, 28. 
93 Neilson, above n 8, 161.  For a particularly powerful demonstration of what Neilson is talking about, 
see: Michel Freyssenet, ‘Developing analytical tools to identify the ‘Fordian model’ in Europe’ in Hubert 
Bonin, Yannick Lung and Steven Tolliday, Ford 1903-2003: The European History (PLAGE, 2003) 45. 
94 Neilson, above n 8, 168-170.  See also: Robert Boyer, ‘How and why capitalisms differ’ (2005) 34(4) 
Economy and Society 509. 
95 Jessop and Sum, above n 12, 375. 
96 A state of affairs that has led, in one instance, to the extraordinary circumstance of Marxism and the 
PRA being counter-posed as two different theoretical approaches: Robert Webb, ‘Regulation Theory or 
Marxism: A Consideration of Two Theoretical Approaches to Industrial Relations in New Zealand’ 
(Paper presented at the 12th AIRAANZ Conference, Wellington, 3-5 February 1998) 439. 
 26 
and undermined by increasing eclecticism.  In the absence of these links, the PRA loses 
what had made it so attractive in the first place – the promise of reconciling an 
intermediate account of capitalism with the more long-run tendencies identified by 
Marx.97   
Secondly, the power of the PRA to make wide-ranging accounts of the transformation 
of advanced capitalist countries has been impaired by the increasingly narrow vistas of 
several of its key notions, most particularly ‘Fordism.’  In sophisticated PRA analysis, 
Fordism (as a model of development) is the result of a dialectical pattern of theorising 
and historical study derived from Marx.  When pitched at its highest operational level of 
abstraction, Fordism is an ideal-type which, in the manner of Marx, ‘brings out and 
fixes the common element.’98  The ideal-typical model of development does not 
describe the concrete experience of any particular society in the absence of sensitisation 
to specific national contexts. Rather, as Treuren notes, it forms a vital intermediate link 
in the movement from abstract to concrete.99  It enters into a dialectical relationship 
with concrete existence in which the model identifies causal relationships whilst 
empirical study comments on the adequacy of the theoretical construct.100 
If, however, the model is confused for an exact account of the experience of any one 
society, it rapidly loses its explanatory potential; more and more caveats and 
qualifications have to be added in the face of the infinitely diverse historical experience, 
ultimately resulting in the model imploding.  On this basis, Boyer could state ‘Fordism, 
when defined by a conjunction of three properties, was a feature found only in a few 
countries at best.’101  Boyer’s confusion represents both a strong tendency toward 
empiricism and the abdication of the hierarchy of abstraction, whereby the explanatory 
power of grand theory is foregone for an ever-increasing profusion of more descriptive 
models. 
                                                          
97 The high cost of severing the link between middle-range and so-called ‘grand’ theory has been 
powerfully traced by Vidal, Adler and Delbridge: Matt Vidal, Paul Adler and Rick Delbridge, ‘When 
Organization Studies Turns to Societal Problems: The Contribution of Marxist Grand Theory’ (2015) 
36(4) Organization Studies 405. 
98 Marx, Grundrisse, above n 7, 85-88. 
99 Treuren, ‘State theory and the origins of federal arbitration legislation in Australia’, above n 48, 60-61. 
100 Ibid 61. 
101 Boyer, ‘How and why capitalisms differ’, above n 94, 514.  The three properties he identified were 
mechanisation-based intensive accumulation, a capital-labour compromise based on the sharing out of 
productivity gains, and a circuit of capital operating within a national space, unburdened by the means of 
insertion into the international economy. 
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The relevance of these developments to this thesis is that I concur with Neilson that the 
regulationist research programme must be placed back on course to deliver on its 
promise of a mid-range Marxist account of the dynamics and trajectories of capitalist 
social formations.102  This involves both re-establishing the links between the PRA and 
the deep-seated tendencies of the capitalist mode of production and the reaffirmation of 
the utility of the ideal-type as a means of identifying causal relationships and broad 
structures.  Happily, this task has already begun, and this project is firmly located within 
this movement.103 
Criticism from within Marxism 
The PRA has also come in for criticism from within Marxism, being subjected to 
sustained critique by scholars including John Holloway, Werner Bonefield, Simon 
Clarke, Peter Kennedy, Robert Brenner and Mark Glick, and Stavros Mavroudeas.104  
Their critiques cover a lot of ground, ranging from attacks on the theory and 
methodology of the PRA to the political ramifications of its prescriptions.  Whilst not 
discounting the significance of the latter, what concerns us here are those criticisms 
targeted at the former. 
The main criticisms of the PRA on these theoretical and methodological scores can be 
summarised as: 
 a reification of capitalist social production relations;105 
 a functionalist and undialectical separation of capitalist structures and class 
struggle;106  
                                                          
102 Neilson, above n 8, 161. 
103 See, for example: Neilson, above n 8; Vidal, ‘Reworking Postfordism’, above n 56; Vidal, 
‘Postfordism as a dysfunctional accumulation regime’, above n 42; Brett Heino, ‘The state, class and 
occupational health and safety: locating the capitalist state’s role in the regulation of OHS in NSW’ 
(2013) 23(2) Labour & Industry 150; Heino and Dahlstrom, above n 82; Heino, ‘Capitalism, regulation 
theory and Australian labour law’, above n 83. 
104 See, for example: John Holloway, ‘The Great-Bear, post-Fordism and class struggle: A comment on 
Bonefeld and Jessop’ (1988) 12(3) Capital & Class 93; Werner Bonefield, ‘Reformulation of state 
theory’ (1987) 11(3) Capital & Class 96; Simon Clarke, ‘Overaccumulation, class struggle and the 
regulation approach’ (1988) 12(3) Capital & Class 59; Peter Kennedy, ‘Beyond the objective & the 
subjective: Putting value back into the social’ (2001) 29(1) Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory 227; 
Robert Brenner and Mark Glick, ‘The Regulation Approach: Theory and History’ (1991) 188 New Left 
Review 45; Mavroudeas, ‘Regulation Theory’, above n 91, 310; Stavros Mavroudeas, The Limits of 
Regulation: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Development (Edward Elgar, 2012).  Note: The reference to 
the 1987 article by Werner Bonefeld as ‘Bonefield’ in the above list reproduce the original error as 
published in Capital & Class (1987) 11(3). 
105 Kennedy, above n 104, 228. 
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 a weakness of mid-range theorising divorced from a broader theory of the 
capitalist mode of production107 and the creation of historically vacuous models 
of real epochs within capitalism;108 and  
 a poor treatment of the state. 
 
These are serious charges, which must be addressed if the contention of this thesis, that 
the PRA is a most useful vehicle for reconciling theory and practice in accounting for 
labour law change, is to be justified. 
The first and second accusations are best answered as a couplet, for the latter is the 
logical outcome of the former.  By a reification of capitalist social relations, critics seem 
to mean that regulationists subscribe to a view of capitalism as dominated by a set of 
self-contained and self-sufficient objective laws, a structuralist view devoid of the 
motive force of class struggle.109  Kennedy states this view powerfully in his attack on 
Hirsch’s work:  
[H]e commences with the erroneous idea that somehow the objective laws of 
value exist in a perpetually crisis ridden state separately from social relations of 
production.  The law of value, according to this regulationist view, becomes 
little more than a sealed and timeless movement.110 
 
If it is true that regulationists reify tendencies within capitalism to abstract historical 
laws, then it follows that class struggle is, as Bonefeld describes, ‘seen as either 
accelerating or retarding the definite course of the law-determined path of development 
but it is incapable of challenging it.’111  The supposed result is that the PRA reproduces 
the bourgeois fetishism of conceptually segregating laws and real-life human struggle 
and generates ‘a picture which seals the appearance of bourgeois society rather than 
prising it open.’112   
                                                                                                                                                                          
106 Holloway, above n 104, 98-102; Bonefield, above n 104, 105-109. 
107 Brenner and Glick, above n 104, 105-106; Mavroudeas, ‘Regulation Theory’, above n 91, 310-320. 
108 Kennedy, above n 104, 228; Clarke, ‘Overaccumulation’, above n 104, 70-79. 
109 Bonefield, above n 104, 105, 121. 
110 Kennedy, above n 104, 231. 
111 Bonefield, above n 104, 105. 
112 Holloway, above n 104, 101-103. 
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The first criticism is comparatively easy to deal with.113  The concept of a reification of 
capitalist social relations appears to be confused with the regulationist positing of an 
invariant core of relations that sits at the heart of capitalism.114  Regulationism, like any 
Marxist political economy approach worth its salt, is not suggesting that capitalist social 
relations are somehow eternal, immutable or mechanistically derived from the abstract 
advance of productive forces.115  Indeed, Marx was explicitly concerned with 
understanding how different relations hold under different modes of production, 
reflected in his aforementioned refusal to attribute a transhistorical essence to humanity.  
This does not mean, however, that Marx neglected to study the laws and tendencies that 
characterised the capitalist mode of production; conversely, such an inquiry was the 
business of a great deal of his life.  As I outlined at the beginning of the chapter, the 
capitalist mode of production is characterised by a basket of invariant features, in the 
absence of which it would be improper to talk of ‘capitalism.’   
To run with Kennedy’s example, let us take the laws of value, principally the labour 
theory of value.  Of course he is correct to state that it is impossible to separate an 
eternal, objective law of value from the social relations of production.116  Fine notes 
astutely that, for Marx, ‘value, money and capital are not things but economic 
expressions of definite productive relations.’117  Marx states explicitly of commodities 
in Volume I of Capital that ‘their objective character as values is therefore purely 
social’ (my emphasis).118  The full operation of the law of value presupposes a society 
of generalised commodity production, which in turn is prefaced on the compulsion of 
the majority of people to sell their labour-power.   
                                                          
113 Particularly given Holloway’s role in developing a highly useful derivationist theory of the state which 
explicitly proceeded from capitalist social relations.  See, for example: John Holloway and Sol Picciotto 
(eds), State and Capital: A Marxist Debate (Edward Arnold, 1978). 
114 Lipietz, ‘Accumlation, Crises, and Ways Out’, above n 26, 17-22; Michel De Vroey, ‘A regulation 
approach interpretation of contemporary crisis’ (1984) 8(2) Capital & Class 45, 46-47. 
115 A point that has been made repeatedly by people working within the PRA.  See, for example: Lipietz, 
‘Rebel Sons’, above n 32, 22; Lipietz, Towards a New Economic Order, above n 26, xii; Boyer, The 
Regulation School, above n 26, vii; Bob Jessop, ‘Fordism and Post-Fordism: A critical reformulation’ in 
Michael Storper and Allen J. Scott (eds) Pathways to Industrialization and Regional Development 
(Routledge, 1992) 46, 65; Bob Jessop, ‘Regulation theory, post Fordism and the state: more than a reply 
to Werner Bonefield’ (1988) 12(1) Capital & Class 147, 151; David Neilson and Paul Harris, ‘Economic 
Determinism or Political Strategy?: A Rejoinder’ (1996) 38 Journal of Australian Political Economy 125, 
127. 
116 Kennedy, above n 104, 231. 
117 Fine, above n 4, 134. 
118 Marx, Capital Volume I, above n 1, 138-139. 
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It is in this sense that the generalised value relation faces humankind as a ‘law,’ as an 
abstraction that subjugates real people.  This is a phenomenon with its roots deeply 
within capitalist social relations which, although it will necessarily manifest itself in 
different ways, can be thought of as flowing from the invariant features of a capitalist 
society.  In other words, the basic properties that make a capitalist society what it is will 
generate a universalised value relation.  If describing this reality constitutes a reification 
of the law of value, then we can equally say that any notion of a distinctive capitalist 
mode of production is also a reification.  Faced with the corruption of that model, we 
would eventually be led to a structureless conception of political economy in which the 
capitalist epoch would lose all specificity.119  Such a development would of course kill a 
Marxist inquiry and runs counter to the essence of Marx’s life work. 
Accepting that a capitalist society will exhibit certain tendencies on account of it being 
capitalist, however, is not the same as suggesting that structure is an empty bucket 
within which an un-related class struggle is contained.  One of Marx’s central 
preoccupations was in explaining why the social relations of production, which is the 
very matter of class struggle, manifest themselves in certain economic and political 
forms.120  Within its own purview, regulationists critiqued structural Marxism’s 
unsophisticated portrayal of the maintenance and reproduction of structures.  Jessop and 
Sum note that:  
[T]he Parisians criticized the Althusserian view that structures somehow 
maintain themselves quasi-automatically, independently of effective social 
agency, and with no significant transformations.  Rejecting the emphasis on 
structural unity typical of Althusser’s concern with reproduction, regulation 
theorists stressed the ‘unity of unity and struggle in regulation.’121 
 
This can be seen most clearly in the regulationist treatment of ‘institutionalised class 
compromises,’ particularly in the work of Delorme and Andre.122  Here, the focus is on 
                                                          
119 A prime example of this is Holloway’s claim that the laws or tendencies of capitalism can be broken, 
presumably within the framework of capitalism.  Of course they can, but the question must then follow if 
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122 See, for example: Robert Delorme, ‘A New View on the Economic Theory of the State: A Case Study 
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how class struggle directly stimulates institutional development and how the resulting 
institutions play a key role in canalising such struggle in a manageable fashion, a theme 
we shall explore in detail in chapters 5 and 6.  Class struggle and institutions are, in this 
conception, intricately linked, and indeed represent the unity of structure and 
struggle.123  The same unity underpins Jessop’s contention that the structure/struggle 
duality is a false one: 
This false duality links the two categories by counterposing structure (as rules 
and resources) to action (as concrete conduct) and/or regarding them as 
recursively reproductive of each other.  Despite its counterposition of structure 
to agency, this approach is still abstract; and, despite its ritual reference to 
recursivity, it remains atemporal.  Yet a genuine duality can be created by 
dialectically relativizing (as opposed to mechanically relating) both analytical 
categories.124 
 
To say that regulationist analysis disarticulates the two thus seems off the mark.  The 
claim that it does is based on a reluctance to label the features and structures of a 
capitalist society, which, although not the intention of critics such as Holloway and 
Bonefield, is itself part of a broader trend to empiricism in the social sciences under the 
impact of post-structuralism.  The result is a voluntarist, structureless conception of 
capitalism that abdicates the need to theorise and identify the invariant features of 
capitalism and their concrete manifestations.   
The contention that the PRA produces inadequate mid-range theory and/or vacuous 
historical models is not one I intend to dwell on.  Suffice it to say that critics on both 
fronts misunderstand the nature of the process of abstraction engaged in by 
sophisticated regulationist work, and the status of the resulting ideal-type models of 
development.  As I have outlined above, these ideal-typical models follow Marx’s lead 
in his description of modes of production, which ‘brings out and fixes the common 
element’ but apprehends ‘no real historical stage.’125  The ideal-typical model of 
development, although it does outline an historical epoch, does not describe the 
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concrete experience of any particular society.126  Vidal is completely correct when he 
states that ‘[t]o expect a sort of narrow technical precision out of the broad conceptual 
architecture of Fordism/postfordism would be to misunderstand this framework.’127  
Rather, it forms a vital intermediate link in the movement from abstract to concrete.128  
It enters into a dialectical relationship with concrete existence in which the model 
identifies causal relationships whilst empirical study comments on the adequacy of the 
theoretical construct.129  This is exactly the kind of process upheld by Mavroudeas as 
the correct Marxist one, so it is difficult to see on what grounds he dismisses the PRA as 
eclectic and historicist in this regard.130  Indeed, the ‘more complex levels’ that result 
from his dialectical spiral between abstract theoretical development and concrete 
historical reality are synonymous with regulationist concepts, which are frameworks for 
the regularities observed at these levels.131  Criticisms like Salvati’s, that the PRA is 
‘neither theory nor history,’ are therefore very wide of the mark.132   
Ultimately, however, the reader will be best placed to judge if the PRA constructs 
employed in this thesis are vacuous and/or inadequate middle-range theories, or are 
instead valuable focussing devices illuminating the evolution of Australian capitalism. 
Treatment of the state and juridic forms 
The last criticism of import to deal with here is the claim that the PRA does not have a 
coherent theory of the state.  This one is critical to address, as this thesis proceeds on the 
assumption that the state and law are related juridic forms of capitalist social relations 
(discussed in greater detail in chapter 3).133  Meeting this challenge also involves 
elucidating my own conception of the state and law as juridic forms.  Given the fact that 
both are intimately involved in the construction of law deployed in following chapter, it 
is best to deal with this basket of issues separately.   
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Specifically, some allege that its theory of the state is either under-developed or 
borrowed from other disciplines,134 whilst other critics accuse it of a narrow, 
functionalist account of state action.135  While there is some truth to these criticisms, 
sophisticated regulationist analyses can overcome both of them. 
The claim that the PRA renders functionalist and economistic accounts of the state can 
be dealt with fairly quickly.  It is fair to say that simplistic regulationist accounts (which 
ironically are often constructed by the critics of regulationism, who then caricature 
them)136 have a proclivity towards both functionalism and economism.  On the first 
score of functionalism, it seems that the tendency to slip into it is a danger inherent in 
the objects of regulationist research.  Given that the PRA is geared to an intermediate 
trajectory of capitalist growth and development, and in particular towards understanding 
how capitalism can be made stable within certain spatio-temporal horizons, it is easy to 
assume not only that the state performs certain functions, but that it actually has the 
capacity to do so.  As regarding the charge of economism, it is true that much 
regulationist work (particularly the more recent) is economically dense and displays an 
inordinate preoccupation with econometrics.137  The fact that many practitioners of 
regulation theory, past and present, were economists no doubt contributes here.  It is 
equally true that there lurks within the PRA a more insidious form of economism, which 
Jessop and Sum describe as regarding ‘the state and civil society as largely external to 
the economy.  Thus it overlooks how the latter is deeply penetrated by extra-economic 
forces and relations.’138  It would not be unfair to state that this is an issue which has 
dogged Marxist work ever since Marx and Engels outlined their method, exacerbated by 
the unfortunate base-superstructure metaphor of Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy.139  My view is that the claim that the regulationist treatment of the 
state tends towards economism is a function more of an ever-present tendency within 
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Marxist political economy than any peculiarity of the Parisian school’s theoretical 
orientation and/or methodology. 
Moreover, these issues are not insurmountable from within a regulationist paradigm.  
The PRA is predicated on acknowledging and understanding the intertwining and co-
evolution of the economic and extra-economic moments of capitalism, the state 
included.140  The Althusserian structuralism which initially grounded the PRA was 
explicitly premised upon a rejection of economism.141  This goes much further than 
Neilson’s aforementioned description of capitalism being ‘politically modified’ in the 
interests of capital’s stability and sustainability.142  The issue with Neilson’s statement 
is that it appears to reify an image of a fundamentally capitalist ‘economy’ distinct from 
the political sphere of the state and civil society whose form is merely contingent and 
capacities only functional.  In doing so, he risks hypostasizing the economism which 
structural Marxism sought to combat. 
Rather than conceiving capitalism as a fundamentally economic system paired with 
contingent or epiphenomenal political forms, it is far better to remain true to the spirit of 
Marx’s analysis and comprehend capitalism as a totality.  This is what structural 
Marxism did, albeit in a highly abstract and impersonal fashion (with individuals 
regarded as the passive bearers of ideology).143  Admittedly, it also tended to too rigidly 
enforce its distinction between economics, politics and ideology, regarding them as 
separate regions rather than many-sided manifestations of the same relations of 
production.144   
The way to retain the structural Marxist emphasis on the role of the state without 
necessarily relegating it to a self-enclosed political sphere is to recognise that capitalist 
production relations assume both economic and juridic forms, a reality we saw Elam 
grasp above.145  Marx’s method in Capital was not that of base and superstructure, but 
instead analysing why the social relations of production (the innermost social ‘content’) 
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necessarily expressed itself in certain forms, such as value and money.146  Although 
Marx was primarily concerned with tracing the economic forms of capitalist society, 
Fine notes that this focus has been confused as concept, giving ‘rise to the impression 
that the economic expression of relations of production is their only expression, as if 
there is an exclusive association between economics and social relations of production 
which is not shared by other forms of social life.’147  As Marsden states eloquently: 
The state is not ‘above’ society, as ‘base-superstructure’ suggests.  Rather civil 
society and political state are twin illusions atop a substratum: capital.  This civil 
society/political state couplet corresponds to the twin forms of capital, economic 
and juridic, fused as private property.  There are not ‘economic’ relations here 
and ‘legal’ relations there.  There is one network of relations of production with 
juridic and economic forms.148 
 
In their economic forms, capitalist production relations, by separating workers from 
their means of production and marketising the commodities needed for their 
subsistence, generate a commodity fetishism, whereby the social relations between 
people are distorted into the economic relations between things, between 
commodities.149  However, the existence of general commodity production/exchange 
and private property presupposes, and is partly constituted by, parallel juridic forms.  
Property rights, particularly capitalist notions of absolute property ownership, are 
almost invariably legal from their beginning; indeed, to speak of ‘rights’ is difficult 
without recourse to law.150  As Marx noted, the enormous expansion of commodity 
relations entailed by capital requires mutual recognition of proprietary right on the part 
of commodity buyers and sellers;151 the violence and robbery that characterised feudal 
society, for example, would not be commensurable with the day-to-day conduct of a 
market system.152  This mutual recognition of right and abstract equality is the simplest 
incarnation of the legal form (whose contours I will trace in much greater detail in the 
following chapter). 
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In the transition to a capitalist society, the separation of the economic and extra-
economic moments of coercion, alongside the roots of abstract equality between 
commodity producers/owners, generates an additional juridic form, that of the alienated, 
national state.  The disintegration of the organic community of feudalism and the 
atomisation of civil society is matched by the development of a formally equal political 
community.153  Raised above civil society, Marx notes that ‘[t]he political state, in 
relation to civil society, is just as spiritual as is heaven in relation to earth.’154 
These juridic forms are every bit as inscribed in, and derived from, capitalist production 
relations as economic forms.  It is thus better to conceptualise them as Taiwo does, as 
part of the essence of the capitalist mode of production, in the absence of which it 
would be incorrect to speak of a capitalist society.155  Or, to return to the beginning of 
the chapter; the working definition of capitalism I used, courtesy of Neilson, identified 
private ownership, wage dependence and the market as the key institutions which 
express both an exploitative wage-labour relationship and competition-based private 
coordination of production, the core social relations of capitalism.156  The admission of 
the state and law as juridic forms of capital means that we can add both to the invariant 
features of the capitalist mode of production.  In other words, a stateless, lawless society 
would not, over the long run, be a capitalist one.157  Chapter 3 will explore the notion of 
juridic forms, their origins and their roles in the capitalist mode of production, in much 
greater detail. 
Despite the fact that this theory of juridic forms has historically been counterposed to 
the Althusserian notion of separate economic, political and ideological ‘regions,’158 
there is nothing in it that would make it incompatible with the PRA.  In particular, 
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Jessop draws attention to the existence of strong extant linkages in the work of scholars 
such as Hirsch and Esser,159 who combine the concepts of the PRA with the insights of 
the state derivation debate of the 1970s and 1980s.160  In such analyses, although the 
form of the state is implanted in capitalist social relations, this form, like all others, is so 
thoroughly underwritten by contradictions that there is no certainty it can perform the 
functions required of it.161  To ascertain if it does, the more intermediate regulationist 
notion of a mode of regulation comes into its own.  If the particular state under analysis 
coheres with an underlying accumulation regime, and fits into the constellation of other 
institutional forms, such as the wage-labour nexus, money and enterprise relations,162 
then we can say that it more-or-less executes its historically conditioned variety of 
functions. 
This approach characterises the best work on the state from a regulationist perspective.  
The variety and sophistication of this work also puts paid to the claim that the PRA has 
an unoriginal account of the state.163  Jessop in particular has developed an original and 
rich ‘strategic-relational’ theory of the state, which combines the insights of Poulantzas, 
the state derivation debate and work on ‘autopoiesis’ with the PRA and generally 
provides a theoretically rigorous yet historically sensitive account of the functions, 
capacities and historical trajectories of capitalist states.164  Elements of this theory will 
be further elucidated and discussed in the following chapters. 
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Regulationism in Australia 
We now have an understanding of PRA concepts, the rebuttal of criticisms and a more 
complete definition of capitalism in hand.  It is necessary to state at this point that the 
regulationist project and its suite of concepts were not devised in an abstract theoretical 
laboratory.  Rather, they were generated by a process of intensive investigation into the 
actual history of post-World War II capitalism, with the path-breaking texts focussing 
particularly upon the mechanics of US and French capitalism.  In the same vein, the 
utility of the PRA in studying Australian capitalism cannot be assumed, but must be 
demonstrated.  It is thus necessary to turn to the question of regulationist influence on 
work regarding the nature of Australian capitalism.  With some very notable exceptions, 
it is fair to say that the PRA has had a quite limited impact on Australian scholarship.  
Such influence as it has had seems to be concentrated in two main areas: 
1. Scholars using regulationist notions to construct periodisation schemas of 
Australian capitalism; and 
2. The ‘Fordist/post-Fordist’ labour process debates of the late 1980s and early 
1990s, especially as played out in the pages of the Journal of Australian 
Political Economy. 
Given the essential theoretical poverty and narrowness of the latter,165 it is only the 
former that I am concerned with here. 
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Regulationist periodisation schemas 
In the Australian context, the scholar who has perhaps taken the greatest lead from the 
PRA is Christopher Lloyd.  He has taken the notion of regulation, in both its theoretical 
and practical sense, seriously and has constructed an elegant, sophisticated model that, 
in its economic moments, draws heavily upon Parisian work. 
Building upon a framework he constructed in a 2002 article,166 Lloyd characterises an 
overall regime of political economy as a product of sets of practices and modalities of 
social life that can grouped under four headings: a production regime or social system 
of production; a regime of formal regulation; a governance regime; and a cultural 
regime.167  Since the beginnings of British colonialism in the country, there have been, 
on Lloyd’s count, four broadly coherent and stable regimes of political economy, 
separated by periods of crisis and experimentation.168  This notion of a regime is 
roughly commensurable with the concept of a model of development, although it more 
explicitly acknowledges the importance of culture to the overall regime of political 
economy.  Whilst this conception does employ a bundle of intermediate concepts that 
resemble regulationist notions, however, it proceeds less rigorously from basic Marxian 
categories and the contradictions inherent in the capital relation.   
Lloyd quite openly acknowledges that his conceptualisation owes a good deal to French 
regulationist work.169  However, he posits that it also differs from their analysis, in that 
he draws more heavily on historical institutionalist analysis.  Based on comments in his 
2002 article, I take him to mean that the PRA concerns itself most with the production 
regime and the regulation most directly targeted at the economic system, whereas his 
analysis is broader in more explicitly identifying the role of government and culture in 
shaping the social totality.170   
Whilst the clear-cut acknowledgement of the importance of the political system and 
culture to the architecture of the overall regime of political economy is to be 
commended, I would argue that this does not take us a great distance from the PRA as it 
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has been constructed here, particularly when it is infused with the notion of juridic 
forms of capital.  Aside from the aforementioned treatment of the state and law as 
juridic forms, the criticism on the count of culture is misplaced.  Although rarely the 
explicit focus of regulationist analyses, it would appear mechanistic to talk of the nature 
of wage labour, the production process and consumption norms without acknowledging 
even obliquely the cultural forms and content that both help constitute, and are in turn 
constituted by, these structures and processes.  Although he does not subsequently go on 
to explore the full impact of culture, Aglietta nonetheless places it conceptually centre 
stage in his discussion of the evolution of the structural forms associated with collective 
bargaining in the United States:  
The formation and operation of structural forms are the theoretical site of the 
articulation of social relations-economic, politico-legal and ideological.  To 
develop a theory of collective bargaining as a structural form means to conceive 
this articulation as unity of the social practices necessary for the reproduction of 
the wage relation (my emphasis).171   
 
Lipietz goes further in explicitly outlining the significance of cultural norms in his 
description of the ‘societal paradigm’ of Fordism, a social worldview constructed of 
shared expectations and visions of progress.172  Although it is fair to say that 
regulationist work focussing directly on cultural forms (outside of those directly 
imbricated in the organisation of the labour process, patterns of collective bargaining or 
modes of consumption) is lacking within the approach, this reflects more an historical 
neglect rather than an innate inability to deal with the subject.173   
On the whole, I find Lloyd’s work compelling, particularly given its sensitivity to 
empirical data and the recognition that regimes of regulation are provisional and contain 
within themselves the seeds of disequilibria, leading to periods of crisis and institutional 
searching, whereby ways are sought out of that crisis.  His models represent an 
informed and sophisticated integration of Parisian regulation work into Australian 
scholarship.  
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There are, however, several theoretical and methodological issues with Lloyd’s work 
(specific criticisms of his models will be reserved for chapter 4).174  Of key significance 
is the fact that the analysis does not move from the abstract to the concrete in a lucid 
fashion.  I regard this as a consequence of adopting a positively eclectic mix of 
concepts, some of which may not be truly theoretically commensurable.  For example, 
Lloyd combines a conception of the production regime which is based heavily on a 
critical (though not exclusively Marxist) political economy with a neo-Darwinian theory 
of social evolution.175  Lloyd is right to note the interpenetration of the micro and macro 
level in determining the course of social evolution, particularly in conceiving of the 
macro level as a ‘selective’ environment for ‘innovations’ generated at the micro 
level.176  However, there is no account of what spurs these ‘innovations’ in the first 
place, nor the logic that binds them.  For a genuinely Marxist political economy, the 
capital relation and its evolution in and through class struggle is the central motor 
driving the process of social evolution.  From this perspective, innovations at the level 
of, say, the workplace, may take the form of isolated and piecemeal developments, but 
are in reality bound up in the logic of a greater tendency, such as the need to intensify 
labour and raise the rate of exploitation.177  To account for the contours of social 
evolution, without analysing root causes, is a serious lacuna that at best tends towards 
empiricism (which informs his sometimes descriptive account of regimes of 
accumulation as a conglomerate of features lacking a clear hierarchy) and at worst is 
conducive towards a voluntarist conception of development at the micro-level.   
A further methodological issue, which we will explore in greater detail in chapter 4, is 
the fact that he sometimes confuses the history of institutions for the structured 
coherence of a stable regulatory regime.  Just because institutions have come into 
existence doesn’t necessarily mean that the social formation is agreed as to their 
function or desirability.  This confusion is pronounced when he accords his ‘labourist-
protectionism’ model a much earlier start date than I give antipodean Fordism on the 
basis of certain of its institutions having a pre-World War II provenance. 
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Lloyd’s work has inspired another scholar, Ray Broomhill, who has also adopted the 
notion of a periodisation of capitalist accumulation in Australia that, whilst identifying 
different epochs to Lloyd, is nonetheless quite consonant with the theoretical schema he 
has developed.178  Importantly, he states:  
Each previous 'boom' featured a burst of innovation and growth followed by 
economic collapse. Each collapse was characterised by intensive capital, labour 
and state restructuring during which there occurred significant changes in the 
role of the state, shifts in economic policy, and fundamental realignments of 
class forces.  These phases of restructuring have been periods of 'creative 
destruction' through which the problems increasingly inherent in the previous 
boom were at least partly resolved and the conditions for a new phase of 
accumulation forged.179 
 
This characterisation of the nature and trajectory of capital accumulation is significant.  
Firstly, it recognises the imbrications of the economic, political and social moments of 
capitalism.  A coherent combination of all three provides the basis of a stable 
accumulation phase.  Secondly, it acknowledges how changes in the role of the state 
accompany new patterns of accumulation.  Lastly, this framework unites the 
development of new accumulation phases with the resolution (at least partially and 
temporarily) of the issues that beset their predecessors.   
This schema is quite in keeping with the PRA.  As with Lloyd’s work, it admittedly 
proceeds less rigorously from basic Marxian value categories, and doesn’t employ the 
neat ‘institutional forms’ typology that characterise a mode of regulation.  However, the 
concept of accumulation phases appears roughly commensurable with the regulationist 
notion of a development model, and there appears to be no major incompatibility 
between regulationist work and the approach of Broomhill.  This conclusion is bolstered 
by the fact that Broomhill had previously published an article that explicitly employed 
regulation theory to analyse the impact of neoliberal globalisation on the development, 
role and functions of state governments in Australia.180  Importantly, he favours a 
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sophisticated and nuanced conception of regulation, noting the importance of agency, 
class struggle and historical contingency in the constitution of modes of regulation.181 
Lynne Chester has also employed a regulationist approach in the periodisation of 
Australian capitalism.  More so than the other scholars discussed here, she has 
continued to employ traditional PRA concepts, especially the mode of regulation 
concept.  In particular, she has developed a detailed account of Australia’s neoliberal 
mode of regulation, tracing well the interconnections between its key structural forms182 
and usefully applying it to the study of subjects such as electricity and water markets.183  
However, as indicated above, she generally does not describe in detail accumulation 
regimes.  Indeed, at times she tends to the view that a mode of regulation is actually a 
more concrete instantiation of an accumulation regime,184 an example of the meso-level 
construction (vis-à-vis an accumulation regime) of the concept I rejected above.  
Moreover, her empirically detailed account of the Australian neoliberal mode of 
regulation is not backed by a similarly rich account of Australia’s Fordist phase.  What 
crisis tendencies neoliberalism is responding to, and how it addresses them, are thus not 
adequately explained.  This shortcoming dovetails with the more general absence of a 
holistic class perspective that links the constituent features of a mode of regulation to 
the contradictions inscribed in capitalist social relations.  Shorn of this basis, Chester’s 
account, like Lloyd’s, mainly describes particular phases of Australian capitalism as 
conglomerates of different institutions, with no organic understanding as to how they 
manage capital’s crisis tendencies and evolve under the impetus of class struggle.  
Another scholar who is informed by the regulation approach is Gerry Treuren.  As well 
as constructing a theory of institutional development and crisis completely 
commensurable with the PRA (particularly regarding the distinction between ‘minor’ 
and ‘structural’ crisis),185 he was the first to sound the need for analysis of a specifically 
                                                          
181 Ibid 119-120. 
182 See, for example: Chester, ‘Another variety of capitalism?’, above n 162; Chester, ‘The Australian 
variant of neoliberal capitalism’, above n 78. 
183 Lynne Chester, ‘Actually Existing Markets: The Case of Neoliberal Australia’ (2010) XLIV(2) 
Journal of Economic Issues 313. 
184 Chester, ‘Another variety of capitalism?’, above n 162, 3. 
185 Gerry Treuren, ‘How and Why Do Institutions Change?  A Four Phase Framework for the Description 
of Institutional Development’ (2003) 7(2) Journal of Economic and Social Policy 51. 
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‘Australian mode of development,’186 a task he did not subsequently undertake.  It was 
specifically in response to this call that I have developed my own periodisation of 
Australian capitalism which, whilst drawing upon the work of these other scholars, has 
attempted to intensify and deepen the PRA method and reconnect it with its Marxist 
heritage, rather than supplement it eclectically with concepts developed elsewhere.187   
There is, of course, a huge body of work outside of the PRA paradigm which deals with 
the categories of capital, the state, the labour process and law, either singly or jointly.  
In particular, Australian scholarship seems to me quite strong in explicating links 
between the state and capital188 (despite the oft-repeated assertion that it isn’t)189 and in 
exploring the system of industrial relations that both partially constitutes, and is partly 
constituted by, the organisation of the labour process.  Work in these veins will be 
integrated into the analysis throughout the thesis where relevant.  The work of labour 
law scholars is of course central, and will be discussed in the following chapter. 
Conclusions 
I began this chapter by noting that a thesis which seeks to truly ground an analysis of 
workplace law within a critical political economy must work at the intersections of 
capital, the state, the capitalist labour process/industrial relations, and the law.  
Although broadly reflective of the disciplinary boundaries that demarcate these areas of 
inquiry, I also noted how these distinctions are in a sense arbitrary, and these categories 
are intimately related through their status as invariant features of the capitalist mode of 
production. 
                                                          
186 Gerry Treuren, ‘Regulation Theory and Australian Theorising of Institutional Change in Industrial 
Regulation’ (Paper presented at 11th AIRAANZ Conference, Brisbane, 30 January-1 February 1997) 358, 
366. 
187 Heino and Dahlstrom, above n 82; Heino, ‘Capitalism, regulation theory and Australian labour law’, 
above n 83; Brett Heino, ‘Award Regulation and the New South Wales Retail Sector, 1971-1988: Crisis 
and Experimentation amidst Changing Models of Development’ (2015) 109 Labour History 75. 
188 Some key works include: Stephen Bell and Brian Head (eds), State, Economy and Public Policy in 
Australia (Oxford University Press, 1994); Ken Buckley and Ted Wheelwright, False Paradise: 
Australian Capitalism Revisited, 1915-1955 (Oxford University Press, 1998); R. W. Connell and T.H. 
Irving, Class Structure in Australian History: Poverty and Progress (Longman Cheshire, 1992); Evan 
Jones, ‘Government ‘Intervention’’ (1984) 17 Journal of Australian Political Economy 53; Peter 
Fairbrother, Stuart Svensen and Julian Teicher, ‘The Ascendancy of Neo-Liberalism in Australia’ (1997) 
21(3) Capital & Class 1. 
189 Gerry Treuren, ‘The Concept of the State in Australian Industrial Relations Theory’ (2000) 11(2) 
Labour & Industry 75. 
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I have demonstrated how the PRA analytically unites these moments of a capitalist 
society using a variety of sophisticated concepts that together form a distinct hierarchy 
on the plane from abstract to concrete.  Building upon the long-term tendencies that 
Marx identifies, the regulationists proffer a dynamic mid-range account of the 
development of capitalist societies, particularly in their economic and political facets.  
The regulationist notion of a model of development uniting a dominant industrial 
paradigm, mode of regulation and an accumulation regime traverses the categories of 
capital, the state, the labour process/industrial relations and law and, in doing so, offers 
a wide-ranging account that allows us to understand the interpenetration of economic 
and extra-economic forces in a capitalist society and their evolution through time and 
space.  Importantly, a perceived weakness in treating the state and, by extension law, 
was resolved by explicitly including both of these in the bundle of invariant features of 
a capitalist society.  Capitalist production relations have juridic, as well as economic, 
forms.  It thus does not pay to see the law and the state as secondarily derived from an 
economic base; they are simply different forms of capital’s existence, in the absence of 
which the resulting society would be something other than capitalist.190  Making this 
strong claim, implicit in better regulationist work, does no damage to a PRA analysis 
when it is acknowledged that the form’s functionality is always in question;191 
conversely, it helps purge it of a claimed economistic bias.  It does, however, require the 
regulationist project to cease its drift into eclecticism and reconnect with its roots in 
Marxism. 
The limited impact of the PRA in the Australian context is somewhat surprising, 
particularly given the fact that post-World War II Australian capitalism exhibited many 
of the characteristics of the ideal-typical Fordist model.  There are, however, sufficient 
examples of quality regulationist-inspired work to attest to the rigour and lucidity the 
PRA could introduce into an account of the development of Australian capitalism. 
                                                          
190 Taiwo, above n 150, 59-65. 
191 Jessop, ‘Regulation theory, post Fordism and the state’, above n 115, 155. 
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Table 1: Regulationist concepts 
Concept Definition Examples 
Industrial paradigm 
-  dominant method of organising the labour process. 
-  governs social and technical division of labour. 
-  not necessary that all labour processes are organised on 
these lines; enough that certain lead sectors are. 
-  mass-production on semi-automatic production 
lines, governed by logic of Taylorism. 
Accumulation regime 
-  macro-level articulation of production and consumption 
reproducible through time. 
-  governs relationship between Departments I and II. 
-  can broadly be conceived as a concrete arrangement of 
capitalism’s economic forms. 
-  extensive accumulation, where capitalist 
production in Department I sits alongside petty-
bourgeois production in Department II. 
-  intensive accumulation, where capitalist 
production in Department I is matched by 
commodification of working-class 
consumption goods. 
Mode of regulation 
-  ensemble of structural forms stabilising and guiding an 
accumulation regime. 
-  forms include wage-labour nexus, particular form of the 
state, enterprise forms and competition, and money form. 
-  can broadly be conceived as a concrete arrangement of 
capitalism’s juridic forms.  
-  mode centred on Keynesian Welfare National 
State. 
-  neoliberal mode of regulation. 
Model of development 
-  coherent combination of an industrial paradigm, 
accumulation regime and mode of regulation. 
-  Fordism 
-  Liberal-productivism 
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Chapter 3 
THE LEGAL FORM, LABOUR LAW AND THE LAW-
ADMINISTRATION CONTINUUM 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how the PRA’s concepts and methodology 
broaches capital, the state, the labour process and law as analytic categories.  Given the 
centrality of law to this thesis, this chapter will be concerned primarily with developing 
a theoretically rigorous account of the form and function of law generally, and labour 
law more specifically.  This task requires placing law within a precisely defined 
hierarchy of abstraction, rooted in Marxist political economy.  This must explicate the 
abstract place of law within the capitalist mode of production at the same time that it 
tackles legal change at the concrete level.  Only by integrating both can we arrive at an 
understanding of law that is theoretically lucid yet empirically accurate.1  Through 
generating ideal-typical models periodising capitalism into distinctive epochs, the 
Parisian Regulation Approach (PRA) is ideally placed to serve as the mid-wife of this 
process of unifying the abstract and the concrete.  Taking the PRA as the point of 
articulation between the two levels, this chapter will construct a coherent hierarchy of 
abstraction that retains the theoretical incisiveness of Marxism whilst exploring the 
impact of history on the legal form.2 
It will be recalled that in chapter 2 I identified the law, along with the state, as juridic 
forms of capital that are part of the basket of invariant features characterising the 
capitalist mode of production.  Given that to many Marxists this would appear a bold 
claim, it is necessary to first explore something of the history of legal analysis from 
within a Marxist political economy.  Only once we have canvassed the best of such 
work can we lay a solid foundation at the abstract level saying what the ‘legal form’ is, 
why it assumes this guise, how it is actualised at the concrete level and how it is 
reproduced over time. 
 
                                                          
1 As was outlined in the preceding chapter, this process of theory construction assumes a spiralling 
pattern, whereby the abstract and the concrete are dialectically relativised.  
2 I have already sketched elsewhere the basic outlines of the theoretical framework established here: Brett 
Heino, ‘Capitalism, regulation theory and Australian labour law: Towards a new theoretical model’ 
(2015) 39(3) Capital & Class 453.    
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Marxism and the law 
Considering the fact that law is a highly visible and potent presence in both public and 
private life, it is somewhat surprising that Marxist analyses specifically grappling with 
the law are, with several very notable exceptions,3 uncommon.  Given that ‘Marx’s goal 
was to understand bourgeois society as a totality, as an inter-connected whole,’4 this 
legal lacuna seems at first instance to be inexplicable.  It becomes more understandable, 
though no less inadequate, in light of the fact that many Marxist scholars have 
historically tended to subsume law within an epiphenomenal ‘superstructure’ 
determined by an economic ‘base.’5  Whilst establishing a vision of a totality, this 
species of determinism leaves little space for a specific understanding of the form of 
law.  It is to these shortcomings Collins (a staunch critic) refers when he states: 
The paucity of Marxist jurisprudence until modern times is probably largely a 
result of the materialist emphasis of Marxism.  Since the primary focus rests on 
the economy and the corresponding power relations within a society, law is 
treated as a peripheral concern.  Even then it is usually relegated to the position 
of a relatively unproblematic sector of the State scarcely worthy of detailed 
consideration.6 
 
Undoubtedly there is a certain truth to this contention, especially insofar as it describes 
the Stalinist, economistic vision of Marxism that came to dominate the politics of 
mainstream Communist parties in the decades bracketing World War II.7  However, it 
must be qualified in two ways.  Firstly, one must be very cautious not to confuse the 
traditional focus and emphases of any theory (Marxist or otherwise) with the actual 
                                                          
3 See, for example: Evgeny B. Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: A General Theory (Barbara Einhorn trans, 
Ink Links Ltd, 1978); Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism (Patrick Camiller trans, NLB, 1978); 
Isaac Balbus, ‘Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the “Relative Autonomy” of the Law’ 
(1977) 11(3) Law & Society Review 571; Bob Fine et al (ed), Capitalism and the Rule of Law: From 
Deviancy Theory to Marxism (Hutchinson, 1979); Bernard Edelman, Ownership of the Image: Elements 
for a Marxist Theory of Law (Elizabeth Kingdom trans, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979); Geoffrey Kay 
and James Mott, Political Order and the Law of Labour (The Macmillan Press, 1982); Csaba Varga (ed), 
Marxian Legal Theory (Dartmouth, 1993); Olufemi Taiwo, Legal Naturalism: A Marxist Theory of Law 
(Cornell University Press, 1996); Bob Fine, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Marx’s Critique of the 
Legal Form (The Blackburn Press, 2002); China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of 
International Law (Haymarket Books, 2006); Heino, ‘Capitalism, regulation theory and Australian labour 
law’, above n 2. 
4 Michael Lebowitz, Beyond Capital (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 52. 
5 See, for example: Alan Hunt, ‘Marxist Theory of Law’ in Dennis Patterson (ed), A Companion to 
Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) 350, 353-354. 
6 Hugh Collins, Marxism and Law (Clarendon Press, 1982) 10. 
7 Paul Blackledge, Reflections on the Marxist Theory of History (Manchester University Press, 2006) 76-
78, 97-98. 
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explanatory possibilities opened by it.  Marxism’s historical neglect of the law as an 
object of study must be distinguished from the opportunities for legal analysis from 
within that theoretical framework.  Relatedly, as we shall see in this chapter, this neglect 
is by no means absolute; there is indeed a body of Marxist work explicitly concerned 
with elucidating the place of law within capitalism. 
By way of grounding, it is worth briefly surveying the contributions of Marx and Engels 
on law.  Whilst it is true that neither ever developed a detailed and consistent theory of 
law,8 they nevertheless had more to say of it than is commonly supposed.9  It is apparent 
that their approach (particularly Marx’s) was a dynamic one, characterised by 
intellectual evolution and the discarding of concepts no longer deemed useful.  Fine 
notes how ‘Marx’s point of departure was classical jurisprudence and his journey away 
from it was accomplished only in stages, without a preconceived destination.’10  More 
specifically, this point of departure was Hegelianism, the influence of which informed 
Marx’s initial legal rationalism, ‘the view that law is an embodiment of Reason striving 
for freedom.’11  On the basis of this idealist notion, Marx opined that a nation’s statute 
book was ‘a bible of freedom,’12 and law’s essence was Reason’s achievement of a 
positive, impersonal existence free of particularistic interests.13 
Marx and Engels’ movement towards their historical materialist method necessitated the 
abandonment of this conception, and a recognition that the law must be approached 
from the class perspective they had developed for political economy.14  This 
appreciation opened up two potential conceptions of law: as an element in a reactive 
superstructure which is ultimately determined by an economic base;15 or as a social 
institution with its roots deeply embedded within, and constitutive of, capitalist relations 
of production and exchange.  The tension between the two was never fully resolved in 
                                                          
8 See, for example, the observation of Campbell and Wiles, cited in Paul Phillips, Marx and Engels on 
Law and Laws (Martin Robertson, 1980) x. 
9 Maureen Cain and Alan Hunt (eds), Marx and Engels on Law (Academic Press, 1979) ix. 
10 Fine, above n 3, 66. 
11 Taiwo, above n 3, 8. 
12 Karl Marx, ‘Debates on Freedom of the Press’ in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works 
Volume I (Lawrence and Wishart Electric Book, 2010) 162. 
13 Ibid. 
14 A journey Fine traces in some detail; Fine, above n 3. 
15 See, for example: Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Charles H. Kerr & 
Company, 1904) 11-12. 
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their writings,16 but, as indicated in the previous chapter’s discussion of juridic forms, 
the latter represents a most fruitful line of enquiry that remains true to the tenets of 
historical materialism whilst avoiding an instrumentalist view of law as 
unproblematically functioning in the interest of capital.17  
A prime example of this more sophisticated treatment of law can be found in Marx’s 
treatment of commodity ownership and exchange in Volume I of Capital.  Marx 
acknowledged that commodities cannot walk to market and exchange themselves.18  He 
continues: 
In order that these objects may enter into relation with each other as 
commodities, their guardians must place themselves in relation to one another as 
persons whose will resides in those objects, and must behave in such a way that 
each does not appropriate the commodity of the other, and alienate his own, 
except through an act to which both parties consent.  The guardians must 
therefore recognize each other as owners of private property.  The content of this 
juridical relation (or relation of two wills) is itself determined by the economic 
relation.19 
 
Despite seeming on the surface to suggest some type of economic determinism 
(depending upon the exact meaning given to the term ‘economic’ in this context),20 the 
practical effect of this statement is in fact quite the opposite.  As Von Arx states of this 
passage, ‘[b]y asserting that exchange requires mutual recognition of private property 
rights, Marx clearly acknowledges that the legal relation between subjects is intrinsic to 
the value relation’ (my emphasis).21  The association of commodities with some 
minimum notion of juridical equality preventing theft was developed further by Engels, 
                                                          
16 Additionally, Fine states that Marx never overcame his tendency to oscillate between viewing law as a 
false semblance of equality or, conversely, an actual substantive structure that afforded some degree of 
equality to those ruled by it: Fine, above n 3, 120. 
17 From a crude instrumentalist perspective, every action of the state is either a victory for capital or 
capital granting some concession to the proletariat in furtherance of its own interests.  Such theories thus 
fail to provide a nuanced, sophisticated view of laws which seem either to aid capital in very indirect 
ways or indeed work against the interests of capital.  For a modern-day exemplar of such a framework 
relevant to this thesis, see: Tom Bramble and Rick Kuhn, Labor’s Conflict: Big business, workers and the 
politics of class (Cambridge University Press, 2011).  For a deeper account of the flaws of 
instrumentalism, see: Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods (New York 
University Press, 1982) 12-16. 
18 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume I (Ben Fowkes trans, Penguin Classics, 
1990) 178. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Fine, above n 3, 96. 
21 Susan Von Arx, An Examination of E.B. Pashukanis’s General Theory of Law and Marxism (PhD 
Thesis, State University of New York, 1997) 66. 
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who stated that law, whilst expressing the general economic expression, must 
nevertheless be ‘coherently unified … and free from glaring internal inconsistencies.’22  
Such notions are the fertile ground out of which a theory of law as a juridic form of 
capital can grow. 
Alongside this admittedly inchoate understanding of law as deeply embedded in 
capitalist production and exchange relations, there is another important insight Marx 
and Engels give us on law; that it is not simply a tool functioning in the interests of the 
capitalist class (which makes law’s neglect at the hands of many Marxist scholars even 
more puzzling).  This can be seen most clearly in Marx and Engels treatment of the Ten 
Hours statute fought for by the British proletariat in the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century.23  For Marx, this legislation represented the concrete manifestation 
of working-class power crystallised in the political arena, the first time that ‘the political 
economy of the middle class succumbed to the political economy of the working 
class.’24  By uniting as a class workers were capable of introducing laws that, in terms 
of content, both represented and facilitated their class interests.  The struggle to force 
such change was a genuine political movement of the class ‘with the object of enforcing 
its interests in a general form, in a form possessing general, socially coercive force.’25  
In this conception law, far from being immune to the class struggle, is instead a focal 
point for it, and it is exactly over the content of labour law that we can expect the 
greatest contestation. 
From this very brief sketch,26 we can discern two central points for our analysis: firstly, 
that law is a strange creature whose basic form is structured by the capitalist relations of 
production and exchange of which it is part; and secondly, that class struggle can play a 
formative role in determining the exact shape and content of law.  The famous dictum 
                                                          
22 Engels in practice adhered more clearly to a base-superstructure model than Marx, which informs his 
notion of law as being a reflection of the economic, a contention I have refuted in the previous chapter: 
Friedrich Engels, ‘Letter to Conrad Schmidt’ in Irving Howe (ed), Essential Works of Socialism (Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1970) 70, 71. 
23 See, for example: Marx, Capital Volume I, above n 18, 389-416; Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the 
English Working Class in England (Electronic Book Company, 2001) 267-268, 330. 
24Marx, Karl, 'Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association' in Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels, Collected Works Volume XX (Lawrence and Wishart, 1985) 10-11; Lebowitz, above n 
4, 80-81. 
25 Karl Marx, ‘Letter to Bolte’ in David McLellan (ed), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford University 
Press, 2000) 636, 637. 
26 For detailed overviews: see Cain and Hunt, above n 9; Phillips, above n 8. 
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‘[b]etween equal rights, force decides’27 is of signal importance in understanding the 
practical struggles over law that occurs within the framework of capitalist social 
relations.  These two points are, moreover, recursive: form is meaningless except 
through its material iterations, whilst the salience of using distinctions between different 
kinds of struggle is predicated upon an understanding that capital has a multi-faceted 
economic and juridical existence. 
For all the promising hints within Marx and Engels’ work, however, it remains the case 
that law never truly interested them in its own right.28  We must thus consult scholars 
who, whilst taking their conceptual and methodological lead from Marx, explore these 
questions of legal form and the class struggle surrounding it in much greater detail.   
Legal form 
In both the preceding and current chapter, repeated reference has been made to law as a 
juridic form of capital.  Before further developing this notion, it is necessary to ascertain 
just what a ‘form’ is.  Fine proffers a useful definition, using the ‘form-content’ couplet:  
The imagery which informs Capital … is not that of base and superstructure, but 
rather of ‘form’ and ‘content’ … starting with economic forms, e.g. value, price, 
money, capital, interest, profit, etc – analysing the specific relations of 
production which lie hidden beneath these forms, and then explaining 
‘synthetically’ why these relations of production necessarily express themselves 
in this economic way.29 
 
Fine and Saad-Filho note of Capital that the ‘divorce between reality (or content or 
essence) and the way it appears (or form) is a central aspect of Marx‘s (dialectical) 
thought.’30  So, simply enough, the form of a thing is its external appearance, the 
structure it presents to the perceiver.31  Within this world of perception it is easy 
                                                          
27 Marx, Capital Volume I, above n 18, 344. 
28 Marx studied ‘the state, law and morality...only in so far as political economy professes to deal with 
these subjects,’ whilst Engels acknowledged that in seeking to derive political, legal and ideological 
notions from economic facts, he and Marx ‘neglected the formal side, i.e., the way in which these ideas 
arose.’  See, respectively: Karl Marx, quoted in E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays 
(Merlin, 1978) 259; Friedrich Engels, ‘Letter to F. Mehring’ in Irving Howe (ed), Essential Works of 
Socialism (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970) 75. 
29 Fine, above n 3, 95-96. 
30 Ben Fine and Alfredo Saad-Filho, Marx’s ‘Capital’ (Pluto Press, 2004) 4. 
31 And is in this way very different to Plato’s notion of form, from whence we get the term.  This 
conception of form is much closer to the sense in which Aristotle uses it.  See, for example: Plato, The 
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enough, beneath the endless diversity of material existence, to perceive regularities 
which might be thought of as ‘master forms.’  Amidst the countless iterations of money, 
wage-labour, laws and states, for example, a commonality can be observed which 
allows us to speak of each in abstract terms, as modes of appearance in a capitalist 
society.  What Marx did was to disassemble mainly economic forms and demonstrate 
why capitalist production relations generate these appearances.  His method, whilst 
starting from the real world, thus avoided the pitfalls of crude empiricism in mistaking 
appearance for reality.32 
Law forms a more-or-less distinctive entity in the life of a capitalist society.  Kay and 
Mott incisively characterise this form, stating, ‘[l]aw is not a set of coercive rules, but a 
tangible expression of a social form with a predetermined historical content, namely the 
commodity nature of the products of labour under a regime of absolute property.’33  
Poulantzas notes that the developed legal form is defined by abstract, universal and 
formal norms that together comprise an axiomatic system.34  In a mature capitalist 
society, it regulates areas of social life as diverse as employment, commerce, 
administration and the family, and it does so with a peculiar set of institutions, modes of 
operation and norms.   Indeed, to meaningfully speak of law necessitates conceptually 
distinguishing these institutions and norms from other, non-legal, ones.   
Historically, however, Marxist work has been little concerned with why law is such a 
pronounced feature of capitalism, and, more deeply, why relationships should take a 
legal form at all.  Evgeny Pashukanis, a leading Soviet jurist in the 1920s and early 
1930s,35 posed the problem of a Marxist account not sensitive to the specificity of the 
legal form: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Republic (Desmond Lee trans, Penguin Classics, 2007) 237-240; Aristotle, Physics (R.P. Hardie and R.K. 
Gaye trans, Infomotions, 2001) 11-15. 
32 Indeed, Marx once noted that ‘all science would be superfluous if the form of appearance of things 
directly coincided with their essence’: Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume III 
(David Fernback trans, Penguin Classics, 1991) 956. 
33 Kay and Mott, above n 3, 94. 
34 Poulantzas, above n 3, 86. 
35 Despite a number of increasingly abject recantations, his original characterisation of the legal form as 
grounded in commodity exchange, and its subsequent existential impossibility in a communist society, 
ran against the grain of Stalinism, particularly after the refutation of the New Economic Policy.  He was 
arrested and executed in 1937.  For a highly useful overview of his life and the radical jurisprudence of 
which he was part, see: Michael Head, Evgeny Pashukanis: A Critical Reappraisal (Routledge-
Cavendish, 2008). 
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[A]ll we get is a theory which explains the emergence of legal regulation from 
the material needs of society … Instead of being able to avail ourselves of an 
abundance of internal structures and interconnections of the juridical, we are 
forced to make do with bare outlines, only approximately indicated.  These 
outlines are so blurred that the borderline between the sphere of the juridical and 
adjacent spheres is completely obliterated.36 
 
We must thus construct such an account of the legal form, drawing carefully from the 
work of scholars such as Pashukanis, Fine, and Kay and Mott, who concern themselves 
with this question of form. 
In the previous chapter I noted the distinction between use-value and exchange-value 
which characterised the commodity form.37  This distinction is also what actually 
constitutes the commodity; if it meets no concrete need it is worthless, whilst if it is not 
produced for exchange it is not a commodity.  A commodity, therefore, only fulfils its 
life mission if it is traded on the market, either in kind for another commodity or for 
money.38  As indicated in the statement by Marx above,39 this in turn requires that the 
owners of those commodities be able to relate to one another as fellow owners.  In other 
words, alongside the economic relation between the objects being traded, there is a 
‘relation of two wills’40 whereby owners recognise each other as such and formally 
respect their right of ownership.41  In this recognition lies the cell of the legal form, the 
owner of private property,42 and the understanding that law ‘is inseparably linked with 
private property and production for exchange – in other words with commodity 
production.’43  
Like the relationship between commodities being expressed at a certain stage of 
development through the universal equivalent of money, so to does this juridic relation 
achieve a form independent of the respective parties.44  A section of society becomes 
vested with overseeing, guaranteeing and codifying this relationship; the law courts and 
                                                          
36 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, above n 3, 55. 
37 Marx, Capital Volume I, above n 18, 125-131. 
38 Ibid 178-244. 
39 Ibid 178. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, above n 3, 109-113; Edelman, above n 3, 93. 
42 Fine, above n 3, 160.  Fine is correct in criticising Pashukanis when the latter placed the cell-form as 
the legal subject, which is in fact a highly developed form that can only come into its own when the union 
of economic and extra-economic coercion in pre-capitalist societies is shattered. 
43 Peter Binns, ‘Law and Marxism’ (1980) 4(1) Capital & Class 100, 102. 
44 Fine, above n 3, 137-139. 
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judges thus emerge on the historical scene.45  All pre-capitalist societies which engage 
in an appreciable measure of commodity exchange exhibit these kinds of institutions 
and personnel,46 and it is telling (as Pashukanis presciently observed)47 that the most 
highly developed systems were in formations like the Roman Empire.  Indeed, the 
reappearance of Roman jurisprudence around commerce and contract from the 1100s 
coincided with the onset of a long decay in European feudalism, partly due to the 
influence of rising merchant and commercial classes re-establishing wide-scale 
commodity exchange.48 
The commodity form therefore requires the most basic cell of the legal form, owner of 
private property, and all societies, capitalist or pre-capitalist, with large-scale 
commodity exchange will be marked by it.49  Whilst some Marxist critics would decry 
this as deriving forms from exchange, rather than production relations (and so running 
against the grain of Marx’s emphasis on the determining role of the latter), this criticism 
is misplaced on two counts.  Firstly, it is appropriate to direct attention to the influence 
of exchange when talking of commodities and the legal form, as it is precisely exchange 
that partially constitutes that form.50  To be exchanged is part of the essence of a 
commodity, and whatever the production relations underlying them, they must still go 
through a process of purchase and sale.51  Secondly, the positing of a bare legal form 
consonant with the commodity form is not to suggest this form is immutable and 
unchanging, nor that the difference between the law of pre-capitalist and capitalist 
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societies is one of degree and not kind.52  Such an understanding runs counter to the 
dialectical relationship between the two elucidated by Marx.53   
Instead, form and content represent a dialectically intertwined unity.  Whilst the 
exchange of commodities provides a most basic, abstract legal form, the content of this 
form (namely, the social relations of production) determines its exact shape and 
development.  This is a reality Marx demonstrated in relation to the commodity form.  
The development from simple to expanded commodity production is not merely 
emptying and filling a static form with new content, but is a simultaneous alteration of 
that form.54  The union of economic and extra-economic coercion in pre-capitalist 
societies,55 along with the particularistic nature of property,56 ensures that the 
boundaries between law and other forms of social power (such as religion and direct 
force) are ambiguous and the reach of the law circumscribed.57  Legal authority in a 
feudal society, for example, was often vested in manorial courts, where the dispenser of 
justice and the economic exploiter was often the same person, whilst feudal law 
recognised all manner of estate, guild and military distinction.  The notion of 
impersonal law binding all members of society as juridically equal citizens, which 
capitalist society would come to know as the rule of law, would have been thoroughly 
foreign in such societies.58 
It is only with the development of capitalist production relations that the specifically 
bourgeois legal form, which Poulantzas describes as an axiomatic system of abstract, 
universal and formal norms regulating juridically equal citizens,59 emerges.  This is so 
for several reasons.  Firstly, the conceptual separation of economic and political 
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exploitation, together with the divorce of the producers from the means of production, 
opens the space for the abstract, alienated capitalist state.60  Although not reducible to 
each other, the law and the state are related forms, and the development of the latter 
takes the former to a new plane.61  The state now ‘introduces clarity and stability into 
the structure of law,’62 and vests law with the formal equality which was only latent in it 
before.63   
More significant for our purposes is the universality of commodity production and 
exchange and the commodification of labour power that occurs under capitalism.  The 
fact that the vast majority of capitalist production is for sale, rather than immediate use, 
intensifies greatly the legal form,64 allowing it to penetrate every pore of social life.  
Capitalism is legalised to a degree unknown in other class societies.65  Even more 
importantly, the fact that labour generally now takes the commodity form means that 
the sale and purchase of labour power becomes an explicitly legal matter.  Unlike the 
feudal lord or slave owner, the capitalist’s extraction of surplus value is mediated 
through a free contract in a labour market.  As the capitalist is appropriating not fixed 
sums of labour, but instead the capacity to labour, this appropriation cannot be once-
and-for-all, but must be repeated on an episodic basis.66  It is at this nexus that we 
identify that unique body of law regulating the terms and conditions of the alienation of 
labour-power: labour law.67  Labour law is a most complex amalgam, with the law of 
‘things’ and exchange relations, namely property and contract law, attempting to 
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incorporate and regulate a living, breathing and thinking subject, the proletarian.  This 
integration marks a qualitative shift in the development of the law, and makes it a 
proper object of class struggle in its own right which, as we saw above, was a reality 
Marx and Engels grasped well.   
The result, Kay and Mott most incisively observe, is that: 
Labour law is the most complex and equivocal of the laws of property for 
fundamental reasons … The buying and selling of labour-power summarises the 
contradictions of capitalist society in a single moment.  The impossibility of 
formulating a contract of employment according to the general principles of the 
formation of contracts originates here.68 
 
Formal equality with unequal content; an alienation of capacities in fact with a 
disavowal of it in contract; equivalent exchange being transformed into its polar 
opposite69 – these are the contradictions with which the employment contract, one of the 
planks of labour law, is riven. These contradictions are inevitable, and will endure for as 
long as the capitalist legal form predominates.  It is worth reiterating here what was said 
in the previous chapter: law, along with the state, are juridic forms integral to the 
capitalist mode of production.70  A society that is lawless and stateless would not, in the 
long run, be a capitalist one.71  
Legal form and administration 
Although the preceding discussion has been abstract, it has been necessary insofar as we 
now understand what is distinctive about the capitalist legal form and the specific 
problems with which labour law must grapple.  In particular, it is clear that the latter ‘is 
shot through with all the tensions of capitalist social relations.’72  Along with the 
general mediating function of law between juridically equal subjects, labour law is 
specifically concerned with ensuring the continued commodification of labour-power.73  
This process is not, however, given or uncontested.  Lebowitz has shown how the 
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workings of capitalist class relations generate two disparate and competing political 
economies, with the capitalist’s valorisation and profit creation objections grating 
against the proletariat’s desire for the full product of its labour and the fulfilment of 
concrete needs.74  The objects that were the matter of the simple commodity 
exchange/legal form couplet could not make demands of that form.  The exchange of 
human labour-power for wages, however, is inseparable from the people supplying that 
labour.  Workers are capable of mobilising as a class and attempting to impose their 
own political economy on the legal form,75 which not only suffuses it with new content, 
but alters the form itself.  I have previously noted that ‘[t]he integration of a collective 
historical subject (the proletariat) into the legal process ensures the law itself becomes 
an arena of class struggle in which the competing political economies of labour and 
capital struggle for the higher ground.’76 
As the proletariat moves through class-struggle and the development of social labour 
advances, it can struggle for new laws and new legal institutions.  In the process, the 
tension between a legal form revolving around juridically equal, de-classed citizen-
subjects and the reality of inequality and exploitation is sharply foregrounded.  One of 
the state’s primary functions is to facilitate the continued commodification of labour-
power.77  A theoretical commitment to the purity of the legal form does not trouble the 
minds of state personnel when they are seeking to reproduce labour.  Although it must 
continue to abstract and formalise working-class power, the state nevertheless receives 
and acts upon the impulses of the working-class in struggle.  What it then does depends 
on a variety of factors, including the balance of class forces, the particular epoch of 
capitalism and the structure and path-dependence of extant institutional structures78 (in 
short, depending upon the kinds of forces the PRA best captures).  If the working-class, 
either singly or in combination with other classes, is able to apply a critical mass of 
economic and/or political pressure, the state is often forced to develop techniques of 
administration, whereby the spot-fires of proletarian activism are dampened by recourse 
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to new tribunals, bureaucracies and procedures.79  Whereas the abstract legal form 
aspires to universality and equality between de-classed juridical equals, administration 
plugs the gaps created when this form can no longer contain the collective interests of 
workers.80  As a result of contestation, institutions whose subject matter is the specific, 
and whose subjects are often industrial organisations representing labour and capital 
collectively, are created.   
Such institutions represent a modification of the legal form, rather than its destruction.  
On the one hand, they are material codifications of working-class power, of its ability to 
rise above the appearance of formal equality and demand action on the basis of material 
inequality.  On the other, administration responds to this pressure in ways that exhaust 
their subversive potential.81  Kay and Mott claim that administrative structures represent 
‘working-class power post-festum; working-class political victories captured and 
formalised at their moment of triumph.’82  Neocleous adds that state administration: 
[A]ppropriates and nullifies the struggle of the working class; as such they are 
the fossilised remnants of class struggle; they are the subsumption of struggle – 
working-class struggle abolished and preserved.  Born of the struggle of the 
working class, these structures are then left with the task of administering that 
same class, a task performed in relation to both collective organisations of the 
working class and its decomposed elements, known as ‘citizens’’ (my 
emphasis).83 
 
The corrosiveness of the legal form,84 its useful capacity to interpellate people as 
individualised citizens,85 and the inability of the state to depart from a notion of juridical 
equality mean that the institutions of administration, although a counter to holes in the 
abstract legal form, nevertheless are legal in terms of their constitution and modes of 
operation.  Indeed, they are normally bound to the formal legal system through the 
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vehicle of judicial review under the separation of powers doctrine.  On these bases, Kay 
and Mott note that law and administration are not separate phenomena, but are instead 
points on a law-administration continuum.86  Using the example of administrative law, 
they demonstrate the interpenetration of the two forms: ‘Administration is law in the 
sense that it creates law, is subject to law, and acts through legal forms; and the law 
affecting administration … is probably the greater part of all law today.’87 
As will be demonstrated in the coming chapters, the unique Australian system of 
compulsory conciliation and arbitration is an example of state administration par 
excellence.  The system will be elucidated in much greater detail in chapters 4-9, but it 
suffices here to understand it as a set of quasi-judicial arbitral tribunals that could 
compulsorily determine disputes between employers and unions, with the resulting 
determinations called ‘awards’.  A response to the devastating Great Strikes of the 
1890s, the structure came about through the political mobilisation of the working-class 
in the form of the Australian Labor Party, allied with middle-class liberals.88  In terms 
of the props given to trade union recognition and input into the process of determining 
disputes, arbitration was, at the time, a definite historical advance for the proletariat.89  
However, from its inception the system was highly legalised (both in terms of operation 
and personnel), time-consuming and directed union attention away from the building of 
strong rank-and-file organisation.90  Moreover, arbitration quickly proved itself 
amenable to capital, with a series of decisions in the late 1920s and early 1930s 
enforcing real wage reductions and increased working hours.91   
The history of the arbitration system (the ascent and decline of which is the subject of 
chapters 5 and 6) reveals the dynamic nature of the law-administration continuum.  
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Unlike Kay and Mott, who seem to suggest that the development of the continuum 
effaces once-and-for-all the distinctiveness of its two constituent features,92 I have 
argued that the nexus point between law and administration is moveable.93  That is, 
depending upon the nature of the class struggle and the fortunes of its respective parties, 
a labour law regime can be more heavily reliant upon those branches of law closest to 
the abstract legal form (such as the common law of contract and property) or can have a 
greater reliance on administrative structures, such as quasi-judicial arbitral tribunals.  
Given the fact that administration is spawned by the state responding to working-class 
pressure and is an answer to the gaps created by the abstract legal form, it is likely to be 
the stronger current when the proletariat has a critical mass of strength, is integrated in 
some way within the state apparatus, and is committed to the administrative structures 
thus created.  Conversely, when the working-class is in retreat, the state is less impelled 
to generate administrative responses to its struggle.  In such an environment, the 
traditional forms of law tend to reassert themselves, particularly if the climate is one of 
increased commodification and the expansion of the competition principle.94  Given its 
abstraction, assumption of juridical equality between unequal subjects and its 
individualising effect,95 the abstract legal form is the form in which capital has always 
operated most comfortably.96   
Of course, what the proletariat and capital are struggling over is, within the broad 
parameters of the capitalist mode of production, time and place specific.  Alongside the 
understanding that the working-class develops a political economy of its own, 
intertwined with but distinct from that of capital’s,97 the manifold crisis tendencies of 
capitalism are handled differently and to varying degrees in different historical epochs.  
For example, capitalists seeking to boost their profit by cutting labour costs 
simultaneously reduce the purchasing power of their workers, jeopardising the 
realisation of surplus value in the marketplace.  Jessop, building upon Althusser, notes 
how capitalist contradictions are internally variegated, such that different poles of each 
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contradiction assume varying weight in different historical conjunctures.98  In this 
realisation lies the secret; the labour law regime is constantly evolving, with the nexus 
point between law and administration shifting as the class struggle itself ebbs and flows.  
The fact that this struggle is itself not static, but also ebbs and flows, revolving around 
one set of contradictions before turning to others, means that the form and content of 
labour law will vary between different periods.  It is at this point that we can introduce 
the PRA. 
The Parisian Regulation Approach and legal analysis 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how the PRA combines a number of concepts 
along the plane from abstract to concrete to render an understanding of distinct models 
of development, which represent a coherent and compatible combination of an 
accumulation regime, mode of regulation and industrial paradigm.99  Of particular 
significance for the study of labour law is the mode of regulation.  In chapter 2, I noted 
that a mode of regulation more-or-less represented a stable, historically conditioned 
arrangement of capital’s juridic forms, revolving around four chief institutional forms 
which must be guaranteed by the state, often through the vehicle of law.  Amongst these 
four forms,100 two are of critical importance for our analysis, namely, state forms and 
the wage-labour nexus.101  The contention made previously, that law and the state are 
related juridic forms of capital, informs my reading of what exactly is entailed by the 
term ‘state forms.’  Located at a lower level of abstraction, ‘state forms’ as part of a 
mode of regulation refers to the historically conditioned manifestations of the legal and 
state forms.  Labour law forms a distinct subset within this structure.  It also serves a 
key role in constituting the wage-labour nexus, what Boyer describes as the process of 
socialisation of productive activity within capitalism.102  He goes on to state that its 
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specific form is ‘defined by the set of legal and institutional conditions that govern the 
use of wage-earning labour as the workers’ mode of existence’ (my emphasis).103  To 
explore the content of these notions in the Australian context is the task of the following 
chapter.  What is significant to note here is that labour law is a crucial component in the 
constitution of a mode of regulation, particularly so regarding the two key institutional 
forms identified. 
The models of development of which modes of regulation are part (whether en 
régulation or in crisis) have their own distinct mechanisms of coherence and trajectories 
of crisis.  They handle the contradictions of capitalism differentially, embed or exclude 
working-class power to varying degrees, and, given the evolving political economy of 
both labour and capital, impart their own hue to the class struggle.  It will be recalled 
that these are the same features which determine the balance point in the law-
administration continuum.  There is thus an intimate connection between the two, such 
that we can say that models of development are tied to distinctive arrangements of this 
continuum.   
The aforementioned dynamism of the processes of law and administration is itself tied 
to the fortunes of the model of development of which it is part.  The latter represent 
broadly coherent formations in which the crisis tendencies of capital are contained, 
managed and/or deferred.104  Whilst the contradictions of capital, and the class struggle 
that generates them, ensures that the basis of such coherence is temporary and inevitably 
undermined, continuity and stability prevail over the short to medium term.  By 
contrast, crisis disrupts extant institutions and norms, typically resulting in periods of 
experimentation and ‘institutional searching,’ whereby new structures are sought which 
can restabilise and renew capital accumulation.105   The same process holds for the law-
administration continuum, and is the subject of extensive discussion in chapters 5 and 6.  
The particular balance between law and administration, and the institutions which 
express it, will be generally stable, albeit evolving, in periods en régulation.  However, 
this arrangement can never absolve the fundamentally contradictory character of the 
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wage-labour/capital relationship.  To the extent that it solves some problem of labour 
commodification, it opens others, a reality strongly expressed in times of crisis.  It is at 
these junctures that, when capital accumulation breaks down and support for previously 
functional institutions wanes, opportunities for remaking the continuum are strongest.  
A theoretically rigorous understanding of the evolution of labour law is thus impossible 
without an adequate account of capitalist periodisation, and it is precisely in the latter 
task that the PRA outperforms competing approaches. 
It is worth noting at this point that specific regulationist studies of labour law are 
uncommon (law generally, still less).  This is not necessarily because regulationists 
deny causal power to the law.  Indeed, Boyer has opined that ‘laws, regulations, and 
rules imposed or confirmed by the state often play an essential role in spreading, and 
sometimes even originating, essential institutional forms’ (my emphasis).106  He also 
notes that law plays a key role in mediating between the system-level needs of an 
accumulation regime and individual decision-making, through exercising a combination 
of coercion and symbolism.107  However, what is lacking in such a perspective is an 
understanding of law as a juridic form of capital, as a necessary and embedded feature 
of capitalism.108  Studies of labour law tend to be in discussions of broader compass, 
and commonly analyse it in terms of the instrumental purposes it serves.109  Law doesn’t 
feature here as a specific, form-determined battleground, but as just one of so many 
forms of regulation and control in a capitalist society.  The warning of Pashukanis 
against conceiving law in these terms springs to mind.110  
As canvassed in chapter 2, this historical shortcoming presents no great difficulty.  The 
PRA is perfectly capable of accommodating a theory of juridic forms,111 provided the 
mode of regulation concept is not conceived as a bundle of institutions designed to 
externally control a capitalist economy, but is instead a hierarchy of forms no less 
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rooted in capitalist social relations.112  With this union, a powerful synthetic theory 
emerges, one capable of unifying the abstract and the concrete in the study of labour 
law.   
Moreover, the comparative neglect of labour law from a PRA perspective is ameliorated 
somewhat by the fact that the past two decades has seen a broader resurgence in work 
exploring the articulations between law and the economy.  Perspectives include the law 
and economics literature, Varieties of Capitalism, Legal Origins, Critical Legal Studies, 
the ‘New Institutionalism,’ institutional complementarity and the Labour Market 
Regulation Approach.113  Certain of these approaches, notably the law and economic 
literature, are thoroughly incompatible with a PRA perspective, rooted as it is in a 
neoclassical conception of rational actors and efficiency.114  I have elsewhere criticised 
others, such as the Varieties of Capitalism and Legal Origins, for being markedly 
inferior to the PRA in terms of explaining legal development.115  None of these 
traditions tend to start from a rigorous Marxist political economy, revealed by the fact 
that notions like ‘endogenity’ and ‘complementarity’ start from a conceptual separation 
of law and economics, as opposed to conceiving them as different forms of capital.  For 
all that, however, much of this work paints a rich empirical picture of the developments 
taking hold of labour law at the concrete level.  The Labour Market Regulation 
Approach in particular has tackled the problem of describing the changing face of 
Australian labour law and the increasingly diverse web of legal relations surrounding 
                                                          
112 It is for this reason that, in the previous chapter, I rejected a conceptualisation of a mode of regulation 
as being a ‘meso’-level construct.  Such a notion seems to suggest that the elements of a mode of 
regulation, most particularly the state and the law, are not so embedded in capitalist social relations as the 
economic forces encapsulated by an accumulation regime.   
113 For useful overviews of these perspectives see: Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics 
(Prentice Hall, 2011); Peter Hall and David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, 2001); Juan C. Botero, Simeon 
Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, ‘The Regulation of Labor’ 
(2004) 119(4) Quarterly Journal of Economics 1339; Klare, above n 81; Raymond Hogler, ‘The 
Consequences of Culture: Legal History, Labor Law, and the Contributions of Christopher Tomlins’ 
(2013) 38(3) Law & Social Inquiry 722; C.A. Heimer, ‘Law: New Institutionalism’ in Neil J. Smelser and 
Paul B. Baltes (eds), International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Pergamon, 2001) 
8534; Lauren B. Edelman and Mark C. Suchman, ‘The Legal Environments of Organizations’ (1997) 23 
Annual Review of Sociology 479; Lauren B. Edelman and Robin Stryker, ‘A Sociological Approach to 
Law and the Economy’ in Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg (eds), The Handbook of Economic 
Sociology (Princeton University Press, 2005) 527; Beth Ahlering and Simon Deakin, ‘Labor Regulation, 
Corporate Governance, and Legal Origin: A Case of Institutional Complementarity?’ (2007) 41(4) Law & 
Society Review 865; Christopher Arup et al (eds), Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation (The 
Federation Press, 2006).  
114 Edelman and Stryker, above n 113, 527. 
115 Heino, ‘Capitalism, regulation theory and Australian labour law’, above n 2, 457. 
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work.116  Where relevant, and with a retooling to fit a regulation perspective, such work 
can help illuminate the legal changes which the PRA has generally eschewed to analyse.  
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have constructed a rigorous hierarchy of abstraction accounting for the 
place of law within the capitalist mode of production abstractly, and within models of 
development more concretely.  The most abstract legal form is a necessary correlate to 
the commodity form, which explains its roots in pre-capitalist societies.  However, the 
development of capitalist production relations sees both a quantitative extension and 
qualitative deepening of this form.  The advent of the state as a related juridic form, the 
generalisation of commodity production and exchange and the commodification of 
labour power exert a fundamentally transformative influence.  The lattermost in 
particular is crucial; by commodifying labour-power, and thus extending the legal form 
over it, capitalism integrates a thinking and active collective subject, the proletariat, into 
the legal process.   
Labour law features most prominently in this process, as it is the area of law most 
intimately related to the class struggle, defining as it does the terms and conditions upon 
which labour-power can be employed and exploited by capitalists.  By unifying as a 
class, the proletariat is capable of forcing its own political economy onto the legal form, 
which the state registers through acts of administration.  These are ad hoc responses to 
working-class power that plug the gaps opened in the abstract legal form (and its 
assumption of de-classed juridical citizen-subjects) with specific institutions that 
address workers and their organisations at the same time that they extinguish the 
subversive potential of their struggle.  Within the framework of a capitalist society, 
administration can thus never liberate the working-class; it can only alter the terms on 
which it is exploited. 
The structure of a law-administration continuum, and the balance between its two poles, 
is an explicitly historical product.  Labour law forms a key part of a mode of regulation, 
whether in coherence or crisis, and is especially significant regarding state forms and 
the codification of the wage-labour nexus.  Given the contribution of a mode of 
regulation to a stable model of development, it is clear that particular arrangements of 
                                                          
116 Arup et al, above n 113. 
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this continuum are in part constitutive of the latter.  To the extent that models of 
development work out the many contradictions of capital to varying degrees, are 
premised upon a particular modality of accumulation and extant institutions, and 
channel the class struggle in different fashions, the regimes of labour law corresponding 
with them will be unique.  When, however, crisis undermines the stability of a model of 
development, its labour law regime will be called into question.  At such historical 
junctures, the nexus point between law and administration proves fluid and can, 
depending upon the balance of social forces, be shifted.  In chapters 5 and 6 I will 
elucidate the relationship between the evolution of post-World War II Australian 
capitalism and regimes of labour law, focussing particularly upon the reformulation of 
the law-administration continuum. 
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Chapter 4 
ANTIPODEAN FORDISM AND LIBERAL-PODUCTIVISM 
IN AUSTRALIA 
In chapter 2 I outlined the concepts and methodology underpinning a regulationist 
perspective.  In particular, I noted that a coherent combination of an industrial 
paradigm, accumulation regime and mode of regulation can constitute a model of 
development, a stable instantiation of the capitalist mode of production.  Understanding 
the ascendency of certain models, their ensuing crisis and the rise of new structures 
(which may or may not cohere into a new model of development) is a most useful 
means by which capitalism can be periodised into distinct epochs. 
Here, I elucidate the two models of development which have defined post-World War II 
Australian capitalism: antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism in Australia.  
These are derived from the more abstract regulationist ideal-types, Fordism and liberal-
productivism, which have broadly characterised the nature of capitalism in advanced 
capitalist countries.  The former, however, have been sensitised to the Australian 
context and thus display a unique institutional materiality and distinctive trajectories of 
crisis.  They are therefore pitched at a lower level of abstraction and do, contra Fordism 
and liberal-productivism as used in the regulation literature, concretely describe the 
experience of a specific society.  
As will become clear in the course of this chapter, antipodean Fordism and liberal-
productivism, whilst clearly manifestations of their respective ideal-types, were/are 
distinctive in a number of significant ways.  Peculiarities in industrial paradigms, 
accumulation regimes and modes of regulation ensured that antipodean Fordism and 
liberal-productivism in Australia had/have unique mechanisms of coherence and 
trajectories of crisis.1   
This reality informs the second task of this chapter, which is to indicate in an abstract 
way the place of labour law within these two models.  The picture presented is 
somewhat one-sided, in that I am here more concerned with how the labour law regime, 
                                                          
1 The arguments presented in this chapter have been made, in an abridged form, in: Brett Heino, 
‘Capitalism, regulation theory and Australian labour law: Towards a new theoretical model” (2015) 39(3) 
Capital & Class 453. 
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and the industrial relations institutions it creates, gives effect to the functional 
requirements of a model of development; that is, what abstract conditions does a model 
of development require to successfully reproduce, and how does labour law contribute 
to that process?  The results of this analysis specifies the kind of functions a labour law 
regime will be called upon to perform and its resultant basic characteristics, as well as 
the particular configuration of the law-administration continuum it manifests.  However, 
echoing Jessop, the fact that particular functions are expected of a form is no indication 
it can actually perform accordingly.2  If this chapter concentrates more on the political 
economic framework within which labour law operates, this is not to suggest that the 
latter plays no role in constituting that framework.  The conception of law as a juridic 
form of capital does not admit of conceiving law in these terms.  The following chapter 
will explore in a more detailed and dynamic sense the internal structure of the labour 
law regime, and how it shaped the fortunes of both models of development.   
Before this closer investigation, however, I must first outline the abstract ideal-typical 
models of development from which the Australian variants are derived. 
Fordism as an ideal-type 
The construction for which the PRA is most well-known (or perhaps notorious) is 
Fordism.  The term, which was coined by Gramsci to describe the development of early 
twentieth century American capitalism,3 has, within a regulationist perspective, been 
used variously to describe an industrial paradigm, an accumulation regime and a mode 
of regulation.4  This is not to mention the confusion added by use outside of a 
regulationist paradigm.5  I stated in chapter 2 that it was specifically as a model of 
development that I deployed Fordism.  It is thus necessary to unfold it precisely. 
                                                          
2 Bob Jessop, ‘Regulation theory, post Fordism and the state: more than a reply to Werner Bonefield’ 
(1988) 12(1) Capital & Class 147, 155. 
3 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith 
trans, ElecBook, 1999) 558-622. 
4 Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum, Beyond the Regulation Approach: Putting Capitalist Economies in 
their Place (Edward Elgar, 2006) 58-89. 
5 Robert Boyer, The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction (Columbia University Press, 1990) ix-xix; 
Ian Hampson, ‘Post-Fordism, the “French Regulation School”, and the Work of John Mathews’ (1991) 28 
Journal of Australian Political Economy 92, 115, 122-124. 
 
 
71 
Lipietz is the scholar who has most consistently and rigorously described Fordism as a 
model of development.6  According to him, Fordism combined:  
 a Taylorist, mechanised labour process paradigm within large, multi-department 
firms; 
 an autocentric mass production/mass consumption intensive accumulation 
regime synthesizing full employment with rising productivity and real wages; 
and  
 a mode of regulation involving a Keynesian Welfare National State (KWNS) 
that guaranteed effective demand through protective social legislation and the 
generalisation of mass consumption norms.7   
 
Each of these structures had their roots in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  However, it was only after World War II – which simultaneously soaked up 
Depression-era unemployment, intensified industrial production, resulted in a massive 
devalorisation of capital and forged a new international hierarchy – that these elements 
could cohere into the Fordist model of development.  
As was indicated in the previous chapter, the contradictions of capitalism are not 
expressed uniformly, or assume the same significance, in different historical 
conjunctures.  Althusser notes that within given social orders, certain contradictions 
appear as primary, others secondary.8  Moreover, each contradiction has opposite poles, 
tension points pulling in opposite directions.9  It is this reality Jessop and Sum capture 
when they note that: 
The commodity is both an exchange value and a use value; the worker is both an 
abstract unit of labour power replaceable by other such units … and a concrete 
individual with specific skills, knowledge and creativity; the wage is both a cost 
of production and a source of demand; money functions both as an international 
currency and as national money; productive capital is both abstract value in 
                                                          
6 See, for example: Alain Lipietz, Towards a New Economic Order: Postfordism, Ecology and 
Democracy (Malcolm Slater trans, Polity Press, 1992) 3-7; Alain Lipietz, ‘The Post-Fordist World: 
Labour Relations, International Hierarchy and Global Ecology’ (1997) 4(1) Review of International 
Political Economy 1, 2-3; Alain Lipietz, ‘Fears and hopes: The crisis of the liberal-productivist model and 
its green alternative’ (2013) 37(1) Capital & Class 127, 128-129. 
7 Lipietz, Towards a New Economic Order, above n 6, 3-7. 
8 Louis Althusser, For Marx (Ben Brewster trans, NLB, 1977) 87-128. 
9 Ibid.  
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motion … and a concrete stock of time-and-place-specific assets in the course of 
being valorized; and so forth.10 
 
On this basis, Jessop adds that:  
[A] given stage or variety of capitalism would differ in terms of the weights 
attributed to different contradictions and dilemmas (hierarchisation), the 
importance accorded to their different aspects (prioritisation), the role of 
different spaces, places, and scales in these regards (spatialisation), and the 
temporal patterns of their treatment (temporalisation).11 
 
Fordism was indelibly marked by the ruination of the Great Depression out of which it 
emerged.  The causes of this economic catastrophe were complex, but a yawning 
disproportion between Departments I and II,12 and relative overproduction compared to 
the restricted purchasing power of the working-class,13 were root problems.  It is thus 
unsurprising that various regulationists have remarked that the wage-labour nexus, the 
set of legal and institutional conditions governing the terms of wage-labour,14 was the 
site of dominant contradiction in the Fordist model of development.15  To prevent a 
recurrence of the species of crisis seen in the Great Depression, the working-class had to 
be subsumed within the developing Taylorist, mechanised industrial paradigm and 
guaranteed the purchasing power to absorb the mass of commodities emanating 
therefrom.  The keys to both were the repositioning of wages as a source of domestic 
demand (rather than simply a cost of production)16 and the encouragement of moderate 
                                                          
10 Jessop and Sum, above n 4, 329. 
11 Bob Jessop, ‘Revisiting the regulation approach: Critical reflections on the contradictions, dilemmas, 
fixes and crisis dynamics of growth regimes’ (2013) 37(1) Capital & Class 5, 10. 
12 Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience (David Fernbach trans, NLB, 
1979) 93-96. 
13 Steven Kettell, ‘Circuits of Capital and Overproduction: A Marxist Analysis of the Present World 
Economic Crisis’ (2006) 38(1) Review of Radical Political Economics 24, 28-31. 
14 Robert Boyer, ‘Perspectives on the wage-labour nexus’ in Robert Boyer & Yves Saillard (eds) 
Régulation Theory: The State of the Art (Carolyn Shread trans, Routledge, 2002) 73, 73-74. 
15 See, for example: Pascal Petit, ‘Structural Forms and Growth Regimes of the Post-Fordist Era’ (1999) 
57(2) Review of Social Economy 220, 221; Robert Boyer, ‘The Political in the Era of Globalization and 
Finance: Focus on Some Régulation School Research’ (2000) 24(2) International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 274, 279-281; Jessop, ‘Revisiting the regulation approach’, above n 11, 14.  Jessop 
also notes that the money form was a site of dominant contradiction within Fordism.  Money was 
principally characterised by its form as national credit money, as opposed to the international, 
hypermobile and diversified forms it assumes under liberal-productivism.  Given my focus on labour law, 
I concentrate on the wage-labour nexus, but I will discuss the impact of shifting money forms where 
relevant, such as the discussion of relocation of production and capital whipsawing in chapter 8: Jessop, 
‘Revisiting the regulation approach’, above n 11, 14, 18. 
16 Jessop, ‘Revisiting the regulation approach’, above n 11, 14. 
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unionism, which obtained increased wages for workers at the cost of deeper real 
subordination to managerial prerogative in the organisation of the labour process.17   
With this understanding of the centrality of the wage-labour nexus within Fordism, we 
can schematically describe the dynamic of Fordism en régulation.  The application of 
Taylorist, mass production principles in the labour process resulted in substantial 
productivity gains for capitalists.18  In exchange for accepting the enhanced managerial 
prerogative and labour intensification consequent upon this development, workers were 
given liberal rights to organise and assured employment security and a growth in their 
real wages in line with productivity improvements.19  The resultant increased 
purchasing power in the proletariat’s hands allowed it to consume a greater proportion 
of the goods and services it created (including the mass-produced consumer goods 
increasingly emanating from Department II), ensuring both high utilisation of capital 
capacity and further opportunities for capitalists to expand the scale of production.20  
This demand thus begets further productivity improvements, beginning the cycle 
afresh.21  To fortify and guarantee this process, the national state adopts policies 
designed to maintain full employment, smooth the business cycle and support the 
stability of demand by ensuring those temporarily out of work or not a part of the labour 
force can nevertheless consume.22  This in turn presupposes both the capacity and 
willingness of the state to directly involve itself in the circuit of capital. 
                                                          
17 David Neilson, ‘Formal and real subordination and the contemporary proletariat: Re-coupling Marxist 
class theory and labour-process analysis’ (2007) 31(1) Capital & Class 89, 102-103. 
18 Josef Esser and Joachim Hirsch, ‘The Crisis of Fordism and the Dimensions of a ‘Post-Fordist’ 
Regional and Urban Structure’ in Ash Amin (ed), Post-Fordism: A Reader (Blackwell Publishers, 1994) 
71, 75-76; Maria Ivanova, ‘Consumerism and the Crisis” Wither ‘the American Dream’?’ (2011) 37(3) 
Critical Sociology 329, 333. 
19 Michel Aglietta, ‘Capitalism at the Turn of the Century: Regulation Theory and the Challenge of Social 
Change’ (1998) 232 New Left Review 41, 57-58; Neilson, ‘Formal and real subordination’, above n 17, 
102-103; Thom Workman, If You’re in my Way, I’m Walking: The Assault of Working People Since 1970 
(Fernwood Publishing, 2009) 9-16; Ben Spies-Butcher, Joy Paton and Damien Cahill, Market Society: 
History, theory, practice (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 170. 
20 Michel Juillard, ‘Accumulation regimes’ in Robert Boyer and Yves Saillard (eds), Régulation Theory: 
The State of the Art (Carolyn Shread trans, Routledge, 2002) 153, 155. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Jessop and Sum, above n 4, 107. 
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This ‘virtuous, self-reinforcing cycle’23 served to offset and/or defer the crisis 
tendencies of capitalism, albeit in a provisional and ultimately self-defeating way.  
Vidal notes that: 
The profit rate in the Fordist period was high initially because it followed a 
massive decline in the value of physical capital and the nominal value of 
financial assets during the Great Depression and World War II.  A rise in the 
technical composition of capital was offset by a continuous rise in productivity 
generated by intensive growth, underconsumptionism offset by rising real wages 
and overproduction moderated through nationally bound, oligopolistic 
competition, again with balanced growth via standardized mass production and 
institutional supports for mass consumption.24 
 
This ability to ameliorate some of capitalism’s most powerful crisis tendencies is the 
key to understanding the physiology of the post-World War II boom, extending up until 
the early 1970s.  This was an era of unprecedented economic growth and stability in 
advanced industrial countries.  Kettell describes this period as:  
[T]he greatest economic boom in the history of world capitalism.  Between 1950 
and 1973 the growth of output and fixed capital investment in “advanced” 
capitalist economies reached virtually double the levels attained during the 
previous golden age of capitalism from 1870 to 1913, while the global market 
experienced an almost continuous expansion as industrialization spread further 
into “developing” nations.  These factors enabled major capitalist economies to 
enjoy a heady mix of high profit margins, annual wage increases, moderate 
inflation, and relatively low levels of unemployment.25 
 
Faulkner adds, ‘[h]igh growth rates, rapidly rising living standards, a business cycle 
whose occasional slowdowns were so slight as to be barely noticeable – these things 
made it appear to many that capitalism had solved its problems and could now deliver 
endless and increasing prosperity for all.’26  Countries as varied as the USA,27 France,28 
                                                          
23 Philipp Genschel and Laura Seelkopf, ‘The Competition State: The Modern State in a Global 
Economy’ in Stephen Leibfried, Evelyne Huber, Matthew Lange, Jonah D, Levy, Frank Nullmeier and 
John D. Stephens (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Transformations of the State (Oxford University Press, 
2015) 237-241. 
24 Matt Vidal, ‘Postfordism as a dysfunctional accumulation regime: a comparative analysis of the USA, 
the UK and Germany’ (2013) 27(3) Work, Employment and Society 451, 458. 
25 Kettell, above n 13, 32. 
26 Neil Faulkner, A Marxist History of the World: From Neanderthals to Neoliberals (Pluto Press, 2013) 
254. 
27 Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, above n 12; Nick Heffernan, Capital, Class & Technology 
in Contemporary American Culture: Projecting Post-Fordism (Pluto Press, 2000) 27. 
28 Alain Lipietz, ‘Accumulation, Crises, and Ways Out: Some Methodological Reflections on the Concept 
of “Regulation”’ (1988) 18(2) International Journal of Political Economy 10, 26-27. 
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West Germany29 and, as we shall see, Australia, experienced a Fordist boom, albeit to 
varying degrees and with distinct institutional twists.   
Antipodean Fordism 
Australia most certainly shared in the post-World War II boom.  Between the years 
1950-1969, the Australian economy grew at the very impressive average of over 5% per 
annum.30  The pattern from the late 1940s until the early 1970s was one of high and 
sustained growth, free from the perturbations of the 1920s and 1930s, where strong 
growth years of between 5-10% were interspersed with periods of precipitous decline.31  
Labour productivity grew vigorously in the 1950s, with a veritable surge of 2.75% 
average annual growth between 1964-65 and 1973-74.32  This tremendous growth was 
reflected in the fact that the growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per worker 
waxed in the 1950s and 1960s.33  As would be anticipated in a Fordist society, this 
productivity growth was articulated to real wage improvements:34 real wage growth in 
the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s averaged 2-3% per annum.35  Effective and durable 
full employment was attained, with the unemployment rate rarely exceeding 2% 
between 1945 and the early 1970s.36  The growth of investment in fixed capital, both in 
trend terms and as a percentage of GDP, reached new highs.37  Most significantly for 
capitalists, the basic indicators of the robustness of capital accumulation were healthy; 
                                                          
29 Bob Jessop, ‘Conservative Regimes and the Transition to Post-Fordism: The cases of Britain and West 
Germany’ in Mark Gottdiener and Nicos Komninos (eds), Capitalist Development and Crisis Theory: 
Accumulation, Regulation and Spatial Restructuring (Palgrave Macmillan, 1989) 261. 
30 David Meredith and Barrie Dyster, Australia in the Global Economy (Cambridge University Press, 
1999) 157; Dean Parham, ‘Labour’s Share of Growth in Income and Prosperity’ (Visiting Researcher 
Paper, Productivity Commission, 2013) 27. 
31 Department of the Treasury, ‘Australia’s century since Federation at a glance’ (2001) Economic 
Roundup 53, 54. 
32 Industry Commission, ‘Assessing Australia’s Productivity Performance’ (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1997) 34-35. 
33 Ibid 35.  
34 Matt Cowgill, ‘A Shrinking Slice of the Pie’ (ACTU, 2013) 4-6. 
35 Paul Frijters and Robert Gregory, ‘From Golden Age to Golden Age: Australia’s ‘Great Leap 
Forward’?’ (2006) 82(257) Economic Record 207, 207-209. 
36 A. Barnard, N.G. Butlin and J.J. Pincus, ‘Public and Private Sector Employment in Australia, 1901-
1974’ (1977) 10(1) Australian Economic Review 43, 50; R.A. Foster and S.E. Stewart, ‘Australian 
Economic Statistics: 1949/50 to 1989/90’ (Occasional Paper 8, Reserve Bank of Australia, 1991) 172. 
37 For example, the real investment growth rate from 1960-69 averaged 7.43% annually, whilst gross 
fixed capital expenditure in the 1960s represented 25.6% of GDP.  See, respectively: Phillip Anthony 
O’Hara, ‘A Social Structure of Accumulation for Long Wave Upswing in Australia?’ (2008) 61 Journal 
of Australian Political Economy 88, 99; Stephen Bell, ‘Inequality, Investment and Trade: The Failure of 
Supply Side Market Liberalism’ (1996) 37 Journal of Australian Political Economy 29, 36. 
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the average rate of profit achieved during the boom is higher than at any subsequent 
point.38  The same can be said for the rate of surplus value.39  
That broadly similar results were achieved in countries identified by regulationists as 
Fordist makes a prima facie case for saying that Australia too experienced a Fordist 
phase.  There is certainly a considerable number of scholars who have explicitly made 
that claim, although the exact meaning they ascribe to the term Fordism is subject to the 
ambiguities I noted above.40  Additionally, there is the work of those such as Lloyd and 
Broomhill who, although they have coined their own terms, draw heavily from the 
regulationist methodology and concepts and recognise something distinctive about 
Australian capitalism during the long boom.41 
The analysis embarked on here uses the ideal-typical model of Fordism elucidated 
above as a focussing device, an abstract outline of causal relationships to guide 
investigation into the structure of post-World War II Australian political economy.  The 
pattern of economic growth, the nature of macroeconomic indicators, the roles and 
functions of the state and, most importantly here, the success of labour law and 
industrial relations institutions in codifying the requisite wage-labour nexus entitle us to 
                                                          
38 O’Hara shows that the average rate of profit (after tax) from 1960-69 was 5.5% (compared, for 
example, to the 3.0% prevailing between 1980-89).  Mohun further adds that a high-water mark profit rate 
(before tax) of 16.2% was achieved in 1969.  See, respectively: O’Hara, above n 37, 100; Simon Mohun, 
‘The Australian Rate of Profit 1965-2001’ (2003) 52 Journal of Australian Political Economy 83, 88. 
39 O’Hara, above n 37, 100. 
40 See, for example: Alastair Greig, ‘Australian Housing, Technological Change and the Fordist Regime 
of Accumulation’ (1997) 12(3) Housing Studies 321; Mark Rolfe, ‘Faraway Fordism: the 
Americanization of Australia and New Zealand During the 1950s and 1960s’ (1999) 33(1) New Zealand 
Journal of History 65; Ray Broomhill, ‘Neoliberal Globalism and the Local State: A Regulation 
Approach’ (2001) 48 Journal of Australian Political Economy 115; Mark Rolfe, ‘Antipodean Fordism: 
Postwar Americanisation down under’ in John Wood & Michael Wood (eds) Henry Ford: critical 
evaluations in business and management Volume 2 (Routledge, 2003) 323-353; James Walsh, ‘Mass 
Migration and the Mass Society: Fordism, Immigration Policy and the Post-War Long Boom in Canada 
and Australia, 1947-1970’ (2012) 25(3) Journal of Historical Sociology 352; Lynne Chester, ‘The 
Australian variant of neoliberal capitalism’ in Damien Cahill, Lindy Edwards and Frank Stilwell (eds), 
Neoliberalism: Beyond the Free Market (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012) 153; Brett Heino and James 
Dahlstrom, ‘War Crimes and the Parisian Régulation Approach: Representations of the Crisis of 
Antipodean Fordism’ (2014/15) 74 Journal of Australian Political Economy 95; Heino, ‘Capitalism, 
regulation theory and Australian labour law’, above n 1. 
41 Christopher Lloyd, ‘Regime Change in Australian Capitalism: Towards a Historical Political Economy 
of Regulation’ (2002) 42(3) Australian Economic History Review 238; Christopher Lloyd, ‘Economic 
policy and Australian state building: from labourist-protectionism to globalisation’ in Alice Teichova and 
Herbert Matis (eds) Nation, State and the Economy in History (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 404; 
Christopher Lloyd, ‘Australian Capitalism Since 1992: A New Regime of Accumulation?’ (2008) 61 
Journal of Australian Political Economy 30; Ray Broomhill, ‘Australian Economic Booms in Historical 
Perspective’ (2008) (61) Journal of Australian Political Economy 12. 
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call Australian society between 1945 and the early 1970s a Fordist one.42  However, it 
will be recalled that in chapter 2 I noted that Fordism as an ideal-type captures the 
dynamic of an epoch of capitalism without describing the concrete experience of any 
one society.  For the model to fulfil its analytical potential, it must be sensitised to 
particular concrete contexts.  If this process of sensitisation is ignored, important 
features of national difference are elided and the experiences of the country closest to 
the ideal-type (in the case of Fordism, the USA) tend to be reified.43  Treuren highlights 
the dangers in so applying the Fordist concept to Australia: ‘[S]imply reading off the 
results of French or US regulationist research, and importing into the Australian context 
is methodologically inappropriate, and will provide misleading results.’44 
The proper method of placing the Fordist concept into a dialectical relationship with the 
Australian experience of the post-War boom reveals a model of development that, 
whilst recognisably Fordist, modifies some of its key constituent components.  Broadly, 
this Australian incarnation of Fordism combined: 
 an industrial paradigm based on mass production but marked by an incomplete 
incorporation of Taylorist forms of work control and organisation; with45  
 an intensive accumulation regime of mass production and mass consumption 
which was not autarkic; that is, it was premised upon the ability of the export-
oriented farming and mining sectors to underwrite high levels of industrial 
protection;46 and 
 a mode of regulation that precociously enshrined the Fordist wage-labour nexus 
in the arbitration system.  This mode, although guaranteed by the KWNS, was 
                                                          
42 This surety comes from treating Fordism as a model of development and observing the overall dynamic 
of this structured totality.  If Fordism referred to an industrial paradigm, accumulation regime or mode of 
regulation singly, it would be much easier to analytically ‘lose sight of the forest for the trees’ and be 
misled by national difference into invalidating it as a model useful in explaining an epoch of capitalism.   
43 A point I have made before: Heino and Dahlstrom, above n 40, 103. 
44 Gerrit Treuren, ‘Regulation Theory and Australian Theorising of Institutional Change in Industrial 
Regulation’ (Paper presented at 11th AIRAANZ Conference, Brisbane, 30 January-1 February 1997) 358, 
362. 
45 Chris Wright, ‘Taylorism Reconsidered: The Impact of Scientific Management within the Australian 
Workplace’ (1993) 64 Labour History 34. 
46 Stephen Bell and Brian Head, ‘Australia’s political economy: Critical themes and issues’ in Stephen 
Bell and Brian Head (eds), State, Economy and Public Policy in Australia (Oxford University Press, 
1994) 10-13. 
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characterised by the unification of that state’s economic and social 
objectives/functions.47 
I have dubbed this model of development antipodean Fordism (a term coined by Rolfe 
who, however, uses it as a vague cultural construct).48  It builds upon the features of the 
‘Australian mode of development’ Treuren hinted at whilst more clearly systematising it 
in line with discrete PRA concepts.49 
With this cursory definition in hand, we can now move to a closer investigation of the 
convergences and differences between the abstract Fordist model of development and 
antipodean Fordism.  This is best done by exploring the latter’s constituent industrial 
paradigm, accumulation regime and mode of regulation. 
Industrial paradigm 
The dominant Fordist industrial paradigm is summarised pithily by Lipietz, who 
describes it as ‘Taylorism plus mechanization.’50  It combined a Taylorist structure of 
job organisation, culture and control with mechanised, supply-driven mass production 
deriving economies of scale from the employment of rigid, specialised machinery.51  As 
mentioned in chapter 2, this is not to suggest that all work has to be organised on these 
principles; indeed, the success of the latter was often reflected by a growth in those 
sectors not then amenable to them.52  It is enough that certain ‘lead sectors’53 (in the 
Fordist era epitomised by manufacturing, most commonly the automobile and 
                                                          
47 Francis Castles, ‘The Wage Earners’ Welfare State Revisited: Refurbishing the Established Model of 
Australian Social Protection, 1983-93’ (1994) 29(2) Australian Journal of Social Issues 120, 123-124. 
48 Rolfe, ‘Antipodean Fordism’, above n 40.  For examples of my deployment of the term, see: Heino and 
Dahlstrom, above n 40; Heino, ‘Capitalism, regulation theory and Australian labour law’, above n 1.  
49 Treuren, ‘Regulation Theory’, above n 44, 366. 
50 Lipietz, ‘The Post-Fordist World’, above n 6, 2. 
51 Matt Vidal, ‘Reworking Postfordism: Labor Process Versus Employment Relations’ (2011) 5(4) 
Sociology Compass 273, 279. 
52 See, for example: Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, above n 12, 166; Greig, above n 40, 322-
327. 
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The former revolves mainly around productivity; the lead sectors are those most strongly representative 
of the dominant industrial paradigm, generating above average productivity and high wages.  The latter, 
whilst certainly not discounting the importance of productivity, includes a more explicitly institutional 
assessment of the relative importance of different sectors.  Throughout this thesis, I adopt the latter view, 
expressed in my definition of lead sectors as those industries in which outcomes disproportionately affect 
industrial, economic and social outcomes in other industries. 
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whitegoods industries) employ them.54  The productivity growth and resultant wage 
increases obtaining in these sectors can then, with appropriately supportive institutions, 
spill over into the workforce at large.   
It is clear that the industrial paradigm of antipodean Fordism fulfilled the mechanised 
mass productionist side of the abstract model.  World War II had fuelled a tremendous 
increase in the scale and diversity of the manufacturing sector.55  The most pronounced 
growth was in relatively capital-intensive industries, such as metals, 
chemicals/petrochemicals and electrical goods, which were able to exploit a growing 
domestic market to reap economies of scale through the employment of machinery and 
advanced manufacturing techniques.56  True, widespread mass production thus took off, 
and Australians were soon consuming a wide variety of mass produced goods. 
Whilst antipodean Fordism demonstrably took a mass productionist industrial paradigm 
as the source of manufacturing dynamism, it didn’t, however, integrate Taylorist forms 
of work organisation to the extent the abstract model would suggest.  This claim can be 
considerably sharpened if a nuanced approach to Taylorism is adopted. 
To provide a complete overview of Taylorism (or ‘scientific management’ as it became 
popularised) is beyond the ambit of this work.  Indeed, a whole book could be devoted 
simply to unfolding the different, and in many instances competing, definitions of 
Taylorism.57  For the purposes of this chapter, I will advance a two-pronged definition 
of scientific management: firstly, as a general ideology of labour process control; and 
secondly as a concrete set of practices and techniques adopted by management.58 
                                                          
54 Bob Jessop, ‘Thatcherism and flexibility: the white heat of a post-Fordist revolution’ in Bob Jessop, 
Hans Kastendiek, Klaus Nielsen and Ove Kai Pedersen (eds), The Politics of Flexibility: Restructuring 
State and Industry in Britain, Germany and Scandinavia (Edward Elgar, 1991) 135, 136-137. 
55 Tom Sheridan, Mindful Militants: The Amalgamated Engineering Union in Australia 1920-1972 
(Cambridge University Press, 1975) 130-146; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia 1988 
(1301.0, No. 71, 1988) 673; Stuart Macintyre, Australia’s Boldest Experiment: War and reconstruction in 
the 1940s (NewSouth, 2015) 340-341. 
56 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia 1988, above n 55, 673. 
57 For some key texts, see: Frederick Winslow Taylor, Scientific Management (Harper & Brothers 
Publishers, 1947); Horace Bookwalter Drury, Scientific Management: A History and Criticism (Columbia 
University, 1918); Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the 
Twentieth Century (Monthly Review Press, 1974); J.-C. Spender and Hugo J. Kline (eds), Scientific 
Management: Frederick Winslow Taylor’s Gift to the World? (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996). 
58 Such as the creation of a planning department to specify jobs and control the production process, time 
and motion studies, incentive payment systems related to effort norms etc.  See Wright, above n 45, 38. 
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As an ideology of industrial organisation, Taylorism is best conceived as the divorce of 
the conception and execution elements that together unify the labour process.59  The 
former becomes the preserve of management, which arrogates to itself the knowledge 
and control once exercised by the skilled craftsperson.  Simultaneously, this separation 
of functions was to run parallel to a cultural revolution which was deliberately targeted 
at the destruction of worker sub-cultures of collectivism and their substitution by a 
unified culture of shared interests between labour and capital.60  Allied to systems of 
machinery, scientific management apprehended at this level is a key moment in capital 
gaining real, as opposed to formal, control of the labour process.61 
Considered in this broad sense, there is no denying the influence of Taylorism in the 
Australian context.  Australian capitalists routinely looked to their overseas counterparts 
in America and Britain for what was perceived to be the ‘latest’ in managerial practices 
and strategy, a process that began in the early decades of the twentieth century and 
intensified after World War II.62  The formation of groups such as the Australian 
Institute of Management represented a determined effort on the part of sections of 
capital to train and support a new managerial class, schooled in the techniques and 
culture of Taylorism.63  Moreover, Taksa notes that scientific management had 
profound cultural and ideological implications in Australia that went well beyond the 
extent of its technical application, most notably education reform and the cult of 
‘Americanisation.’64   
The question of how pervasive Taylorism as shop-floor practice was in Australia, 
however, is the source of some debate.65  It is clear that both capital and the state made 
intensive efforts to implant Taylorist forms of work organisation; indeed, as we shall 
see in chapter 7 with the metal trades, the arbitration system itself was often a vehicle 
for their imposition.66  Moreover, the dominant narrative amongst the union movement, 
                                                          
59 Braverman, above n 57, 124-126. 
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particularly the peak Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), is certainly that 
these forms were the prevailing logic of the labour process during the era according 
with antipodean Fordism.67  Empirical research by Wright, however, suggests that the 
actual adoption of Taylorist work practices in this period was somewhat less widespread 
than its ideology.68  He states that ‘Taylorist practices were used by only a minority of 
Australian firms and tended to be concentrated in particular industries.’69  
Unsurprisingly, these industries were concentrated in the manufacturing sector, where 
the production of physical goods generally allowed for a more thorough division of 
labour and an ability to more accurately measure productivity, both on a collective and 
individual basis.  
Outside of manufacturing, the spread of Taylorism as a suite of shop-floor routines 
appears limited.70  Despite the best efforts of capital and the state, for example, the 
building industry in particular proved less amenable to Taylorist techniques than was 
hoped and expected.71  Even within manufacturing, the diffusion of Taylorism was 
retarded in some cases by the nature of the production process itself, particularly insofar 
that the state of technology did not yet allow for a rigid application of Taylorist 
principles.  Wright notes, ‘there were practical limitations upon the use of scientific 
work measurement in all industrial settings.  In particular, detailed work measurement 
was less practical in highly capital intensive industries or those whose products were 
produced over longer periods of time.’72  
As was often the case in the United Kingdom, the adoption of Taylorist techniques 
could also be stymied by trade union resistance.73  Powerful metal unions such as the 
                                                          
67 See, for example: Stephen de Rozairo, Enterprise Bargaining: An ACTU Perspective (1992) ACTU 
<http://www.actu.org.au/actu-media/archives/1992/enterprise-bargaining-an-actu-perspective>; Bill 
Mansfield, The National Training Reform Agenda and Enterprise Bargaining (1993) ACTU 
<http://www.actu.org.au/actu-media/archives/1993/the-national-training-reform-agenda-and-enterprise-
bargaining>; Industrial Democracy Policy (ACTU Congress, 1989) 
<http://www.actu.org.au/media/349707/actucongress1989_industrial_democracy_policy.pdf>. 
68 Wright, above n 45, 41-44.  
69 Ibid 41. 
70 See, for example, the very low use of methods study and work measurement in the finance and property 
and retail sectors in a 1969 survey: Ibid 42. 
71 Greig, above n 40, 322-327. 
72 Wright, above n 45, 43.  He cites as an example the impracticality of Taylorist practices in the steel-
making industry. 
73 Chris Howell, Trade Unions and the State: The Construction of Industrial Relations Institutions in 
Britain, 1890-2000 (Princeton University Press, 2005) 96.  For a useful counter-narrative, however, see: 
Kevin Whitson, ‘Worker Resistance and Taylorism in Britain’ (1997) 42(1) International Review of 
Social History 1.  His account of how Taylorism came to structure the terrain of the labour process, even 
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Amalgamated Engineering Union were particularly opposed, as evidenced by their 
struggle against the imposition of pay incentive schemes.74  In the face of such hostility, 
some employers in the metal trades took discretion as the better of valour and backed 
down.75 
A somewhat piecemeal and incomplete circulation of Taylorist work practices should 
not be taken, however, as a refutation of both its material and symbolic importance 
during the era of antipodean Fordism.  As Wright himself acknowledges, ‘[t]he decades 
of the 1950s and 1960s then were boom years for the application of Taylorist techniques 
in Australian industry.’76  To the extent that Taylorist practices were imposed, they 
tended to be concentrated in the manufacturing sector, the engine of intensive 
accumulation.  Moreover, even in the absence of strictly defined and identifiable work 
practices, the ideology of Taylorism informed the radical separation of conception and 
execution that underlay the mass-production oriented industrial paradigm of antipodean 
Fordism.77 
Accumulation Regime 
The accumulation regime of antipodean Fordism was unmistakably intensive in 
character; that is, it involved an effort on the part of capital to raise the share of relative 
surplus value through a commodification of the proletariat’s means of consumption and, 
in so doing, create an organic series of linkages between Department I and II in the 
production (and reproduction) process.78   
More simply, this intensive accumulation regime unified mass production with mass 
consumption.  The post-War decades saw profligate advertising, easy access to banking 
capital and comparatively high wages create a market for the vehicles, white goods, 
televisions and other appliances which mass production and a diversified manufacturing 
                                                                                                                                                                          
if never perfectly realised according to Taylor’s utopian schemes, has much in common with the 
Australian experience. 
74 See, for example, Sheridan, above n 55, 283-284; Nikki Balnave and Greg Patmore, ‘The AMWU: 
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76 Ibid 40. 
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48 Labour History 54 
78 Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, above n 12, 71-72. 
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sector could now proffer at an affordable price for the working class.79  Mass production 
also took hold of more basic subsistence goods, particularly such items as canned 
goods, confectionary and clothing.80  Suburbanisation, and the concomitant rise in home 
ownership levels to record highs,81 was also a key element of this mass consumption 
paradigm; indeed, Rolfe describes it as ‘the focal point of antipodean Fordism.’82  
Broadly, Walsh notes how ‘[n]ew houses, cars, clothing and consumer durables all 
provided an expanding market for the producers of the Fordist bloc.’83  The net effect 
was to provide the skeleton of the virtuous circle described above. 
As the abstract model of Fordism suggests, the engine of this regime was the 
manufacturing sector.  Balnave and Patmore state that ‘[t]he average annual rate of 
growth for manufacturing output, employment and productivity between 1945-50 and 
1967-68 was 6.1 per cent, 2 per cent and 4.1 per cent.’84  The Australian Bureau of 
Statistics adds: 
Growth of manufacturing output per employee from Federation to World War II 
had varied from 1.0 to 1.3% per annum (excluding the years of the Great 
Depression). During the 1950s and 60s, however, growth rose dramatically to an 
average of 4.3% per annum. Over this period the expansion of manufacturing 
productivity per annum was 11% higher than in the agricultural sector and 
almost double that of the economy as a whole (my emphasis).85 
 
The fact that manufacturing outperformed agriculture (the traditional bastion of the 
Australian economy and its historical means of insertion into the international economy) 
specifically, and the economy generally, prima facie justifies calling it the leading 
sector.  In chapter 7 we will see how the metals sector assumed a particularly important 
lead sector role, acting as the primary site upon which the gains of intensive 
accumulation were institutionally levered. 
                                                          
79 For an excellent description of these processes, see: Greg Whitwell, Making the Market: The Rise of 
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However, despite these similarities between the accumulation regime of the abstract 
model and antipodean Fordism, the latter was distinct in a highly significant way.  
Unlike the ideal-typical construction, this accumulation regime was not autarkic; that is, 
it was unable to form a self-sufficient system.86  It was heavily dependent upon the 
export of primary commodities (such as agricultural and mineral products),87 the 
success of which provided the material basis of the highly protective tariff system which 
allowed Australian manufacturing to fuel intensive accumulation.88 
This introduced a latent yet fundamental fracture point into antipodean Fordism, 
cleaving a line between export-oriented, ‘competitive’ primary production and the 
largely inward-looking, ‘uncompetitive’ manufacturing sector.  The ability of 
antipodean Fordism to accumulate intensively was predicated in part upon the 
subordination of pastoral and mining capital to industrial capital, largely through the 
former paying higher prices for labour and capital inputs.89  Whilst the former 
(particularly the farming sector) were co-opted into the system somewhat through the 
liberal imposition of tariffs on imported products, the increase in mining and energy 
exports in the late 1960s and early 1970s exposed, through a species of the ‘Dutch 
Disease,’ this fragility of the accumulation regime of antipodean Fordism.90 
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Mode of regulation 
In many ways, the mode of regulation that ensured the coherence of the post-war long 
boom was the archetypal Fordist exemplar.  As Lloyd notes, key features of his 
‘labourist-protectionism’ model (which he plots as beginning in the early 1900s),91 such 
as the historic class compromise between capital and labour and the institutions created 
to crystallise and channel it, only became widespread in other industrial countries from 
the 1940s.92  In a more explicitly regulationist fashion, Grieg adds: ‘The Australian 
federal state was well placed to perform a central role in the advent of Fordism, as many 
of the institutions established in the infancy of Federation coincided with the 
requirements of Fordist growth.’93  He adds, ‘[i]f the experience of the US during the 
1930s can be described as a Fordist regime of accumulation in search of a mode of 
regulation, then the Australian experience appears as a mode of regulation waiting for 
a Fordist regime of accumulation’ (my emphasis).94   
This reality should not be taken to suggest that Australia represented a ‘proto-Fordist’ 
society.  Fordism constructed as a model of development denotes the coherence of the 
structured whole; a requisite mode of regulation revolving around the KWNS could not 
be construed as an element of Fordism if it did not articulate with a regime of intensive 
accumulation.95  What the presence of certain precocious institutions did mean, 
however, was an ability to rapidly assume a Fordist trajectory once a critical mass of 
industrialisation had been achieved. 
Where the Australian mode of regulation was truly Fordist par excellence was its 
unique system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration.  A much deeper exploration 
                                                          
91 Depending upon the context of its use, this construction can be largely synonymous with either a 
regulationist model of development or mode of regulation 
92 Lloyd, ‘Regime Change in Australian Capitalism, above n 41, 239, 247.  
93 Greig, above n 40, 329. 
94 Ibid.   
95 Although framed in different terms, this is the mistake Lloyd makes in his formulation of the ‘labourist-
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for Fordist development. 
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of this structure will be made in the subsequent chapters.  Suffice it to say here that the 
arbitration framework proved exceedingly adept at effecting outcomes necessary for the 
Fordist model of development, particularly insofar as it institutionally entrenched the 
Fordist wage-labour nexus.  As this touches directly on the labour law regime, further 
discussion until be reserved for the following section.  
More broadly, other aspects of the ideal-typical Fordist mode of regulation were also 
present.  The Commonwealth Bank of Australia and, from 1960 onward, the Reserve 
Bank of Australia, executed the functions of a central bank and lender of last resort, one 
of the key responses to the crisis of extensive accumulation in the 1930s.96  Both 
oversaw a tightly managed national currency (pegged to the British pound sterling until 
1971) subject to strict exchange and capital controls,97 which aided in the effort to 
shield domestic institutions from the vagaries of the international economy.  The state 
was unmistakably Keynesian in its approach to macroeconomic management, and 
actively used the budget as a counter-cyclical tool.98  The domestic economy was 
dominated by a comparatively small number of large firms, particularly in the mining 
and manufacturing sectors,99 with the latter selling its wares to a predominantly closed, 
national market.100  Oligopolistic competition between such large, often vertically 
integrated firms, was the norm.101  In these respects, the Australian mode of regulation 
during the long boom period closely resembled the ideal-typical Fordist model. 
This mode did, however, possess other features which represented a unique antipodean 
twist to the abstract structures and tendencies of Fordism.  For the purposes of this 
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thesis, the most significant were certain characteristics of the KWNS, most notably the 
mechanisms through which it performed its redistributive capacities. 
Ironically, the arbitration system, which I regarded above as a precociously Fordist 
institution, was also the vehicle of considerable divergence from the ideal-typical 
Fordist model of development.  This paradox stems not so much from the structure or 
function of the arbitral tribunals themselves, but rather from their articulation with the 
wider institutional ensemble of the state.  Broadly, whereas the ideal-typical model of 
the KWNS (and the experience of many European countries) envisages a 
comprehensive system of social support married to a large public sector as the 
instruments of government welfare, the Australian state used the arbitration system as a 
vehicle to deliver social and economic policy.102  As shall be outlined in chapter 5, from 
the landmark Harvester103 decision in 1907, the arbitration system took as a 
foundational concept the ‘Basic Wage,’ a wage minimum deemed necessary to support 
the male worker, his wife and two children in ‘frugal comfort.’104  The provision of a 
substantial arbitral safety net, combined with industry protection and a selective inward 
migration scheme, rendered possible a rather ‘minimalist and residual state welfare 
system.’105  Whilst the abstract goals of the KWNS remained the same, they were 
fulfilled in a distinct way. 
The uniqueness of the Australian state in this regard has been well-captured by Castles, 
who coined a new term to describe it – the ‘wage earners’ welfare state.’106  He states of 
it: 
The simplest way of locating the essential difference between Australia and 
most other nations is to say that, in Australia, wages policy, in large part, 
substituted for social policy, with the functional identity between the two being 
                                                          
102 Breen Creighton, 'One Hundred Years of the Conciliation and Arbitration Power: A Province Lost?' 
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denoted by the peculiar (in terms of capitalistic criteria) importation into 
Antipodean wage-setting mechanisms of such concepts as the ‘fair wage...’107 
 
Although the Australian KWNS performed the functions necessary to Fordism, it 
delivered these policy goals through an institutional configuration which was 
thoroughly novel.  As we shall see below, this idiosyncratic imbrication of the wage-
labour nexus and the form of the Australian KWNS had profound ramifications for the 
structure of antipodean Fordism, particularly insofar as it planted within it the seeds of 
its own unique crisis tendencies. 
Antipodean Fordism and labour law 
With an understanding of antipodean Fordism now in hand, we can move to an abstract 
consideration of the regime of labour law that characterised it. As was previously stated, 
elements of the mode of regulation corresponding with antipodean Fordism predated the 
structured coherence of the whole; certainly this was the case with the system of 
compulsory conciliation and arbitration.  But Fordism as a concept denotes the 
congruity of the whole, a totality that emerged only under the impulses of the crisis of 
the Depression and World War II.  It is to this era that my analysis of labour law 
applies. 
As was mentioned previously, the circuit of capital is wrought by structural 
contradictions which, although all broadly derived from capitalist social relations, are 
nonetheless variegated and fluid through time.  The Fordist model of development, 
partly as a response to the crisis dynamics of the Depression and partly as an effort to 
formalise labour-power within the context of growing union strength, crystallised the 
wage-labour nexus as its primary contradiction.108 
It will be recalled that the key to this nexus is the exchange of employment security, 
liberal rights to unionise and growing real wages for labour intensification and the 
acceptance of managerial prerogative in the labour process.  These are processes which 
go to the heart of labour-power as a commodity, determining the terms and conditions 
upon which labour-power will be exploited by capital.  Chapter 3 demonstrated that this 
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process of commodification was an inherently legal process, with labour law playing 
this function in concrete societies through particular arrangements of the law-
administration continuum.  We can thus say that the antipodean Fordist wage-labour 
nexus both presupposed and reproduced a distinctive labour law regime.109 
So what are the basic legal premises of the antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus?  I 
argue that for this nexus to function, a set of distinct legal and institutional conditions 
was required, namely those that allowed for the diffusion of wage increases from high-
productivity ‘lead sectors,’ permitted collective and ‘connective’ bargaining, 
encouraged the organisation of labour and developed a notion of the ‘standard,’ full-
time employment contract.110   
These functional requirements undergirded the key features of this regime, namely a 
permissive attitude towards organised labour, bargaining between capital and labour at a 
broad occupational and/or industry level, a series of institutions which diffused wage 
gains from leading sectors and the growth of administrative fixes to heightened worker 
power.111  With this abstract understanding in hand, a sketch can be made of the broad 
nature of labour law during the period of antipodean Fordist functionality.  What 
interests us here is the broad brush form and content of the regime of labour law, 
particularly insofar as this is related to the distinct contours and social relationships of a 
particular model of development.  A much more detailed empirical investigation into 
the evolution of labour law through time will be carried out in the following two 
chapters.  
As identified above, one of the key features rendering antipodean Fordism distinctive is 
the unique system of compulsory arbitration.  This structure proved exceedingly adept 
at meeting one of the key requirements of the Fordist model of development, namely, 
                                                          
109 As Boyer does: Boyer, ‘Perspectives on the wage-labour nexus’, above n 14, 73-74.  This is not to 
imply that any and every legal development can be explained by reference to the wage-labour nexus.  One 
of the hallmarks of the legal form, discussed in the previous chapter, is that law achieves its class function 
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impersonality and juridical equality vests the law with its own crisis tendencies, in that it must, as Engels 
notes, possess a degree of internal coherence and stability regarding the judicial decision-making process.  
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form.  See: Friedrich Engels, ‘Letter to Conrad Schmidt’ quoted in Michael Head, Evgeny Pashukanis: A 
Critical Reappraisal (Routledge-Cavendish, 2008). 
110 A point I have made in: Heino, ‘Capitalism, regulation theory and Australian labour law’, above n 1, 
462. 
111 Ibid. 
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ensuring the stability of effective demand, and with it the stability of Fordist intensive 
accumulation, through the creation of a coherent and relatively homogenous wage 
structure.112  This coherence was ensured by institutions linking high-productivity lead 
sectors with the economy and labour force at large.  In Australia, the arbitration system 
was better placed to deliver these outcomes than in other Fordist countries, largely 
through the pyramidal structure of the award system.113   
Cochrane observes the process at play in the post-World War II years, with militant 
unions in the metal trades, mining and stevedoring applying ‘plant by plant duress’ to 
individual employers; concessions, once granted, could ‘flow-on’ to other sectors of the 
economy.114  As we shall see in great detail in chapter 7, this was particularly the case 
with the metals industry, an archetypal Fordist lead sector.  Well into the late 1960s, the 
Metal Trades Award was at the apex of the award system, with tribunal decisions about 
wage margins for skill being founded upon it.  Respondents to other federal awards 
would then have their own award varied accordingly, whilst state tribunals would 
generally follow the lead of their federal counterpart.  Even after the advent of the 
‘Total Wage’ in 1967 (which abolished the traditional practice of determining a ‘Basic 
Wage’ and wage margins separately), the metal awards remained institutionally 
entrenched as pace-setters, and were key instruments in the wage explosion of the early 
1970s.115 
This tendency for the Fordist wage-labour nexus to take root in the Australian 
arbitration system was further expedited by the notion of ‘comparative wage justice,’ 
which enshrined the view that equal work should be equally recompensed regardless of 
industrial location.116  When combined with the dynamic of the metals sector and the 
carefully established relationships of relativities and differentials between various 
awards in the structure, comparative wage justice ensured the flow-on of national wage 
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cases to the workforce at large.117  As shall be demonstrated in chapter 5, such an 
ideology was a powerful force of the wage homogeneity characteristic of the Fordist 
model of development. 
Arbitration was also instrumental in the deployment of another key element of the 
Fordist wage-labour nexus, namely the creation of the category of the full-time, ongoing 
employee working a delimited range of ordinary hours and enjoying a basket of legally 
enforceable entitlements and protections, so-called ‘standard’ employment.118  Bosch 
has described this relationship as: 
‘[S]table, socially protected, dependent, full-time job . . . the basic conditions of 
which (working time, pay, social transfers) are regulated to a minimum level by 
collective labour and/or social security law’ (Bosch 1986: 165). The full-time 
nature of the job, its stability, and the social standards linked with permanent 
full-time work are the key elements in this definition.119 
 
The standard employment model, together with the internal labour markets with which 
they were intimately associated, accorded with the industrial paradigm of Fordism, with 
security of employment part of the quid pro quo for managerial prerogative and labour 
intensification.120  Moreover, it buttressed the ability of workers to take a share in the 
large productivity increases that helped power Fordism,121 maintaining the high levels 
of endogenous demand it required.  Within the fabric of antipodean Fordism, it fell to 
the arbitral tribunals to codify this model.  In the following chapter, I will investigate 
the mechanics of this process, but it suffices here to note that it was only by the mid-
twentieth century, and particularly after World War II, that standard employment came 
                                                          
117 Roy Green, ‘The ‘Death’ of Comparative Wage Justice in Australia’ (1996) 7(2) Economic and 
Labour Relations Review 224, 229. 
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120 Ibid 620. 
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to define the working arrangements of the greater part of the Australian working-
class.122  This is perfectly commensurate with the periodisation forwarded in this thesis. 
Another element of antipodean Fordism that directly shaped the modality of labour law 
was its aforementioned unification of the economic and social policy goals of the 
Australian KWNS.  This tended to both support and place pressure on the antipodean 
Fordist model of development in two distinct ways.  Firstly, the dissemination of 
‘occupational welfare benefits’123  through the award system, and most particularly the 
notions of a Basic Wage and comparative wage justice, tended to produce (in concert 
with the dominance of manufacturing under intensive accumulation) the relatively 
homogenous, compressed wage structure typical of Fordism.  Secondly, however, the 
fact that the mode of regulation peculiar to antipodean Fordism largely subsumed the 
economic and social functions of the KWNS into the quasi-judicial system of wage 
regulation heightened the fundamentally contradictory nature of labour law remarked 
upon in the last chapter.124  That antipodean Fordism combined this contradictory 
structure with broader social and economic imperatives could not help but exacerbate 
this tension, particularly insofar as it encouraged an intimate identity of economic and 
social performance with the regulation of the labour market.125  As will be seen over the 
course of this thesis, this was a tendency that pronounced itself strongly in the crisis of 
antipodean Fordism from the mid-1970s onwards, where the source of malaise was 
often located in the award system and trade union militancy. 
Labour law under antipodean Fordism was premised upon moderate trade unionism, the 
encouragement of which was one of the purposes of the original Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1904.126  The arbitration system itself can be viewed as an 
institutionalised class compromise between labour and capital,127 one that fixed a 
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pronounced institutional role for labour within the fabric of labour law.  Indeed, Justice 
Higgins, the renowned second President of the original Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration, had noted that ‘without unions, it is hard to conceive how arbitration could 
be worked.’128  As was elucidated in the previous chapter, this integration of labour 
demands a particular arrangement of the law-administration continuum, including a 
whole suite of administrative concepts and institutions which take as their subjects the 
collective organs of labour and capital.  The arbitral tribunals and trade unions related to 
each other as part of an administrative totality; the former, empowered by statute, 
‘registered’ trade unions, in the process recognising them as the legitimate 
representatives of the working-class at the same time as conferring a host of benefits 
and costs.  Unions, in turn, made the system effective, policing awards, bringing actions 
and enforcing discipline over their members.  Arbitration required unionism (of a 
moderate stripe) and unionism came to rely heavily upon arbitration.129  The 
administrative forms that constituted and mediated their interactions represented in 
themselves the essential character of administration; dealing with labour and capital as 
collective entities, responding at times in an ad hoc fashion to the spot-fires of 
proletarian activism, yet always striving to abstract the latter into an impersonal and 
formalistic process.  The following chapter will explore the historical unfolding of this 
process in a more rigorous and detailed fashion. 
In short, the features of the labour law regime appropriate to antipodean Fordism 
reflected and crystallised its unique structuring of capitalism’s contradictions, most 
particularly its construction of the wage-labour nexus.  In practice, the elements of the 
system – including compulsory arbitration, the diffusion of the standard employment 
model, encouragement of moderate unionism, the unification of wage and social 
objectives and the growth of administrative fixes to worker power – ensured its 
coherence whilst also containing disequilibria.  All were premised upon a highly 
distinctive law-administration continuum, the heart of which was the arbitration system.  
The crisis of antipodean Fordism from the mid-1970s onwards was simultaneously the 
crisis of this order of labour law. 
                                                          
128 H. B. Higgins, ‘A New Province for Law and Order: Industrial Peace through Minimum Wage and 
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Fordist crisis 
At many points in the course of this thesis I will approach the issue of the crisis of 
antipodean Fordism from around 1973 onwards.  The current discussion is intended not 
as an exhaustive treatment of this crisis, nor of its legal manifestations.  Instead, I seek 
to present a schematic understanding of the unfolding of the crisis, focussing 
particularly on the distinct contribution of law to the nature and trajectory of the crisis 
period. 
For Fordist countries generally, crisis broke out in the early 1970s.  De Vroey notes how 
this crisis exhibited distinctive domestic and international characteristics: 
On one hand, most of the advanced capitalist countries experience a parallel 
dysfunction of intensive accumulation though each has a specific character.  On 
the other hand, on the international scene, we notice a weakening of the 
American hegemony, shifts in the hierarchical structure among national 
economies, and disruptions in the international monetary system.130 
 
More specifically, Fordism began to come apart under the weight of several notable 
crisis tendencies, all rooted in the general contradictions of capitalist social relations but 
imparted with a distinct twist and weight by the architecture of the Fordist model of 
development.  The most important of these were the exhaustion of the productivity-
realising potential of mechanised Taylorism in lead sectors,131 the resistance of 
empowered workers to intensified exploitation and job fragmentation,132 the 
internationalisation of production and resultant ebbing of state power over an enclosed 
national space,133 and the dismemberment of the post-War Bretton Woods financial 
framework.134  The result: burgeoning inflation and the re-emergence of mass 
unemployment combined with slowing economic growth, the infamous ‘stagflation.’ 
That Australian capitalism fell into crisis at this time is indisputable.  The Australian 
Treasury’s figures demonstrate that average GDP growth decreased from 5.3% in the 
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1960s to 3.4% in the 1970s and 1980s, whilst per capita GDP over the same period 
decreased from 3.2% to 1.8% and 1.9% respectively.135  The same figures reveal that 
inflation increased alarmingly, rising from an average of 2.5% in the 1960s to a 
whopping 10.4% in the 1970s, and remaining high at 8.1% in the 1980s.136  
Unemployment rose from around 2% in the late 1960s and early 1970s to 6% by the end 
of the decade, spiking at 10% in 1983 and 11% in 1993.137  After a large increase 
brought about by a wages explosion in 1974-75, real wage levels remained more-or-less 
stagnant for the next twenty years,138 whilst the wages share of GDP (which had peaked 
in 1974-75 and jumped again in 1979-82) entered a period of retreat throughout the 
majority of the 1980s.139  Productivity growth stagnated,140 whilst the value of private 
equipment investment and gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP 
generally declined after the early 1970s, bottoming out in the recession of the early 
1990s.141  Finally, O’Hara notes that two key indicators of capitalist health, the rate of 
profit and the rate of surplus value, took a hit: the former fell from an annual average of 
5.5% from 1960-69 to 3.3% in 1970-79 and 3.0% in 1980-89; the latter dropped by 
almost a third, from 15.0% in 1960-69 to 10.1% from 1970 to 1989.142 
Although the domestic and international angles of this crisis of antipodean Fordism 
were intimately related, it is salutary to treat them separately for purposes of analytical 
clarity.  Beginning with the former, this crisis was first and foremost a crisis of the 
wage-labour relationship, particularly in its manifestation in the dominant industrial 
paradigm and its fixture as a precociously institutionalised nexus in the mode of 
regulation.   
Although, as has been explored, the actual diffusion of Taylorist work practices was 
uneven, and subject in some instances to strong union resistance, Taylorism began to 
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encounter both technical and ideological limits by the late 1960s.143  Technical barriers 
to a mass production-based industrial paradigm derived largely from the stagnation of 
productivity growth that could be achieved by further intensification and routinisation 
of the labour process, along with the growth of imbalances across production lines.144  
Beyond a certain point, efforts to this end tended to provoke worker resistance, which 
manifested itself in both an individual, inchoate way (seen through high absenteeism, 
rapid employee turnover, poor quality work, sabotage etc) and in an organised fashion 
(such as strikes).145 
This phenomenon was no stranger in the Australian context. Broomhill notes how 
‘[m]anufacturing industry, the engine of post-war growth, began to stumble as labour 
productivity levels fell from an average of 3.4 per cent between 1960–73, to 2.3 per cent 
between 1973–9 and then to 1.2 per cent between 1979–93.’146 Bramble describes the 
‘blue-collar blues’ in the leading metals sector: ‘[T]he early 1970s witnessed growing 
labour turnover and absenteeism that were sufficiently worrying to merit reports on the 
first by the Department of Labour and Immigration (1974) and on the second by the 
Department of Productivity (1977).’147 The South Australian Policy Research Group & 
Political Economy Movement (1978: 82) add that: 
During this period absenteeism, labour turnover and industrial disputation 
reached record levels … Workers were sick of alienating and inhuman 
production lines, filthy factories and low wages, they voted with their feet, 
followed the highest pay and stayed away from work often.148 
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Productivity improvement was the engine of the virtuous circle of manufacturing 
underlying antipodean Fordism.  Its stumbling (which was abetted by comparatively 
poor aggregate investment in new technologies consequent upon the aforementioned 
heavy but indiscriminate tariff wall)149 undermined intensive accumulation in that it 
distorted the articulation of mass production and mass consumption with the continued 
valorisation of capital.  Lipietz adroitly summarises this contradiction: 
This system of intensive accumulation combined with monopolist regulation 
may go on indefinitely, the rise in mass purchasing-power making it possible to 
ward off a crisis of overproduction.  However, capital can only remain profitable 
on two conditions: unless increased productivity in the producer-goods sector 
offsets the rising technical composition of capital, the proportion of immobilized 
assets will become dangerously high; and unless increased productivity in the 
consumer-goods sector balances the rise in mass purchasing-power, the share of 
wages in total value-added will climb to the detriment of profit.150 
 
The last point is particularly significant.  If wage rises outstrip productivity growth, the 
foundation of intensive accumulation is fractured; where wages and productivity once 
grew synergistically, wage growth now becomes directly competitive with profits in a 
zero-sum game.  
The irony of Fordism is that, in crystallising the wage-labour nexus as the key site of 
contradiction and the lever of intensive accumulation, it was hamstrung in addressing 
the productivity challenge and the dysfunctions of the accumulation regime.  The need 
to maintain effective demand amongst the working class, the co-opting of trade unions 
within the fabric of Fordism and, in the Australian context, the centrality of unions to 
the operation of the labour law regime and its associated economic and social functions, 
all institutionally entrenched trade unionism.  This phenomenon ensured that, whilst 
productivity stagnated, wage demands did not, particularly when accompanied by a 
wave of militancy amongst union rank-and-file members, who engaged in wildcat 
stoppages to extract over-award payments.151  In consequence, wage claims, which until 
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1973 had roughly been in line with productivity gains, started to outstrip them.152  The 
1974-75 wage explosion discussed above had seen the wages share of GDP climb to 
62.4%, the highest ever figure for which statistics are available.153  This heightening of 
the real value of labour power spiked the long-run tendency of the rate of profit to fall, 
which was in turn reflected in the share of profit in the national income; after peaking at 
approximately 17% around 1968-69 (coinciding with the beginning of the ‘flood tide’ 
of working class militancy),154 the profit share declined rapidly.155  By the mid-1970s it 
had shrunk to just over 13% of GDP.156   
Union militancy also began to manifest itself in atypical and, for capital, disturbing 
forms, such as the campaign for improved workplace safety, political strikes over the 
Vietnam War and conscription and a spate of experiments in worker 
control/occupations.157  Such a development spoke of the maladaptive functioning (from 
the standpoint of capital) of the mode of regulation centred on the arbitration system.158  
This will be discussed in greater detail below. 
These domestic developments were reinforced by the international dimensions of 
Fordist crisis. Mass production began to become spatially disaggregated as 
multinational corporations relocated labour-intensive manufacturing to low wage but 
newly-industrialising countries in South-East Asia.159  Declining manufacturing 
competitiveness against these countries was exacerbated by the growing importance of 
mineral and energy exports, which lead to something of a resources boom during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, and early 1980s.160  This development produced a form of 
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‘Dutch Disease,’ whereby progressive increases in the exchange rate on the back of the 
strength of commodity exports erodes the competitive position of manufacturing.161  
Paradoxically, at the same time the strength of farming exports was being undermined 
by technological advances in the farming sectors of most other industrialised countries 
in concert with increased agricultural protectionism (as seen in the European Union’s 
Common Agricultural Policy).162  In such a context, the latent divide between export-
oriented mining and agricultural capital and inward-looking manufacturing capital 
became explicit.  The heavy tariff wall protecting Australian manufacturing came to be 
regarded as no longer feasible.  It is in this light that the Whitlam Government’s 1973 
decision to introduce a blanket 25% cut in tariffs must be read.  Such a policy, however, 
fundamentally revealed the cleaving point of the intensive accumulation regime of 
antipodean Fordism; not being autarkic, its dynamic could be maintained only so long 
as wide-ranging industrial protection was viable, both economically and politically.  
The collapse of this consensus, the subsequent assaults upon industrial protection and 
the growth of competition from low-wage jurisdictions resulted in the essential collapse 
of Australian manufacturing, a development we shall explore in greater detail in 
chapters 7 and 8. 
The loss of manufacturing jobs in Australia went hand-in-hand with the growth of 
typically low-productivity/low-wage sectors, such as hospitality and retail,163 along with 
the expansion of the services sector generally.164  The growing importance of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) also served to overcome some of 
the barriers Taylorism had experienced in Australia, both within and between different 
sectors.  Technological change associated with ICT’s tended to intensify and deepen the 
reach of Taylorism within manufacturing, particularly sectors such as metals and 
automobiles.165  Moreover, the new technologies (especially the computer) allowed the 
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diffusion of Taylorism to industries which had previously remained relatively immune 
because of technical limitations, such as retail, warehousing, fast food and health 
care.166  The decline in the pre-eminence of manufacturing, associated with the diffusion 
of Taylorist forms of work control into the services sector, fractures the functional unity 
between lead sector productivity gains and general wage improvements for the 
proletariat (particularly insofar as the hitherto lead sector is no longer so).167 
So, how did the crisis of antipodean Fordism in the 1970s and 1980s impact upon the 
regime of labour law appropriate to it?  It is best to answer this question at this point in 
terms of the forces this crisis unleashed and their ramifications for the legal system.  As 
shall be explored in chapters 5 and 7, a key issue for capital that had to be tackled was 
the large wage-rounds consequent upon the institutionalised position of labour and the 
hierarchical award structure.  The pattern of flow-on from certain key awards, most 
particularly the Metal Trades and Metal Industry Awards, and the ideology of 
comparative wage justice that lubricated it, ate into the profit share of national income 
once productivity growth began to stagnate.168  This led to capital seeking ways to sever 
the institutionalised links binding the workforce together, so that the gains of the 
industrially strong could be quarantined from the weak.   
The spatial disaggregation of the mass production paradigm, the diffusion of ICT 
technologies into the labour process of tertiary sector jobs and the general decline of 
manufacturing in its capacity as a lead-sector engine of growth also challenged the 
norms with which labour law was used to dealing, particularly the view of the typical 
worker as a male, unionised, manual employee.  The increasing corrosiveness of 
competition from low-wage countries and the generally declining barriers of industrial 
                                                          
166 Christopher Wright and John Lund, ‘Best-Practice Taylorism: 'Yankee Speed-Up' in Australian 
Grocery Distribution’ (1996) 38(2) Journal of Industrial Relations 196; John Lund and Christopher 
Wright, ‘State Regulation and the New Taylorism: The Case of Australian Grocery Warehousing’ (2001) 
56(4) Relations Industrielles 747; Claire Mayhew and Michael Quinlan, ‘Fordism in the fast food 
industry: pervasive management control and occupational health and safety risks for young temporary 
workers’ (2002) 24(3) Sociology of Health & Illness 261; Robin Price, ‘Down the aisle: the effects of 
technological change on retail workers skills’ (Paper presented at 27th International Labour Process 
Conference, 6-8 April 2009) 8-9; Robin Price, ‘Technological Change, Work Re-organization and Retail 
Workers' Skills in Production-Oriented Supermarket Departments’ in Irena Grugulis and Odul Bozkurt 
(eds), Retail Work (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 88; Sandra Martain, ‘The Taylorisation of paid care work 
in aged care’ (Paper presented at the 28th Conference of the Association of Industrial Relations 
Academics of Australia and New Zealand, Melbourne, 5-7 February 2014). 
167 Heino, ‘Capitalism, regulation theory and Australian labour law’, above n 1, 464. 
168 A reality exacerbated by the particular troubles of the metals sector.  In chapter 7, we will see that the 
loss of dynamism in this crucial industry grated against its institutionalised place atop the award pyramid, 
resulting in large catch-up claims to establish parity with other awards that were pulling ahead.  This 
process tended to stoke wage rounds and led to instability in the wage structure. 
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protection, together with the capacity of ICTs in more perfectly fragmenting labour-
power into smaller units to be reassembled to match increasingly volatile market 
conditions, undermined the standard employment model and encouraged the growth of 
precarious employment forms, forms characterised by a ‘lack of protective regulation, 
short or uncertain duration, lack of ‘standard’ employment benefits, and ambiguous or 
unprotected legal status.’169  As shall be seen in the following chapters, awards in the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s were complex and involved documents, based around standard, 
full-time employment and often equipped with a host of qualitative and quantitative 
controls over part-time and casual labour.  The impulses towards precarisation thus 
tended to grate against the award system at the same time as they found expression 
within it. 
The unique structure of the Australian KWNS also contributed towards the unfolding of 
Fordist crisis as a distinctly legal process.  Indeed, the decline of antipodean Fordism 
was in many cases seen as a prima facie crisis of labour law and industrial relations 
institutions.  The aforementioned unification of economic and social goals within the 
arbitration system heightened the tendency to identify industrial relations outcomes as a 
proxy for the economy at large.  The perception of an ‘industrial relations problem,’ 
together with a reputation for industrial strife (not wholly deserved),170 created the view 
that industrial law would have to be reformed if the conditions for economic growth 
were to be restored.  And indeed, this view was, in a highly fetishised way, at least 
partly true; the limits of antipodean Fordism were in part constituted by the rise of union 
militancy and an inability to contain proletarian struggle within Fordist institutions.   
The crisis also directly informed the transformation of labour law instruments and 
institutions through the process of ‘institutional searching,’ whereby the state, capital 
and labour are engaged in a contradictory and contested process of institutional 
experimentation to negotiate an escape from crisis and a return to growth and 
                                                          
169 John Burgess and Iain Campbell, ‘The Nature and Dimensions of Precarious Employment in 
Australia’ (1998) 8(3) Labour & Industry 5, 8.  For an excellent account of the growth of global precarity, 
and its intimate relationship to the new epoch of capitalism, see: Guy Standing, The Precariat: The New 
Dangerous Class (Bloomsbury, 2014). 
170 Whilst post-World War II strikes in Australia were frequent and often involved considerable numbers 
of workers, they also tended to be of very short duration when compared to other countries: Waters, 
above n 157, 203-225; Stephen Creigh and Mark Wooden, ‘Strikes in Post-War Australia: A Review’ 
(1985) 27(2) Journal of Industrial Relations 131. 
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stability.171  These efforts were neither homogenous nor always coherent.  In some 
cases, recourse was made to an intensification and deepening of the institutions of 
antipodean Fordism itself.172  For example, the Prices and Income Accord between the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Hawke Labor government (which we shall 
explore in great detail in chapter 5) reinvigorated the federal Arbitration Commission, 
placing it firmly in charge of national wage-setting.  On the other hand, certain 
developments represented a rejection of the tenets of antipodean Fordism and a new 
modality of ordering the social structure, including the recourse to common law torts 
against strike action and the adoption of restructuring and efficiency and structural 
efficiency principles by the Commission in the late 1980s.  Both movements, and the 
tensions and articulations between them, necessarily assumed a legal form (being partly 
legal in origin), pulling the labour law regime in different directions. 
Given the precocious nature of the wage-labour nexus and its entrenchment in 
antipodean Fordism’s mode of regulation, this period of transition was bound to be 
difficult, prolonged and contested.  This reality, however, forebodes both the means and 
ends of the process, each of which are profoundly important for the modality of labour 
law.  Firstly, the strength and institutional insertion of trade unionism within antipodean 
Fordism suggests that change was likely to be incremental and conducive towards 
corporatist political arrangements; it is far easier to push through reform with the active 
consent of those whom the reforms will most affect.  Secondly, the intractable nature of 
the obstacles besetting the Fordist wage-labour nexus suggests that new sites of 
contradiction will assume importance in the effort to escape crisis.173  Given the fact 
that this wage-labour nexus assumed in Australia a unique legal form in the shape of the 
arbitration system, this phenomenon unleashed a motive force that pushed the balance 
point of Kay and Mott’s ‘law-administration continuum’ towards its former pole.174  
That is, as the law of labour lost the economic and wider social influence it once 
                                                          
171 A term I have employed elsewhere: Brett Heino, ‘Award Regulation and the New South Wales Retail 
Sector, 1971-1988: Crisis and Experimentation amidst Changing Models of Development’ (2015) 109 
Labour History 75.  Although he does not use the term (he dubs it ‘experimentation/ideational 
evolution’), Treuren provides an excellent account of the physiology of institutional searching: Gerry 
Treuren, ‘How and Why Do Institutions Change? A Four Phase Framework for the Description of 
Institutional Development’ (2003) 7(2) Journal of Economic and Social Policy 51. 
172 Heino, ‘Award Regulation and the New South Wales Retail Sector’, above n 171, 77.  This method of 
escaping from crisis was first alluded to by Aglietta in his discussion of so-called ‘neo-Fordist’ responses 
to the exhaustion of the Fordist industrial paradigm: Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, above n 
12, 122-130. 
173 Jessop, ‘Revisiting the regulation approach’, above n 11, 15-19. 
174 Kay and Mott, above n 124, 131-137. 
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wielded as part of the arbitration structure, it would tend to become less functionally 
differentiated (vis-a-vis other bodies and institutions of law) and become more heavily 
‘juridified,’ that is, subsumed to the logic of the abstract legal form at the expense of 
administration.175  This tendency was invigorated by the increased valency of market 
forces under neo-liberalism176 and the declining power of organised labour (which had 
the effect of reducing the pressure on the state to formalise labour-power through 
administrative fire-fighting).177  These two lattermost tendencies will be discussed in 
greater detail below. 
With an understanding of the forces unleashed by the crisis of antipodean Fordism, and 
the legal implications of them, I can now turn to a consideration of the form and 
function of labour law within the successor model of development; liberal-
productivism. 
Liberal-productivism as an ideal-type 
The worldwide decline of Fordism forced regulationists to consider what would come 
after.  Was a successor model of development in evidence?  If so, what did it look like, 
how did it solve Fordist crisis, and would it enable a return to durable economic growth 
and stability?  These investigations, along with the work of other scholars not strictly 
part of the PRA tradition but drawing upon its terminology, informed the debates on 
‘post-Fordism’ in the 1980s and 1990s.  I do not intend to recapitulate the often vitriolic 
debates that have surrounded this notion.  Suffice it to say here that, from the late 1980s 
and early 1990s onwards, a recognisable, more-or-less coherent post-Fordist model of 
development did emerge,178 answering, in a provisional fashion, the crisis of Fordism.179   
                                                          
175 Heino, ‘Capitalism, regulation theory and Australian labour law’, above n 1, 465. 
176 As was seen in the previous chapter, the corrosiveness of market forces within a particular society 
influences the form of legal relations; the greater their input, the more important the law’s role as a 
medium of association between commodity producers and exchangers becomes: Bob Fine, Democracy 
and the Rule of Law: Marx’s Critique of the Legal Form (The Blackburn Press, 2002) 142. 
177 Heino, ‘Capitalism, regulation theory and Australian labour law’, above n 1, 465. 
178 A reality acknowledged by a host of scholars working in the PRA tradition, regardless of whether they 
use the exact term.  See, for example: David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Blackwell 
Publishers, 1990); Lipietz, Towards a New Economic Order, above n 6; Ivanova, above n 18 ; David 
Neilson, ‘Remaking the Connections: Marxism and the French Regulation School’ (2012) 44(2) Review 
of Radical Political Economics 160; Aaron Tauss, ‘Contextualizing the Current Crisis: Post-fordism, 
Neoliberal Restructuring, and Financialization’ (2012) 76 Colombia Internacional 51; Vidal, 
‘Postfordism as a dysfunctional accumulation regime’, above n 24; Jessop, ‘Revisiting the regulation 
approach’, above n 11; Lipietz, ‘Fears and hopes’, above n 6. 
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As with Fordism, the scholar who has most closely theorised this post-Fordist epoch in 
line with the model of development concept outlined in chapter 2 is Lipietz.  He has 
dubbed the model that has become dominant liberal-productivism.180  According to him, 
it combines: 
 an intensification and deepening of Taylorism into the tertiary sector, together 
with the rise of ‘lean’ production; 
 an intensive accumulation regime that disassociates wages and productivity (and 
is thus debt-fuelled); and 
 a neoliberal mode of regulation in an increasingly complex global division of 
labour.181 
 
Each of these structures had their roots in the development of Fordism’s crisis 
tendencies.  However, they only began to cohere into something resembling a cogent 
model of development from the late 1980s-early 1990s. 
Bearing in mind the discussion above about the nature of capitalism’s contradictions, 
their division into dominant and secondary poles and the uneven nature of their 
historical manifestation, what can be said about the ordering of these contradictions 
within the fabric of liberal-productivism?  Unlike Fordism, which crystallised the wage-
labour nexus as the site of dominant contradiction in response to the ruinous 
underconsumption of the Great Depression, liberal-productivism was born of a crisis 
                                                                                                                                                                          
179 Some scholars, such as Neilson and Vidal, question if stability and high economic growth are 
necessary prerequisites for a model of development, or are instead features historically unique to Fordism.  
Others, such as Jessop, suggest that there is not one common post-Fordist model, but a variety of post-
Fordist alternatives, such as the knowledge-based economy and finance-dominated accumulation.  The 
first does not necessarily trouble us in this thesis, as it will be demonstrated that liberal-productivism has 
indeed generated economic growth in Australia superior to the crisis phase of antipodean Fordism.  On 
the second claim I draw attention back to the nature of the abstraction generating regulationist ideal-types, 
elucidated in chapter 2.  The ideal-types serve as focussing devices, highlighting the baskets of causal 
relationships active in specific epochs of capitalist development.  They do no, and cannot, describe the 
concrete experience of any one society.  With this caveat in mind, I agree with Neilson that post-Fordism 
(or what he describes as the neo-liberal model of development) describes the common tendencies and 
logic underlying change in capitalist countries.  See, for example: Neilson, ‘Remaking the Connections’, 
above n 178, 169-170, 173-174; Vidal, ‘Postfordism as a dysfunctional accumulation regime’, above n 
24, 454-459; Jessop, ‘Revisiting the regulation approach’, above n 11, 16-20. 
180 I find the term liberal-productivism useful as it terminologically represents what must be made 
explicit; the post-Fordist model of development did not simply invert the characteristics of Fordism, but 
crystallised and ordered the contradictions of capitalism in distinct ways.  The term also allows us to 
better conceptualise post-Fordism in a strictly temporal sense; that is, it the historical conjuncture coming 
after Fordism.  Within this epoch, history was open, and a variety of models could have become 
operative. 
181 Lipietz, ‘Fears and hopes’, above n 6, 129-130. 
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rooted at least partially in the power of organised labour and the grating of national state 
boundaries against growing transnational capital.  Of particular note in the latter regard 
is the spatial and temporal disaggregation of liberal-productivism’s dominant industrial 
paradigm.  Whereas Fordism enshrined a mass-productionist labour process model 
which was nationally organised and executed, liberal-productivism reformulates the 
social division of labour on an increasingly global scale.  Unlike previous 
configurations of the global social division of labour,182 liberal-productivism has 
segmented the production process of manufactured goods and distributed the resulting 
atoms in spatially uneven ways.  The typical example is of a globally organised 
production chain in which high-end research and development, marketing and financial 
arrangements are concentrated in the previous hubs of Fordism, whilst labour-intensive 
manufacturing is relocated to low-wage, newly industrialising zones such as China and 
South-East Asia.  This has led to a certain degree of deindustrialisation in the former 
countries and a commensurate growth in the tertiary sector.183  In such an environment, 
the competition principle (which was carefully controlled with Fordism through 
monopoly/oligopoly arrangements between firms and limits upon the reach of the 
commodity form),184 both between firms and between countries, requires an open field 
of action if capitalists are to exploit the global production system to their advantage.  
This in turn has seen competition within liberal-productivism assume the place once 
occupied by the wage-labour nexus within Fordism,185 a reformulation with profound 
influences for labour law. 
Additionally, the centrality of the competition principle in a new global division of 
labour necessarily entails an inversion of the wage-labour nexus, whereby the wage is 
                                                          
182 A global social division of labour has always been a feature of the capitalist mode of production; as 
Marx notes, capital inherits a world market, one of the historic achievements of mercantilism.  However, 
this division was typically organised on readily identifiable sectoral lines i.e. primary production tended 
to be the preserve of developing countries, whilst manufacturing was dominated by advanced 
industrialised economies. See: Karl Marx quoted in Neil Smith, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital 
and the Production of Space (The University of Georgia Press, 2008) 112. 
183 See, for example: Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant 
Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (Basic Books, 1982); Steven 
S. Saeger, ‘Globalization and Deindustrialization: Myth and Reality in the OECD’ (1997) 133(4) 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 579; Christopher Kollmeyer and Florian Pichler, ‘Is Deindustrialization 
Causing High Unemployment in Affluent Countries? Evidence from 16 OECD Countries, 1970-2003’ 
(2013) 91(3) Social Forces 785; Sally Weller and Phillip O’Neill, ‘De-industrialisation, financialisation 
and Australia’s macroeconomic trap’ (2014) 7(3) Cambridge Journal of Region, Economy and Society 
509.  
184 Jessop and Sum, above n 4, 230. 
185 Petit, above n 15, 229-233. 
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reconstructed as a cost of international production, rather than source of domestic 
demand.186  This places downwards pressure on wages, encourages the intensification of 
Taylorism and lean production within the labour process,187 and dovetails with the 
growth of low-paying, low-productivity service sector jobs mentioned above.188  These 
developments undermine the domestically-focused virtuous circle of manufacturing that 
had fuelled the intensive accumulation regime of Fordism.  The question then becomes 
how the latter is maintained within liberal-productivism and what its version of a 
virtuous circle looks like. 
Broadly, the application of intensified Taylorism and lean production within both the 
manufacturing and service sectors has the effect not only of raising productivity but of 
deepening managerial control of the labour process even further.189  Companies are thus 
able to appropriate a greater share of surplus value, resulting in extremely high profit 
shares of national income (and concomitantly low labour shares) even in the midst of 
profit rates below that achieved during Fordist coherence.190  In the midst of a continued 
tendency towards global overproduction,191 finance often proves the more attractive 
investment for these profits,192 and it is finance capital which provides the engine of the 
accumulation regime.  This remains intensive in character, in that it is premised upon a 
commodification of the proletariat’s means of subsistence and an articulation of mass 
production and consumption.  However, as mentioned above, intensive accumulation is 
now based on a disassociation of wages and productivity, and is globally configured.193  
                                                          
186 Jessop, ‘Revisiting the regulation approach’, above n 11, 18. 
187 Lean production is a useful short-hand term for the industrial paradigm of liberal-productivism, 
particularly in its applications in the manufacturing sector.  Unlike the industrial paradigm of Fordism, it 
tends to be demand-driven, focussed on economies of scope and deploys flexible machinery.  However, 
its logic also tends to subsume the service sector.  For more, see: Vidal, ‘Reworking Postfordism’, above 
n 51, 279, 281-283. 
188 Matt Vidal, ‘Low-autonomy work and bad jobs in postfordist capitalism’ (2013) 66(4) Human 
Relations 587, 605. 
189 Andy Danford, ‘The ‘New Industrial Relations’ and Class Struggle in the 1990s’ (1997) 21(1) Capital 
& Class 107, 137; Neilson, ‘Formal and real subordination’, above n 17, 101; Vidal, ‘Reworking 
Postfordism’, above n 51, 279-284. 
190 See, for example: Mohun, above n 38; Bramble, Trade unionism in Australia, above n 115, 78; Matt 
Vidal, ‘Inequality and the growth of bad jobs’ (2013) 12(4) Contexts 70, 71-72; Vidal, ‘Postfordism as a 
dysfunctional accumulation regime’, above n 24, 462. 
191 Kettell, above n 13, 36-41. 
192 David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism (Oxford University Press, 2010) 
26-31; Chris Harman, ‘Not all Marxism is dogmatism: a reply to Michael Husson’ (5 January 2010) 125 
International Socialism <http://isj.org.uk/not-all-marxism-is-dogmatism-a-reply-to-michel-husson/>.   
193 Such that even if Fordist institutions had remained on foot, the gains of its accumulation regime could 
not be contained within the nation state, which would undermine the conditions of the Fordist virtuous 
circle. 
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Cheap credit emanating from the financial system covers the gap between worker 
demand and worker purchasing power expressed in hard money.194  This cheap credit, a 
function of the financialisation of capital investment and the hypermobile, international 
capital flows it begets,195 now provides the motive force of intensive accumulation. 
A neoliberal mode of regulation is both constitutive of, and constituted by, these 
developments.  Neoliberalism is a multifaceted and value-laden concept, but it can in 
regulationist terms be described as a mode of regulation that supports the accumulation 
regime of liberal-productivism.196  Broadly speaking, the KWNS (which was crippled 
by heavy fiscal burdens and a corroded ability to control a bounded economic and 
political space)197 is replaced by a Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime 
(SWPR).198  This performs a variety of functions, including the recasting of labour as a 
commodity like any other, the subordination of social policy to the increasingly de-
regulated labour market, and reducing fetters on the free movement of commodities and 
capital across an increasingly connected yet variegated global space.199  These 
developments, full told, represent a huge expansion of the frontiers of the commodity 
form, a qualitative and quantitative extension with profound influences for labour law.   
Like Fordism, liberal-productivism bears within itself the seeds of crisis, derived from 
the abstract crisis tendencies of capitalism yet given a distinct character.  Of particular 
note is the lack of a distinctive scale of primary regulation (the space occupied by the 
national state within Fordism),200 the centrality of debt as the motive force of intensive 
accumulation,201 the mountain of fictitious financial capital which can never be 
validated by the real economy,202 and the still-depressed state of the rate of profit.203  
                                                          
194 Harvey, The Enigma of Capital, above n 192, 17-18;  
195 For useful sources about this phenomenon (not necessarily in total agreement) see Ibid; Robert 
Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence: The Advanced Capitalist Economies from Long Boom to 
Long Downturn, 1945-2005 (Verso, 2006); Harman, above n 192; Costas Lapavitsas, ‘Theorizing 
financialization’ (2011) 25(4) Work, employment and society 611.  
196 Lipietz, ‘Fears and hopes’, above n 6, 130.  
197 Philip Armstrong, Andrew Glyn and John Harrison, Capitalism since World War II: The making and 
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The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 arguably represents the beginning of a period of 
terminal decline for liberal-productivism.204  However, these are questions for the 
future, and do not weigh upon the discussion of labour law here.  I can thus move to an 
investigation of the relationship between liberal-productivism in Australia and the ideal-
type. 
Liberal-productivism in Australia 
There is certainly a prima facie case that a liberal-productivist model has taken hold in 
Australia since the early 1990s.  Indeed, more so than other advanced capitalist nations, 
Australia has, in macroeconomic terms, benefitted from the coherence of this model.   
After the doldrums of the early 1990s recession, average GDP growth recovered to 
4.5% in the second half of the 1990s (3.2% in per capita terms).205  Over the period of 
1995-2005, the average rate of GDP growth weighed in at 3.5%, whilst another measure 
recorded growth of 3% between 2000 and 2010 (both considerably superior to the 
commensurate Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, or OECD, 
figures of 2.5% and 1.9%).206  Productivity generally, and labour productivity 
specifically, surged in the 1990s, averaging 3.9% average annual growth from 1994/94-
1998/99.207  Real wage growth, which had remained stagnant between 1975 and the 
early 1990s, resumed from the mid-1990s and has outperformed many other OECD 
nations,208 but has, in accordance with liberal-productivist ideal-type, not been able to 
arrest a declining wage share of national income,209 and started to lag behind 
productivity gains from 2000 onwards.210  This growth, moreover, has been achieved 
                                                          
204 See, for example: Ivanova, above n 18, 340-347. 
205 Department of the Treasury, ‘Australia’s century since Federation at a glance’, above n 31, 55-56. 
206 See, respectively: Broomhill, ‘Australian Economic Booms’, above n 41, 23; Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Year Book Australia 2012, above n 163, 797. 
207 Ben Dolman, ‘What Happened to Australia’s Productivity Surge?’ (2009) 42(3) Australian Economic 
Review 243, 246; Productivity Commission, Productivity Update (July 2015) 9. 
208 Frijters and Gregory, above n 35, 209; OECD, Innovations in Labour Market Policies: The Australian 
Way (OECD Publishing, 2001) 257-258; OECD, OECD Employment Outlook 2014 (OECD Publishing, 
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209 In 2011-12, the wages share of national income sat at 53.1%, much lower than the peak of 61.9% 
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Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian System of National Accounts 2011-12 (5204.0, 2012) 13-14. 
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that liberal-productivism is entering a period of stagnation/crisis in the Australian context.  See: David 
Jacobs and Alexandra Rush, ‘Why Is Wage Growth So Low?’ (June Quarter 2015) Reserve Bank of 
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despite the fact that the Australian manufacturing sector has contracted sharply, going 
from accounting for nearly 30% of GDP in the late 1950s and early 1960s211 to a paltry 
6.2% in early 2015.212  As anticipated in the abstract model, this dissolution has been 
accompanied by exponentially increased levels of personal debt.213 
We are thus in a position to make the claim that Australia is in a liberal-productivist 
phase.214  Although they do not necessarily use the same terminology, there is 
agreement amongst a number of scholars that Australia has indeed entered a new, 
broadly coherent capitalist epoch.215  The constituent features of this model of 
development continue to demonstrate unique structures and mechanisms of coherence.  
However, given the fact that liberal-productivism is characterised by a corrosive global 
logic that undermines the ability of individual states to remain outside it, and has 
achieved purest expression in liberal-market economies such as Australia, the US and 
the UK, fewer divergences from the abstract model are encountered. 
Industrial paradigm 
The dominant model of labour-process organisation in Australia matches almost exactly 
that of the ideal-type.  The diffusion of ICTs, changed managerial practices, a shift from 
supply to demand driven production, and the development of economies of scope has 
cohered as a system of lean production, which subsumes both the manufacturing and 
services sectors within its logic.216  As indicated above, this has allowed the extension 
of Taylorism deep into the service sector,217 particularly insofar as computer 
                                                          
211 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia 2005 (1301.0 No. 87, 2005) 430. 
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technologies allowed the measurement and routinisation of work that ‘mechanical’ 
Taylorism found difficult to penetrate.218  In chapter 9 I will elucidate the impact of this 
development for retail workers, most specifically the link between the new industrial 
paradigm and precarious employment forms. 
Accumulation Regime 
In a conceptual sense, the accumulation regime of liberal-productivism in Australia 
closely accords with that of the ideal-typical model.  The aforementioned fracturing of 
the virtuous circle of domestic manufacturing, and the resulting disarticulation of mass 
production and mass consumption it effected, destroyed the engine of growth which had 
powered antipodean Fordism.  An alternative basis of intensive accumulation was found 
in the shape of debt-financed consumption,219 which allowed consumption levels to 
remain high even in the face of the growing disassociation between productivity growth 
and real wages.220 
However, the accumulation regime of Australian liberal-productivism is also 
characterised by significant continuities with its predecessor, continuities which made 
the process of transition less radical than was the case with, say, the United States.  
Unlike the latter, the accumulation regime of antipodean Fordism was never self-
sufficient.  Indeed, as was demonstrated above, the viability of its virtuous cycle of 
manufacturing was underwritten by the stability of agricultural and mining commodity 
exports.221  Today, Australia depends as heavily as ever on commodity exports, 
particularly from the mining sector.  The unprecedented level of demand for raw 
materials, particularly for coal and metals, consequent upon the industrialisation of 
China led both to massive investment in the development of Australia’s vast mineral 
resources and burgeoning commodity prices on world markets.  The resultant upsurge in 
Australia’s terms of trade (which peaked in the middle of 2011 and has declined 
substantially since) is probably the single greatest factor in Australia’s superior 
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economic performance compared to other OECD nations.222  However, given the fact 
that mining is highly capital-intensive, it employs a comparatively small number of 
workers.223  The currency appreciation brought about on the back of strong commodity 
exports has had a deleterious effect on the competitiveness and viability of Australian 
manufacturing,224 which, even at its May 2015 nadir, still employs four times as many 
workers as the mining sector.225  As shall be seen in chapters 7 and 8, this exacerbation 
of the long-term decline of manufacturing, together with the broader economic volatility 
associated with an increased dependence upon commodity exports,226 eroded the 
standard employment model at its very heart. 
Mode of regulation 
The aforementioned features of the neoliberal mode of regulation which characterises 
liberal-productivism have largely taken hold in Australia.  The most important of these 
is the inversion of the wage-labour nexus from a source of domestic demand to a cost of 
international production.  This required a frontal assault on the institutionalised 
crystallisation of this nexus in its Fordist form, the arbitration system.  This is of such 
importance to the labour law regime that it is discussed in the following section. 
Also of key importance is the effective dissolution of many of the key functions of the 
KWNS and its replacement by the SWPR.  Whereas the KWNS’s objectives in abstract 
terms was the maintenance of full employment, demand-side economic management 
and the generalisation of norms of mass consumption within a more-or-less delimited 
national space,227 the SWPR’s abstract goals include state facilitation of product, 
process, organisational and market innovation to bolster economic competitiveness 
through supply-side intervention and the subordination of social policy to the dictates of 
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labour market flexibility and global competition.228  In practical terms, the movement 
towards the SWPR involved an intensified commodification of social life through the 
marketisation of goods and services previously rendered by the state,229 a general state 
aversion towards explicit intervention in the economy and,230 most importantly for our 
purposes here, an explicit and self-aware abandonment of the principle of full 
employment.231  The latter development is of particular importance in that the crisis of 
the antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus was understood by some, in a highly 
fetishised manner, as the issue of industrial relations in a climate of full employment.232 
Lastly, and in line with the SWPR’s ethos of bolstering economic competitiveness 
through exposure to international competition, Australian liberal-productivism has 
effected a transformation in the regime of industrial protection.  From the very high 
levels of industrial protection cited above, a period of sustained tariff reductions has 
occurred since the peak reached in the late 1970s and early 1980s.233  Whereas in 1978-
79 the average tariff plus primage on all dutiable goods was 31.3%, in 2004-05 the 
figure stood at only 9.5%.234  Leigh states more broadly that ‘[f]rom 1970 to 2001, the 
average level of industry assistance fell from over thirty percent to under five 
percent.’235  This reduction has both constituted, and been constituted by, the fracturing 
of the base of antipodean Fordist accumulation; the phasing out of tariffs as a long-term 
response to the crisis of Fordism both removed the domestic engine of intensive 
accumulation, and in so doing exposed the vulnerability of the manufacturing sector.  
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This development was one of the root causes of the manufacturing sector’s woes in the 
1980s, 1990s and 2000s, and further encouraged the precarisation of the manufacturing 
workforce and the undermining of the standard employment model more generally 
(explored in chapters 7 and 8). 
Liberal-productivism and labour law 
I have stated that the general characteristics, or ‘essences,’ of the liberal-productivist 
regime of Australian labour law includes ‘hostility to trade unions, a destruction of the 
conciliation and arbitration system, a severing of the institutional links homogenising 
the wage structure and associating productivity and wage growth and an intensified 
juridification on the back of the increased valency of market forces.’236  To this can be 
included the erosion of the standard employment model and the profusion of various 
precarious forms of employment, such as casuals and contract labour.237 
The single most important distinction between antipodean Fordism and liberal-
productivism vis-a-vis labour law is the latter’s inversion and reordering of the 
contradictory wage-labour nexus.  The precocious institutionalisation of the Fordist 
wage-labour nexus in the form of the arbitration system, together with the bundle of 
functions this particular institution played in antipodean Fordism en régulation, meant 
that a cogent liberal-productivist system could only be ‘rolled out’ after a multi-pronged 
attack had ‘rolled back’ arbitration.238  This attack has both displaced the arbitral 
tribunals from their traditional functions and usurped their centrality within the fabric of 
Australian industrial relations, a reality graphically demonstrated in chapter 6. 
As has been outlined, the dysfunctionality of the antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus 
largely derived from the power and privileged institutional position accorded to 
organised labour (especially insofar as it allowed the industrially strong to universalise 
their gains through the award framework).  In answer, wage bargaining within liberal-
productivism is fragmented and generally decentralised.  In particular, I will 
demonstrate in chapter 7 how the pyramidal structure of the award system, spearheaded 
by the Metal Trades and Metal Industry Awards, was broken by the Accord in the 1980s 
                                                          
236 Heino, ‘Capitalism, regulation theory and Australian labour law’, above n 1, 454. 
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and ‘enterprise bargaining’ in the 1990s.  Metal trades margins cases and comparative 
wage justice claims, based on establishing parity in occupations between industries, no 
longer exist to homogenise the wage structure and act as a transmission belt linking the 
strong and the weak. 
Awards more generally have been recast as ‘safety nets,’ providing minimum wages 
and conditions which can only be improved upon through enterprise bargaining.  The 
rise of enterprise bargaining in both federal and state jurisdictions from the early 1990s 
onwards has been of immense importance to the rise of a cogent liberal-productivist 
labour law regime.  Indeed, enterprise bargaining is the node at which many of the 
essences of legal change have been realised.  Increasingly strict statutory control has 
seen the process pitched at the workplace and/or firm level, increasing resource 
demands upon unions to negotiate literally thousands of agreements whilst intensifying 
the atomisation of the proletariat into competing units agglomerated around ‘their’ 
separate capitals.  Attempts to return to the industry-level bargaining de facto permitted 
by the award system, such as the metal and manufacturing unions campaign in the late 
1990s, have been rebuffed by the legislature, a reality that shall be explored in greater 
detail in chapter 7.  
Whilst the form of bargaining thus hinders the proletariat in making common cause, the 
content of these agreements has often dovetailed with the lean production/neo-Taylorist 
industrial paradigm and the displacement of the standard employment model.  The 
general pattern of enterprise agreements has been that they trade headline wage 
increases for a thoroughgoing enhancement of the real subordination of labour.  
Workers have been subjected to a radical increase in both functional and numerical 
flexibility; that is, they have had to accept management’s right to deploy them across a 
broader range of functions with ever greater control over when and in what numbers.239  
Enterprise agreements have also typically restricted union input into key management 
decisions such as manning and the control over part-time and casual labour.  In chapters 
7, 8 and 9, it will be demonstrated that this is a development which holds in both the 
manufacturing (specifically metals and food processing) and retail sectors. 
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The tendency of enterprise agreements to reduce or dispose of qualitative and 
quantitative controls over part-time, casual and contract labour is representative of a 
broader truth.  The standard employment model, so significant to the antipodean Fordist 
wage-labour nexus, has been fundamentally usurped by a host of precarious forms, 
forms which were characterised above by a ‘lack of protective regulation, short or 
uncertain duration, lack of “standard” employment benefits, and ambiguous or 
unprotected legal status.’240  In 2004, some 34.4% of the workforce fell outside the 
standard employment model,241 whilst in 2013 nearly one-quarter of employees were 
casual (the largest sub-group within non-standard employment).242  The profusion of 
such employment forms (which shall be analysed in greater detail in chapters 5 and 6) 
has stymied working-class power in a variety of ways, not least the fact that such 
employees are less likely to be union members243 and are less likely to resist the 
exercise of managerial prerogative precisely because of the insecurity of their position.  
Chapters 8 and 9 in particular demonstrate the unfolding of this process of precarisation 
in food processing industries and the New South Wales retail sector. 
The disempowerment of workers under the impact of precarisation has had its mirror at 
the macro-level, with the power of the trade union movement at a historic low ebb.  
Union density, which had peaked at two-thirds of the workforce in the early 1950s,244 
has been in free-fall since the early 1990s, and in August 2014 only 15% of employees 
were union members in their main job.245  Organisational weakness has both 
constituted, and been constituted by, a movement to legally hamstring the ability of 
trade unions to make common cause, itself a result of the inversion of the antipodean 
Fordist wage-labour nexus.  The dysfunction of the latter manifested itself in a wave of 
industrial militancy in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which often pressed against and 
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outside the established legal and administrative channels.246  The threat this posed to the 
continued valorisation of capital, and the related strain this placed on the state’s ability 
to formalise labour-power, necessitated mechanisms by which the unification and 
solidarity of the proletariat (a development that Fordism continually tends toward)247 
could be disrupted.  Labour law, at the forefront of the commodification of labour-
power and the construction of labour as a subject, is crucial in this endeavour.  This 
tendency was the driving force behind a legal climate that became increasingly hostile 
towards trade unionism, firstly by breaking the most militant sections of organised 
labour248 and then through gradually severing the institutionalised links between trade 
unionism and the conduct of industrial relations.  The tight embrace between the arbitral 
tribunals and unions has been replaced by an arm’s length relationship, one in which the 
state finds it easier to legislate against union interests.  This has informed a myriad of 
legal prohibitions against concerted union action, with laws against secondary boycotts, 
solidarity strikes and industrial action outside of designated bargaining periods 
disrupting the expression of common working-class interests.249 
As was outlined in chapter 3, a labour law regime is both predicated upon, and tends to 
reproduce, a certain arrangement of the law-administration continuum.  The decline of 
proletarian power that has been a feature of liberal-productivism is itself a force that 
impinges upon the form and content of this regime.  The erosion of trade union power 
and the fragmentation and atomisation of the proletariat reduces the ability of the 
working-class to force the state to generate administrative solutions to the class 
struggle; administrative fixes which take as their subjects the collective organs of labour 
give way to an increasing penetration of the legal form narrowly construed, the form in 
which capital has always operated most comfortably.  In the Australian experience of 
liberal-productivism, this reality has seen a continual state retreat from direct 
administrative regulation of the labour market, partly substituted by an increasing 
juridifcation of work relations that constructs the labour-capital relationship in the 
fetishised image of abstract, de-classed juridical equals engaged in mutually beneficial 
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exchange.250  Juridification, which I construct as the subsumption of administrative 
fixes beneath the abstract legal form, is, on this score, merely the concrete expression of 
the reduced need of the state to spawn institutional fixes to proletarian struggle.  It also 
represents a reconfiguration of the law-administration continuum in which the centre of 
balance is shifted towards law.  The combined effect of juridification in supplanting 
arbitration, weakening administration’s collective subjects and re-asserting the ‘purer’ 
legal form has resulted in the lengthy experiment with statutory individual contracts, the 
channelling of industrial disputes through the regular court system or a weakened 
tribunal, the recrudescence of common law industrial torts and the usurping of the 
constitutional basis for federal industrial regulation.  These will be the focus of deeper 
investigation in chapter 6. 
As was the case with antipodean Fordism, the regime of labour law appropriate to 
liberal-productivism reflects and crystallises its unique structuring of capitalism’s crisis 
tendencies.  Although it comes with a host of its own unique twists to these abstract 
tendencies, and is inherently unstable given its international configuration and debt-
financed accumulation regime, it does answer the crisis of the antipodean Fordist wage-
labour nexus.  This was achieved through shattering the law-administration continuum, 
and its nexus point in the arbitration system, and the erection of a new order of labour 
law fixed in a transformed continuum and predicated on working-class weakness. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have demonstrated that post-World War II Australian capitalism can be 
usefully periodised using the regulationist concepts of Fordism and liberal-
productivism.  These are ideal-types, and when pitched at this level of abstraction do 
not describe the concrete experience of any one society.  In order to fulfil their 
analytical potential, they must be sensitised to the Australian context.  This process of 
sensitisation reveals two distinct models of development, separated by a period of 
profound crisis and institutional searching: antipodean Fordism, stretching from 1945 to 
the early 1970s; and liberal-productivism in Australia, which had begun to cohere in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s and remains on foot today.  These clearly share in the 
dynamic and hierarchisation of crisis tendencies of their ideal-types, but are often 
unique in how the key abstract functions are performed.  This is particularly true of 
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antipodean Fordism, given that its central scale of economic and political regulation was 
the nation-state (unlike liberal-productivism, which is premised on an explicitly global 
production system).   
In Table 2, I have summarised the key similarities and differences between the ideal-
types and antipodean Fordism/liberal-productivism in Australia across their respective 
industrial paradigms, accumulation regimes and modes of regulation. 
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Table 2: Ideal-types and Australian instantiations  
 Industrial paradigm Accumulation regime Mode of regulation 
Ideal-typical 
Fordism 
-  based on unification of 
Taylorism and mechanisation 
in lead sectors. 
-  tailored to mass production; 
economies of scale. 
-  autocentric mass production/mass 
consumption intensive accumulation 
regime. 
-  productivity and wages linked. 
-  KWNS guaranteed effective demand through 
protective social legislation and the 
generalisation of mass consumption norms. 
-  wage-labour nexus site of primary 
contradiction 
Antipodean 
Fordism 
-  based on mass production but 
marked by an incomplete 
incorporation of Taylorist 
forms of work control and 
organisation. 
-  intensive accumulation regime based on 
mass production/mass consumption. 
-  however, regime not autarkic – depends 
upon primary commodity exports to 
underwrite industrial protection. 
-  Fordist wage-labour nexus preciously 
institutionalised in arbitration system. 
-  KWNS economic and social 
objectives/functions unified. 
Ideal-typical 
liberal-
productivism 
-  intensification and deepening 
of Taylorism into the tertiary 
sector.  
-  rise of ‘lean’ production; 
economies of scope. 
-  intensive accumulation, still based on 
mass production/mass consumption but 
globally configured. 
-  disassociation of wages and productivity; 
regime debt-fuelled. 
-  SWPR oversees neoliberal of regulation.   
-  labour recast as a commodity like any other; 
subordination of social policy to 
increasingly free labour market; reduced 
fetters on the free movement of 
commodities and capital. 
-competition site of primary contradiction; 
Fordist wage-labour nexus inverted. 
Liberal-
productivism in 
Australia  
- dominant model of labour 
process organisation closely 
matches ideal-type. 
-  intensive accumulation regime closely 
matching ideal-type. 
-  significant continuities with forebear. 
-  mode of regulation closely matches ideal-
type. 
-  Fordist wage-labour nexus destroyed. 
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Chapter 5 
EVOLUTION AND CRISIS OF THE ANTIPODEAN 
FORDIST LABOUR LAW REGIME 
In the preceding chapter, I outlined the abstract tendencies and characteristics of the 
labour law regimes of antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism, concentrating in 
particular upon how these regimes helped ensure the coherence of their respective 
models of development.  I noted that the picture was somewhat one-sided, focussing 
more upon the conditions that must be fulfilled for both models of development to 
reproduce themselves and the place of labour law in constituting those conditions.  As a 
first step in the dialectical relationship between theory and concrete history, it 
established the functions of law within these models of development, the requisite 
structure of the law-administration continuum, and regions of change.  The actual legal 
history of these processes, specifically how and in what fashion the law and industrial 
relations institutions changed, was only cursorily indicated. 
Chapters 5 and 6 provide this concrete legal history.  I begin by noting that the 
transition between antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism saw labour law 
transform along a number of broad fronts.  The dimensions I am focussing on can be 
described thematically as: 
 Wage fixation – how wages and conditions for workers are determined, the 
instruments that control them, and the motive force of the system; 
 Forms of employment/flexibility – the legal categories defining work 
relationships, the relationship between ‘standard’ employment and more 
precarious forms, and the ability of management to deploy labour and organise 
the labour process as it sees fit; 
 Collectivism/individualism and the scale of industrial relations – the degree 
to which the industrial relations system takes collective entities of capital and 
labour or individual workers and corporations as its subject, who controls the 
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creation, content and enforcement of the rules of the employment relationship,1 
and the predominant spatial scale at which this relation is expressed; and 
 The legal matrix – how the labour law regime is embedded within the broader 
legal framework, particularly regarding the former’s constitutional basis and 
standing. 
 
To highlight best the fundamental characteristics of the antipodean Fordist and liberal-
productivist labour law regimes, a ‘slice’ approach is employed, building upon the 
periodisation of post-World War II Australian capitalism advanced in chapter 4.  
Certain key years are selected as a snapshot and are analysed according to the state of 
labour law vis-à-vis the four themes identified.  Each period represents a crucial point in 
the process of political-economic transformation.  1964 is the departure point, a time 
when antipodean Fordism was at its height.  From there I move to 1975, by which time 
the antipodean Fordist boom had ended and serious symptoms of crisis were becoming 
manifest.  The year 1982 marks a time of institutional exhaustion, where the final 
iteration of the post-war cycle of metal trade flow-on revealed the intrinsic and 
intractable nature of Fordist crisis.  This period of profound and insoluble crisis is the 
end point of the current analysis.  In chapter 6, I will pick up the threads in the late-
1980s, when some of the constituent legal elements of liberal-productivism were 
coming into existence.  
Taken together with the framework established in chapter 4, this analysis allows us to 
come to an account of labour law change that is theoretically rigorous yet empirically 
rich.  As shall be seen, the nature and timing of the transformations taking place is 
completely in keeping with the periodisation schema forwarded in this thesis.  Indeed, 
echoing Treuren, the analysis reflects upon the fundamental soundness of the theory 
advanced.2 
1964 – Height of antipodean Fordism 
The starting point of my analysis is the year 1964, the high water mark of the 
antipodean Fordist model of development.  At this point in time, the institutions of the 
                                                          
1 Mark Bray and Johanna Macneil, ‘Individualism, Collectivism and Awards in the Australian Hospitality 
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antipodean Fordist mode of regulation cohered fully with the intensive accumulation 
regime and Taylorised, mass-production based industrial paradigm.   
In terms of the key themes elucidated above, the antipodean Fordist labour law regime 
exhibited a coherent and self-reinforcing character.  Wage fixation, particularly 
regarding marginal payments for skill, revolved around the manufacturing sector 
generally, and the metal trades industries specifically.  Gains won in the latter, 
crystallised in the leading Metal Trades Award, generally diffused throughout the work 
force at large, producing the relatively homogenous wage structure described in the 
previous chapter and a ‘standardised award structure.’3  In turn, this structure was 
premised upon the dominance of standard, full-time employment for male workers, with 
the male fitter employed in blue-collar industries generally taken as the regulatory 
yardstick by arbitral tribunals.  Chapter 4 also indicated that the labour law regime itself 
was highly collectivist, with organised labour deeply imbricated in the workings of the 
arbitration system and awards, the latter of which provided detailed and comprehensive 
rules governing the employment relationship.  Lastly, the unique legal matrix 
surrounding the labour law regime helped shape the architecture of the system, 
particularly concerning the overlapping jurisdictions of the federal and state 
government.  Together, these structures constituted a cogent whole, channelling class 
conflict through institutionalised channels and moderating certain crisis tendencies 
although, as will be demonstrated, at the expense of setting others in motion. 
Wage fixation 
The fundamental concepts of wage fixation in 1964 had been in evidence since the 
beginnings of the compulsory arbitration system.  In the famous Harvester Case,4 
Higgins J had established a two-tiered structure, composed of a ‘Basic Wage’5 that 
ideally supported all working-men and their families in ‘frugal comfort’6 and a system 
of marginal payments for skill.7  Whereas the former was based upon the needs of an 
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7 See, for example: Ibid 7-16; Gas Employees Case (1919) 13 CAR 427, 461. 
 
 
123 
unskilled labourer, the latter represented an increment paid for ‘[t]hose who have 
acquired a skilled handicraft.’8   
By 1964, this dual-wage remained on foot, albeit with significant modifications since 
Harvester.  Whereas the initial determination of a Basic Wage was on a needs basis, the 
Great Depression had infused it with a more economistic logic, with the capacity of 
industry to pay becoming a key concern.9  Moreover, the attempt to maintain the value 
of the Basic Wage through automatic quarterly adjustments (indexed to prices), 
introduced in 1922,10 had been abandoned in 1953 (again, largely on the grounds that 
this principle was inconsistent with the capacity of the economy to pay).11  The 
combined result of both developments was a substantial increase in the size and scope 
of Basic Wage cases.  Faced with a Basic Wage that would not maintain purchasing 
power automatically, unions resorted to launching claims more frequently, with Basic 
Wage cases generally conducted annually from 1956 onwards.  Moreover, the growing 
centrality of the capacity to pay criterion saw an increasingly technocratic approach to 
cases, with both unions and employer associations calling upon a retinue of expert 
witnesses to buttress their cases.12     
Capacity to pay had also come to feature prominently in the fixation of margins.  As 
will be seen chapter 7, from 1947 onwards the metal trades sector was increasingly 
institutionalised at the apex of the award structure,13 a Fordist lead sector par 
excellence.  The fixation of margins there tended to ‘flow-on’ to other awards, whilst 
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9 In 1931, the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration reduced the Basic Wage by 10%.  In 
this case, and the subsequent decisions in 1932 and 1933 to reject claims for wage restoration, national 
economic capacity featured as the predominant concern.  See: Basic Wage Inquiry (1931) 30 CAR 2; 
Application for Cancellation—Emergency Reduction of Award Rates (1932) 31 CAR 305; Application 
(No. 2) for Cancellation Emergency Reduction of Wage Rates (1933) 32 CAR 90. 
10 Basic Wage Case (1922) 16 CAR 829. 
11 Wage and Standard Hours Inquiry 1952-1953 (1953) 77 CAR 477, 497. 
12 Stuart Macintyre, ‘Arbitration in Action’ in Joe Isaac and Stuart Macintyre (eds), The New Province for 
Law and Order: 100 Years of Australian Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration (Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) 55, 88. 
13 Beginning in earnest with the Metal Trades Margins Case (1947) 58 CAR 1088. 
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the capacity of the metal trades and of the national economy were largely taken as 
synonymous.14   
Equally important as the macro-level methods of Basic Wage and margins fixation were 
inter-award relationships, regulated by the notion of ‘comparative wage justice.’  This 
concept had a long pedigree in the landscape of Australian industrial regulation.  It can 
be read in a broad or narrow light,15 but its core is that ‘employees doing the same work 
for different employers or in different industries should by and large receive the same 
amount of pay irrespective of the capacity of their employer or industry.’16  Such a 
system requires certain benchmark occupations to which most others can be 
compared.17  From the 1920s, the fitter was increasingly taken as the measuring rod by 
which other blue-collar occupations were judged,18 a reflection both of the fact that 
fitters were found throughout the industrial structure and played a significant role in the 
growing manufacturing sector.19  Combined with the dominance of the metal trades in 
the post-World War II award framework, the general engineering fitter within the Metal 
Trades Award occupied a special place in the architecture of Australian wage fixation.20  
It provided the nexus point between the metals awards and most others in the award 
framework, a relationship explored further in chapter 7. 
Comparative wage justice has also been used to describe the preservation of historical 
inter-award relativities.21  The practice of using benchmark occupations, and the fact 
that early tribunal decisions often tended to codify existing employment categories and 
pay differentials,22 encouraged the entrenchment of pay differentials.  Combined with 
the historically occupational-based structure of Australian trade unionism, this 
established a complex web of intra- and inter-award relativities, with certain awards 
                                                          
14 See, for example: Metal Trades Margins Case (1954) 80 CAR 3, 32. 
15 See, for example: Chris Provis, ‘Comparative Wage Justice’ (1986) 28(1) Journal of Industrial 
Relations 24. 
16 Oil Industry Case (1970) 134 CAR 159, 165. 
17 As Commissioner O’Reilly noted in 1968: Furnishing Trades Award, 1964 in C.P. Mills and E.G.A. 
Lambert (eds), Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 10(32) (23 November 1968) ¶461. 
18 See, for example: Boilermakers’ Case (1924) 20 CAR 770, 778; Meat Industry Case (1925) 22 CAR 
794, 803-804. 
19 Tom Sheridan, Mindful Militants: The Amalgamated Engineering Union in Australia 1920-1972 
(Cambridge University Press, 1975) 22. 
20 Metal Trades Margins Case (1952) 73 CAR 324, 345. 
21 Provis, above n 15, 27-30. 
22 Keith Hancock and Sue Richardson, ‘Economic and Social Effects’ in Joe Isaac and Stuart Macintyre 
(eds), The New Province for Law and Order: 100 Years of Australian Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 139, 182. 
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sharing ‘historical nexus’ with others.  How these differentials arose was less important 
than the fact that once on foot, they were jealously guarded by unions.23  A change in 
the pay rates of one classification produced pressures for the changes in others in the 
name of maintaining wage relativities.   
The sensitivity of unions to intra- and inter-award relativities, together with a 
willingness to take action to maintain them, was such as to force a de facto 
acknowledgment on the part of the arbitral tribunals of the role of comparative wage 
justice in ensuring industrial order.  A federal tribunal judge, Raymond Kelly, 
commented in 1942 that: 
It will of course be conceded by employers and employees alike that in default 
of the adoption of, and adherence to the principle of comparative wage justice, 
nothing but chaos would result in the field of minimum wage fixation.  No basis 
could be laid without this ‘cornerstone of industrial regulation’ for industrial 
contentment in the community (my emphasis).24  
 
This last statement reveals much more than it means to.  It was made at a time when the 
immense stresses of World War II were forging the critical industrial mass that could 
found the antipodean Fordist model of development.  It is remarkably prescient in 
understanding how central comparative wage justice became to the post-War Australian 
wage structure.   
We are now in a position to describe the means by which wages were set for the 
majority of the workforce during the height of antipodean Fordism.  From 1956 
onwards, more-or-less annual Basic Wage Cases took as their reference point national 
economy capacity.  The union movement appeared quicker on the draw in developing a 
cogent and sophisticated model of wage-fixation before the tribunal, particularly after 
future Prime Minister Bob Hawke became the Australian Council of Trade Unions 
(ACTU) advocate in 1959.  From 1961 to 1964, its ‘prices plus productivity’ formula of 
adjusting the Basic Wage for both productivity improvements and price increases was 
the officially accepted model employed by the federal Commission.25  Importantly, in 
                                                          
23 See, for example: Australian Builders' Labourers' Federation v Archer (1913) 7 CAR 210; J. Hutson, 
Six Wage Concepts (Amalgamated Engineering Union, 1971) 144-145. 
24 Printing Industry Employees Union of Australia v Balmoral Press (1942) 49 CAR 304, 310. 
25 Basic Wage and Standard Hours Inquiry (1961) 97 CAR 376.  For a useful overview of the prices plus 
productivity formula, see: V. Watson, ‘Legislation and Decisions Affecting Industrial Relations’ (1961) 
3(2) Journal of Industrial Relations 136, 136-137. 
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the latter year, the employers’ proposal for a ‘Total Wage,’26 a fundamental 
reformulation of the basic structure of Australian wage fixation, was rejected out of 
hand.   
When adjustments were made to the Basic Wage and margins, it was technically only 
the Metal Trades Award that was being varied, with other awards moving in line when 
the unions responsible for them applied to the Commission.  The metals sector was a 
Fordist lead sector par excellence, providing the motive force by which the institutional 
structure turned.  The typical antipodean Fordist wage cycle it dominated can be 
described thus.  Militant metal unions, such as the Amalgamated Engineering Union, 
were adroit in applying industrial pressure in a comparatively small number of large, 
well-organised ‘hot shops’ over issues of margins, conditions and over-award 
payments.27  The threat and efficacy of industrial action, together with the gains 
achieved by this ‘plant-by-plant duress,’28 informed national level Basic Wage and 
margins cases, which proved more likely to grant substantial increases when so 
pressured.29  The paramountcy of the Metal Trades Award, together with the complex 
web of relativities and nexus between awards, ensured that the Commission’s decisions 
eventually flowed-on to the most workers.  Stewart described this reality as: 
‘[T]he shunter’s law’ or the law of transmitted shock.  An upward pressure is 
generated in one section or location in the economy and rapidly moves with a 
series of successive thrusts, through other sections or territories, until its 
momentum comes to rest.  We have seen these upward pressures commence in 
one State, or with margins for skill, or an Arbitration Court decision such as for 
engineers and then reverberate quickly through other areas.30 
This is a phenomenon key to a Fordist model of development, the ‘connective’ 
bargaining identified by Boyer that links the gains of employees in lead sectors with the 
                                                          
26 Employers’ Total Wage Case 1964 (1964) 106 CAR 683. 
27 See, for example: Peter Cochrane, ‘Doing time’ in Verity Burgmann and Jenny Lee (eds), Making A 
Life: A People’s History of Australia Since 1788 (McPhee Gribble/Penguin Books, 1988) 177-193.  Over-
awards were payments typically made at the workplace/enterprise level which were technically outside 
the formal arbitration system. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Sheridan, above n 19, 286-293.  Indeed, the federal Commission itself noted this pattern, describing 
how ‘[t]he “militant” approach … was based upon the view that the way to win a case before the 
Commission was, first to develop a major national propaganda campaign and make claims on every 
employer and seek to obtain over-award payments by demands backed by the threat of strikes, which 
should if necessary be carried into action.  Application should then be made to the Commission to obtain 
recognition of the established fact’: National Wage Cases of 1965 (1965) 110 CAR 189, 261. 
30 Keith Stewart quoted in Hutson, above n 23, 142-143. 
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workforce at large,31 producing the relatively homogenous wage structure noted in the 
previous chapter and buttressing the contention that the arbitration system precociously 
enshrined the Fordist wage-labour nexus. 
At this point of maximum Fordist functionality, however, there were already indications 
of potential crisis tendencies.  Firstly, the two-tier Basic Wage/margin structure was 
becoming increasingly unwieldly, with separate benches having to be constituted to 
hear claims that, in the 1965, were heard concurrently anyway.32  As national economic 
capacity came to underpin both components of the formal wage,33 employers came to 
resent the process of dual determination, regarding it as an opportunity for unions to 
‘double-dip.’34  The entrenchment of the Metal Trades Award as an institutionalised 
pace-setter depended in part on the dynamism of the metals sector.  As shall be seen in 
chapter 7, if this dynamism waned, the relatively larger wage gains in other sectors 
would tend to encourage wage rounds as metals workers sought to catch-up.  This 
potential was exacerbated by the pervasive ideology of comparative wage justice which, 
in a situation of high inflation and industrial instability, could lead to wage ‘leap-
frogging,’ the stoking of a wage-price spiral and, most significantly for capitalists, an 
erosion of the profit share of national income.  Moreover, full employment strengthened 
the union hand in extracting over-award payments, which risked larger and larger 
segments of total wage rises occurring outside the purview of the Commission.35 
In 1964, however, these threats were largely latent, kept in check by the coherence of 
antipodean Fordism.   
Employment forms/flexibility 
Absolutely central to the Fordist wage labour nexus was the provision of employment 
security and a basket of rights and entitlements in exchange for the intensification of 
                                                          
31 Robert Boyer, The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction (Columbia University Press, 1990) x. 
32 National Wage Cases of 1965 (1965) 110 CAR 189. 
33 Jonathan Gaul, ‘Employers to test total wage plan in court case’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 7 January 
1965, 1.  
34 See, for example: ‘Employers Open Wage Case’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 22 April 1964, 3/16. 
35 Indeed, by 1965 this was already occurring: Richard Mitchell, ‘Australian industrial relations and 
labour law policy: a post-war review’ (1980) 52(1) The Australian Quarterly 40, 46.  See also: H.R. 
Edwards, ‘Over-Award Payments and Incomes Policy’ (1965) 7(3) Journal of Industrial Relations 250, 
256. 
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labour and Taylorist work practices, the standard employment model described in 
chapter 4.   
By 1964, standard employment was firmly established as ‘the crucial pivot in the 
development of labour regulation, social welfare policy and trade union action,’36 
having assumed a more-or-less cogent shape in the post-World War II period.37  Part of 
the basket of rights, both in Australia and other Fordist countries, was the prescription 
of regular, so-called ‘ordinary,’ working hours.  In Australia, the specific form this 
assumed was the 40-hour work week spread over five days.38  For many Australian 
workers, this was won off the back of a massive wave of industrial action following the 
end of World War II.  Reduced working-hours was seen as an essential component of 
the post-War order, and was reflected by the universal support the 40-hours campaign 
commanded amongst the union movement.39  After some groups of workers achieved a 
40-hour week during the conflict, a general test case was convened before the federal 
tribunal.40  Goaded by the New South Wales Australian Labor Party (ALP) 
government,41 and sensitive to the threat of industrial disruption,42 the Commission 
acquiesced and, on 8 September 1947, granted the 40-hour work week,43 with the other 
state tribunals following its lead.44 Although the various commissions did not state that 
this had to be worked over five days, unions sought to ensure that it did, proving willing 
                                                          
36 John Burgess and Iain Campbell, ‘Casual Employment in Australia: Growth, Characteristics, A Bridge 
or a Trap?’ (1998) 9(1) Economic and Labour Relations Review 31, 33. 
37 Ibid 33; John Howe, ‘The Job Creation Function of the State: A New Subject for Labour Law’ (2001) 
14(3) Australian Journal of Labour Law 1, 4.  That this should be the case is no surprise given the 
anatomy and timeline of antipodean Fordism elucidated in the previous chapter.   
38 A point I have made elsewhere: Brett Heino, ‘Award Regulation and the New South Wales Retail 
Sector, 1971-1988: Crisis and Experimentation amidst Changing Models of Development’ (2015) 109 
Labour History 75, 79. 
39 See, for example: ‘The 40 Hour Week’, Queensland Times (Ipswich), 9 January 1946, 3; ‘40 Hour 
Week’, Cloncurry Advocate (Cloncurry), 22 February 1946, 1; ‘40 Hour Week Supported’, Morwell 
Advertiser (Morwell), 25 July 1946, 7; ‘40 Hour Week’, Western Herald (Bourke), 11 April 1947, 1. 
40 Laura Bennett, Making Labour Law in Australia: Industrial Relations, Politics and Law (The Law 
Book Company Limited, 1994) 114. 
41 Which had unilaterally granted the 40-hour week to those workers covered by its own awards: 
Industrial Arbitration (Forty Hours Week) Amendment Act 1947 (NSW). 
42 As will be seen in chapter 7, the 40-hours campaign was contemporaneous with a massive dispute in 
the metals sector.  Although the strikes were over separate issues, they were politically related, especially 
given the lead role of the Amalgamated Engineering Union in both: Rowan Cahill, ‘On Winning the 40-
Hour Week’ (2007) 7(1) Illawarra Unity 16, 21. 
43 Standard Hours Inquiry, 1947 (1947) 59 CAR 581. 
44 Whilst some states, like NSW and Queensland, enacted legislation, others, such as South Australia and 
Western Australia, simply incorporated it into their awards: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and 
Statistics, Year Book Australia 1964 (1301. 0, No. 50, 1964) 457. 
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to apply industrial pressure to this end.45  The success of unions in this regard is 
evidenced by Jones’ observation that ‘[s]ince the adoption of the 40-hour week, there 
has been general acceptance that ordinary hours of work should be within a five-day 
week, except for retail and similar trades rendering service direct to the public.’46  
The development of a 40-hour, five-day ordinary working week was one of the primary 
hallmarks of the entrenchment of the standard employment model, a reality that shall be 
explored in great detail when I come to consider the case of retail in chapter 9.  By 
1964, other rights and entitlements consonant with the model had also been achieved.  
For example, test cases before the federal Commission increased paid annual leave to 
two weeks in 1945,47 three weeks in 196348 and would soon (in 1973-74) be set at the 
still-prevailing standard of four weeks.49  The majority of the states provided for long-
service leave in the 1950s,50 with the federal tribunal following suit in 1964,51 a 
development reinforcing the notion of lifetime employment significant to the workings 
of the antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus.52   
The entrenchment of the standard employment model was also effected by the 
imposition of strict award controls over the use of other forms of labour.  The link 
between the former and full-time employment was particularly strong in Australia,53 
with the result that unions took active steps to protect its position vis-à-vis other 
employment categories.  As shall be seen in the case study chapters, provision for part-
time workers within awards was very limited, with unions typically intensely suspicious 
of its capacity to supplant full-time employment.  Casual employees had a greater 
                                                          
45 See, for example: ‘40-Hour Week’, The Cootamundra Daily Herald (Cootamundra), 30 June 1947, 4; 
‘Unrest in N.S.W. Over 40-Hour Week’, The Examiner (Launceston), 2 July 1947, 1. 
46 Sandra Jones, ‘Penalty Rates under Challenge’ (1981) 23(4) Journal of Industrial Relations 504, 505. 
47 Metal Trades Annual Leave Case (1945) 55 CAR 595. 
48 Re Metal Trades Award; Re Annual Leave (1963) 103 CAR 637. 
49 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia 1974 (1301.1, No. 60, 1974) 301. 
50 See, for example: Factories and Shops (Long Service Leave) Act 1953 (Vic); Long Service Leave Act 
1955 (NSW); Long Service Leave Act 1956 (Tas); Long Service Leave Act 1958 (WA). 
51 Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Year Book Australia 1965 (1301.0, No. 51, 1965) 
477-478. 
52 Particularly insofar as long service leave relied upon continuous service with one employer.  Time 
spent with one employer did not generate an entitlement transmissible to another for the purposes of long-
service leave. 
53 Iain Campbell, Gillian Whitehouse and Janeen Baxter, ‘Australia: Casual employment, part-time 
employment and the resilience of the male-breadwinner model’ in Leah F. Vosko, Martha MacDonald 
and Iain Campbell (eds), Gender and the Contours of Precarious Employment (Routledge, 2009) 60, 62-
63. 
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standing in the award system;54 indeed, O’Donnell argues that ‘the category of casual 
employment in Australia is largely the creation of the award system rather than the 
common law.’55   However, as chapters 8 and 9 will demonstrate, this form was tightly 
hemmed in by a variety of qualitative and quantitative measures, including proportions 
clauses regulating the ratio of casual to full-time staff and/or the share of casual hours in 
total hours worked.   
These developments, together with the plentiful supply of full-time jobs in a strongly 
growing economy, ensured the dominance of the standard employment model during 
the period of antipodean Fordist functionality.  However, as was the case with the 
system of wage fixation, this state of affairs came with its own inbuilt crisis tendencies.  
The development of a basket of standard hours and conditions had to be won through 
struggle.  Capital typically begrudged each and every concession to labour, despite the 
fact they ultimately benefited from the resultant coherence of the Fordist wage-labour 
nexus.56  In other words, the forward momentum that carried this model forward was 
premised on working-class strength.  Moreover, the dominance of the standard 
employment model went hand-in-hand with full employment.  The two exhibited a 
mutually-reinforcing character; full employment enabled unions to leverage the benefits 
of standard employment, whilst standard employment tended to buttress the strength of 
organised labour.57   
Full employment would prove to be one of the key levers of the crisis of antipodean 
Fordism, abrading the ability of the arbitration system to keep union power within the 
                                                          
54 Many awards provided for casual employees, which were usually defined very widely as ‘one 
employed as such.’  This meant that the terms of the employment contract itself determined the form of 
engagement.  It has been remarked before that the category of casual employee has no fixed meaning 
(see, for example: Reed v Blue Line Cruises Limited (1996) 73 IR 420, 424).  As mentioned in footnote 
242 of the previous chapter, the best proxy measure is that adopted by the ABS, that being those who do 
not receive paid leave entitlements: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Employee Earnings, Benefits and 
Trade Union Membership (6310.0, August 2013) 6. 
55 Anthony O’Donnell, ‘’Non-Standard’ Workers in Australia: Counts and Controversies’ (2004) 
17(1) Australian Journal of Labour Law 1, 13. 
56 Which reiterates a point made throughout this thesis, that models of development are not designed in a 
theoretical laboratory and unfolded over a passive society.  What was in the interests of collective capital, 
such as the stabilisation of the Fordist wage-labour nexus and the maintenance of high levels of working-
class consumption, was often resented by individual capitalists, who desired macro-level coherence 
without the associated costs.   
57 Particularly given the well-documented fact that full-time employees are more likely to be union 
members: David Peetz, ‘Trend Analysis of Union Membership’ (2005) 8(1) Australian Journal of Labour 
Economics 1, 18-19; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union 
Membership, above n 54, 29. 
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boundaries set by valorisation imperatives.58  To the extent of their interrelationship, 
standard employment contributed to this reality.  
Collectivism/individualism and the scale of industrial relations 
It will be recalled that in chapter 3 I elucidated the basic distinction between law and 
administration.  Whereas the former is centred on the de-classed juridical citizen-
subject, equal to all other members of the polity, administration fills the gaps class 
struggle rends in this structure by taking as its reference point the organised collectives 
of labour and capital.  There are few better concrete examples of this theoretical point 
than the nature of the Australian arbitration system in 1964.  In this period, the labour 
law regime was highly collectivist, as it had been ever since the steady expansion of 
federal and state awards in the 1920s progressively crowded out (but did not extinguish) 
the common-law contractual system.  Indeed, one of the stated purposes of the original 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act was ‘[t]o facilitate and encourage the organization of 
representative bodies of employers and of employees,’59 whilst Higgins J had stated in 
1915 that ‘without unions, it is hard to conceive how arbitration could be worked.’60   
This centrality was reflected in a number of ways.  Firstly, after becoming a ‘registered’ 
organisation, a host of benefits accrued to a trade union.  Most importantly, it could 
initiate proceedings unilaterally in the Commission.  This guaranteed juridical 
recognition of trade unions tended to prevent employers from refusing to recognise or 
treat with them;61 if unions could obtain results on their own account in the tribunal, it 
made little sense for employers to leave themselves out in the cold.  Registration also 
conferred other benefits, such as the guarantee of a union monopoly over a certain 
group of workers (both in terms of representation and, in some instances, membership), 
                                                          
58 A point I have made elsewhere: Brett Heino, ‘The state, class and occupational health and safety: 
locating the capitalist state’s role in the regulation of OHS in NSW’ (2013) 23(2) Labour & Industry 150, 
159. 
59 Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) s 2(vi). 
60 H. B. Higgins, ‘A New Province for Law and Order: Industrial Peace through Minimum Wage and 
Arbitration’ (1915) 29(1) Harvard Law Review 13, 23. 
61 W.B. Creighton, W.J. Ford and R.J. Mitchell, Labour Law: Text and Materials (The Law Book 
Company Limited, 1993) 931, 932. 
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the attainment of corporate status, the ability to be party to awards, and the protection of 
trade union officials and members from certain acts of discrimination by employers.62 
The collectivism of the regime was also reflected in the fact that the respondents to 
awards were unions, and ipso facto those eligible to be members, as opposed to 
individual workers.  It was the union, rather than individual workers, who had standing 
to appear before the Commission.63  It is telling that, formally speaking, non-unionists 
were not parties to an award.64  The understanding which buttressed this particular 
structure was that trade unions were the legitimate representatives of workers, including 
employees who weren’t members and were working in non-union shops.  Unions were 
empowered to act on their behalf, even if the workers caught up in resultant disputes 
were happy with their terms and conditions of employment.65 
The period of antipodean Fordist functionality had seen this system reinforced, 
particularly through cementing the ability of unions to maintain de facto monopolies of 
labour through strengthened preference provisions.  From the beginnings of the 
arbitration system it was within the power of both the federal and state tribunals to 
award preference to unionists.66  This power, however, was tightly regulated and actual 
use was comparatively rare.67  The aforementioned upsurge in industrial action in the 
immediate post-World War II period, however, led to a re-think.  As part of a basket of 
amendments enacted in 1947, the federal tribunal was given a much wider power to 
enact preference clauses in awards.68  Although the High Court read the provision in a 
                                                          
62 Keith Hancock, Committee of Review into Australian Industrial Relations Law and Systems (Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1985) 442-443 (‘the Hancock Report’). 
63 Indeed, the High Court had found that a claim of an individual employee against their employer is not 
of itself an industrial dispute, which depended upon group mobilisation: Metal Trades Employers 
Association v Amalgamated Engineering Union and Others (1935) 54 CLR 387, 403-404. 
64 Ibid 405. 
65 Burwood Cinema Limited v Australian Theatrical and Amusement Employees’ Association (1925) 35 
CLR 528, 528-529. 
66 See, for example: Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) s 40(b); Creighton, Ford and Mitchell, 
above n 61, 1002. 
67 The kind of preference granted by the early federal Commission tended to be qualified, with preference 
to unionists only conceded ‘all things being equal,’ and usually only in circumstances of employer 
discrimination against union members.  See, respectively: Federated Carters and Drivers Industrial 
Union Australia v J.H. Abbot & Co. (1935) 34 CAR 841; Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen’s 
Association of Australasia v Broken Hill Pty Co. Ltd (1911) 5 CAR 9. 
68 Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) s 43(2) as amended by Commonwealth 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1947 (Cth) sch 8. 
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narrow way, so preventing absolute preference to unionists,69 it was nevertheless an 
attempt on the part of what was probably the most left-wing federal Labor government 
to further integrate unionism with the award system.70   
The 1947 amendments are also an instructive example of administration as practice as 
well as structure.71  A concern that excessive legalism in the conduct of conciliation and 
arbitration stoked industrial disruption72 encouraged the Chifley government to appoint 
a host of ‘lay’ commissioners.  These needn’t come from a legal background, and 
enjoyed wide powers to make awards and settle disputes, except where these touched on 
wages and hours.73  Frazer notes that ‘[i]t was expected that they would operate as 
administrative bodies rather than legal tribunals, exercising their powers with 
discretion to prevent impending disputes before they arose’ (my emphasis).74  Such a 
system was predicated on an understanding and acknowledgement of union power and 
the willingness of workers to resort to the strike weapon.  Other scholars have noted the 
recourse to more administrative or ‘accommodative’ attitudes and practices on the part 
of the Commission during periods of intense class struggle and heightened worker 
power,75 an implicit acknowledgement of the movement towards administration during 
the antipodean Fordist period.  
Despite the collectivism of the labour law regime, however, the species of collectivism 
which was encouraged was of a moderate, bureaucratic nature.  Peetz has described how 
so-called ‘arbitral unionism’ was often more concerned with organisational efficiency 
                                                          
69 See: R. v Wallis; Ex parte Employers’ Association of Wool Selling Brokers (1949) 78 CLR 529; 
Richard Mitchell, ‘The Preference Power and the Practice of the Federal Industrial Tribunal, 1904-1970’ 
(1987) 29(1) Journal of Industrial Relations 3. 
70 Unions were often able to enforce de facto closed shops through agreements with management at the 
workplace, enterprise or industry level: Gianni Zappala, ‘The Closed Shop in Australia’ (1992) 34(1) 
Journal of Industrial Relations 3, 15.  
71 A distinction I draw in: Brett Heino, ‘Capitalism, regulation theory and Australian labour law: Towards 
a new theoretical model’ (2015) 39(3) Capital & Class 453, 469. 
72 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 20 February 1947, 44 (H.V. Evatt); 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 18 April 1947, 1434 (Hubert 
Lazzarini). 
73 Macintyre, ‘Arbitration in Action’, above n 12, 80. 
74 Andrew Frazer, ‘The Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Power: from Cradle to Grave?’ (Research 
Paper No. 15, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2002) 29. 
75 Ibid 2; Jane Romeyn, ‘Towards a Motivational Theory of Arbitration in Australia’ (1980) 22(2) 
Journal of Industrial Relations 181; Malcolm Rimmer, ‘The Workplace Relations Act 1996: An 
Historical Perspective’ (1987) 23(1) Australian Bulletin of Labour 69, 74. 
 134 
before the tribunals than the building of an activist, self-reliant rank-and-file.76  
Moreover, part of the historic mission of compulsory arbitration, as Justice Higgins saw 
it, was to ameliorate ‘the rude and barbarous processes of strike and lockout.  Reason is 
to displace force; the might of the State is to enforce peace between industrial 
combatants.’77   
By 1964, the initial prohibitions on strikes and lockouts provided for in the original 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act78 had long been repealed, but their disciplinary 
function had been assumed by so-called ‘bans clauses,’ provisions inserted in awards 
that typically prohibited conduct such as bans, limitations or restrictions upon the 
performance of work.79  Once ascertained, breaches of bans clauses could be punished 
by injunctions and/or fines.  Whilst reflecting the collectivist nature of the Australian 
labour law system (through, inter alia, making bans clauses binding on unions rather 
than individual employees), these penal provisions exploited this collectivism to ensure 
both union moderation and centralised union control over militant rank-and-file 
members.80  After the 1956 Boilermakers’ Case,81 which saw the arbitral and judicial 
functions of the Federal tribunal separated between the re-dubbed Commonwealth 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and a new Industrial Court respectively, the 
latter was charged with the machinery of enforcing penal provisions. The Court existed 
as an element of the formal judicial system, bound by the application of rigid juridical 
formula, an ideological affinity with the employers and a profound aversion to the more 
pragmatic approach of the arbitral tribunals.82  In short, it was an example of the nature 
of law counter-posed to administration.83  Unsurprisingly, it proved itself a safe pair of 
hands for business, freely granting injunctions for breaches of bans clauses; non-
                                                          
76 David Peetz, Brave New Workplace: How Individual Contracts are Changing our Jobs (Allen & 
Unwin, 2006) 161-162. 
77 Higgins, above n 60, 14. 
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complying unions faced fines for contempt.84  From 1961 onwards in particular, the use 
of these provisions by employers to discipline militant unions, especially in the metal 
trades, escalated,85 and foreboded a showdown between metal unions and the 
employers, the latter of whom would be supported by the state.  In 1964, however, 
metal union leaders were not at this point,86 and bans clauses were effective enough at 
moderating industrial behaviour (or at least making militant unions pay a premium for 
their activities). 
As would be anticipated by the model of the antipodean Fordist labour process, the 
collectivism of the regime was also generally barred entry to the inner sanctum of 
control over the labour process.  The federal tribunal was empowered to hear and 
determine disputes only insofar as they revolved around ‘matters pertaining to the 
relations of employers and employees,’87 the definition of which fell to the High Court.  
Stating the case in 1972, Justice Stephen noted ‘the subject of demands by either party 
which are, for example, of a political or social or managerial nature will not be 
industrial matters’ (my emphasis).88  The period of antipodean Fordist functionality, 
therefore, saw the domain of managerial prerogative more-or-less armoured against the 
intrusion of trade unions into the control and organisation of the labour process 
(excepting the aforementioned award controls on the use and deployment of precarious 
labour).89 
With this understanding in hand, I can move to a consideration of the scale of industrial 
relations during this period of antipodean Fordist functionality.  As can be gathered 
from the discussion on wage fixation above, the Commonwealth tribunal was coming to 
exercise a growing dominance over industrial regulation generally, with the state 
equivalents increasingly following its lead.  Given the centrality of the KWNS to the 
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fabric of Fordism generally, this increasing development of the federal-level as the 
primary scale of industrial relations is unsurprising.  However, the unique institutional 
fabric of the arbitration system ensured that the way in which this increasing 
centralisation came about was novel.   
As will be discussed in the following section, the Constitution vests the federal 
parliament with the ability to legislate ‘conciliation and arbitration for the prevention 
and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State.’90  
The early history of arbitration saw this power read narrowly, with the High Court 
maintaining that federal awards could not have common rule effect (unlike their state 
equivalents).91  In other words, awards could only be made in the resolution of inter-
state disputes between identifiable parties.   
By the period of antipodean Fordist functionality, however, this situation had changed, 
in practice if not necessarily in the letter of the law.  Firstly, the High Court had 
validated the union tactic of creating ‘paper disputes’ (by serving logs of claims on 
employers in more than one state), by which they could enliven the federal 
jurisdiction.92  Secondly, the High Court had also given as expanded meaning to section 
109 of the Constitution,93 which guarantees the paramountcy of laws of the 
Commonwealth over individual states in the event of inconsistency.94  Lastly, as the 
sphere of economic activity increasingly took on a national, as opposed to strictly state-
based, character, the field of federal regulation naturally tended to grow.95  Within this 
framework, the federal tribunal gradually came to influence state bodies more than they 
influenced it; from the 1950s in particular, the latter came to generally follow the lead of 
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the former in matter such as Basic Wage determination96 and in fields where the 
Commonwealth was dominant.97  Although not codified in the way it would be during 
the crisis of antipodean Fordism, by 1964 the federal tribunal exercised the kind of 
authority necessary to the maintenance of the national-level as the primary scale of 
Fordist regulation.98   
Legal matrix 
Much of what is relevant about the broader legal matrix in the constitution of industrial 
regulation, particularly regarding the constitutional foundations of conciliation and 
arbitration, has been discussed above.  Important to note here are two additional issues.  
Firstly, the limitations as to the extent of federal regulation extended to the nature of the 
industries under regulation.  A dispute could only be handled under the arbitral power if 
it could be regarded as ‘industrial.’  Despite a fairly liberal start,99 the High Court 
generally came to regard industry as encompassing the production and/or distribution of 
tangible goods and commodities, as well as activities thought to be incidental or 
ancillary to it (such as banking and insurance).100  This meant that considerable numbers 
of workers, such as teachers,101 firefighters102 and state health and welfare staff,103 
remained outside federal jurisdiction.  As well as impinging upon the ability of the 
federal Commission to control the aggregate movement of wages, it grated against the 
increasing spread of unionism into these white-collar occupations. 
Secondly, the development of the machinery of arbitration and conciliation had in many 
ways submerged, although by no means extinguished, the significance of the common 
law as it applied to employment and industrial relations.  Of particular note was the fact 
that the disciplining mechanisms used to rein in intransigent unions, such as bans 
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clauses and union de-registration, operated through the arbitration system.  Older means 
of employer redress, such as common law industrial torts, generally fell into desuetude.  
That is, the tools of union restraint were attached to a system that I have identified as an 
administrative response to class struggle, taking as its subjects the very bodies it was 
trying to keep in line.  The supremacy of these forms over older common law remedies 
is evidence both of the relative dominance of administration over the ‘pure’ legal form 
within antipodean Fordism and the degree of consensus between labour and capital 
regarding arbitration’s place as the central node of industrial relations.104   
1975 – End of antipodean Fordist boom 
By 1975, the scene had changed dramatically.  As established in the previous chapter, 
the long boom had come to an end as antipodean Fordism lost coherence.  The 
contradictions latent within the antipodean Fordist labour law regime had by now 
germinated and were rapidly coming into full bloom.  In particular, the system of wage 
fixation had become deeply unstable and was increasingly outside the control of the 
federal tribunal, compromising the lynchpin role it exercised within the antipodean 
Fordist mode of regulation.  The precocious institutionalisation of trade union power 
had also become dysfunctional, as waves of rank-and-file militancy broke over the walls 
of arbitration.  Amidst this turmoil can also be seen emerging the first attempts to 
address these crisis tendencies systematically.  After a brief dalliance with the idea of 
supplementing arbitration with a system of collective bargaining in 1973 (a de facto 
recognition of union success in directly negotiating over-award payments with 
employers), a system of wage indexation was officially adopted by the Commission in 
1975.  Such a development represented an attempt to resolve the contradictions of 
antipodean Fordism through the intensification of its institutions.  
Wage fixation 
By 1975, huge changes had broken out all along the wage fixation front.  Firstly, the 
two-part Basic Wage/margins structure had been superseded in 1967 by the so-called 
‘Total Wage,’ a single figure for award classifications into which both the Basic Wage 
and margins were collapsed.  As mentioned above, employer groups first floated the 
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idea before the federal tribunal in 1964.105  The Commission had rejected the 
application, noting that to do so was ‘to abandon a concept which had been an integral 
part of Australian wage fixation for over fifty years.’106  It had also opined that there 
was little more to the employers’ proposal than ‘greater tidiness’ in the operation of the 
system, which was countervailed by trenchant union opposition and the tribunal’s 
overarching (administrative) role in the prevention and settlement of disputes.107 
However, union militancy in a situation of full employment had begun to tax the Basic 
Wage/margins structure, especially given the incidence of escalating over-award 
payments in key industries such as metals.108  In particular, employers were coming to 
resent the centrality of the metals sector in the determination of marginal rates for the 
national wage structure.109 
By 1966, the Commission had been convinced, approving of the Total Wage in 
principle110 and, consequent upon a work-value inquiry into the metal trades, deploying 
it in 1967.111  If, however, the goal was to disrupt the status of the metal trades as an 
institutionalised lead sector (as I argue in the next chapter), the effort failed dismally.  
This brings us to the second major problem that had manifested itself by 1975: the 
increasing exhaustion of the metal trades as a lead sector.  Given that this is an issue 
which is explored in great detail in chapter 7, it can be presented rather schematically 
here.  From the early 1970s in particular, it was becoming apparent that the 
aforementioned tension inherent in the position of the metal trades was manifesting 
itself.  In particular, the place of the Metal Trades Award and its successor, the Metal 
Industry Award, at the apex of the award framework had generated a contradictory 
reality in which metal workers were increasingly disadvantaged precisely because of 
this structure.  With the knowledge that any increase granted in metal awards would 
flow through to large sections of the workforce, minimum rates in these awards had 
tended to lose ground relative to other manufacturing awards, especially in the early 
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1970s.112  This not only compelled metal workers to seek higher over-awards but also 
invited large ‘catch-up’ claims to match wage rises granted in other key sectors, such as 
transport and building.113  Given the fact that the metal awards remained institutional 
leaders, even in the face of a loss of relative industrial significance, these catch-up 
claims then flowed-though to other industries on the basis of comparative wage justice 
claims.  The result: large, ‘leap-frogging’ wage claims in the early to mid-1970s114 
which made for industrial disruption and a fragile wage structure increasingly outside of 
the control of the federal tribunal. 
The Commission’s loss of control over the aggregate movement of wages, together with 
its often ad hoc and contradictory responses, constitutes a third major frontier of change.  
What Bramble posits as the start of the ‘flood tide’ of union militancy was the outcome 
of the 1967 work-value inquiry into the Metal Trades Award.115  The Commission had 
become increasingly uneasy with the fact that this leading award was based upon a 
classification structure which was developed and valued when it was created in 1930.116  
The concern of the Commission was that metal margins themselves, as well as the 
relativities between them, did not reflect the actual value of the work being 
performed.117  Given the pronounced impact of new technologies on the content and 
range of jobs, and the use of the fitter as a yardstick for many awards, the Metal Trades 
Award was, according to the Commission, increasingly anachronistic as a pace-setter in 
its current form.  
What was significant about the work value inquiry, however, was not so much its 
findings as the aftermath.  The Commission had granted comparatively generous 
marginal increases,118 but left it open to employers to ‘absorb,’ or off-set, the rises out 
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of existing over-award payments.119  Moreover, as will be investigated further in chapter 
7, the Commission explicitly sought to restrict the margins adjustments to the Metal 
Trades Award,120 an attempted usurpation of its place at the apex of the award 
framework.  On both scores, the Commission failed dismally, with a huge upsurge of 
industrial action in the metals sector ensuring the defeat of absorption and paving the 
way for strong currents of flow-on. 
This event marked an upswing in union militancy generally, a development greatly 
aided by unions breaking the shackles of the bans clauses.  A massive strike in May 
1969 essentially wrecked the penal provisions of the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act.121  The increasingly profligate use of such disciplining tools by employers, and the 
willingness of the Industrial Court to grant them, had pushed union tolerance to the 
edge.  Although an amended framework of penal powers was developed in the 
aftermath, they fell into desuetude as their use became politically untenable in a context 
of union militancy and Commission reticence.122 
The most important consequence of this new reality for wage fixation was the removal 
of legal-administrative impediments to union pay campaigns.  Organised labour thus 
found it easier to extract higher over-award payments and/or secure ‘consent’ awards123 
through direct action.  Employers generally caved along the front throughout the early 
1970s, resulting in the real wage spike documented in the previous chapter, with 
workers receiving an increasingly large chunk of their wage rises outside of the purview 
of both state and federal tribunals.  The percentage of wage increases stemming from 
National Wage Cases steadily declined from 52.6% in 1969/70 to a mere 19.1% in 
1973/74.124  That is, approximately 80% of the wage increases obtained by workers in 
1973/74 were outside the Commission’s main instrument of wage policy.  
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This fact was not lost on the Commission, a recognition that, in line with the schema 
linking the law-administration continuum to class struggle developed in Chapter 2, 
forced it to temporarily relinquish the system of principles developed throughout the 
1960s (the administrative equivalent of legal precedent) and develop ad hoc 
accommodative responses that attempted to put out the spot-fires of proletarian 
struggle.125  It tacitly admitted as much in justifying the comparatively generous 6% 
increase granted in the 1970 wage case,126 also foreshadowing restrictions on its scope 
to award future increases: 
If we are not realistic in our attitude to wage fixation, then those who look to the 
Commission as their main source of wage increases … will be treated 
inequitably while more and more of those who are strong enough to do so will 
seek increases in the field.  If in the present state of the economy and in the 
atmosphere of general affluence … we failed to give a reasonable increase we 
would be failing in our duty.  However, we wish to emphasise that the material 
before us … disclosed a state of affairs which if continued may inhibit the 
Commission in future national wage cases.  This material shows union pressure 
for wage increases outside the Commission leading to concessions from 
employers, sometimes granted too easily, which favour the industrially strong 
(my emphasis).127 
 
It will be noted that the Commission used the criterion of comparative wage justice as a 
justification for the increase granted.  Indeed, throughout this period it had held the line 
on this principle as some unions sought to exploit the highly favourable economic 
conditions of the mid to late 1960s by introducing the profitability of individual firms as 
another basis upon which pay could be calculated.128  The Commission reiterated the 
traditional view that capacity to pay, a central consideration in wage fixation, was to be 
assessed at the industry/macroeconomic level.  This was thoroughly in keeping with the 
predominant spatial scales of industrial relations and the oligopolistic competition 
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characterising antipodean Fordism.129  The Commission also argued that the system 
sought by the unions in these cases would disrupt the equalising role comparative wage 
justice played, as well as affirming the distribution of productivity gains to the 
workforce at a national level.130   
However, as was foreshadowed above, the continued entrenchment of the comparative 
wage justice doctrine ensured accelerating wage rounds in the early to mid-1970s, 
particularly from 1973-1975 as inflation spiralled.  Hancock notes that in this latter 
period, average annual earnings increased by a massive 20.5%,131 constituting the real 
wage spike documented in chapter 4.  Bentley states that as the resultant ‘wage-price 
spiral was dealt with by trade unions (and employers) in an unplanned and decentralized 
manner, wage relativities were disturbed.  These disturbances led to a process of wage-
leapfrogging…’132 
By the end of 1974, however, the deepening of the economic crisis, both globally and 
within Australia, had forced a rethink on the part of the state, capital and labour.133  The 
Whitlam Labor government grew perceptibly tired of union militancy and large wage 
claims.134  It began to flirt with the idea of wage indexation,135 whereby wage increases 
granted by the Commission were limited to the rise in the Consumer Price Index.  This 
would tend to reduce cost-push inflation, whilst the certainty in the level of wage rises 
would reduce ambit claims by unions.136  Unions were generally supportive; right-wing 
unions welcomed the prospect of wage increases without strikes, whilst the union most 
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likely to oppose indexation, the militant Amalgamated Metal Workers’ Union 
(AMWU), was grappling with deepening economic problems in the metal sector.137  For 
the movement generally, indexation seemed appealing as a means of locking-in the 
large real wage gains recently achieved.138  Employers and the conservative parties, 
were generally reluctant, but many of the former had come around to the idea that 
something needed to change.139 
The ACTU and the Commonwealth proposed automatic wage indexation in the 1974 
Wage Case.140  The Commission rejected it as this stage, citing amongst other things the 
need for unions to rein in wage claims outside of National Wage Cases.141  Once the 
ACTU had reluctantly given such an undertaking,142 the Commission duly developed a 
set of wage-fixing principles centred on indexation in its 1975 National Wage Case.143  
The essence of the system was that wage rises outside of indexation would be small and 
would not threaten the Commission’s efforts to regulate aggregate wage outcomes.144   
I am now in a position to describe the dysfunctional character of wage fixation and its 
role in constituting the crisis of antipodean Fordism in the early to mid-1970s.  The 
advent of the Total Wage in 1967 had done very little to usurp the institutionalised 
position of the metals sector.  However, the flagging dynamism of this sector, and 
manufacturing more broadly, saw workers in other industries pull ahead.  Given the fact 
that many awards were tied to the Metal Trades and Metal Industry Awards, large 
catch-up campaigns by metal workers sparked comparative wage justice claims by other 
unions.  In a context of high inflation, a destabilising process of wage leapfrogging ate 
into the profit share of national income, made for increasing uncertainty in wage 
fixation and saw the Commission lose control of the aggregate movement in wages.  
This movement was greatly facilitated by the union victory over the penal powers in 
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1969.  Employers found it harder to resist over-award demands, whilst the Commission 
and Industrial Court were shorn of a key tool used to discipline militant unions.   
The confluence of these developments is key to understanding the Commission’s 
decision, supported by the state and federal governments and the ACTU, to adopt a 
wage indexation system in April 1975.  It represented a conscious effort to re-establish 
the Commission as the main source of wage increases and the arbiter of wage policy.  
That this was necessary was also a function of the limitations of the arbitral power, 
which rendered the Commission as the only real institutional means through which the 
federal state could exercise wage and industry policy designed to address the economic 
crisis.  Wage indexation was thus an explicit effort to address the crisis of antipodean 
Fordism through an intensification of its institutions.  The arbitration system, a lynchpin 
of the antipodean Fordist mode of regulation, was seeing its authority augmented in an 
attempt to clamp down on the wage explosion that had largely come about outside its 
framework.145   
This was an effort fraught with danger.  Deepening an antipodean Fordist institution 
risked magnifying its contradictions on a broader stage.  Moreover, given the limitations 
inherent in the arbitral power of the Constitution, the Commission remained constrained 
in the ways it could intervene in the labour market.  For wage indexation to be effective, 
a more-or-less durable consensus between the state, capital and labour was required.  
The support of the latter was especially critical.  The ability of the ACTU to keep 
militant unions in check and promise minimal wage claims outside indexation was 
explicitly identified by the Commission as key in making indexation a viable 
concern.146  If unions rebelled, the system would be a dead-letter.   
Forms of employment/flexibility 
Unlike the case with wage fixation, the institutional arrangements surrounding the 
standard employment model remained essentially unchanged.  Awards continued to 
encourage full-time employment, and the system of qualitative and quantitative checks 
on other forms, such as casual and part-time labour, remained in place.   
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However, beneath the surface of comparative institutional stasis, a major change was 
taking place in the composition of the workforce.  From the early 1960s, women were 
entering the workforce in ever increasing numbers, being particularly concentrated in 
clerical and sales positions.147  Whereas in February 1968, 36.9% of the female 
population aged 15 and over were in the labour force,148 by November 1975 this had 
grown substantially to 43.7%.149  This growth was overwhelmingly in ‘part-time’ 
employment;150 indeed, Hancock shows that the number of women employed as part-
time workers increased by 84% between 1966 and 1975, compared to a 24% increase in 
full-time female workers.151   
Female workers not employed on a full-time basis were thus becoming an increasingly 
important segment of the workforce.  Chapters 8 and 9 will demonstrate that this 
development would grate against the award system’s preference for, and defence of, the 
standard employment model. 
Collectivism/individualism and the scale of industrial relations 
The question of collectivism/individualism can be dispensed with easily enough.  In 
chapter 4, it was argued that the crisis of antipodean Fordism was at least partially 
constituted by the very collectivism of the system, and the growing dysfunctionality in 
its articulation with the valorisation of capital.  Certainly, trade union power was 
waxing in the early 1970s.152  After comparatively slow absolute growth in the 1960s 
(accompanied by a comparatively small but steady loss in density),153 union 
membership and density grew strongly in the early 1970s,154 even in traditionally 
poorly-unionised white-collar sectors.155  Industrial disputation sky-rocketed as workers 
                                                          
147 Hancock, The Hancock Report, above n 62, 70. 
148 Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, The Labour Force (6203.0, May 1969) 4. 
149 Australian Bureau of Statistics, The Labour Force (6203.0, November 1975) 6. 
150 The figures Hancock uses, derived from ABS data, does not distinguish between part-time and casual 
labour. 
151 Hancock, The Hancock Report, above n 62, 74. 
152 For an excellent overview, see Bramble, above n 80, 41-71. 
153 Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Year Book Australia 1964, above n 44, 504; 
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Year Book 1969 (1301.0, No. 55, 1969) 299-300. 
154 Union density increased from 50% of total wage and salary earners in 1970 to 58% in 1975, 
representing an influx of nearly 500,000 new members: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book 
Australia 1973 (1301.0, No. 59, 1973) 278; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia 1975-
1976 (1301.0, No. 61, 1976) 309-310 
155 Russell Lansbury, ‘The Growth and Unionization of White-collar Workers in Australia: Some Recent 
Trends’ (1977) 19(1) Journal of Industrial Relations 34.   
 
 
147 
increasingly resorted to direct action to get results.  Whereas in 1963, some 581,568 
working-days were lost in industrial disputes,156 1969 saw 1,957,957 days lost,157 whilst 
in 1974 (the peak of the early 1970s strike wave) an enormous 6,292,500 working days 
were forfeited to disputes.158  Expressed differently, the days lost to industrial disputes 
in 1974 represented an enormous 982% increase on the 1963 figure.  The general 
upswell in class struggle also encouraged employers to come to closed-shop 
arrangements with unions perceived to be industrially moderate in sectors such as retail 
(more on which will be discussed in chapter 9), banking and administration, in the 
hopes of excluding militant competitors.159  Regardless of whether or not capital was 
successful in the latter regard, such agreements reinforced the institutional entrenchment 
of trade unionism within Australian industrial relations and buttressed the collectivist 
character of its labour law regime. 
As regarding the scale of industrial relations, this burgeoning crisis period of antipodean 
Fordism saw a contradictory reality.  The increasing significance of National Wage and 
margins cases in the 1960s, together with the role of the federal Commission as one of 
the key macroeconomic lynchpins in the fabric of antipodean Fordism, had encouraged 
an increasing concentration of representation on the part of both capital and labour.  The 
resource and research demands of wage cases facilitated the growth in ACTU power 
vis-à-vis affiliates.  In the all-important metals sector, the immense AMWU had come 
into being in 1973, whilst the employers had created the Metal Trades Industry 
Association (MTIA).  Workers and employers, therefore, were increasing the scale upon 
which they mobilised. 
However, as can be gathered from the foregoing discussion of over-award campaigns 
and the marginalisation of National Wage Cases, increasing organisational 
centralisation was concomitant with the emergence of a de facto collective bargaining 
system, one that was most prevalent at the workplace, enterprise and, sometimes, 
industry level.  It made little sense for unions to go through the rigmarole of compulsory 
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conciliation and arbitration for an uncertain outcome when the application of industrial 
pressure on employers could deliver better outcomes in a timely fashion.160   
The pervasiveness of union collective bargaining outside the bounds of the arbitration 
system had convinced many within both the industrial and political wings of the labour 
movement that the arbitration system was in need of a thorough overhaul.  The ALP 
Industrial Relations Committee had in 1970: 
[R]ecommended that tribunals should confine themselves to the fixation of 
minimum rates and conditions and expect that there will be bargaining for over-
award payments and conditions. It also suggested that present bargaining 
procedures for over-award conditions should be regularized and formalized.161 
 
The recommendation was enshrined in the ALP’s industrial relations platform unveiled 
in May 1971, which was ‘based firmly on the principle of collective bargaining.’162  The 
tabling in April 1973 of a Bill to amend the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 
represented a wide-ranging reform package, including, amongst other things, a total 
abolition of the penal powers, granting of immunity from tort liability for unions and 
officials for acts related to an industrial matter163 and, most importantly, limiting the 
power of the Commission to refuse to certify ‘collective agreements.’164  It was 
described by Minister for Labour Clyde Cameron as ‘the first stage of a radical 
transformation of industrial relations in Australia.’165  In the event, however, strong 
hostility from the business community and parliamentary conservatives, together with 
Senate obstructionism, ensured that the Act that was eventually passed was heavily 
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diluted.  In particular, a genuine collective bargaining system did not emerge, whilst 
immunity from tort actions was dropped and strike penalties retained.166   
Two key points are of note here.  Firstly, the failure to grant unions immunity from 
actions in tort would come to bear dark fruit in the 1980s (as shall be revealed below).  
Secondly, the conservative reaction to the original Bill was due in no small part to the 
fear that collective bargaining in a context of union strength would amount to industrial 
duress untrammelled by arbitration.167  In 1970, the Minister for Labour Billy Snedden 
stated the conservative case quite candidly: ‘The concern that I have about direct 
negotiation is the degree to which powerful unions in an industrial sense are able to use 
the threat of strike action to coerce employers to give wage increases beyond the 
capacity of the economy to pay and in advance of the development of productivity.’168  
From this perspective the arbitration system was perceived as a defence against union 
militancy, a view shared by some employers concerned at its usurpation.  The President 
of the Australian Capital Territory Employers Federation, for example, pleaded that 
‘[t]he Government and Parliament need to strengthen authority to discourage strikes and 
encourage conciliation and arbitration’ (my emphasis).169   
This last statement is significant for the purposes of this thesis in two ways.  Firstly, it 
helps explain why the process of institutional searching for ways out of the developing 
crisis initially took the form of an intensification of antipodean Fordist institutions.  If 
the arbitration system, rather than union militancy at the point of production, was 
identified as the core issue by a strategic majority of employers, then it is hardly likely 
that the effort to recentralise control under its aegis would have succeeded.  Secondly, it 
provides a stark point of contrast to the developing attitude of capital in the latter half of 
the 1980s and early 1990s, where the institutions of arbitration themselves were 
perceived to be the source of malaise.  Capital would come to forget its own history 
when it championed the cause of collective, or ‘enterprise,’ bargaining in these periods. 
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Legal matrix 
Broadly speaking, the constitutional basis upon which the arbitration system was 
erected remained unchanged.  However, another head of power which the 
Commonwealth could use to legislate received a major boost in 1971 when the High 
Court significantly expanded the ambit of the corporations power.170  This amplified 
power underwrote the Trade Practices Act 1974,171 a statute that was initially concerned 
with the establishment of ‘laws concerning restrictive trade practices … mergers and 
acquisitions, and consumer protection.’172  This piece of legislation would, however, 
become in the near future a major weapon against militant unionism.  
1982 – Institutional exhaustion 
1982 represents the end point of the initial attempts to handle the crisis of antipodean 
Fordism through intensifying its institutions.  The indexation system established in 1975 
began to be abraded in the late 1970s and finally came unstuck in 1981.  Its end was 
brought about by another large wage round, ostensibly based on work-value 
considerations but in essence simply another iteration of the post-war pattern of flow-
on.  Crucially, the system again reverted to a more de-centralised model, with the 
Commission’s decision to abandon indexation based in no small part on the fact that 
employers were already conceding wage and conditions demands to unions at the 
enterprise and industry level.  Moreover, the conservative Fraser government’s efforts 
to curb union power through a specialist body, the Industrial Relations Bureau (IRB), 
proved a dead letter. 
Amidst this stagnation, however, can be discerned the first developments that speak of a 
qualitatively different means of addressing crisis, means which cut across the grain of 
antipodean Fordism rather than buttressing it.  Of especial note was the development of 
tools to disrupt the unification of the proletariat, most notably through the emergence of 
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statutory prohibitions on solidarity action, or ‘secondary boycotts.’  In outline, these can 
be considered ‘proto’ liberal-productivist impulses. 
Wage fixation 
The wage indexation system established in 1975 operated effectively enough for several 
years, particularly when viewed from the perspective of capital and the state.  
Dabscheck notes that ‘the commission was generally successful in ensuring that 
national wage cases were the major source of wage movements between 1975 and 
1981.’173  In particular, before December 1978, National Wage cases accounted for well 
over 90% of the movement in total wages.174  If the experiment with wage indexation 
was designed to reassert Commission control over aggregate wages, as is maintained 
here, then it must be regarded as a success, at least until 1979.175 
However, the fragility of the consensus underpinning indexation was glaringly revealed 
as the state and capital increasingly refused to hold up their end of the bargain in an 
arrangement still requiring union support.  Amongst other things, the Fraser government 
repeatedly, and often successfully, petitioned the Commission to ‘discount’ wage rises 
based upon the inflationary impact of some of their policies.176  This discounting was 
tremendously frustrating to unions, who reasoned (legitimately) that the driving forces 
of inflation were non-wage factors.177   
In the face of persistent discounting, and an economic upturn in the late 1970s and very 
early 1980s on the back of a minerals boom, some unions in construction, transport, and 
metals attempted to get around the constraints of indexation by lodging ‘work-value’ 
cases, established exceptions to indexation guidelines based upon the changing skill 
content of jobs.178  That unions in these industries were the spearhead was unsurprising 
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– they were the same unions who in the early 1970s had been the most active in 
collective bargaining outside the arbitration system.  Their activity informed the 1979 
Biennial Congress of the ACTU, which carried a resolution that suggested collective 
bargaining and conciliation and arbitration were synonymous.179   
Declining union commitment to indexation and the spread of work-value claims threw 
the whole system into jeopardy.  The Commission correctly appraised the danger, 
noting that the future of the centralised system was in the hands of the participants 
themselves180 and that a general round of work-value cases was not compatible with 
indexation principles.181  Moreover, it lamented that the government, through its 
insistent demands for discounting, was forcing it to choose between frustrating 
government policy or letting the ‘fragile package’ of indexation collapse.182 
In the event, indexation did not survive.  A wave of work-value cases originating 
amongst waterside, warehousing, road transport and metal workers had, by 1981, 
brought across-the-board increases (often of around $8.00 a week) to approximately 
80% of the workforce.183  Moreover, a 1981 consent award in the metals sector was the 
precursor to the general spread of the 38-hour work week.184  Bramble’s account clearly 
demonstrates that, in substance, the work-value round was little different to the 
processes of collective bargaining, backed by industrial action, that had produced the 
wage leap-frogging in the early 1970s.185  Once on foot, the entrenched logic of 
comparative wage justice ensured the gains flowed-on.  Quite simply, the event 
demonstrated the intractability of Fordist crisis.  Its logic of wage and conditions flow-
on remained on foot, but in circumstances of dysfunctionality. 
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Forms of employment/flexibility 
The ongoing crisis of antipodean Fordism throughout the 1970s and early 1980s 
intensified and deepened the growing significance of employment forms outside the 
full-time, standard model.  Hancock notes that between 1975 and 1984, part-time 
employment increased by a substantial 44%, compared to the paltry 5% increase 
recorded in full-time employment.186  Whereas in 1966 only 10% of the workforce 
worked part-time, by 1982 the figure had grown to 17%.187  Importantly, the crisis also 
had the effect of accelerating the growth of part-time employment amongst males,188 
foreshadowing the transformation from what was a highly gendered phenomenon into 
something of more general compass.  The significance of this shift was recognised by 
many, with one commentator going so far as to call the growth in part-time work ‘the 
most significant social change taking place in the Australian workforce.’189 
As will be demonstrated in the case study chapters, the successful union claim for a 38-
hour working week in the early 1980s was accompanied by the demand for cost offsets, 
which often included either the introduction of part-time employment in awards (as the 
MTIA tried to do for male workers in the Metal Industry Award),190 or the relaxation of 
some of the controls, both qualitative and quantitative, on its use (as was the case with 
the New South Wales Shop Employees Award).191  These represented the first, very 
tentative and inchoate, steps towards a liberal-productivist wage labour nexus based 
upon precarity and increased managerial control over the engagement and control of 
labour-power as a commodity.  Trade unions generally recognised the danger 
(especially the threat to full-time jobs) and attempted to maintain the strict award 
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controls on part-time and casual work.192  Even in 1982, they had adequately held the 
line in this institutional regard.   
Their stand was aided by the federal Commission, which agreed that part-time work 
should not be used to compromise the model of standard, full-time employment.  In an 
important case involving the vehicle industry, employers cited the growth in part-time 
work, together with the recent provision for it in awards covering sectors as varied as 
insurance, banking and confectionary, as evidence enough that the Commission’s 
presumption against part-time work should be voided.193  The Commission response is 
telling: ‘[T]here has been no significant departure from the original concept that it must 
be shown to be desirable to meet the particular needs of the industry and that it would 
not be detrimental to full time employment’ (my emphasis).194 More thoroughgoing 
change in the institutional settings around non-standard employment forms and 
flexibility would have to wait until later on in the decade. 
Collectivism/individualism and the scale of industrial relations 
The fundamentally collectivist nature of the labour law regime and the award 
framework remained intact in 1982.  As was the case in 1975, this collectivism was 
dysfunctional for capital, particularly insofar as union power remained entrenched.  The 
wages explosion of the early 1980s was brought about by a large strike wave.  Whilst 
the strait-jacket of indexation had seen working days lost to industrial disputes reach a 
nadir of 1,654,800 in 1977,195 rounds of work-value cases beginning in 1978-79 saw the 
rate pick up, reaching a peak of 4,192,200 days lost in 1981 (an increase of 
approximately 153% on the 1977 figure).196  It was, in many ways, the re-emergence of 
the same crisis tendency that had manifested itself in 1975 – the system depended upon 
trade unions to function, but demanded they act in a controlled, moderate way within 
the bounds of valorisation imperatives.   
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This re-emergence, however, was not for lack of the Fraser government trying to effect 
profound change which, although generally not realised, represented in essence a proto-
liberal-productivist arrangement, particularly insofar as individual rights (which were 
historically marginal to the system) assumed a greater importance.   
The government’s reform program revolved around the creation of a body known as the 
Industrial Relations Bureau in 1977.197  The IRB was armed with a wide suite of powers 
well in excess of those it had inherited from its predecessor, the Arbitration 
Inspectorate.  Two powers in particular are key here: 
1. ‘[T]he right to obtain an order restraining persons or organisations from 
contravening the Act or regulations, and the imposition of a penalty in the case 
of the breach or non-observance of an order or award.’198  Such a power 
represented an attempt to reintroduce and enforce a penal provisions regime; and 
2. Administering individual ‘safeguards,’ namely the freedom of workers not to 
join a trade union on expanded conscientious grounds and a right not to be 
compelled to partake in industrial action.199 
 
The notion of individual safeguards was premised on the views of the Fraser 
government that the closed shop placed enormous power in the hands of union 
officials200 and that union members naturally grated against their leaderships expanding 
the realm of union activity beyond the industrial sphere into broader political and social 
issues.201  Government MP John Martyr stated, ‘[t]he whole essence of the legislation 
before us is that it is designed to protect the individual, to protect his rights against 
arbitrary dismissal, to protect his rights against arbitrary action by union officials’ (my 
emphasis).202  This understanding sat uneasily with the administrative fabric of 
arbitration.  The latter’s primary function, the prevention and resolution of industrial 
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disputes, took as its subject the collective organs of labour, whilst its administrative 
practice demanded a sensitivity to the industrial realities of the 1970s.   
This tension was graphically demonstrated by the case of Barbara Biggs, a young 
woman employed as a tram conductor in the fiercely union Melbourne tramway 
system.203   She had obtained a certificate exempting her from union membership, but 
her employment by the Tramways Board was met by a strike of fellow employees ‘in 
defence of the closed shop.’204  It is worth quoting Mitchell at length about the 
subsequent events: 
At this point the Commission came into the dispute and subsequent events 
highlight the clash between the traditional pragmatism of the Commission’s 
dispute settling processes and the ideology of the individual rights legislation.  
The Commission recommended the removal of Biggs from the roster and that 
she be offered alternative employment in exchange for a return to work.  The 
Tramways Board refused to accede to this recommendation because it felt that 
such action on its part would involve a breach of the Act (my emphasis).205 
 
The clash Mitchell observes assumes special importance in the context of this thesis.  It 
represents an image of the law-administration continuum at a time of tension.  The 
arbitration system was presented with a legislative agenda in which the collective 
subject was jostled by newly important individual subjects.  The nexus point of the law-
administration continuum was at stake, and the fact that Biggs discussed the dispute 
with the IRB and subsequently opted to take a position with another employer206 attests 
to the temporary victory of the established labour law institutions over the 
Government’s legislative baby. 
The case of Biggs was one of a number involving employees seeking to avoid union 
membership with the support of the IRB.207  All basically came unstuck in the face of 
unionists refusing to work with non-union labour.208  Such failures, coupled with 
broader issues of maintaining adequate inspections209 and legal setbacks,210 made the 
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IRB a widely recognised failure.211  ALP Opposition Leader Bill Hayden’s contention, 
that the IRB ‘is useless and impotent,’212 was ultimately validated by its demise in 
1983.213  For the moment, then, the administrative fabric of arbitration, and its 
crystallisation of a distinct form of the law-administration continuum, was maintained.   
With this understanding in hand, I can now move on to a brief consideration of the scale 
of industrial relations.  As was apparent from the foregoing discussion of wage fixation, 
the 1975-1982 period was characterised by efforts to intensify the federal arbitration 
commission as the pre-eminent lynchpin within antipodean Fordism.  Outside of 
indexation, the Fraser government undertook other institutional reforms designed to 
buttress the position of the federal tribunal.  For example, it legislated to provide greater 
consistency between the decisions of the Commission and its state counterparts,214 aided 
by legislation in some states, such as New South Wales and Western Australia, basically 
compelling the state body to follow the Commonwealth’s lead in the absence of 
countervailing reasons.215  Moreover, it attempted to develop a more co-ordinated 
approach between the Commonwealth and state governments regarding wage fixation, 
seeking agreement with the latter, for example, in enforcing its 1982 wage-freeze.216  
This effort at augmenting the centrality of the federal Commission was broadly 
successful, as Hancock notes: ‘Since 1975, state tribunals have (with minor exceptions) 
conformed to the principles laid down in major decisions of the Arbitration 
Commission.’217 
However, greater institutional coherence between the arms of federal and state 
arbitration meant little when unions broke the straitjacket of indexation and reverted to a 
system of de facto collective bargaining.  Dabscheck pithily describes the result upon 
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the destruction of indexation: ‘After July 1981 Australia moved to a decentralised, 
unco-ordinated system of industrial relations regulation.’218   
By 1982, therefore, Australian capitalism was in much the same state as it was in 1975.  
The centrality of the Commission as the lynchpin in the antipodean Fordist mode of 
regulation had been breached by unions pressing against and outside the arbitration 
system.  The Fraser government’s 1982 wage freeze was a crude acknowledgement that 
its more sophisticated attempts at crisis resolution had failed.  The fact that 1982 was a 
re-run of the events of 1975 demonstrate that the crisis tendencies of antipodean 
Fordism were intractable.  To fundamentally shift the ground, unions would either have 
to be held in line, or their integration into industrial relations fabric usurped.  As I will 
demonstrate later, the achievement of the former during the rest of the 1980s paved the 
way for the latter in the 1990s. 
Legal matrix 
Whilst the constitutional basis of the arbitration system remained unchanged, a 1982 
High Court decision augured a significant change.219  For some time members of the 
Court had expressed dissatisfaction with the increasingly inadequate and complex 
definition of an industry for the purposes of ascertaining if an industrial dispute 
existed.220  It deprived large groups of workers access to the federal system221 and was 
premised on a narrow, productivist reading of ‘industry’ increasingly at odds with the 
reality of an ever more intertwined economy.  In the 1982 case, the Court ruled that, 
under the traditional definition, staff at universities were not engaged in or in connexion 
with industry.222  However, the bench left open the door, suggesting that had the 
applicants sought to affirm principles of the Court’s earlier, more liberal approach to 
determining the meaning of industry,223 the case may have been decided differently.224  
In the next chapter we will see major change on this front, particularly as the pressures 
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(1908) 6 CLR 309. 
224 R v McMahon; Ex parte Darvall (1982) 151 CLR 57, 63, 65, 74. 
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of the Accord forced the opening of a wider conception whilst allowing for a more 
unified national system. 
In other developments, the Trade Practices Act had, as foreshadowed above, been 
turned into a tool of union repression.  A 1976 committee of review was tasked with 
exploring the application of the Act ‘to anticompetitive conduct by employees, and 
employee or employer organisations’ (my emphasis).225  One of its recommendations 
regarding secondary boycotts is worth citing at length: 
If an organisation or group of persons for its own reasons deliberately interferes 
with the competitive process, then the community is entitled to have those 
reasons scrutinised by a body independent of the persons engaged in the dispute.  
If that independent body finds those reasons inadequate, the community is 
entitled to require that the position be remedied.226 
 
Despite the fact that the committee made no recommendation as to whether the 
provisions should be inserted into the administrative fabric of the arbitration system or 
the more ‘pure’ legal form of the court system,227 the Fraser government opted for the 
latter course, duly introducing section 45D into the Trade Practices Act228 in June 1977.  
The section is highly complex, but is broadly a very wide net designed to capture all 
manner of conduct in which ‘persons’ (most usually unions) disrupt one corporation’s 
supply or acquisition of goods and services in an attempt to apply pressure on 
another.229  A member of the ALP opposition presciently grasped the implications, 
noting that what was termed ‘secondary boycotts’ by the government were really 
sympathy strikes, and what the government actually sought was to break the cycle 
whereby the industrially strong helped the weak.230  That is, it was part of an effort to 
break the connective links binding the strong and the weak within antipodean Fordism 
under the aegis of the arbitration system. 
                                                          
225 T.B. Swanson, J.A. Davidson, A.G. Hartnell, A. Kerr and H.S. Schreiber, Trade Practices Act Review 
Committee-Report to the Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs (Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1976) 1. 
226 Ibid 85. 
227 Ibid 86. 
228 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 45D 
229 Ibid.  Indeed, the section was cast so broadly that, subject to some weak protection, s 45D could even 
capture ‘primary’ boycotts, or boycotts targeted at an employer by their own employees.  See, for 
example: Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd v Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees’ Union (1987) 15 FCR 
31.  See also: Bruce Juddery, ‘Bill ‘threat to union’’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 21 March 1977, 1/7.  
230 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 May 1977, 1981-1982 (Mick 
Young). 
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Unsurprisingly, trade unions almost invariably lost their early battles with section 45D.  
The very first encounter, involving the Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union 
(AMIEU), saw the union injuncted from black-banning two abattoirs in an attempt to 
enforce compulsory unionism at a small butchery business.231  Additional cases saw 
storehouse,232 meat,233 and transport workers234 served with interlocutory injunctions 
under the legislation.  A case involving disruption of the NSW fuel transport industry235 
also saw the introduction of another new provision, section 45E, designed to prevent 
union and employer agreement in disrupting the supply or acquisition of goods and 
services to/from ‘target’ companies.236  Full told, sections 45D and 45E represented a 
determined effort on the part of employers and the conservative Fraser government to 
place sympathy strikes outside the administrative fabric of arbitration, where the 
resolution of disputes was paramount, and relocate it within the ordinary, and generally 
hostile, court system.   
However, even at this stage, union power made capital somewhat gun-shy.  Although 
section 82 of the Act provides that the aggrieved party can reclaim damages,237 in 1982 
no case had ever gone beyond the injunction phase.  Employers were typically content 
to get the industrial action ended; pursuing further action for damages risked worsening 
it, as well as making it incumbent upon the business to prove loss. The latter course of 
action only became viable once the New Right ideology had congealed into a cogent 
and explicitly activist program for utilising the legislation and court system to their 
advantage.   
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have provided the first half of the concrete legal history needed to flesh 
out the abstract framework developed in chapter 4.  To demonstrate the soundness of 
the theory of transition forwarded there, the state of labour law has been described at 
                                                          
231 ‘Union loses in secondary boycott case’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 8 December 1979, 3. 
232 Industrial Enterprises Ltd v Federated Storemen and Packers Union in CCH, Australian Industrial 
Law Review, vol 21(7) (4 April 1979) ¶106. 
233 Tillmans Butcheries Pty v AMIEU in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 22(1) (9 January 
1980) ¶2. 
234 Leon Laidley Pty Ltd v Transport Workers Union of Australia  (1980) 43 FLR 168. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Di Yerbury, ‘Industrial Relations Legislation in 1980’ (1981) 23(1) Journal of Industrial Relations 90, 
92. 
237 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 82. 
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certain key dates capturing the coherence and crisis of antipodean Fordism.  I began in 
1964, when antipodean Fordism was at its zenith.  The unique structure of the law-
administration continuum, in which the latter was dominant, was represented most 
perfectly in the arbitration system, which precociously institutionalised the antipodean 
Fordist wage labour nexus.  In particular, compulsory arbitration at this time facilitated 
the pattern of flow-on from the industrially strong to the industrially weak, further 
developed and diffused standard employment, and strongly integrated organised labour 
into the fabric of the law and the state, all essential planes of coherence in antipodean 
Fordism. 
By 1975, however, antipodean Fordism had entered a period of profound crisis, 
constituted in part by the same legal framework essential to its functionality.  In 
particular, in a context of stagnating productivity and dynamism in lead sectors such as 
metals and rising inflation, the power of organised labour manifested itself in large 
wage rounds and comparative wage justice claims, which proved highly destabilising 
for the wage structure and ate into the profits of capitalists.  Early experiments in crisis 
management, such as wage indexation, proved exceedingly fragile, and by 1982 the 
institutional exhaustion of antipodean Fordism and its labour law regime had become 
apparent.   
The stage was thus set for more radical changes in the second half of the 1980s, 
developments that would prove corrosive of antipodean Fordism’s labour law regime 
and constitutive of a liberal-productivist successor. 
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Chapter 6 
FORMATION AND ASCENDENCY OF THE LIBERAL-
PRODUCTIVIST LABOUR LAW REGIME 
In this chapter I continue to trace the concrete history of labour law change begun in 
chapter 5.  From the intractably crisis-ridden and institutionally exhausted position of 
antipodean Fordism in 1982, major developments had occurred across the four themes 
(wage fixation, forms of employment/flexibility, collectivism/individualism and the 
scale of industrial relations and the broader legal matrix) canvassed.  By 1989, some of 
the constituent legal elements of liberal-productivism were coming into existence, 
grating against the decaying yet still entrenched institutions of antipodean Fordism.  
Liberal-productivism had entered a stage of broad coherence by 1996, and by 2006 we 
can speak of the ascendency of a liberal-productivist labour law regime.  This regime 
provisionally answers the crisis tendencies of its antipodean Fordist predecessor and 
helps maintain the coherence of liberal-productivism. 
1989 – Seeds of liberal-productivism germinating 
Whereas 1982 had been the closing chapter of the post-World War II institutional status 
quo, by 1989 a deep process of institutional searching had led to profound changes in 
the fabric of industrial relations and labour law.  Although some developments 
represented an extension of attempts at intensifying the institutions of antipodean 
Fordism, others indicated that the elements of a liberal-productivist model of 
development were coming into existence and starting to affect material and ideological 
practice.  In terms of the theory of transition forwarded in this thesis, this period thus 
becomes a crucial one, one where the tension between the old and the new is at its 
height. 
Substantial evolution had occurred across all the key themes in the period from 1982 to 
1989.  The majority of this change is bound up with a historic deal between the 
Australian Labor Party (ALP) and Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), named 
‘the Accord’.  It was struck in August 1982 and came into effect after the victory of the 
ALP, led by Bob Hawke, in the 1983 election.  Over the course of its history, the 
Accord would be rewritten seven times, but in its original, ‘Mark I’ form, it was a 
 
 
163 
comprehensive document that combined a return to wage indexation with a broad policy 
package providing for improvements in the social wage, tripartite institutions for 
industry planning and occupational health and safety, and a desired return to full 
employment.1  It was, in essence, corporatism established without the explicit 
cooperation of capital.23  
There were other technological, economic, political and legal forces at play that bore 
upon the four themes. These will be discussed where they are relevant below.  The 
primary vehicle of change, however, was the Accord, and it occupies a central place in 
the following analysis. 
Wage fixation 
One of the Accord’s primary impacts was the destruction of the post-World War II 
pattern of wage fixation centred on wage and conditions flow-on from the pace-setting 
metal trades.  It required of the ACTU and its constituent unions an acceptance that the 
maintenance and improvement of living standards ‘will require a suppression of 
sectional priorities and demands’ (my emphasis).4  Upon election, the Hawke 
government convened a National Economic Summit, bringing together representatives 
of the state, capital, organised labour and various community groups in an exercise of 
attempted crisis management.  In light of that event, Hawke stated: 
                                                          
1 ‘Statement of Accord by the Australian Labor Party and the Australian Council of Trade Union 
regarding economic policy, February 1983’, (‘The Accord’) in Frank Stilwell, The Accord…and Beyond: 
The Political Economy of the Labor Government (Pluto Press, 1986) 159-162, 167-173; Tom Bramble, 
Trade Unionism in Australia: A history from flood to ebb tide (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 119-
120. 
2 I use ‘corporatism’ here in the manner indicated by Panitch when he described it as ‘a political structure 
within advanced capitalism which integrates organized socioeconomic producer groups through a system 
of representation and cooperative mutual interaction at the leadership level and of mobilization and social 
control at the mass level.’  Most importantly for my purposes, Panitch adds that ‘in virtually every liberal 
democratic country in which corporatist structures become at all important an incomes policy designed to 
abate the wage pressure of trade unions was the frontispiece of corporatist development.’  This wage 
restraint was the primary purpose of the Accord.  See: Leo Panitch, ‘The Development of Corporatism in 
Liberal Democracies’ (1977) 10(1) Comparative Political Studies 61, 66, 74.  The recognition that the 
Accord represented an essentially corporatist system even in the absence of an organ of capital matching 
the integration and organisation of the ACTU has been recognised by a number of scholars.  See, for 
example: Randal G. Stewart, ‘The politics of the Accord. Does corporatism explain it?’ (1985) 20(1) 
Politics 26; Braham Dabscheck, The Accord: Corporatism Visits Australia (1996) <http://www.i-
repository.net/contents/outemon/ir/501/501961207.pdf>.  
3  Despite formally binding only the ACTU and the federal government, employers were nevertheless 
granted full consultation in the Accord process: ‘Economic recovery “via accord,”’ Canberra Times 
(Canberra), 14 April 1984, 7. 
4 ‘The Accord’, above n 1, 162. 
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I would point out again that all at the Summit agreed that if a centralised system 
of wage fixing is to work, there must be an abstention from sectional claims 
except in special and extraordinary circumstances … my Government’s 
interpretation of what constitutes such circumstances is the common-sense 
interpretation and leaves no room for selfish claims from maverick sections of 
the trade union movement.5 
 
The Accord and the Summit, therefore, evinced a desire to break the historical pattern of 
metal trade flow-on and the leap-frogging wage rounds of the mid-1970s and early 
1980s.  The institutional mechanisms to realise this goal were ‘no-extra claims’ 
provisions and a renovated system of wage indexation, whereby wages were moved in 
line with Consumer Price Index (CPI) increases at six-monthly intervals.  The former 
were designed to cut off sectional wage campaigns outside of price rises at their source.  
To be entitled to receive the wage increases handed down by the Commission in 
National Wage Cases, trade unions were compelled to ‘sign on’ to the Accord 
principles, which included foregoing wage claims outside of indexation.  Left-wing 
unions which proved reluctant to sign on (such as the Victorian branches of the Food 
Preservers’ Union and Federated Confectioners’ Association, who feature in chapter 8) 
were excoriated by the Commission and denied the wage improvements given to other 
unions.6  Regarding these unions, the ACTU was faced with a contradiction in 
reconciling its functions as the peak organ of labour solidarity and its new found 
position in the Accord fabric as industrial disciplinarian.7  Faced with this paradoxical 
position, the ACTU leadership generally elected to perform the latter role.   
In terms of re-establishing Commission control over the aggregate movement of wages, 
the Accord was very successful.  Dabscheck notes: ‘In June 1986 the commission 
reported that, between September 1983 and December 1985, 96 per cent of all award 
wage increases resulted from its decisions in national wage cases, and that it was unable 
to identify any sizeable movements in over-award pay in this period.’8  By virtually 
eliminating over-award campaigns in the field, the Accord placed great strain on the 
                                                          
5 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 3 May 1983, 94 (Bob Hawke). 
6 See, for example: National Wage Case April 1984 in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 26(7) 
(11 April 1984) ¶117; Bramble, above n 1, 131-132. 
7 Indeed, one newspaper described the ACTU as an ‘industrial police force’ and the Hawke government 
as a ‘jailer’: Michael Stutchbury, ‘Why Bob Hawke and Ralph Willis got so tough with the BLF’, 
Australian Financial Review (Australia), 15 October 1984, 13. 
8 Braham Dabscheck, ‘The arbitration system since 1967’ in Stephen Bell and Brian Head (eds), State, 
Economy and Public Policy (Oxford University Press, 1994) 142, 155. 
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unions who had the most to gain by them, such as the Amalgamated Metal Workers’ 
Union (AMWU).  This tendency was exacerbated by the fact that, despite the rhetoric of 
shared burden, the Accord was functioning as a massive exercise in income 
redistribution from wages to profit, producing the declining wage share of national 
income noted in chapter 4.  
Amidst the continued economic travails of the mid-1980s, full wage indexation came to 
be regarded as a source of problems rather a solution,9 and wage rises above certain 
minima needed to be justified by productivity and efficiency improvements.10  The 
development of the resultant ‘restructuring and efficiency’ and ‘structural efficiency’ 
principles (in 1987 and 1988 respectively)11 represented the first movements to a more 
decentralised system within the co-ordinated wages policy of the Accord framework.  In 
following sections I will be more concerned with the ramifications of these principles 
for the structure and scope of industrial relations and the role of the Commission.  
Suffice it to say here both principles rejected a system of total wage indexation.  The 
restructuring and efficiency principle provided for a flat $10.00 wage increase to all 
employees covered by awards, plus ‘second-tier’ increases of up to 4% provided a range 
of productivity directed, enterprise/workplace-based measures enunciated by the 
Commission were met.12  The structural efficiency exercise saw a combination of flat 
and proportional increases consequent upon unions agreeing to the process of award 
restructuring and, later, upon the Commission ratifying an award restructuring 
package.13  In both cases the Commission retained ultimate control over the wage 
fixation system, but had changed the criteria for accessing it.  Unlike the early years of 
the Accord (1983-1985) in which wages were adjusted according to the macroeconomic 
CPI figure, these later principles reduced inflation to one consideration amongst many, 
and made certain pay rises dependent upon restructuring at the award and, more 
importantly, enterprise level.  This certainly presaged the turn to enterprise bargaining 
                                                          
9 Ibid 156; ‘Accord ‘fails’ to deliver a land of milk and honey’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 16 October 
1985, 12. 
10 Keith Hancock and Sue Richardson, ‘Economic and Social Effects’ in Joe Isaac and Stuart Macintyre 
(eds) The New Province for Law and Order: 100 Years of Australian Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 139, 175. 
11 See: National Wage Case March 1987 (1987) Print G6800; National Wage Case August 1988 (1988) 
Print H4000. 
12 National Wage Case March 1987 (1987) Print G6800, 35. 
13 National Wage Case August 1988 (1988) Print H4000, 6-8; National Wage Case August 1989 (1989) 
Print H9100, 13, 20-21. 
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in the early 1990s, and was indicative of a wage structure in which the needs of 
individual businesses were key.  In this reality was implanted the dissolution of the 
homogenised wage structure of antipodean Fordism and its usurpation by the polarised, 
variegated wage system of liberal-productivism. 
Forms of employment/flexibility 
The 1980s proved an era that saw enforced employment precarisation intensify, 
building upon the emergent tendencies of casualisation and part-time labour in the 
1970s.  The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) recorded (using a measure that would 
have captured the majority of casual employment) that part-time employment had 
increased from 17.3% of employed persons in December 1982 to 20.7% of employed 
persons in December 1989.14  Burgess and Campbell, using a more specific index, note 
that casual workers as a percentage of the workforce had increased from 15.8% of 
employees in 1984 to 18.9% in 1988.15  As economy-wide figures, these measurements 
bespeak of a substantial increase in the incidence of forms of employment outside the 
standard model.  At the sectoral level, the results demonstrate a highly uneven 
development of these forms, with certain sectors, particularly retail, community services 
and recreation/tourism heavily dependent upon casualised and part-time labour, whereas 
other industries, such as manufacturing and transport, demonstrated much lower (but 
still rising) proportions of such workers.16  At the same time, the use of contract labour, 
which was generally free of award coverage, proliferated.17 
What is of significance here is the removal of legal impediments to this growing 
deployment of precarious labour.  Here, the restructuring and efficiency and structural 
efficiency principles are of key importance.  In discussing the context of the former, the 
Commission noted the continued stagnation of Australian manufacturing and the 
consensus amongst all parties of the need to promote improved efficiency and 
                                                          
14 Australian Bureau of Statistics, The Labour Force Australia (6203.0, December 1982) 18; Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, The Labour Force Australia (6203.0, December 1989) 21.  This measure of part-time 
is subject to the caveat in footnote 150 in the previous chapter.  
15 John Burgess and Iain Campbell, ‘Casual Employment in Australia: Growth, Characteristics, A Bridge 
or a Trap?’ (1998) 9(1) Economic and Labour Relations Review 31, 35. 
16 Bureau of Industry Economics, ‘Reducing Standard Hours of Work: Analysis of Australia’s Recent 
Experience’ (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1984) 59. 
17 Stilwell, above n 1, 54. 
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productivity as a potential panacea.18  Amongst other things, the Commission identified 
‘changed working patterns’ as a potentially necessary result.19  The Department of 
Industrial Relations reported that a substantial number of second-tier agreements 
incorporated the use of part-time and casual labour, whilst others provided for the 
engagement of contract and off-site labour.20  As will be seen in chapters 8 and 9 
particularly, these agreements tended to loosen controls on part-time and casual labour, 
thus threatening the dominance of the standard model of employment. 
The restructuring and efficiency exercise also provided a tremendous jolt to employer 
efforts to gain more control over the organisation of the labour process and the flexible 
deployment of labour.  A large number of agreements promoted multi-skilling and 
broad-banding, whereby workers were to be trained across a number of functions and 
certain narrow positions were to be collapsed into broader classifications.21  More 
important were commitments to flexible staffing levels, a greater spread of hours, 
flexibility in scheduling breaks, Rostered Days Off and holidays and changed overtime 
arrangements.22  What Marx termed the ‘porosity’ of the working day was also 
reduced,23 with strict controls on starting and finishing times and the explicit reduction 
in ‘non-productive time’24 featuring in many agreements. 
The structural efficiency principle built upon the localised and somewhat piecemeal 
changes25 wrought by the restructuring and efficiency principle by systemic reform at 
the award level.  In its August 1988 decision, the Commission explicitly stated that one 
of the fronts along which structural efficiency could proceed was ‘ensuring that working 
patterns and arrangements enhance flexibility and meet the competitive requirements of 
the industry’ (my emphasis).26  A year later, the Commission indicated the kind of 
changes it was envisaging, including:  
                                                          
18 National Wage Case March 1987 (1987) Print G6800, 12-14. 
19 Ibid 16. 
20 Department of Industrial Relations, ‘Report on the Operation of the Restructuring and Efficiency 
Principle’ (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1990) 17-18. 
21 Ibid 14-16. 
22 Ibid 20, 24-30. 
23 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume 1 (Ben Fowkes trans, Penguin Classics, 
1990) 534. 
24 Department of Industrial Relations, ‘Report on the Operation’, above n 20, 25-26. 
25 National Wage Case August 1988 (1988) Print H4000, 5. 
26 Ibid 6. 
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 flexibility in the arrangement of hours of work (including 12-hour shifts and 
ordinary hours on any day of the week);  
 greater flexibility in the taking of annual leave (with a view to maximising 
production);  
 reviewing the role of part-time and casual employment; and  
 changes in award provisions which restricted the right of employers to manage 
their business.27   
 
Such changes were highly sought by employer groups, who ‘stressed the need for these 
issues to be an integral part of the restructuring menu.’28  Unions were compelled to 
sign on to the process, and saw their proposals scuttled if it did not accord with such 
principles (a fate that befell the Food Preservers’ Union, as documented in chapter 8).  
The exact implications of both the restructuring and efficiency and structural efficiency 
principles for specific awards are explored further in the case study chapters, focussing 
upon the unfolding of the twin pressures of flexibility and precarisation in the metals, 
food processing and retail sector. 
In the late 1980s, therefore, we see the process of precarisation and flexibilisation, 
absolutely central to the development of a liberal-productivist wage-labour nexus and 
industrial paradigm, received institutional jolts from the Commission, supported, to 
varying degrees, by the Hawke Government, employers and the trade union movement.  
These developments sat uneasily with the continued presence of proportions clauses in 
both federal and state awards limiting casual and part-time labour and establishing a 
role for unions in its engagement,29 both of which would be the source of further 
conflict.   
Collectivism/individualism and scale of industrial relations 
In this era, although the system remained fundamentally collectivist, movements were 
afoot concerning the scale at which collective arrangements operated.  In 1985, a major 
                                                          
27 National Wage Case August 1989 (7 August 1989) Print H9100, 10. 
28 Department of Industrial Relations, ‘Review of the Structural Efficiency Principle February-May 1989: 
Submission by the Commonwealth Government’ (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989) 68. 
29 Indeed, employers complained that union power hampered management in achieving the efficiency and 
flexibility goals they were after.  See, for example: Rob Harden, ‘Employer Matters in 1990’ (1991) 33(1) 
Journal of Industrial Relations 126. 
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report commissioned by the federal government into the Australian industrial relations 
system was handed down (the ‘Hancock Report’).30  Although the overall argument of 
the Hancock Report was for retention of the compulsory conciliation and arbitration 
system, it approved of existing provisions in the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
relating to ‘certified agreements’ between parties given the force of awards,31 and 
argued for their strengthening.32  These recommendation were taken up by the Hawke 
Government in its 1988 Industrial Relations Act.33  Importantly, the Act provided that, 
to the extent an agreement and the underlying award dealt with the same matters, the 
former prevailed.34  It also sought to prevent these bargains becoming a method of wage 
flow-on in the manner of the early 1980s, giving the Commission the power to refuse 
certification to agreements on public interest grounds and prima facie rejecting bargains 
where they were based on terms on the terms of other agreements.35  Additional 
provisions guarded against industrial agreements being used as a vehicle to force 
changes in awards.36   
In chapter 4 I noted how a key feature of a liberal-productivist labour law regime is the 
decentralisation of bargaining in the context of union weakness.  At this particular 
historical juncture, however, movement on this front was stymied by the continued 
institutional entrenchment of the trade union movement through the Accord and its 
dedication to that system, a comparatively buoyant economy and the fear of some 
employers (most importantly the powerful Metal Trades Industry Association, or 
MTIA)37 of a wages explosion in the manner of the mid-1970s and early 1980s.  In the 
face of this array of forces, the desire of some employer organisations (notably the 
Business Council of Australia) for a system based on enterprise-level bargaining38 could 
not be realised.  The tension was reflected in the fact that the certified agreements 
provided for by the Act were never particularly popular with employers or unions.  As 
shall be seen below, it would take the economic recession of the early 1990s and the 
                                                          
30 Keith Hancock, Report of the Committee of Review into Australian Industrial Relations Law and 
Systems (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1985) 442-443 (‘the Hancock Report’). 
31 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) s 28. 
32 Hancock, The Hancock Report, above n 30, 678. 
33 Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) s 115-117. 
34 Ibid s 116(1)(a). 
35 Ibid s 115(4)(7) 
36 Ibid s 95. 
37 See, for example: National Wage Case April 1991 (1991) Print J7400, 30-31. 
38 See, for example: Business Council of Australia Industrial Relations Study Commission, Enterprise 
Based Bargaining Units: A Better Way of Working (Business Council of Australia, 1989). 
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breakdown of commitment to the Accord from some of the stronger unions amidst 
continued wage restraint to clear the ground for the roll-out of a fundamentally more 
decentralised system.   
Legal matrix 
The period from 1982 to 1989 saw considerable alterations in the legal framework 
surrounding the labour law regime which, unsurprisingly for this period, were 
paradoxical in character.  On the one hand, as part of the broader intensification of the 
Commission as an antipodean Fordist institution, it benefited from an expansion of its 
jurisdiction consequent upon the enlarged meaning given to the term ‘industrial 
dispute,’ upon which the Commission’s powers of conciliation and arbitration 
depended.39  In the Social Welfare Union case, the High Court overturned the restrictive 
definition of ‘industrial dispute’ mentioned above, stating instead: ‘The words are not a 
technical or legal expression. They have to be given their popular meaning – what they 
convey to the man in the street.’40  The fact that the Court’s decision brought about a 
speedy expansion of federal authority in areas previously regulated by the states,41 
including education42 and health,43 is indicative of the thesis of intensification; the 
standing of the Commission as the macroeconomic lynchpin for industrial relations was 
enhanced. 
The Social Welfare Union case cannot be understood apart from its historical context.  
The strong growth of white-collar unionism noted in the previous chapter had helped 
bridge the organisational cleavages that had separated it from its blue-collar brethren.  
Unions representing non-manual workers and government employees were traditionally 
affiliated with their own peak bodies (respectively, the Australian Council of Salaried & 
Professional Associations and the Council of Australian Government Employee 
Organisations).  However, in 1979 the Australian Council of Salaried & Professional 
Associations merged with the ACTU under the latter’s banner.  The Council of 
Australian Government Employee Organisations would follow suit in 1981, such that 
                                                          
39 Australian Constitution s 51(xxxv). 
40 R v Coldham; Ex parte Australian Social Welfare Union (1983) 153 CLR 297, 312. 
41 John Howe and Richard Mitchell, ‘The Evolution of the Contract of Employment in Australia: A 
Discussion’ (1999) 12(2) Journal of Industrial Relations 1, 15. 
42 See, for example: R v Lee; Ex parte Harper (1986) 160 CLR 430. 
43 See, for example: Australian Nursing Federation v Minister for Health (WA) (1991) 38 IR 93. 
 
 
171 
by that year the ACTU could legitimately claim to be the peak body for almost every 
trade union in Australia.  Given the Accord’s early focus on centralised, macroeconomic 
regulation, a situation in which large sections of the ACTU’s membership was locked 
out of federal regulation was unlikely to persist long.  This indeed proved the case. 
The Accord process also informed other efforts to intensify the role of the Commission.  
It will be recalled from the previous chapter that the federal tribunal was historically 
limited in its ability to deal with the full gamut of industrial disputes by the requirement 
that the substance of the dispute be ‘matters pertaining to the relations of employers and 
employees.’44  I also demonstrated that this was constructed by the High Court in such a 
way as to generally place managerial prerogative outside the ambit of a matter 
pertaining to the employment relationship.45  However, the Accord had pledged the 
government to ‘support the establishment of rights for employees, through their unions, 
to be notified and consulted by employers about the proposed introduction of 
technological change.’46  The government had also agreed to support the creation of 
redundancy protections for workers, including an obligation on employers to consult 
with unions in redundancy situations.47  Both of these types of provisions, however, had 
usually been taken to be outside the jurisdiction of the Commission, or were at least in 
doubt.48  Given the fact, noted in chapter 5, that the federal government could only 
effect such regulatory outcomes through the Commission, a broadened scope of matters 
pertaining to the employment relationship was required in order to deliver on these 
Accord promises.   
Little more than a year after the Social Welfare Union case, the High Court ruled in a 
crucial decision that consultation with unions about technological change could be 
considered an industrial matter.49  Armed with this broadened power, the Commission 
                                                          
44 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) s 4. 
45 See, for example: R v Portus; Ex parte A.N.Z. Banking Group Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 353, 371. 
46 ‘The Accord’, above n 1, 167. 
47 Ibid. 
48 W.B. Creighton, W.J. Ford and R.J. Mitchell, Labour Law: Text and Materials (The Law Book 
Company Limited, 1993) 537, 732. 
49 Federated Clerks’ Union of Australia v Victorian Employers’ Federation (1984) 154 CLR 472.  The 
case began as an employer appeal against a decision of the Industrial Relations Commission of Victoria 
varying the state’s Commercial Clerks’ Award by including a clause relating to consultation over 
technological change.  This clause, in turn, was inserted by the authority of the Industrial Relations Act 
1979 (Vic) s 34(1).  This demonstrates that the effort to expand the scope of ‘industrial matters’ was 
pursued at the state level also. 
 172 
was able to hand down its landmark Termination, Change & Redundancy case,50 which 
allowed it to insert clauses in awards giving effect to the aforementioned Accord 
promises.  Like the broadening of the definition of ‘industry,’ this is to be understood as 
an exercise in institutional intensification, augmenting and deepening the powers of the 
Commission so it could play the macroeconomic role required of it.51 
Against these developments, however, were others of an entirely different character and 
provenance that were corrosive of the established order.  Perhaps of deepest 
significance here is the legal strategy of a bellicose section of capital, the so-called 
‘New Right,’ in a series of set-piece battles with militant unions, including the 
Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union (AMIEU) at the Mudginberri abattoir, the 
Federated Confectioners’ Association (FCA) at Dollar Sweets and the Australian 
Federation of Air Pilots (AFAP).  These disputes demonstrated the ability of employers 
to subvert the arbitration system through a two-pronged attack: exploiting the secondary 
boycott and fines provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974;52 and making recourse to 
common law industrial torts such as the tort of nuisance and interference with 
contractual relations.  In both cases disputes were basically removed from the 
administrative fabric of arbitration and funnelled into the regular court system, the 
domain of the legal form narrowly construed. 
The Mudginberri dispute demonstrated how the 1977 trade practices amendments53 
discussed in chapter 5 could be used to discipline labour outside of the traditional 
channels of conciliation and arbitration.  In response to an AMIEU picket line designed 
to enforce a tally pay system, abattoir owner Jay Pendarvis successfully pursued the 
union for damages under section 82(1) of the Act,54 with the Federal Court granting a 
crippling sum of $1,759,444.55  Only after this critical damage had been inflicted was 
the Commission in a position to deliver a more permanent settlement, handing down a 
decision that validated the employer practice of seeking payment by result contracts 
                                                          
50 Termination, Change and Redundancy Case (1984) 8 IR 34. 
51 The fact that the de jure ambit of managerial prerogative was being restricted at this time did not mean, 
however, that employers were not able to increase their de facto power.  As I outline in this chapter, and 
will demonstrate in greater detail in chapters 8 and 9, award restructuring in the late 1980s and early 
1990s bolstered managerial power in the organisation of the labour process and the deployment of labour. 
52 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 45(D), s 82. 
53 Trade Practices Amendment Act 1977 (Cth). 
54 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 82(1). 
55 Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd v Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union (1986) 15 IR 272, 312. 
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with workers.56  The Trade Practices Act 1974, a piece of legislation which had started 
out primarily as a protection for the consumer against monopoly interests, had thus 
become a workable tool of union repression and offered a way for employers with the 
will and resources to avoid what the New Right regarded as the union-friendly 
arbitration system.   
That avoidance of Commission oversight was the goal was even more vividly 
demonstrated by the actions against the FCA and AFAP.  The former lost a pitched 
battle with the small confectionary manufacturer Dollar Sweets in 1985 over the refusal 
of certain employees to pledge adherence to the award and forego an FCA campaign for 
a shorter working week.57  Most significant here is the fact that the union was forced to 
lift the picket after the imposition of an interlocutory injunction by the Supreme Court 
of Victoria, based on actual and threatened torts of interference with contractual 
relations, intimidation, nuisance and wilful injury.58  Subsequently, the FCA was forced 
to pay a hefty $175,000 in what was only the second case since the early 1970s where a 
company had pursued a damages claim after gaining interlocutory relief from the 
courts.59  The Commission’s role in the dispute was exceedingly minimal, limited to a 
recommendation to lift the pickets before the case was removed to the Supreme Court.60   
The AFAP fared even worse, with pilots suffering a crushing defeat in 1989 in a show-
down that revolved primarily around the government-owned Australian Airlines and the 
privately-held Ansett.  Upon application by the airlines, the Commission cancelled the 
awards covering the pilots.61  This, however, was not what mortally wounded the union.  
This blow was dealt when the AFAP was hit with a devastating suit for wrongfully 
interfering with contractual relations, interfering with trade or business by unlawful 
means and for conspiracy using unlawful means.62  A cabal consisting of Prime 
Minister Hawke, the chairmen of Ansett and Australian Airlines, and senior government 
                                                          
56 See, for example: ‘Meat union loses Mudginberri case’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 11 September 
1985, 6; ‘Compromise reached in abattoir dispute’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 29 March 1986, 8. 
57 As I will explore in chapter 8, the FCA refused to sign on Accord wage principles until 1984. 
58 Dollar Sweets Pty Ltd v Federated Confectioners Association [1986] VR 383. 
59 Pamela Williams, ‘Union Pays Up In Milestone Dispute’, Australian Financial Review (Australia), 12 
April 1988, 1/2. 
60 Dollar Sweets Pty Ltd v Federated Confectioners Association of Australia [1985] AIRC 403. 
61 Graham F. Smith, ‘From Consensus to Coercion: the Australian Air Pilot Dispute’ (1990) 32(2) 
Journal of Industrial Relations 238, 241-242. 
62 Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (No 2) [1991] 2 
VR 636.  For a useful overview of the legalities, see: Kathleen McEvoy and Rosemary Owens, ‘The 
Flight of Icarus: Legal Aspects of the Pilots’ Dispute’ (1990) 3(2) Australian Journal of Labour Law 87. 
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ministers explicitly constructed action using torts and the trade practices legislation as a 
means of defeating the pilots; if they intended to go outside the (Accord) system, then 
the state and capital would follow, so the reasoning went.63 
These events are a window into a period where the centre of gravity in the law-
administration continuum was shifting.  The operation of the secondary boycott 
provisions of the Trade Practices Act64 and the re-emergence of industrial torts65 were 
elements of the process of juridification described in chapter 3, and represented the 
diversion of matters usually determined by the Commission to common law courts.  As 
was seen with the case of bans clauses, courts of ordinary standing were bound by the 
logics of the abstract rule of law, equality of juridical equals and the application of the 
law according to formalistic tests.  They shared very little indeed with the historic 
mission of the Commission to reconcile the capitalist project of reproducing the 
commodity labour-power with the struggle of an active, vigorous proletariat.   
Such tactics on the part of capital, however, were more than just opportunistic.  They 
were elements of an inchoate liberal-productivism, capitalist answers to the unification 
of the labour force set in motion by Fordism.66  Moreover, Australian capitalism was 
becoming more competitive and more open to international competition at the same 
time as the field of commodification increased ever further.67  These stimuli would tend 
to place a premium on the role of law as a medium of association between private 
property owners,68 the role Pashukanis always perceived as its essence and driving 
force.69  In terms of the law-administration continuum, it is ‘law’ which performs this 
function better, in that the concern of the working-class to place limits on the 
exploitation of labour-power as property evident in administration is shorn away.   
 
                                                          
63 For a damning exposé, see: Mike Taylor, ‘How Hawke and Co fixed the pilots’, Canberra Times 
(Canberra), 28 May 1992, 1.  The AFAP, which was not a member of the ACTU, was also abandoned by 
that body.  See, for example: Smith, above n 61, 241-242, 250-251. 
64 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 45(D) – (E). 
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66 Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience (David Fernbach trans, NLB, 
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67 Particularly as the Hawke Government sought to rationalise and corporatise the public sector. 
68 Bob Fine, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Marx’s Critique of the Legal Form (The Blackburn Press, 
1984) 142. 
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1996 – Liberal-productivism coheres 
By 1996, the seeds of liberal-productivism which were germinating in 1989 were 
coming into full bloom.  The 1980s had generally seen methods of crisis resolution 
which oscillated between intensification of antipodean Fordist institutions and the 
development of new liberal-productivist structures.  The 1990s, however, would see the 
former, most particularly the federal Commission, become thoroughly degraded, 
playing an increasingly marginalised role in the emergent model of development.  
Profound changes took place in the fields of wage fixation, forms of 
employment/flexibility and the scale and nature of industrial relations.  Of key 
importance for our purposes is the rise of enterprise bargaining, the explosion in the 
incidence of precarious employment and the first full-blown statutory attempts to 
encourage an individualist employment relations taking as its subject the individual 
worker.  Full told, these developments evinced the essential character of a liberal-
productivist labour law regime outlined in chapter 4.   
Wage fixation 
As we shall see in our chapter on the metal trades, the enforced wage restraint of the 
Accord became increasingly untenable in the late 1980s, particularly given the 
comparatively buoyant labour market.70  The Accord saw the drop in the factor share of 
wages noted in chapter 4, whilst real award wages decline markedly.71  For unions such 
as the AMWU, well-schooled in a tradition of over-award bargaining, a return to plant 
and enterprise-level agreements free from national wage guidelines was seductive.  It 
dovetailed with the demands for enterprise bargaining emanating from some sections of 
the business community, most notably the Business Council of Australia.72  So far as it 
was concerned, most of the blame for Australia’s poor economic performance was due 
to the structure and attitudes of trade unions and the existing legal-institutional 
                                                          
70 See, for example: Pamela Williams, ‘Wage Plan Under Pressure’, Australian Financial Review 
(Australia), 2 May 1989, 3; Brad Norington, ‘ACTU Agrees To Rebuild Awards’, Sydney Morning 
Herald (Sydney), 3 June 1989, 4. 
71 A reality acknowledged by the Commission: National Wage Case April 1991 (1991) Print J7400, 11.  
See also: Chris Briggs, ‘Australian Exceptionalism: The Role of Trade Unions in the Emergence of 
Enterprise Bargaining’ (2001) 43(1) Journal of Industrial Relations 27, 32. 
72 Business Council of Australia, Enterprise-Based Bargaining Units, above n 38. 
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framework.73  Enterprise bargaining, from the perspective of this organ of capital, 
promised vastly increased productivity and flexibility.74 
Enterprise bargaining had the virtue of being all things to all people.  The confusion 
over just what enterprise bargaining actually entailed would prove the source of conflict 
between capital, labour and the state in the 1990s.  However, by November 1990 the 
government, many unions and a strategic majority of employers agreed that movement 
to an enterprise bargaining system, however defined, was necessary.75  In a submission 
to the April 1991 National Wage Case, the ACTU duly argued for the adoption of an 
enterprise bargaining principle, supported by the Government and most employer 
groups.76  In this claim they were supported by the majority of the states, some of which 
were beginning to experiment with enterprise bargaining systems of their own.77   
The response of the Commission is the institutional equivalent of Trotsky’s observation 
of declining classes flaring ‘with a bright although smoky light’ before the march of 
history snuffs out their reason for being.78  The Commission, taking its Accord role of 
macro-level wage regulator very seriously, noted the danger of outcomes deemed best at 
the enterprise-level leading to excessive aggregate wage outcomes.79  Moreover, the 
Commission was not duped by the language of novelty surrounding the current push to 
bargaining, opining that ‘[t]he term may be relatively new in Australian industrial 
relations. The substance is not … In its simplest form, enterprise bargaining explains 
much of the growth of overaward payments which has occurred since the 1940s.’80  It 
summed up by saying that enterprise bargaining required a whole new workplace 
culture and management and that ‘[t]he parties to industrial relations have still to 
develop the maturity necessary for the further shift of emphasis now proposed.’81  The 
                                                          
73 See, for example: Suzanne Jamieson, ‘Enterprise Bargaining-the Approach of the Business Council of 
Australia’ (1990) 3(1) Australian Journal of Labour Law 77. 
74 Ibid 80. 
75 A conference in that month between the parties had agreed as much.  Before this, enterprise bargaining 
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76 Ibid. 
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whole exercise led one major paper to state that ‘[t]he Industrial Relations Commission 
has moved aggressively to protect and entrench its central role in national wage 
fixation’ (my emphasis).82 
The response of the parties, particularly the ACTU and the government,83 demonstrated 
the fact that the Commission in its historic form was in the process of being sloughed 
off in the transition to liberal-productivism.  ACTU Secretary Bill Kelty described the 
decision as ‘vomit.’84  He was supported, if in less strident terms, by the broader union 
movement, the Keating government and business groups.85  In a portent of things to 
come, then-Opposition Industrial Relations spokesman, John Howard, stated that the 
Commission’s rejection of enterprise bargaining was the result of an ‘almost 
insufferable paternalism.’86   
In the event, the isolation of the Commission, together with the recalcitrance of the 
state, unions and employers in acting on its recommendations for more developed and 
coherent enterprise bargaining policies, forced its hand.  Despite misgivings,87 the 
Commission duly adopted an enterprise bargaining principle in its October 1991 
National Wage Case.  It distinguished enterprise bargaining from the aforementioned 
structural efficiency exercise; whereas the former was capped at a 2.5% pay rise, the 
latter was not.88  Although agreements could sit alongside awards, they also had the 
potential to replace them, provided they did not involve a reduction in ordinary time 
earnings or a departure from Commission standards on matters such as hours of work, 
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88 Ibid 12. 
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annual leave and long-service leave.89  Lastly, and perhaps most tellingly, the 
Commission’s preferred form of enterprise bargains was so-called section 115 
agreements.90  In 1991, the section was in a sense a micro-level historical snapshot of 
the transition between antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism.  On the one hand, 
it explicitly provided that bargains (known as certified agreements) could not be based 
on the terms of another certified agreement except in limited circumstances, whilst the 
legislation elsewhere provided that there could no automatic flow-on from certified 
agreements to awards.91  On the other, section 115 also maintained that the Commission 
had the power to refuse to certify agreements that were contrary to the public interest.92  
In short, the Commission still held the kind of macroeconomic guardian role it 
exercised during the coherence and crisis of antipodean Fordism, but was expected to 
neuter the cycle of wage and conditions flow-on that had been one of its central 
dynamics. 
Such a hybrid role could not be maintained for long, and was reflected initially by the 
slow-uptake of certified agreements.93  In the face of what was considered the 
conservatism of the Commission, the government passed the Industrial Relations 
Legislation Amendment Act 1992,94 which removed the Commission’s ‘responsibility to 
examine enterprise agreements in the public interest.’95  In it place was inserted a much 
narrower ‘No-Disadvantage Test’ (NDT) which sought merely to ensure that employees 
covered by agreements were not disadvantaged vis-à-vis the award.96  This was an 
historic departure from the Commission’s traditional concern with moderating ‘the 
outcomes of the industrial relations process by reference to the public interest.’97 
The transformation of the Commission’s role in wage fixation received a qualitatively 
new jolt from the passage of the Keating ALP government’s Industrial Relations 
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Reform Act 1993,98 which sought to much more surely entrench and encourage 
enterprise bargaining as the primary lever of wage determination in Australia.  The role 
of the Commission in this new model was substantially reduced, as Prime Minister 
Keating attests to in his description of the system: 
It is a model which places primary emphasis on bargaining at the workplace 
level within a framework of minimum standards provided by arbitral tribunals. It 
is a model under which compulsorily arbitrated awards and arbitrated wage 
increases would be there only as a safety net … We would have an Industrial 
Relations Commission which helped employers and employees reach enterprise 
bargains, which kept the safety net in good repair, which advised the 
Government and the parties of emerging difficulties and possible improvements, 
but which would rarely have to use its compulsory arbitral powers.99 
 
In the following sections, I will explore the substantive implications of this shift in 
terms of the collectivism/individualism of the labour law regime and the content of 
awards and agreements.  What is of interest here is the relationship of new methods of 
wage determination to the wage structure and the historical pattern of flow-on.   
In chapter 4 it was explained that a relatively homogenous wage structure was an 
important structural feature of the antipodean Fordist model of development.  By 1996, 
a yawning gulf had emerged between the wage outcomes of the considerable number of 
employees (some 35-40% of total employees) who were reliant purely on awards and 
those who were bound by both awards and enterprise agreements (30-40% of 
employees) or enterprise bargains alone (5-10% of employees).100  Whereas the former 
experienced an estimated average annual wage increase of 1.3%, the latter two saw pay 
rises of between 4-6%.101  Declining award coverage,102 together with the generally 
small safety net adjustments made to them, also ensured that award wage increases 
                                                          
98 Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth). 
99 Paul Keating, ‘Speech by the Prime Minister, The Hon. P.J. Keating MP’ (Speech delivered at the 
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accounted for a decreasing share of average weekly ordinary time earnings.103  Awards, 
which had previously been the comprehensive instruments of wage and conditions 
control, were reduced to bare-bone minimums that left the workers reliant upon them 
increasingly worse off in relative terms.  Claims for wages and conditions above it was 
considered the province of enterprise bargaining.104  
Even more importantly, enterprise agreements, generally revolving around the power 
dynamics, needs and nature of individual enterprises/workplaces, were a very poor 
vessel for the flow-on of wages and conditions from the industrially strong to the weak.  
The resource demands of negotiating many individual enterprise agreements, rather than 
campaigning over one award, made it difficult to co-ordinate action and translate the 
gains of some into gains for all.  The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in 
presenting its view of the essence of the new system, came close to describing the 
reality of enterprise bargaining as it would develop.105  It asked that the Commission 
and the parties ‘recognise the role of awards as a safety net, rather than for example as a 
mechanism for flowing the results of enterprise bargaining to non-unionised and non-
consenting employers’ (my emphasis).106   
In chapter 7, it will be seen that unions, once they realised the danger, attempted to 
return to the industry-level bargaining once common in the award system through the 
tactic of ‘pattern bargaining.’  By 1996, this pressure was just beginning to manifest 
itself. 
Forms of employment/flexibility 
The recession of the early 1990s greatly intensified the growth of employment forms 
outside of the standard full-time model.107  The recession saw the loss of 127,900 full-
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time jobs go hand-in-and with a gain of 164,000 part-time jobs.108  Much of this growth 
was in the form of casual employment.109  Indeed, Burgess and Campbell note that the 
percentage of total employees who were casual increased from 19.4% in 1990 to 26.3% 
in 1996.110  Importantly, although women as a whole remained over-represented in both 
part-time and casual employment measures, the growth in casual employment was 
proportionately faster amongst men.111  There was also an age dimension to the growth 
of casual and part-time employment, with young men and women between 15 and 24 
(many of them students)112 being largely funnelled into part-time and casual positions as 
they entered the workforce in larger numbers.113  Lastly, the expansion of these forms 
was, whilst still concentrated in certain industries such as a retail and hospitality, a 
movement observed across all industry divisions.114   
Whereas this process of precarisation had for the best part of the 1980s worked through 
the award system, the advent of enterprise bargaining, and the associated degradation of 
awards, saw precarity advance along new fronts in the 1990s.  In particular, enterprise 
bargains tended to fit a typical pattern: headline wage increases were obtained by 
trading away many of the conditions that constituted the standard employment model.  
The degradation of this model went much deeper than simply employing more casuals 
and/or part-timers.  Indeed, bearing in mind the definition forwarded in chapter 4, 
precarity increasingly came to define the experience of full-time employees.115   
The assault on the standard employment model within agreements, explored in the case 
study chapters, could broadly be said to revolve around: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Bureau of Statistics, Measures of Australia’s Progress (1370.0, 2010) 
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111 Ibid 42; Iain Campbell, ‘The Spreading Net: Age and Gender in the Process of Casualisation in 
Australia’ (2000) 45 Journal of Australian Political Economy 68, 85. 
112 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Social Trends 2000 (4102.0, 2000) 97. 
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1. The removal of qualitative and quantitative controls on the deployment of part-
time and casual employment; and 
2. The increasing spread of ordinary working hours for all workers, including full-
time employees, and concomitant reductions in penalty rates.116 
 
The process of trading-off conditions and controls in exchange for wage increases also 
extended to the organisation of the labour process.  As shall be seen in great detail in 
relation to the food processing and retail industries in chapters 8 and 9, ‘enterprise 
bargaining explicitly linked the provision of wage increases to changes in work 
arrangement.’117  These included, but were not limited to: 
 the introduction/deepening of performance benchmarks and productivity 
agreements; 
 greater flexibility for management in rostering staff, with an emphasis on 
maintaining constant production at minimum possible cost; 
 the broad-banding of classifications; and 
 contracting out of certain functions which had historically been performed by 
employees of the enterprise.118 
 
For those left on awards, the same process of enforced precarity and flexibility ensued 
without the kind of wage improvements obtained through enterprise bargaining.  The 
aforementioned recasting of awards as a safety net tended to preclude them from 
providing the kind of comprehensive controls on precarious employment forms that 
they previously exhibited.  This was made explicit by the Workplace Relations Act 
1996,119 which limited awards to twenty ‘allowable’ matters,120 which did not include 
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proportions clauses governing the employment of different categories of workers,121 nor 
minimum or maximum hours of work for part-time employees.122  Indeed, their 
inclusion in awards was prohibited.  The processes of award restructuring set in motion 
by the structural efficiency principle in the late 1980s also flowered in the early 1990s, 
and typically facilitated intensified managerial control over rostering, the allocation of 
labour to different functions and the organisation of the labour process generally.   
These developments are, for the purposes of this thesis, profound.  Awards had been 
transformed from instruments crystallising the standard employment model and 
establishing more-or-less rigid controls on labour classifications and demarcations in 
the workplace to bare-boned minima that now placed no barrier to the further extension 
of precarity and flexibility into the heart of the employment relationship.  This transition 
represents no less than a substantial codification of the liberal-productivist wage-labour 
nexus in the labour law regime.123 
Collectivism/individualism and the scale of industrial relations 
Whereas the fundamentally collectivist nature of labour regulation had largely survived 
the 1980s, the basket of reforms surrounding the introduction of enterprise bargaining 
took concrete steps towards severing the institutionalised link between trade unions and 
the labour law regime.  Of paramount significance here is the Keating government’s 
introduction of so-called ‘enterprise flexibility agreements’ (EFAs).124  These 
essentially created a non-union bargaining stream, where employers could negotiate 
with their workers without trade union representation.125   
                                                          
121 Ibid s 89A(4)(a). 
122 Ibid s 89A(4)(b). 
123 I say ‘substantial’ because, despite its central place in the development of a liberal-productivist labour 
law regime, the Workplace Relations Act 1996 was a political compromise.  The original Bill was diluted 
after being bogged down in the Senate.  The support of the Australian Democrats was gained with a 
number of amendments which, among other things, restored some of the powers of the Commission (such 
as vetting problematic AWAs) and increased the number of allowable matters from 18 to 20.  Difficulties 
in the Senate meant that the original vision of the Howard government would not be realised until the 
passage of WorkChoices in 2005.  For more, see: Quinlan, above n 118, 80-83. 
124 Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth) s 170NA. 
125 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 22 November 1993, 3328 (Laurie 
Brereton). 
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The stated rationale from the ALP government was that it facilitated the penetration of 
enterprise agreements to the non-union sector.126  Unions, however, recognised the 
material and symbolic threat posed by EFAs.  Tim Pallas, the ACTU Assistant 
Secretary, opined that employers could get the flexibility they desired from regular 
enterprise agreements; those that went for EFAs did so for ‘ideological reasons.’127  
Their concern was heightened by the fact that some employers attempted to supplant 
union-negotiated agreements with EFAs.128 
Although EFAs did not prove as popular with capital as one would have expected129 and 
had a comparatively low uptake,130 a seismic symbolic shift had been effected, 
demonstrating that unions were not indispensable to the bargaining process.131  The 
conservative Howard government eagerly took the opportunity upon its election in 1996 
to remove the institutional impediments to the union-excluding potential of EFAs, 
substituting a new form of certified agreement that did not give unions the right to be 
involved unless requested by members who were to be covered by it.132 
The Howard government also took another, rather more direct, step to marginalise the 
role of unions within the system: outlawing the closed shop.  Unlike the Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act 1904133 and the Industrial Relations Act 1988,134 the new 
                                                          
126 See, for example: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 28 October 
1993, 2781 (Laurie Brereton); Nicholas Way, ‘Employers, unions warm to flexibility’, BRW (Australia), 
10 July 1995, 20. 
127 Tim Pallas quoted in Way, ‘Employers, unions warm to flexibility’, above n 126, 20. 
128 See, for example: Tim Dodd, ‘ACCI Recommends Way to Exclude the Unions’, Australian Financial 
Review (Australia), 20 January 1994, 5; Nicholas Way, ‘Optus Puts Union on Permanent Hold’, BRW 
(Australia), 20 June 1994, 30; Steve Lewis and Mark Davis, ‘Optus Staff in Non-Union Deal’, Australian 
Financial Review (Australia), 22 August 1994, 3; Attempt to Bypass Bank Union Stymied’, The Age 
(Melbourne), 12 May 1995, 4. 
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example: Nicholas Johnston, ‘Commission Blocks Bus Line Wage Deal’, The Age (Melbourne), 26 
September 1994, 6; Mark Davis, ‘IRC laws down law on non-union agreements’, Australian Financial 
Review (Australia), 12 May 1995, 3; Amanda Coulthard, ‘Non-Union Bargaining: Enterprise Flexibility 
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1993 (Cth) s 170NA(2)(b). 
130 Steve O’Neill, ‘Enterprise Agreements: Myths and Realities (A Conference Report)’ (Current Issues 
Brief No. 27, Parliamentary Research Service, 1994) 7. 
131 See, for example: Peter Gahan and Andreas Pekarek, ‘The Rise and Rise of Enterprise Bargaining in 
Australia, 1991-2011’ (2012) 22(3) Labour & Industry 195, 201-202; Laura Bennett, ‘Bargaining Away 
the Rights of the Weak: Non-Union Agreements in the Federal Jurisdiction’ in Paul Ronfeldt and Ron 
McCallum (eds), Enterprise Bargaining, Trade Unions and the Law (The Federation Press, 1995) 129 
132 Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 170LK. 
133 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) s 2(vi). 
134 Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) s 3(f). 
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Workplace Relations Act 1996 did not have as one of its objects the facilitation and 
encouragement of representative organisations of workers and employers.  Instead, it 
manifested for the first time at the federal level a negative freedom of association, that 
is, the freedom to not belong to a trade union.135  A government member stated 
tellingly: ‘It is a very important element of this legislation that freedom of association 
be vested with the individual, not with an organisation they are compelled to belong to 
so they can have a job in a particular workplace’ (my emphasis).136  Rimmer adds that: 
Until the Workplace Relations Act, individual employees had to gain 
representation usually through the appropriate registered organisation if they 
wished to have locus standii before the Commission.  The Workplace Relations 
Act has changed all that … the other objects make plain that the individual 
employee can have legal standing in this jurisdiction.137  
 
This concentration on the individual as subject, rather than the collective union subject, 
establishes a revealing point of difference with the aforementioned efforts of the Fraser 
government to make it easier for workers to avoid union membership. Whereas the 
latter took as its reference point the collective system, attempting to provide exemptions 
therefrom, the new legislation gave no conceptual pre-eminence to collective 
arrangements.  To this end, the Commission was denied the power to insert preference 
clauses in federal awards, part of the Howard Government’s struggle to undermine 
union power by eradicating the closed shop.138   
The Howard government also used the opportunity of its election to introduce a far 
more radical method of individualising industrial relationships; the introduction of 
statutory individual contracts known as Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs).  In 
this it was following the lead of some states, such as Western Australia and Queensland, 
                                                          
135 Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 298A(a). 
136 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 June 1996, 2748 (Mark Vaile). 
137 Malcolm Rimmer, ‘The Workplace Relations Act 1996: An Historical Perspective’ (1997) 23(1) 
Australian Bulletin of Labour 69, 72-73.  Technically speaking, this standing had been growing since the 
Industrial Relations Act 1988, which allowed individual workers to bring legal proceedings before the 
Federal Court for the enforcement of awards and collective agreements.  In 1990, an amendment removed 
the requirement that these workers be union members.  This reality is thoroughly in keeping with the 
account of the law-administration continuum being pushed to its former pole.  For more, see: Martin 
Vranken, ‘Demise of the Australasian Model of Labour Law in the 1990s’ (1995) 16(4) Comparative 
Labor Law Journal 1, 17-18. 
138 Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 94.  This was reflected by a 7% drop in the number of 
employers forcing employees to join unions in the year immediately after the passage of the Act 
compared to the pre-1996 figure: Simon de Tuberville, ‘Union Decline and Renewal in Australia and 
Britain: Lessons from Closed Shops’ (2007) 28(3) Economic and Industrial Democracy 374, 383-384.  
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which had developed their own individual contracting regimes in the early 1990s.139  
AWAs were subject only to the weak NDT and were aggressively promoted by the 
government.  Individual workers were legally free to nominate a ‘bargaining agent,’140 
but unions did not possess automatic standing to participate in the process.  Generally 
negotiated between single employees and bosses, AWAs were also perhaps the most de-
centralised tools of industrial regulation yet devised in the liberal-productivist 
trajectory, and crucially appeared at a time of increasingly evident union weakness.  
Perhaps the most important and telling element of the AWA reform bundle was the fact 
that the administration of AWAs was not placed within the purview of the Commission, 
but a new body called the Office of the Employment Advocate (OEA).  Agreements 
were to be lodged with, and approved by, the OEA, and only in the event of uncertainty 
on its part could the agreement be referred to the Commission for determination.141  
This process was nothing less than an explicit attempt to recast the law-administration 
continuum by marginalising the Commission, its dominant administrative form.  
Burdened (from the perspective of the state and capital) by its collectivist heritage and 
practice, the Commission was a poor vessel for the new species of individualism 
represented by AWAs.  Instead, AWAs were guaranteed by their own, purpose-built 
institution which took as its basic subject the individual worker contracting with the 
individual employer.142  
The collectivism and centrality of the labour law regime was also breached by the 
nature of the ‘safety net’ established by the 1993 legislation.  As discussed above, in the 
enterprise bargaining regime, awards were recast as part of a floor of minimum rights 
and entitlements.143  Awards, the historically predominant instrument of collective 
labour law, guarded by particular unions and often covering a swathe of workplaces, 
was thus relegated to a lesser role within the fabric of the new system.  By contrast, the 
                                                          
139 See, for example: Workplace Agreements Act 1993 (WA); Andrew Frazer, ‘Individualism and 
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scheme of statutory minima, including provisions relating to unfair dismissal, 
redundancy and equal pay (discussed in the section below), were conceived, and often 
enforced, as individual rights.144  In a context of union strength, such a development 
might have been harmless.145  However, in the circumstances, it further attacked the 
representational monopoly Australian trade unions had typically possessed in the 
industrial relations system. 
The last point of note to address here are the legislative fetters which were increasingly 
placed around the ability of unions to organise and struggle, particularly on an inter-
union basis.  Whilst the 1993 statute did relocate the secondary boycott provisions of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974146 into industrial legislation (and so within the purview of 
the Commission),147 it nevertheless hemmed in the circumstances in which unions could 
strike.  Ironically, the Keating government, in recognising the first de jure right to strike 
in Australian industrial history, simultaneously cramped the comparatively wide de 
facto ability of unions to engage in industrial action.  Unions won a limited form of 
immunity from tort liability and Commission-imposed penalties in the case of strikes, 
but only if the action was deemed to be ‘protected,’ which required, amongst other 
things, that it occurred within the bargaining period of an enterprise agreement.148  Only 
when an agreement was in the negotiation phase did strike action enjoy immunity.149  
Once an agreement had been struck, industrial action for the duration of the agreement 
was unprotected.  Although the legislative green light to tort claims in these 
circumstances did not necessarily mean employers would take action,150 the threat was 
often enough, particularly given the regime of toughened penalties established for 
breaches during the currency of agreements.151   
                                                          
144 Mark Bray and Andrew Stewart, ‘From the Arbitration System to the Fair Work Act: The Changing 
Approach in Australia to Voice and Representation at Work’ (2013) 34(1) Adelaide Law Review 21, 26. 
145 Indeed, Stewart suggests that one of the reasons for the late development of a statutory unfair dismissal 
regime, for example, was precisely because of the confidence of unions in their own ability to address 
cases directly with employers: Andrew Stewart, ‘And (Industrial) Justice for All? Protecting Workers 
Against Unfair Dismissal’ (1995) 1(1) Flinders Journal of Law Reform 85, 87. 
146 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 45D – 45E. 
147 Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth) s 38. 
148 Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth) s 170PM. 
149 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 28 October 1993, 2782 (Laurie 
Brereton). 
150 See, for example: Mike Taylor, ‘Wider fight looms after air chaos’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 29 
November 1994, 1 
151 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 28 October 1993, 2782-2783 
(Laurie Brereton). 
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Howard’s ascension to power in 1996 was marked by more stark anti-union measures.  
The Workplace Relations Act 1996 explicitly provided that secondary boycotts could 
not be the subject of protected industrial action.152  The secondary boycott provisions 
were also reinserted into the Trade Practices Act 1974, which the conservative parties 
had always regarded as their natural home.153  Indeed, one government member 
revealingly stated of the purpose of the relocation: ‘When we have restored those 
sections, they will eliminate the mindless, inane and insane strikes that we have seen 
around this country … They will restore natural justice to the workplace.’154  Ironically, 
the need to restore justice to the workplace did not save the requirement to bargain in 
good faith, introduced by the Keating government in 1993.  Under the Coalition’s new 
legislative scheme, ‘there was no positive obligation on an employer to recognise a 
union that sought to negotiate a collective agreement on behalf of employees, and … no 
duty to bargain in good faith.’155 
This last point is a particularly potent demonstration of the fundamental shift to a 
liberal-productivist model of development.  It will be recalled from chapter 4 that an 
integration of organised labour into the fabric of the arbitration system was a defining 
characteristic of antipodean Fordism, realised in the privileged legal status trade unions 
enjoyed in the arbitration system.  By 1996, the scene had changed entirely.  Now, the 
standing of unions was severely corroded, and employers who were so-inclined had the 
legislative tools at their disposal to systematically expunge unions from the workplace 
through refusing to recognise and treat with them in the negotiation of agreements.   
Legal matrix 
By the early 1990s, the limits of the arbitral power in supporting the reform agenda of 
the Keating government were becoming manifest.  Informed by the radical de-
regulation of the Victorian Employee Relations Act 1992,156 Accord Mark VII included 
a commitment to a range of minimum employment standards that would apply to all 
employees; that is, they would have what amounted to common rule effect.  To this end, 
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some of the key protections embedded in the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993, 
such as unfair dismissal, protections surrounding redundancy and equal pay for women, 
were enacted using the external affairs power of the Constitution.157  In particular, 
reliance was placed upon Australia’s ratification of a number of International Labour 
Organization Conventions.158  Additionally, the creation of EFAs relied for its validity 
not on the traditional arbitral power, but on the corporations power.159  In the Industrial 
Relations Reform Act 1993, therefore, we have the first systemic effort on the part of 
any federal government to ground important segments of the labour law regime on 
something other than section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution. 
Frazer has stated that, on this basis, ‘the legislation was the most dramatic example of 
direct regulation by the Federal Parliament in the field of industrial relations since 
Federation,’160 whilst McCallum opined that the Act marked ‘the commencement of the 
internationalisation of Australian industrial law.’161  Unlike the arbitral power, which 
prescribed a specific conciliation and arbitration machinery separate from the legislature 
and executive, both the corporations and external affairs powers are plenary powers.162  
This means that in enacting industrial legislation on these grounds, the Commonwealth 
was not reliant upon the established channels of arbitration and the administrative 
subjects and practices it entailed.  The recasting of the law-administration continuum 
noted throughout this section thus became immensely easier given that the legal fetters 
placed upon the state’s statutory control of industrial relations were loosened.  The 
‘purer’ legal form was becoming easier to access at the same time that its administrative 
brethren was corroding.   
The links binding the ALP to the union movement meant that the Keating government 
did not press this revolution as far as it could go.  Indeed, the provisions enacted using 
the corporations and external powers were generally placed within the purview of the 
                                                          
157 Australian Constitution s 51(xxix).   
158 Katy Reade, ‘The Use of the External Affairs Power in the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993’ 
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Commission.163  However, a precedent had been set, and when the Howard Government 
constructed its AWAs on the basis of the corporations power,164 it exploited the 
potential to sideline arbitration and placed the administration of the program with the 
OEA.   
The re-assertion of the abstract legal form both informed and was constituted by the 
diversification of the constitutional bases of industrial regulation.  However, in 1996 the 
arbitral power remained the most substantial of these, and was central to the operation 
of the federal tribunal.  It was not until 2005-06 that Australian liberal-productivism 
purged itself of the arbitral power for good.  
Almost as important in the reformulation of the law-administration continuum was a 
crucial 1995 High Court decision, which had brought a great deal of clarity into the 
relationship and hierarchy bonding law and administration together.165  It will be 
recalled from the previous chapter that the development of the arbitration system had 
largely submerged, but not extinguished, the traditional body of common law 
employment principles, most particularly the employment contract.  The case was 
complicated, but basically revolved around a claim of two airport baggage handlers that 
an award clause providing for procedural fairness should be imported or implied into 
their contracts of employment.166  The Court found that the award term could not be 
imported/implied into the award.167  In other words, the employment contract and the 
award regime, although often intertwined, were conceptually distinct.  To the extent that 
awards established some of the key terms and conditions of employment, it was 
unnecessary for the contract of employment to also provide for them.168  However, we 
have seen that the comprehensiveness of this regime was failing.  As administration 
continued to degrade, the regulatory vacuum could thus be captured by duties implied 
into the common law employment contract, duties which typically favoured employers. 
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2006 – Ascendancy of liberal-productivist labour law regime 
On the 27th of March 2006, the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act169 
came into effect.  The passage of this legislation was the apotheosis of the liberal-
productivist labour law regime, which had deepened and rested on an increasingly sure 
institutional footing since 1996.  Enterprise bargaining spread apace, whilst the role of 
unions in its conduct was reduced.  The collectivism of the broader labour law regime 
continued to be corroded, especially after the passage of WorkChoices, which hampered 
the activities of organised labour, further degraded the status of awards170 and removed 
the NDT, the last vestige of the link between awards and other instruments.  
Concomitantly, the scope of individualisation was radically widened by the open legal 
and political facilitation and encouragement of AWAs.  There was a continued 
diminution in the role of the Commission, a function of explicit legislative fetters, the 
development of competing institutions, and the broader juridification of labour law as 
administration gave way to the legal form narrowly construed.  Perhaps most 
importantly, the federal government at last succeeded in broadening its constitutional 
capacity to regulate industrial relations.  A monumental High Court decision in 2006 
sounded the death-knell of the arbitral power,171 the keystone upon which a good deal of 
the law-administration continuum peculiar to antipodean Fordism relied.   
By 2006, therefore, the ascendancy of the liberal-productivist labour law regime had 
been achieved.  It gave effect to the dynamics of coherence and balance of social forces 
constituting liberal-productivism in Australia, which were identified in chapter 4.  The 
repeal of WorkChoices and its replacement by the Fair Work Act 2009172 (FWA) bears 
very little on this fundamental truth.  Where differences are material they will be 
discussed, but the FWA is best conceived as a technical modulation of WorkChoices, 
concerned with calibrating liberal-productivist structures to the limits of political 
legitimacy.173  The limited forms of collectivism it re-established have been made at a 
time when trade unionism, the engine of working-class collectivism, has ebbed to 
historic lows. 
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Wage fixation 
The general pattern of wage and conditions fixation from 1996 onwards is one of 
decentralisation, fragmentation and increased polarity.  The shift away from awards as 
the primary source of wage determination is captured nicely by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, which recorded methods of wage-setting between May 2000 and May 
2010.174  In the former, 37% of workers had their pay determined by enterprise 
agreements, 34% by individual arrangements,175 and 23% by award alone.176  By the 
latter, the respective figures were 43%, 37% and 15%.177  The gains in both collective 
and individual agreement coverage were thus almost totally at the expense of awards.  
Moreover, this contraction of awards in scope was matched by a diminution in their 
relevance to the quantum of average wage rises.  For example, in May 2000, the average 
weekly total earnings of non-managerial award-only employees was equivalent to 
68.4% of the average for all non-managerial workers.178  By August 2008, however, this 
had dropped to just 50.4%.179  Combined with further legislative undermining and the 
sidelining of the Commission, which shall be explored below, the award system had 
thus arrived at the point it was destined for within a liberal-productivist model of 
development.  It was in many respects unrecognisable, a permeable floor of minimum 
rights and conditions, rather than a comprehensive, detailed framework of instruments 
which could be used to universalise the gains won by sections of organised labour.  
The only way over and above the increasingly poor award wage floor was through 
enterprise bargaining or AWAs.  WorkChoices succeeded in severing the main 
institutional link between these instruments and awards through abolishing the NDT (a 
development I will return to below).  Rather tellingly for my analysis, one government 
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member opined that only through removing this safeguard could agreements become 
full substitutes for awards.180  Peetz and Preston conducted a most useful study 
comparing pay rates in AWAs and collective agreements in 2006, the first full year 
without the NDT.  The results speak for themselves: employees on AWAs earned on 
average $2.00 less per hour than workers on collective agreements, whilst median AWA 
earnings in 2006 were $4.00 below the figure for collective agreements.181  Importantly, 
the differences in earnings between workers on AWAs was pronounced, as they tended 
to capture both low-income workers, such as those in retail and hospitality, and high-
income workers, such as miners.182   
One can only wonder at the number of AWAs that would have failed the NDT had it 
been in place at this time.  A disturbing insight is afforded following the reintroduction 
of a weak ‘Fairness Test’ in 2007183 (the Howard government’s response to the electoral 
damage threatened by public anger towards WorkChoices).  Figures from the 
government’s own Workplace Authority (a successor to the OEA) revealed that one in 
seven AWAs lodged failed the Fairness Test, usually through not compensating the 
removal of penalty rates with a higher hourly rate.184 
Even after the Rudd government phased out AWAs185 (leaving alone generally less 
egregious unregistered individual contracts such as common law contracts) and replaced 
the Fairness Test with a more robust ‘Better Off Overall’ test, the pay of non-
managerial workers under ‘individual arrangements’ (to use the new ABS term) 
remained in 2012 $1.80 less per hour than those bound by a collective agreement.186  
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The marginally higher average weekly total earnings of the former was bought by 
working, on average, an extra 2.4 hours a week.187   
In short, since 1996 a three-part wage structure has crystallised, with an increasingly 
small group of award-dependent workers falling behind employees in individual 
arrangements, who themselves consistently earn less per hour than workers covered by 
collective agreements.  The description of the implications of this structure for 
inequality in earnings is best left to the government’s own neoliberal think tank, the 
Productivity Commission.  This body has produced research conclusively 
demonstrating:  
 labour income growth has been strongest in the top three income deciles;188  
 greater dispersion in earnings;189 and 
 overall higher levels of labour income inequality.190 
 
What we have here, therefore, is the fracturing of the relatively homogenous wage 
structure deemed necessary to antipodean Fordism in chapter 4.  Whilst it would be 
exceedingly difficult to measure to what degree legal change ‘caused’ these 
developments, the question of causation is largely beside the point; whatever the source, 
transformations in the labour law regime were necessary for these wide degrees of 
inequality to result.   
In chapter 7, I  will explore in detail a striking example of the liberal-productivist 
assault upon wage equality, namely the struggle over pattern bargaining.  Upon 
realising the danger posed by enterprise bargaining to the common weal of labour, 
unions such as the AMWU attempted to orchestrate industry-wide enterprise bargaining 
campaigns, whereby agreements were negotiated with various employers 
simultaneously and timed to have a common expiry date.  In this effort, they were trying 
at least in part to re-establish the antipodean Fordist cycle of flow-on, whereby the 
militancy of well-organised workplaces could be leveraged at the industry and, 
potentially, macroeconomic levels.  As shall be seen, this endeavour, despite some 
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promising early successes, ultimately came undone, stifled precisely because of newly-
developed statutory inhibitions that rendered such conduct illegal.  Here, labour law 
achieved at last, and in totality, a purpose for which it had been pressed since at least the 
Accord years; a destruction of the links binding the industrially strong and weak, 
extinguishing the last remnants of the historical forces of flow-on.   
Employment forms/flexibility 
In the 1980s and 1990s the movement towards removing the formal barriers to the 
intensification of precarity had proceeded apace, most specifically the stripping of 
awards of qualitative and quantitative controls on the employment of casual, part-time 
and/or junior labour, culminating in the 1996 prohibition of such clauses being included 
in federal awards.191  On an institutional front, therefore, there was little more to do 
regarding the accessibility of such forms for capital,192 although the case study chapters 
will demonstrate a continued effort on the part of management to enhance their control 
over the deployment and conditions of precarious labour. 
An issue that was still live at the time of WorkChoices, however, was the growing use 
of outsourcing strategies by increasingly lean firms, who sought to use labour hire 
companies and independent contractors to perform jobs historically done in-house at a 
lower cost and without the overheads associated with a direct employment relationship.  
There had been historical difficulties in measuring the incidence and trajectories of 
these particular forms.193  Nevertheless, a House of Representatives committee 
estimated that in 1998 independent contractors represented around 10% of people in 
employment (a 15% growth from 1978),194 a figure that remained broadly constant 
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through the 2000s.195  The same committee found that in 2002 3.9% of all employees 
were labour hire workers, a large increase on the equivalent figure of 0.8% in 1990.196  
Such developments were in themselves indicative of the decline of antipodean Fordism, 
evidencing the degradation of the internal labour markets and vertical company 
integration that we saw in chapter 4 characterised it. 
As shall be seen in chapter 8 in the case of the food processing industry, both forms 
were valuable in capital’s effort to break union power in the workplace and disempower 
employees, artificially dividing the workforce with complex tangles of legal 
relationships outside the traditional standard employment model.  Given the evidence 
that outsourcing to contractors and labour hire companies did indeed effect these 
outcomes, as well as threatening occupational health and safety and employee 
wellbeing,197 moves to reduce the controls on these kinds of arrangements could not 
help but exacerbate the deepening of flexibility and precarity at the heart of the liberal-
productivist industrial paradigm and wage-labour nexus. 
Such a deepening, however, was at the top of the Howard government’s list of 
priorities.  Historically, unfair contract provisions implanted in industrial legislation 
gave contractors ready access to the court system, allowing them to seek redress for 
‘unfair’ or ‘harsh’ agreements.198  The Howard government, however, had consistently 
formed the view ‘that independent contracting arrangements should be regulated by 
commercial law, not workplace relations law,’199 an expression par excellence of my 
contention that capital prefers the legal form narrowly construed over administration in 
times of proletarian weakness.   
The Coalition’s efforts to realise their vision assumed a number of dimensions.  Firstly, 
regulations enacted pursuant to WorkChoices rendered provisions in enterprise 
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agreements or AWAs restricting or qualifying the engagement of independent 
contractors and/or labour hire workers as ‘prohibited content.’200  Secondly, a 
contemporaneous piece of legislation, the Independent Contractors Act 2006,201 was 
passed, which essentially meant that, ‘henceforth subcontractors with grievances had 
access only to the much more expensive and time-consuming avenue of redress through 
commercial law’ (my emphasis).202  Again, the recourse to commercial law further 
strengthens my thesis of liberal-productivist reconstruction of the law-administration 
continuum in favour of the former pole. 
As the case study chapters will demonstrate, both enterprise bargaining and AWAs in 
this period were subject to the extant forces of precarisation, heightened flexibility and 
the whittling away of the basket of rights and entitlements attaching to the standard 
employment model.  Of particular note is the damning evidence of the utility of AWAs 
for capital in these endeavours.  Despite a disturbing level of opacity surrounding 
them,203 the government’s own figures demonstrated incontrovertibly that AWAs 
systematically undermined employee rights and entitlements.  A sample of 998 AWAs 
lodged between May and October 2006 found that: 
 76% did not include shift loadings; 
 68% did not include penalty rates; 
 59% omitted annual leave loading; 
 30% did not include rest breaks; and 
 23% did not protect declared public holidays.204 
 
These are conditions which were hard-won over a long period of time, cohering as part 
of the framework of protections and entitlements that were part and parcel of the 
antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus.  Although the AWA structure that permitted 
such flagrant conditions-stripping has since been dispensed with by the FWA, the very 
possibility of such an effort, together with its success, is demonstrative of the fact that 
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the wage-labour nexus of liberal-productivism operates according to a very different 
logic to its Fordist predecessor. 
Collectivism/individualism and the scale of industrial relations 
Three key themes confront us when looking at the collectivism/individualism and scale 
of the labour law regime in the late 1990s and 2000s: the further degradation in the 
functions and powers of the federal Commission; the radically expanded scope for 
AWAs to be employed; and the ever increasing density of legal fetters placed upon the 
activities of trade unions.   
The Commission’s powers were attacked on a number of fronts.  The ability of the 
Commission to compulsorily determine disputes was all but abolished,205 a function of 
the usurpation of the arbitral power.  The award safety net for which it was responsible 
was further gutted by WorkChoices, which reduced the number of allowable matters 
from twenty to fourteen.206  Furthermore, the removal of the NDT mentioned above 
severed the link between the skeletal award framework it oversaw and other 
instruments.207  Concerning the latter, the Commission lost even its role in approving 
collective agreements which, like AWAs, were now to be lodged with the OEA.   
Perhaps most important was the diversification and empowerment of competitor 
institutions.  As seen above, this began with the creation of the OEA in 1996, and was 
further evidenced by the establishment of the Fair Pay Commission,208 which was given 
the responsibility of determining the federal minimum wage hitherto exercised by the 
federal arbitral tribunal.  Stripped even of its role in maintaining a meaningful basic 
safety net of award wages and conditions, the Commission became, in many respects, a 
voluntarist provider of conciliation services.209  Gifted the opportunity, Prime Minister 
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Howard lived up to the threat he had made in 1992, stating of the Commission, ‘we will 
stab them in the stomach.’210 
Above and in chapter 4, I noted that the rise of liberal-productivism involves a 
juridification of work relationships, whereby the law-administration continuum is 
pushed towards its former pole as administrative fixes to proletarian struggle give way 
to the purer legal form.  The usurpation of the arbitration system was one manifestation 
of this assault upon the law-administration continuum peculiar to antipodean Fordism.  I 
showed above how some employers in the mid-1980s achieved this through going 
behind the Commission’s back, falling upon common law industrial torts and statutes 
like the Trade Practices Act 1974 which were, in conception, only tangentially related 
to labour law.  After 1996, the process assumed a more direct and naked form, as the 
development of a more comprehensive statutory scheme of industrial regulation 
institutionalised channels outside the arbitration system.   
In the Australian context, this involved an explicitly legalistic turn.  Ludeke astutely 
noted in 1998 that ‘[a]nother indicator of change is the growing tendency for parties to 
turn to the courts rather than the traditional tribunals … it has now been held that the 
structure of the present legislation itself “thrusts the parties towards the common law 
courts.”’211  The ‘structure of the present legislation’ probably refers in part to the 
explicit enlargement of the Federal Court’s jurisdiction under the Workplace Relations 
Act 1996 which, unlike its predecessor, granted the power for parties to commence 
actions in the Court.212  More broadly, the general devolution of bargaining to the 
enterprise and individual levels (in a context of union weakness), and the emphasis this 
placed on the self-help of the parties, encouraged the pursuit of the full range of legal 
institutions and instruments to secure desired outcomes.  In Victoria, for example, the 
Court of Appeal found that so long as employers had complied with their statutory 
obligations, there should be no barrier placed before them in accessing their common 
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law rights,213 a decision very much channelling the case of Byrne v Australian Airlines 
Ltd214 discussed above.   
The fact that the courts of ordinary standing were now competitors for the 
Commission’s business was graphically demonstrated by the infamous 1998 Maritime 
Dispute, in which Patrick Stevedores attempted to expel the Maritime Union of 
Australia (MUA) from the waterfront.  The case was notable for not directly involving 
the Commission.  The flow of events involved Patricks seeking injunctions against 
picketing in the Supreme Courts of New South Wales, Victoria and Western 
Australia,215 before the MUA eventually won a High Court challenge based upon the 
freedom of association provisions of the Workplace Relations Act 1996.216  Although 
the MUA prevailed in this case, the observation made in chapter 3, that traditional 
forms of law tend to reassert themselves during periods of working-class weakness, 
holds.   
Juridification was also apparent in the recasting of what had traditionally been collective 
rights into individual ones, as well as the generation of new institutions to enforce 
them.217  By severing the constitutional link between industrial legislation and the 
arbitral power, which shall be discussed below, WorkChoices accorded a much greater 
role to the individual worker, building upon the developments of the early 1990s.  The 
institutional expression of this was the expansion of the so-called Office of Workplace 
Services218 and, in the final months of the Howard Government, its transformation into 
a ‘Workplace Ombudsman.’219  These were both bodies designed explicitly to address 
the complaints of employees qua individuals.220  Something of their character can be 
discerned from the fact that the Office of Workplace Services deemed that a Cowra 
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abattoir had not broken the law when it fired 29 of its workers and attempted to rehire 
20 of them on new contracts that cut their weekly pay by $180.221   
The FWA has retained in many ways the fundamentally individualistic character of the 
rights and protections afforded by statute.  Creighton notes that the individualistic 
element of the regime: 
[I]s also evidenced by the fact that all awards and enterprise agreements must 
contain provisions enabling the making of IFAs where the operation of the 
collective instrument can be modified in its application to individual employees, 
that individuals … have the capacity to enforce their entitlements under 
enterprise agreements and modern awards, and that the ‘safety net’ protections 
set out in Part 2-2 relate very much to the rights of the individual rather than the 
collectivity … unions are increasingly treated as just another participant in the 
industrial process, rather than its driving force222 (my emphasis). 
 
WorkChoices also radically intensified the individualism of the labour law regime 
through making AWAs more accessible to capital at the same time that the protections 
built in to them were wound back.  Stung by the relatively slow take-up of AWAs,223 
the Howard government increased their attractiveness and ease in a number of ways.  
The abolition of the NDT severed the strings still binding it to the award system.  Now, 
AWAs merely had to comply with a new statutory Fair Pay and Conditions Standards’ 
scheme, prescribing only five basic conditions.224  Moreover, they could be offered as a 
condition of employment for prospective workers.225  For those employees already 
covered by collective agreements, employers proved willing to refuse to bargain when 
they came up for re-negotiation, instead waiting workers out (and in some cases firing 
them) in an attempt to force them on to AWAs.226  In short, WorkChoices created ‘a 
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cascading hierarchy of instruments at the apex of which are AWAs, followed by 
collective agreements then awards.  An instrument higher up the hierarchy operates to 
the complete exclusion of any instrument further down the list.’227  Unlike the case 
hitherto, AWAs now completely displaced awards and collective agreements. 
The generation of this hierarchy resulted in the rapid growth of the AWA stream.  From 
the 2.4% of employees calculated to be covered by AWAs in 2004,228 the rate rose to 
something between 5-7% in February 2008.229  They were particularly concentrated in 
traditionally unionised industries, such as mining, transport and (as shall be seen in 
chapter 9) retail,230 where they inflicted grievous damage to union strength.231  
Although never high in absolute terms, the disempowering impact of AWAs went far 
beyond their actual incidence.  One AMWU official accurately grasped the case when 
they stated that ‘[e]mployers now understand that a few AWAs here and there in key 
enterprises dent confidence in union bargaining, lower standards and diminish outcomes 
much more than the one or two per cent of workers that they cover.’232  It is true that the 
FWA has subsequently dispensed with statutory individual contracts, but it has 
introduced ‘Individual Flexibility Agreements’ into modern awards and enterprise 
agreements, which permit variations of award conditions provided they satisfy the new 
‘Better Off Overall’ test.233  Nevertheless, evidence demonstrating that they are open to 
abuse suggests that at least some of the managerial prerogative-enhancing quality of 
AWAs persists in them.234 
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The diffusion of AWAs was proceeding apace at the same time as the capacity of trade 
unions to resist them was weakening.  WorkChoices struck at the heart of the ability of 
unions to organise and operate.  Union rights of entry were even more severely limited 
than they had been, making it extremely difficult for organisers to access workplaces 
without any union members.  The legislation played the dual trick of specifying a highly 
formalistic procedure by which union officials obtained ‘permits’235 whilst at the same 
time preventing new workplace agreements from providing entry rights separate from 
the statutory regime.236 
The list of ‘prohibited content’ in workplace agreements did not stop with rights of 
entry.  Indeed, the list was voluminous.  Among the immense number of prohibited 
terms were any dealing with: 
 deduction of union dues;237 
 paid trade union training and/or meeting;238 
 encouragement or discouragement of union membership;239  
 allowing industrial action;240 or 
 restricting AWAs.241 
 
These were clearly targeted directly at the ability of unions to obtain more favourable 
terms through enterprise bargaining.  
The damage inflicted on trade unions by the increasingly hostile legislative framework 
from 1996 onwards is reflected in several key indicators, revealing a movement in a 
deep malaise.  The end of the closed shop, tightened access to existing and potential 
members and the availability of instruments outside of union oversight combined with 
the broader secular decline of trade unions to hit membership hard.  In 1997, there were 
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still more than 2.1 million members, representing some 30.3% of employees.242  By 
2009 there had been an absolute decline of more than 250,000 members, whilst union 
density had decreased to 19.7%.243  The FWA has proved to be of no help in arresting 
the decline; by August 2014, only 1.6 million people were trade unionists in their main 
job, with density standing at the historically low rate of 15%.244 
Levels of industrial disputation, which had been roughly steady for most of the 1980s 
before falling rapidly after the recession of the early 1990s,245 proved remarkably 
sensitive to changes in the labour law regime.  The ABS reported that ‘[t]here was a 
42% reduction in the number of working days lost between 1996 and 1997. The number 
of employees involved dropped by 45%, and the number of disputes by 18%.’246  The 
fact that 1996 saw the introduction of the Howard government’s anti-union program is 
more than a little coincidental. 
Disputation continued to decline throughout the Howard years, with the absolute nadir 
being reached in 2007.  In that year, there were a paltry 135 disputes, involving a mere 
36,000 employees.247  Again, the FWA has proved of scant comfort to unionists, with 
historically low levels of industrial action, in terms of numbers of disputes, employees 
involved and working days lost remaining the order of the day.248 
Legal matrix 
In the discussion of the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 and Workplace Relations 
Act 1996, I noted how the arbitral power was supplemented by both the corporations 
and external affairs powers.  WorkChoices was a radical leap further down this road.  
Given the parliamentary obstacles the Howard Government had encountered in further 
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deploying its vision of workplace reform in the late 1990s, the 2004 election victory, 
which granted the government majorities in both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate,249 presented a window of opportunity for the conservative parties to force the 
issue.  After failing to get the states to ‘refer’ their industrial powers to the 
Commonwealth,250 the government turned to the corporations power to found the bulk 
of the WorkChoices legislation.251  The prize for this effort, if successful, was twofold: 
the ability to bring many workers currently covered by the state system under the 
control of the Commonwealth, arrogating to the latter the common rule application it 
had traditionally lacked; and an ability to break the mould of conciliation and 
arbitration, with all its collectivist traditions, prescribed in the arbitral power. 
Conservative parliamentarians made no bones about both objectives.252  An ALP 
member incisively grasped the ramifications of the Coalition’s scheme, stating: 
It is also important to note that this legislation shifts the most important 
principles in our legal constitution – the way we work and the way workplaces 
relations are run in this country – from the labour power to 
the corporations power. What does that mean? We are no longer talking about 
arbitration. We are no longer talking about two parties – the worker and the 
employer in their workplace – we are now talking about corporations power and 
about economic and employment costs. We are talking now about commodities 
and simple units of production.253 
 
This expansive use of the corporations power, although having historical antecedents in 
the 1993 and 1996 legislative packages, was unique in that it essentially usurped the 
arbitral power.  Given the stakes, for both the union movement and state governments 
who were seeing an enormous disturbance in the balance of federalism,254 a High Court 
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challenge was inevitable, despite the fact that it chances of success were seen by many 
experts as slim.255 
In a massive 385-page decision, the High Court (by a five to two majority) held that the 
corporations power could be used to found the Howard Government’s industrial 
relations legislation.256  Most significantly for my analysis, the majority held that:  
s 51(xxxv) did not contain a positive prohibition or restriction on what would 
otherwise be the ambit of the power conferred by s 51(xx) or give rise to a 
negative implication of exclusivity which would deny the validity of laws with 
respect other heads of power which also had the character of laws regulating 
industrial relations in a fashion other than as required by s 51(xxxv) (my 
emphasis).257 
 
In other words, the High Court gave the Government an enormous latitude in legislating 
for industrial relations, freeing the latter from the prescribed mode of industrial 
regulation established by the arbitral power.   
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Kirby hit upon one of the motive forces for this 
shift in terms supporting the theory of transition forwarded in this thesis.  He stated of 
the arbitral power: 
[T]he feature of the independent determination of industrial disputes has the 
potential to encourage and promote collective agreements between parties and 
the protection of economic fairness to all those involved in industrial disputes, 
secured by the distinctive procedures of conciliation and arbitration. Such 
elements of fairness would not necessarily be assured by an unlimited focus of 
federal law on the activities of employers as constitutional corporations.258 
 
The analysis here and in chapters 4 and 5 allows us to regard the claims for the 
arbitration system’s historic fairness with the skepticism it deserves.  Compulsory 
conciliation and arbitration was not a gift to ensure fairness to workers, but a structure 
sitting astride the competing demands of capital accumulation and a powerful labour 
movement.  With that caveat in mind, however, I have demonstrated that part of 
                                                          
255 Marcus Priest, ‘Insiders’ verdict: IR challenge doomed’, Australian Financial Review (Australia), 28 
April 2006, 1; Michael Pelly, ‘The final glory, but not all the powers’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 
3 May 2006, 11. 
256 New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1. 
257 Ibid 4. 
258 Ibid 190. 
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arbitration’s utility to Australian capitalism in its antipodean Fordist phase was 
precisely that it was more distributively ‘fair’ than the free labour market system which 
had preceded it.  This ensured both the maintenance of adequate demand in the hands of 
the proletariat and the integration of organised labour into the fabric of the state.  The 
survival of the system more-or-less intact for the majority of the twentieth century, 
together with the general acceptance of the federal state that its power to regulate 
industrial relation was contained within this power to the exclusion of others,259 attests 
to this fact.  Liberal-productivism, however, is both premised upon, and reproduces, a 
different balance of forces and modalities of cohesion.  What made arbitration ‘fair’ is 
precisely what made its destruction necessary in the new epoch of Australian capitalism. 
The effective death of the arbitral power in 2006 was not reversed by the incoming ALP 
government, which instead exploited the constitutional shift in enacting their own 
industrial legislation.  With that passed into history one of central foundation stones 
upon which the law-administration configuration unique to antipodean Fordism was 
erected. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have provided the second half of the concrete legal history needed to 
flesh out the abstract framework developed in chapter 4.  From where the previous 
chapter left off, major developments across the four key themes have resulted in the 
destruction of the antipodean Fordist labour law regime and its replacement by a liberal-
productivist successor. 
The advent of the Accord between the ACTU and the ALP heralded a far more 
concerted effort at searching for ways out of crisis than had hitherto been the case, 
revolving initially upon intensifying the federal Commission and placing it as the 
lynchpin in aggregate wage fixation.  However, the intractability of the crisis forced 
more drastic changes by 1989, as the state, labour and capital sought for a way to 
increase efficiency and competitiveness through a strategic decentralisation to the award 
and workplace level.  The development of the restructuring and efficiency and structural 
efficiency principles was particularly important in this regard, especially to the extent 
that they built upon the emerging norm of precarity and enhanced managerial control 
                                                          
259 Ibid 189. 
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over the organisation and execution of the labour process.  This movement towards new 
forms of the traditional award system co-existed with, and to a certain extent grated 
against, the development of new, more legalistic instruments of industrial control, such 
as secondary boycott prohibitions, and the recrudescence of industrial torts in set-piece 
battles between militant New Right employers and unions.   
Juridification, this movement towards the ‘purer’ legal form, continued throughout the 
1990s and 2000s, as collective rights gave way to individual ones and the Commission 
found itself competing for business with courts of ordinary standing.  The emergence of 
enterprise bargaining further limited the tribunal’s role and power, as ALP and 
Coalition governments sought to narrow the circumstances in which it could arbitrate 
disputes and/or refuse to certify enterprise agreements.  In 1996, the Howard 
government took the next step, introducing statutory individual contracts that 
fundamentally threatened the collectivism of the labour law regime.  In their war against 
pattern bargaining and secondary boycotts, they attacked this collectivism from another 
angle, finally severing the last remnants of the historical pattern of wage and conditions 
flow-on. 
The activation of WorkChoices in 2006 marks the ascendency of the new liberal-
productivist labour law regime.  The remnants of the award system and the Commission 
were reduced to just that: institutions that, in the logic and effect of their action, shared 
little with their predecessors but the names.  Unions, once critical to the operation of the 
industrial relations systems, were relegated to unwanted ‘third parties,’ stifled by a wide 
array of legal fetters that largely survived the death of WorkChoices and remain integral 
to the FWA.  The new regime was made complete when WorkChoices, building on 
exploratory moves in the 1990s, abandoned the arbitral power of the Constitution and 
sought the footing of the corporations power.  This constitutional revolution, legitimated 
by the ALP when it used the latter to anchor the FWA, removed one of the keystones of 
the law-administration continuum unique to antipodean Fordism, and is perhaps the 
single most telling indication that liberal-productivism has remade labour law in its own 
image. 
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Chapter 7 
THE METAL TRADES SECTOR AND ANTIPODEAN 
FORDIST FLOW-ON 
In the previous two chapters I was concerned with developing a broad historical account 
of labour law change in Australia.  In particular, I explained how the labour law regimes 
of antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism concretely performed the abstract 
functions required of them whilst also mapping the process of evolution between the 
two.  This chapter marks the beginning of the case studies, where I isolate some of the 
most important changes identified and explore their application to specific 
industries/sectors in greater detail.   
The focus in this particular segment is the rise and decline of the antipodean Fordist 
process of wage and conditions ‘flow-on’ centred on the articulation between the 
arbitration system and the leading metals sector.  In chapters 4 and 5 it was established 
that the former performed the immensely important function of flowing-on gains won in 
the latter to the labour force at large through the award framework, a process that helped 
in no small part to establish the Fordist character and coherence of post-World War II 
Australian capitalism. Here, the mechanics of flow-on, the architecture of the award 
system and the role of metals within that structure will be examined in much greater 
detail.  In particular, the analysis will focus upon the historical role of the Metal Trades 
and Metal Industry Awards as industrial pace-setters, an institutional expression par 
excellence of a Fordist lead sector.  I will trace the ascension of these awards to the apex 
of the award hierarchy in the period of antipodean Fordist functionality, before 
witnessing the growing dissonance between their institutional entrenchment and the 
flagging dynamism of the metals, and broader manufacturing, sector.  The enforced 
wage straitjacket of the Accord stopped the cycle of metal trade flow-on in its tracks, 
whilst the advent of enterprise bargaining and associated legislative change destroyed it 
once and for all. 
As shall be seen in this chapter, the fate of the antipodean Fordist cycle of flow-on was 
a function both of the destruction of the horizontal and vertical links binding the award 
system together and the unfolding of enterprise bargaining in the manufacturing sector.  
Both processes reflect opposite sides of the same political-economic coin.  Whereas the 
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former was a critical development in the ‘rollback’ phase, whereby the foundational 
institutions of antipodean Fordism were undermined, corroded and displaced, the latter 
is part of an ongoing ‘roll-out’ of liberal-productivist structures.1 
The choice of this particular subject is informed by a variety of considerations.  Firstly, 
the centrality of the flow-on process to the coherence of antipodean Fordism cannot be 
under-estimated; indeed, in chapter 5 I stated that metal sector flow-on was ‘the motive 
force by which the institutional structure turned.’  Understanding the institutionalisation 
and usurpation of the metal trades as a lead sector is thus key to understanding one of 
the central pivots of antipodean Fordist functionality and crisis.  Secondly, the bundle of 
legal changes investing the ascent and decline of the metals sector as an institutionalised 
pace-setter go to the heart of several of the fundamental essences of the labour law 
regimes of antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism elucidated in chapters 4, 5 and 
6, including:   
 For the former: compulsory arbitration precociously institutionalising the Fordist 
wage-labour nexus, most particularly its linkage of the industrially strong and 
weak, the growth of administration fixes to worker power, and broad 
occupational/industry-level bargaining; 
 For the latter: the severing of the institutionalised links binding the labour force 
together, de-centralisation and intensified juridifcation. 
 
Before the analysis can be constructed, however, it is necessary to briefly plot the early 
history of the relationship between the metal trades and the arbitration system. 
Early history 
By the time of Federation in 1901 there was already a small but growing manufacturing 
sector.2  It is thus not surprising that cases involving manufacturing workers were 
determined from the inception of the federal arbitral system.3  The industrial impetus of 
World War I, the growth of the domestic market and the advent of a cogent system of 
                                                          
1 Jamie Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason (Oxford University Press, 2010) 22-23. 
2 Nikki Balnave and Greg Patmore, ‘The AMWU: Politics and Industrial Relations, 1852-2012’ in 
Andrew Reeves and Andrew Dettmer (eds) Organise, Educate, Control: The AMWU in Australia 1852-
2012 (Monash University Publishing, 2013) 3, 4. 
3 Indeed, the landmark Harvester case revolved around workers engaged in the production of agricultural 
machinery: Ex Parte H. V. McKay (1907) 2 CAR 1 (‘Harvester’).  
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substantial tariff protection combined in the 1920s and 1930s to provide a kick-start to 
manufacturing of a more industrial character, particularly basic metals, metal fabrication 
and machinery construction (referred to collectively here as the ‘metal trades’ and 
‘metal industry’). 
The metal trades unions (including at this time the Amalgamated Engineering Union, 
the Australasian Society of Engineers, the Federated Moulders Union of Australasia and 
the Blacksmiths’ Society of Australasia) had pursued their own separate state awards 
until the 1920s, when the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) sought and obtained 
their first federal award in 1921.4  They were followed by the other craft unions5 and 
more general unions organising unskilled workers (such as the Federated Ironworkers 
Association),6 such that by the mid-1920s they all held awards in the federal 
jurisdiction, representing the first concerted effort ‘to standardise conditions of 
employment in the metal industries which were a key component of national industrial 
expansion.’7   
A moment of critical importance for the analysis here was the creation of what would 
become the cornerstone of the post-World War II award structure, the consolidated 
Metal Trades Award in 1930.8  Cockfield notes that, unlike the patchwork of awards 
which had characterised the sector up to this point, the award ‘covered all occupational 
unions: both engineering unions, the blacksmiths’, boilermakers’, and moulders’ unions, 
                                                          
4 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steam-Ship Company Limited (1921) 15 CAR 297.  The 
move to the federal jurisdiction was based in no small part on the perception of Justice Higgins as 
handing down decisions rather more sympathetic to workers than those emanating from state-based 
tribunals: Tom Sheridan, Mindful Militants: The Amalgamated Engineering Union in Australia 1920-
1972 (Cambridge University Press, 1975) 64. 
5 See, for example: Federated Society of Boilermakers and Iron Shipbuilders of Australia v Adelaide 
Steamship Company Limited (1924) 20 CAR 770; Federated Moulders (Metals) Union of Australasia v 
Adelaide Steamship Company Limited (1924) 20 CAR 890; Blacksmiths’ Society of Australasia v 
Adelaide Steamship Company Limited (1924) 20 CAR 1047; Australasian Society of Engineers v 
Abbotsford Manufacturing Company and also the Australasian Society of Engineers v the Australian 
Electric Motors Ltd (1924) 20 CAR 1075. 
6 See, for example: Federated Ironworkers Association of Australia v Mort’s Dock and Engineering 
Company Limited (1925) 22 CAR 378. 
7 Sheridan, Mindful Militants, above n 4, 64.  Indeed, the Federated Society of Boilermakers had 
explicitly sought federal award coverage for the purpose of introducing uniformity into what had been an 
industry ruled by varying state awards:  Federated Society of Boilermakers and Iron Shipbuilders of 
Australia v Adelaide Steamship Company Limited (1924) 20 CAR 770, 772. 
8 Amalgamated Engineering Union v Metal Trades Employers Association (1930) 28 CAR 923.  Such 
was the significance of this moment that Justice Dunphy and Justice Wright saw fit to pay homage to ‘Mr 
Justice Beeby, the parent of the great Metal Trades Award, to whose patient foresight I think we can say 
secondary industries owe so much’: Justice E.A. Dunphy and Justice S.C.G. Wright, ‘The Jubilee of 
Industrial Arbitration in the Federal Sphere’ (1951) 25 Australian Law Journal 360, 375. 
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the Federated Ironworkers Association, and the Sheet Metal Workers Union.’9  In an 
indication of how important the metals sector was even at this early stage, the tribunal 
stated of the case: 
The interests involved, all more or less related, constitute the most important 
group of secondary industries of the Commonwealth.  The industrial 
relationships of establishments, employing approximately 110,000 workers, will 
be affected either directly or indirectly by the award.10 
 
In terms significant to my construction of the industrial paradigm according with 
antipodean Fordism, the award was determined at a time when mass production 
techniques were beginning to transform the sector and supplant the typical ‘jobbing’ 
pattern which had characterised employment therein.11   
From the mid-1930s onwards, the metal trades served a critical function as the base of 
recovery for organised labour in the aftermath of the economic turmoil of the Great 
Depression.  A 1935 adjustment to the Metal Trades Award by Justice Beeby 
substantially increased margins for skilled workers12 and, more importantly, led to 
requisite movements in many other awards, in what was to be the first example of the 
Metal Trades Award acting as an industrial pace-setter.13  A concerted AEU campaign 
to extract over-award payments from metal employers throughout 1936-1937 proved 
extremely successful, triumphing despite the union being de-registered federally.14  
Upon being re-registered, Beeby J noted: ‘[i]t is obvious that this Union not being 
registered completely disorganises the Metal Trades Industry and the Metal Trades 
Award, which is one of the most important ever made by the Court’ (my emphasis).15 
This acknowledged significance of the metal trades industry only grew with the onset of 
World War II.  Sheridan notes how ‘[t]he metal trades workforce practically doubled 
between 1938-9 and 1943-4 from 177,000 to 341,000.  This rapid expansion was 
                                                          
9 Sandra Cockfield, ‘Arbitration, Mass Production and Workplace Relations: ‘Metal Industry’ 
Developments in the 1920s’ (1993) 35(1) Journal of Industrial Relations 19, 25. 
10 Amalgamated Engineering Union v Metal Trades Employers Association (1930) 28 CAR 923, 927. 
11 Indeed, employers had argued for the right to exploit the de-skilling potential of new single-purpose, 
automatic and semi-automatic machinery through employing unskilled, partially skilled and/or junior 
labour in roles traditionally occupied by craftsmen: Ibid 930.  See also: Cockfield, above n 9, 23-24, 28.   
12 Metal Trades Employers Association v Amalgamated Engineering Union (1935) 34 CAR 449. 
13 Keith Hancock, 'The First Half-Century of Australian Wage-Policy-Part II' (1979) 21(2) Journal of 
Industrial Relations 129, 145. 
14 Sheridan, Mindful Militants. above n 4, 130-143. 
15 Justice Beeby quoted in Ibid 143. 
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accompanied by a revolution in engineering practice and the scale of operations.’16  
Technological innovations, such as tungsten carbide tipped tools, new steels and 
improved machinery, helped expand output vastly, whilst by 1943 domestic production 
of machine tools had increased seven times on the pre-war figure.17  Just as significant 
was the increasing scale of production, with metal workers increasingly employed in 
large workplaces.18  Both developments combined were to provide the foundation of a 
post-War metals sector of a different qualitative magnitude to the one that existed 
before the conflict.  With this industrial critical mass established, the metal unions, 
characterised by powerful and active industrial organisation and a pent-up worker desire 
to make good the privations incurred during the Depression and World War II, were 
placed to take a vanguard role in the post-War wave of militancy.  In these struggles the 
Metal Trades Award would serve as a key institutional nexus. 
Antipodean Fordism and the Metal Trades Award – Rise to 
paramountcy 
With the end of hostilities in 1945, the path was finally cleared for the coherence of the 
antipodean Fordist model of development.  Key to this process was moving the 
economy from a war footing through the reconversion of manufacturing capacity to 
peacetime production and the release of bottled-up consumer demand.  The latter 
phenomenon, however, was stymied by the Chifley Australian Labor Party (ALP) 
government’s maintenance of the wage and price controls which had enabled the state 
to maximise both output and macroeconomic control of the wartime economy.  In 
particular, there was reluctance and hedging on the part of Chifley to relinquish the 
maximum wage ceiling and allow fresh applications for marginal rates variation.19  His 
government’s overwhelming desire to restrain inflation, and thus wages, placed it on a 
collision course with organised labour, whose hand was strengthened by the virtual 
                                                          
16 Sheridan, Mindful Militants, above n 4, 145. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Sheridan observes that ‘[the proportion of metal workers employed in establishments with 100 hands or 
less on the payroll fell from 42 per cent in 1936-6 to 24 per cent in 1942-3’: Ibid 146. 
19 For an excellent overview of the Chifley government and its industrial relations record, see: Tom 
Sheridan, Division of Labour: Industrial Relations in the Chifley Years, 1945-49 (Oxford University 
Press, 1989); Tom Sheridan, 'Shoring up the System: The ALP and Arbitration in the 1940s' (1989) 31(1) 
Journal of Industrial Relations 3; Stuart Macintyre, Australia’s Boldest Experiment: War and 
reconstruction in the 1940s (NewSouth Publishing, 2015) 346-352, 441-446. 
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elimination of pre-war, Depression-begat unemployment.   Unsurprisingly, the metal 
trades were the primary front along which the conflict was waged. 
The freezing of margins cases during the War, along with the fact that the Basic Wage 
was varied by automatic quarterly adjustments to the ‘C Series’ price index, meant that 
in nominal award terms the marginal relativity between skilled and unskilled employees 
had declined.  In practice, however, metal unions had been generally successful in 
obtaining over-award payments (although technically illegal under the government’s 
wage-pegging scheme) from employers keen to profit from war production in a tight 
labour market.20  Direct action at the point of production proved similarly propitious in 
the post-War environment.  In the face of government and employer intransigence, a 
massive six month dispute in the Victorian metal trades over the issue of over-awards 
and margins proved critical.21   Angered by the protracted bureaucratic wrangling over 
the Basic Wage and 40-hour week hearings, metal unions, most prominently the AEU, 
embarked on an over-award wage campaign, with the latter enforcing overtime bans to 
that effect.  The employers responded with an ill-conceived lock-out, whilst the federal 
Commission (at this time still the Arbitration Court) appeared fundamentally confused, 
both as to the nature of wage-fixing regulations and how to control an industrial brawl 
that threatened to spill over state boundaries.22  In the event, the employers and the 
Arbitration Court caved along the line, with a 1947 Full Bench Margins case23 
sandwiched by two decisions of Commissioner Mooney24 granting substantial marginal 
increases.25   
The 1947 Margins case was of critical importance to the institutionalisation of the role 
of the metal trades at the apex of the award structure.  Although Hancock and 
Richardson note that ‘[t]he tendency for the overall wage structure to move in line with 
                                                          
20 Sheridan, Mindful Militants, above n 4, 151-153. 
21 For a useful overview, see: Tom Sheridan, ‘Labour v. Labor: The Victorian Metal Trades Dispute of 
1946-47’ (1973) 24 Labour History 176. 
22 As an example of the fact that the Court was sometimes forced to sacrifice principle for pragmatism, 
moves to settle the dispute occurred despite the fact that the unions were still on strike, a break with 
established industrial precedent.  Such a development was an almost perfect example of the recourse to 
administrative practice in times of waxing working-class militancy.  See: Victorian Chamber of 
Manufacturers v Amalgamated Engineering Union (1947) 58 CAR 551, 552. 
23 Metal Trades Margins Case (1947) 58 CAR 1088 (‘1947 Margins Case’). 
24 Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers v Amalgamated Engineering Union (1947) 58 CAR 551; Metal 
Trades Award, 1941 (1947) 59 CAR 1272. 
25 Such was the intensity of the union campaign that Commissioner Mooney was forced to rebuke the Full 
Court for not giving expression to the whole agreement ending the Victorian metals dispute: Ibid 1277-
1278.  See also: ‘Attack on Courts’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 18 November 1947, 15. 
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“metals” emerged as early as 1935,’26 this trend only really became consistent from the 
1947 Margins case onwards.27  Although the Bench stated that the 1947 rulings were ‘in 
settlement of a specific industrial dispute and … of little value as a precedent,’28 Hutson 
maintains that ‘[t]he 1947 Margins Case on the Metal Trades Award took on the 
character of a national test case … because the increases eventually flowed to other 
awards.’29  Despite their desire to prevent flow-on to other sectors, the Court was forced 
to acknowledge after the case that ‘by consent and by adjudication, the metal trades 
marginal increases are beginning to percolate into other industries.’30 
The case was something of a prototype for the pattern of margins determinations that 
would follow in the 1950s and 1960s.  The participants in the hearing were still only the 
metal unions and metal employers, a situation that was to change drastically in future 
cases as their national significance was acknowledged.  Moreover, the case represented 
a hybrid in terms of the grounds upon which marginal increases were granted.  Whereas 
in a 1937 case evidence of a general economic recovery was regarded as inappropriate 
in the fixation of metal margins,31 the 1947 hearings evinced a different methodology, 
whereby both the economic capacity of the metals sector and the capacity of industry 
generally were to considered in the fixation of marginal rates in the Metal Trades 
Award.32  This melding of the fortunes of the metals sector with industry at large was a 
key moment in the institutional entrenchment of the former as a lead-sector, a 
crystallisation that would be completed by the 1954 Margins Case.33 
The 1952 Margins Case34 served as a mid-wife to the momentous 1954 case.  Although 
it did not yet formally unify the capacity of the metal trades sector with that of industry 
generally, Hancock notes that considerations of the macroeconomic impact of marginal 
                                                          
26 Keith Hancock and Sue Richardson, 'Economic and Social Effects' in Joe Issac and Stuart MacIntyre 
(eds), The New Province for Law and Order: 100 Years of Australian Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 139, 183. 
27 For example, marginal improvements gained in the metal trades in 1937 were not generally followed in 
other awards: Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners of Australia v Thomas WM Anthony 
(1940) 42 CAR 472, 475.  See also: Hancock, above n 13, 153. 
28 1947 Margins Case 58 CAR 1088, 1092. 
29 J. Hutson, Six Wage Concepts (Amalgamated Engineering Union, 1971) 157. 
30 Carpenters and Joiners Award, 1946 (1948) 59 CAR 957, 959.  Also see the account of Commissioner 
Galvin in Metal Trades Margins Case (1952) 73 CAR 324, 345 (‘1952 Margins Case’). 
31 Metal Trades Employers Association v Amalgamated Engineering Union and also Amalgamated 
Engineering Union v Adastra Airways Ltd (1937) 37 CAR 176, 182. 
32 1947 Margins Case 58 CAR 1088, 1090. 
33 Metal Trades Margins Case (1954) 80 CAR 3 (‘1954 Margins Case’). 
34 1952 Margins Case (73) CAR 324. 
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adjustments were determining factors.35   It was also conducted with the air of a national 
test case.36  Commissioner Galvin, although not actually awarding marginal increases in 
the event,37 remarked of the nature of the proceedings: 
It has been said on numerous occasions … that, to an extent, the principles laid 
down in the Metal Trades Award, form the pattern for quite a large number of 
other awards.  What transpired in the case of other awards subsequent to the then 
Full Court’s decision of 1947 amply bears that out, and that being so it is evident 
that these proceedings do take on something in the nature of an economic 
inquiry in miniature.  In brief, the ultimate determination of this dispute is … 
one fraught with possible grave consequences not only to the Metal industry but 
to all industries (my emphasis).38 
 
Galvin also traced the development of the fitter as the standard skilled employee when 
comparing inter-award marginal relativities, which was indicated in chapter 5.  Again, it 
is worth quoting him at length: 
[F]or many years past, first the members of the Court and later Conciliation 
Commissioners have adopted the practice of treating the rate of pay prescribed 
for the general engineering fitter as the focal point or yardstick upon which to 
measure the rates of other skilled tradesmen, and to relate thereto the services of 
the semi-skilled and unskilled class of workers … That has been proved time 
and time again, and there is no more recent exemplification of it than what 
happened subsequent to the Full Court’s 1947 Metal Trades decision, where 
notwithstanding the clear pronouncement that it was designed to cover the 
special circumstances of the Metal Trades Industry, it was quickly imported into 
the awards of most other industries.39 
 
The recognition that gains won in the Metal Trades Award tended to diffuse to industry 
generally, elucidated so clearly by Galvin,40 underlay the momentous 1954 Margins 
Case.41  The Arbitration Court (in what was to be its last major margins case before 
                                                          
35 Hancock, above n 13, 154. 
36 Hutson notes that ‘there was a big increase in the participants to 16 metal unions, 4 white-collar unions, 
8 employer organisations, 6 individual major employers, 3 State Governments, and 11 State 
Instrumentalities’: Hutson, above n 29, 157. 
37 Sheridan, Mindful Militants, above n 4, 186.  Metal union disgust was palpable.  See, for example: 
‘Unions’ Reactions On Margins’, West Australian (Perth), 18 January 1952; ‘Metal trade unions seeking 
£5 margin’, The Advocate (Burnie), 13 May 1952, 2. 
38 1952 Margins Case (1952) 73 CAR 324, 340. 
39 Ibid 345. 
40 Ibid. 
41 1954 Margins Case (1954) 80 CAR 3. 
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being reconstituted as the Arbitration Commission in 1956)42 understandably reasoned 
that if Metal Trades Award decisions were going to have macro-level significance, it 
followed that the capacity of the national economy should be the determining feature in 
the fixation of metal margins.  It stated of the skilled employee: 
[W]e cannot overlook the fact that any increase in his margin is likely to have 
some reflection in the marginal rates of other skilled employees not in this 
industry.  It is particularly because of this fact that in making any increase for 
the skilled employee we have anxiously considered the state of the economy.43 
 
In determining whether or not the economy could bear the cost of increased marginal 
payments, the Court marshalled data on rural production and productivity, investment 
levels, employment and the state of secondary industry, little of which had to do with 
the metals sector specifically.44  When requisite economic capacity had been 
ascertained, the principles of comparative wage-justice ensured that the margins thus 
determined flowed through the award structure at large.45  The case, whilst building on 
the 1947 and 1952 decisions, represented a hitherto unprecedented entrenchment of the 
Metal Trades Award at the pinnacle of the award structure.  From now on, the capacity 
of the metal trades and the capacity of the national economy were regarded as 
synonymous.  The fact that this position of paramountcy was buttressed by powerful 
and generally militant metal unions ensured that the wage and conditions ‘inputs’ 
provided by their struggle found ready-made institutional channels through which to 
diffuse. 
The pattern set by this critical 1954 case was followed with only minor variations until 
the 1967 Total Wage Case46 and the 1967 Metal Trades Work Value Inquiry.47  The 
1959 Margins Case48 introduced a qualification into the use of general economic 
capacity as a guide for setting marginal rates in the Metal Trades Award, arguing that 
the economic position of particular industries could be a factor to be taken into account 
in the fixing of margins where capacity was greater or less than the economy 
                                                          
42 A result of the High Court decision that the Court could not wield both executive and judicial power: R 
v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254.  
43 1954 Margins Case (1954) 80 CAR 3, 32. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid 53. 
46 National Wage Cases (1967) 118 CAR 655. 
47 Metal Trades Award (re Work Value Inquiry) (1967) 121 CAR 587 (‘Work Value Case’). 
48 Metal Trades Margins Case (1959) 92 CAR 793 (‘1959 Margins Case’). 
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generally.49  However, it then proceeded to find that this was not the case with the 
metals industry, whose capacity (not by accident) was taken as analogous to the 
economy at large.50  Another margins hearing in 196351 reiterated the principle, adding: 
‘[i]n our view it is proper … to ascertain if there has been any increase in economic 
capacity in the Metal Trades industry and if that increase has occurred in a context  of 
increased capacity in industry generally.’52  Given the difficulty in making this 
comparison, however, the relationship between the two was essentially assumed, with 
evidence of widespread overtime, over-award payments and a lack of employer dissent 
to the contrary taken as proof ‘that by and large, the economic capacity of the Metal 
Trades industry is certainly not less than and probably more than that of industry 
generally.’53   
The 1963 Margins Case represents the institutional highpoint of the Metal Trades 
Award.  Although conceptually distinct, the capacity of the metal trades and the 
economy generally were in practice unified.  The industrial capacity of the nation was 
thus refracted through the prism of the Metal Trades Award; once so refracted, it could 
flow through the award structure, lubricated by the ideology of comparative wage 
justice elucidated in chapter 5.  The Metal Trades Award was the nexus of this ideology, 
certainly for blue-collar workers and, in many instances, their white-collar brethren.  
Commissioner O’Reilly, in discussing the utility of the metal trades fitter as an 
industrial measuring rod, summed it up best: 
It seems elementary that some standard or measuring rod is indispensable in any 
measuring assignment.  The adequacy of any wage or salary cannot be 
meaningfully assessed unless it is considered in relation to other wages or 
salaries.  This seems just as fundamental whether the jobs concerned have 
common features or not (my emphasis).54 
 
                                                          
49 Ibid 803-804. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Metal Trades Margins Case (1963) 102 CAR 138 (‘1963 Margins Case’). 
52 Ibid 143. 
53 Ibid 146. 
54 Furnishing Trades Award, 1964 in C.P. Mills and E.G.A. Lambert (eds), Australian Industrial Law 
Review, vol 10(32) (23 November 1968) ¶461.  
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Despite often repeating a stock-standard assertion that decisions concerning the metal 
trades were not meant to automatically apply to other industries,55 the award framework 
as it evolved in the 1950s and 1960s came to be dominated by the Metal Trades Award.  
Aside from the crucial role it played in margins determinations, it was also the vehicle 
for Basic Wage claims; that is, the Commission formally altered the Basic Wage in the 
Metal Trades Award, which was regarded as a decision of general application.56  
Moreover, it was an important test award for the introduction of new standards of 
employment, such as provision for three weeks annual leave.57  From no more an 
authoritative source than the President of the Commission, Sir Richard Kirby, came the 
admission that the metal trades industry acted as a ‘guide-liner or trend-setter for wages 
and working conditions.’58  In short, it helped institutionalise the metals sector as an 
archetypal Fordist lead-sector and facilitated the performance of its functions in this 
role;59 as I stated in chapter 5, the reality of flow-on exerted a strong homogenising 
impact on the wage structure60 at the same time as a ‘standardized award structure’ was 
produced.61 
It is vital to note, however, that this position of industrial gravity was not achieved nor 
perpetuated by the institutions of arbitration alone.  As seen in chapter 4, this period of 
institutional ascendency was based on the waxing of the manufacturing sector generally 
within Australian capitalism.  In 1957-1958, there were some 1,073,807 people 
employed in what the-then Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics dubbed 
‘industrial classes,’ of whom approximately 42.8% (459,345) were classified as 
working in ‘industrial metals, machines and conveyances’ (in short, the metals sector).62  
Over the same period, manufacturing engaged on aggregate a massive 38.3% of wage 
                                                          
55 See, for example: 1947 Margins Case (1947) 58 CAR 1088, 1092; 1963 Margins Case (1963) 102 
CAR 138, 154. 
56 Hutson, above n 29, 8. 
57 R. E. McGarvie, ‘Principle and Practice in Commonwealth Industrial Arbitration after Sixty Years’ 
(1964) 1(1) Federal Law Review 47, 66-67. 
58 Richard Kirby, ‘Preface’ in Norman Dufty, Industrial Relations in the Australian Metal Industries 
(West Publishing Corporation, 1972) v. 
59 Without using the terms deployed here, Plowman comes close to this understanding when he states of 
wages flow-on that ‘[t]he Metal Trades Award served this function admirably’: David Plowman, 
‘Industrial Relations and the Legacy of New Protection’ (1992) 34(1) Journal of Industrial Relations 48, 
58.  See also: Bede Healey, Federal Arbitration in Australia: An Historical Outline (Georgian House, 
1972) 37. 
60 See, for example: H. F. Lydall, 'The Dispersion of Employment Incomes in Australia' (1965) 41(96) 
Economic Record 549. 
61 Dunphy and Wright, above n 8, 71. 
62 Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Year Book Australia 1960 (1301.0, No. 46, 1960) 161. 
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and salary earners in civilian employment.63  We can thus say that in this period, 
employees engaged in the metal trades accounted for 16.4% of total civilian 
employment.64  It was also in the late 1950s and early 1960s that manufacturing as a 
contributor to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) peaked, at just under 30%.65  
Manufacturing in Australia was thus as large and significant, in relative terms, as it was 
ever to be, and within this the metals sector constituted the single largest industrial 
group.  The Metal Trades Award was not simply important by dint of its institutional 
position; rather, this was premised on its critical importance within the fabric of 
Australian capitalism. 
Moreover, the success of the union movement in achieving gains in the Metal Trades 
Award and then flowing them on was predicated on the strength of the metal unions 
themselves.  Sheridan recounts at length the success the AEU and other metal unions 
achieved in Basic Wage and margins cases when backed by industrial campaigning and 
the application of ‘plant by plant duress’66 to individual employers.67  The Commission 
itself rather lucidly described union strategy:  
The “militant” approach … was based upon the view that the way to win a case 
before the Commission was, first to develop a major national propaganda 
campaign and make claims on every employer and seek to obtain over-award 
payments by demands backed by the threat of strikes, which should if necessary 
be carried into action.  Application should then be made to the Commission to 
obtain recognition of the established fact.68 
In the absence of such pressure, the Commission proved more recalcitrant and hesitant 
to effect timely change.  This reality would become of crucial importance as union 
power began to degrade through the 1980s. 
 
                                                          
63 Ibid 453-454.  This figure excludes rural wage earners, female domestic servants and defence force 
personnel.  It is also worth noting the figure has to be taken with some caution, as at this stage it included 
employees engaged in the selling and distribution of metals products. 
64 Sheridan adds that factory employment in the metal trades grew by 58% between 1953-54 and 1967-68, 
outstripping the 34% growth in total factory employment over the same period.  The growth of consumer 
durables production was a particularly important stimulus to this growth: Sheridan, Mindful Militants, 
above n 4, 266. 
65 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia 2012 (1301.0 No. 92, 2012) 510. 
66 Peter Cochrane, 'Doing Time' in Verity Burgmann and Jenny Lee (eds), Making A Life: A People's 
History of Australian Since 1788 (McPhee Gribble/Penguin Books, 1988) 177-193. 
67 Sheridan, Mindful Militants, above n 4, 282-291.   
68 National Wage Cases of 1965 (1965) 110 CAR 189, 261. 
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Total Wage and Work Value – Attempted institutional dislocation and 
industrial militancy 
As seen in chapter 5, capital came to resent the ‘shunters law’69 set in motion by the 
metal trades and resented the identification of metal trades margins with the capacity of 
the wider economy, with employers feeling that unions were getting two bites at the 
wage cherry through using national capacity to buttress both Basic Wage and margins 
claims.70  Despite the functionality of the system for the overall coherence of antipodean 
Fordism, capital, governed by the corrosive laws of competition, often loses sight of the 
forest for the trees.  A feeling that organised labour had the upper hand, along with the 
Commission supporting the trade union sponsored ‘prices and productivity’ method of 
adjusting the Basic Wage,71 convinced leading employer organisations that a change of 
tack towards the whole system of wage determination was necessary.72 
The first attempts to disrupt the paramountcy of the Metal Trades Award were part of 
this broader effort to effect change in the methodology of the Commission.  In chapter 5 
I outlined the history of the employer’s desire for a ‘Total Wage,’ whereby the two-part 
Basic Wage and margins structure would be replaced by a single wage which would 
embrace both.  After introducing the concept in 1964,73 it took only three years for the 
Commission to come around to the employer’s point of view and jettison what had been 
the bedrock of wage fixation since 1907 in favour of the Total Wage.74  Although 
characterised by Justice Moore as ‘no more than a procedural change,’75 the Total Wage 
concept bore within itself the ability to minimise the importance of metal trades 
decisions.76  Indeed, Hawke noted that ‘while the present total wage system operates the 
only automatic flow to other awards of decisions made under the Metal Trades Award 
                                                          
69 Keith Stewart quoted in Hutson, above n 29, 142-143. 
70 See, for example: ‘Employers Open Wage Case’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 22 April 1964, 3/16; 
Ron Brown, ‘New Wage Structure-The Challenge’ (1967) 8 Australian Left Review 15, 17-18. 
71 Whereby price increases were taken into account in annual Basic Wage cases, whilst broader increases 
in productivity were to be factored in during reviews every three or four years.  See: Basic Wage Case 
(1961) 97 CAR 376.  
72 Hutson, above n 29, 256-260; Peter Long, ‘Total wage: What does it mean’, Canberra Times 
(Canberra), 16 July 1966, 14/28. 
73 Employers’ Total Wage Case 1964 (1964) 106 CAR 683. 
74 For a particularly cutting critique of the Commission’s backflip, see: Brown, above n 70, 16-17.  
75 Basic Wage, Margins and Total Wage Cases of 1966 (1966) 115 CAR 93, 188. 
76 Dufty, above n 58, 129. 
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will be in respect of decisions in annual national wage cases.’77  The formal abolition of 
margins, combined with the centrality of the Metal Trades Award in their 
determination, heightened this potential.   
The primacy of the metal trades was also threatened somewhat by a huge work value 
inquiry over 1966-1967, the first in over thirty years.78  It was a curious twist of fate that 
the structural basis of margins fixation in federal awards escaped work value analysis 
for such a long time, with Commissioner Winter noting that comparative evaluation of 
the work processes ‘within the framework and scope of the Metal Trades Award has 
been allowed to remain perennially within the rigid time capsule of the decade of the 
1920s.’79  Over the objections of both employers and unions,80 the Commission initiated 
an inquiry on its own accord.  After an exhaustive process of workplace inspections and 
hearings, it determined that the work value of employees (particularly tradesmen) in the 
metal trades had grown in a context of deep technological innovation81 and granted 
substantial marginal rises.   
In granting the increases, however, the Commission made two critical, inter-related 
qualifications, one conceptual and the other practical, which both threatened the 
position of the Metal Trades Award as a pace-setter and upset the industrial relations of 
the sector generally.  The first was the stated desire to avoid flow-on to other sectors.  
Although similar statements had been made in previous cases, they were largely token 
and undermined by the identification of metal trade capacity with the capacity of the 
national economy.  This inquiry, however, was qualitatively distinct from the margins 
cases which had come before, in that the primary consideration was not abstract 
economic capacity, but the actual work value content of eleven pilot classifications 
within the Metal Trades Award.  In this context, the following statement of the 
Commission assumed a new weight: 
                                                          
77 R. J. Hawke, ‘Total Wage-An Analysis’ (1968) 3(1) Federal Law Review 86, 114. 
78 Work Value Case (1967) 121 CAR 587. 
79 Metal Trades Award, 1952 (1966) 114 CAR 39, 66. 
80 Hutson, above n 29, 171-176. 
81 Of particular note is the argument of many employers that technological change tended towards the 
simplification and de-skilling of labour, thus reducing its real value.  For the opposite reason, unions 
tended to argue that the greater complexity of the labour process and the new machines workers were 
expected to operate raised the real value of labour.  Both, however, appear agreed on the intensification of 
labour and the link between the diffusion of new technologies and mass production techniques, the 
essence of the antipodean Fordist labour process. See: Work Value Case (1967) 121 CAR 587. 
 
 
223 
We also emphasise that this is not a case in which increases in wage rates for the 
metal trades sets a pattern for wages in other industries.  The increases which we 
would grant … relate solely to employees working under clause 4 of the Metal 
Trades Award and do not constitute a reason for awarding wage increases to 
employees covered by other awards or working in other industries.82 
 
Combined with this stated desire to minimise the pace-setting role of the Metal Trades 
Award83 was the Commission’s invitation to employers to ‘absorb’ the wage-rises 
granted out of existing over-award payments.  In other words, an employer already 
paying a $6.00 over-award would only have to grant a $1.40 increment to tradesmen to 
fulfil the $7.40 increase ordered by the Commission.84  Given the comparatively 
generous nature of the wage-rises given, metal employers and their organisations (such 
as the Metal Trades Employers’ Association) needed no encouragement and, unlike 
previous margins cases, made a concerted effort to enforce absorption. 
The result was the monumental absorption struggle of early 1968.  Metal unions 
embarked upon a series of rolling strikes, with the first six weeks of 1968 witnessing 
some 400 stoppages.85  Judge Dunphy noted of the fracas: ‘Never before, in my 
memory, have employers had more reason to fear industrial disruption of a grand scale 
than is now in evidence before us in New South Wales.’86  Despite the levying of tens 
of thousands of dollars in fines for breaches of bans clauses87 and the imposition of 
what amounted to a blanket no-strike order,88 the union campaign was almost 
completely victorious, with the Commission stating, ‘[i]t appears to all of us that 
                                                          
82 Ibid 594. 
83 Indeed, Justice Moore had spoken of how no single award should ‘tower above all others’: Justice 
Moore quoted in Dufty, above n 58, 134. 
84 Seeing as though the level of existing over-awards closely matched the work value increases, this 
effectively meant much of the metal trades workforce would get next to nothing: Tom Bramble, Trade 
Unionism in Australia: A history from flood to ebb tide (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 41. 
85 Ibid 42. 
86 Metal Trades Award in C.P. Mills and E.G.A. Lambert (eds), Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 
10(3) (17 February 1968) ¶28. 
87 Over $100,000 of fines were levied on unions in 1968, representing ‘one-third of all the fines imposed 
over the last eighteen years’: A. E. Woodward, ‘A Review of Industrial Relations 1968/9’ (1969) 11(2) 
Journal of Industrial Relations 89. 
88 Ibid; Bramble, above n 84, 42; Michael Richardson, ‘ACTU Takes Metal Row’, The Age (Melbourne), 
9 February 1968, 1. 
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substantial absorption in over award payments of the wage increases recently granted 
has not in this industry been practicable in the existing circumstances.’89   
The defeat of absorption paved the way for powerful currents of flow-on from the metal 
trades decision to other awards.90  Mills, writing in 1968, opined that the flow-on would 
not be automatic, but would nevertheless be extensive.91  A year later, Woodward noted 
that attempts to enforce flow-on had been a major factor in strikes in the building and 
railways industries, and observed that wage increases were being awarded on a 
comparative justice, rather than work value, basis.92  He added: 
[S]ince the reasons given for the increases in the metal trades were sufficiently 
general to have application in many other industries, the claim has proved very 
hard to answer.  As more and more industries have fallen more or less into line, 
it has become increasingly difficult for any to be left aside.93 
 
The early efforts to disrupt the place of the metal trades sector and its all-important 
award in the wage fixation structure were thus largely thwarted.  Decisions which 
threatened to usurp the paramount position of the Metal Trades Award were rendered 
ineffective, at least in this period, by a combination of intense industrial militancy on 
the part of metal unions and the continued inability of the Commission to match its 
rhetoric on flow-on with changed practice.  This latter reality was best captured by 
Commissioner O’Reilly when he stated of the 1967-1968 work value increases: 
If I have paid insufficient heed to the strictures of the Metal Trades Bench I am 
not alone.  The Metal Trades increases have by now been reflected substantially 
in other Federal and State awards … Some industries affected have been akin to 
the metal trades industry; in others the affinity has been less apparent (my 
emphasis).94 
 
 
                                                          
89 Metal Trades in C.P. Mills and E.G.A. Lambert (eds), Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 10(7) (23 
March 1968) ¶80.  The best the Commission could do for employers was to stagger the payment of the 
work value increases, with 70 percent payable upfront whilst the remaining 30 percent was deferred until 
the next National Wage Case. 
90 Woodward, above n 87, 93. 
91 C. P. Mills, ‘Legislation and Decisions Affecting Industrial Relations’ (1968) 10(2) Journal of 
Industrial Relations 154, 157. 
92 Woodward, above n 87, 93. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Furnishing Trades Award, 1964 in C.P. Mills and E.G.A. Lambert (eds), Australian Industrial Law 
Review, vol 10(32) (23 November 1968) ¶461. 
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Early 1970s-early 1980s – Institutional exhaustion and economic crisis 
The first real signs of stress in the post-war award hierarchy began to manifest 
themselves in the early 1970s.  Regarding the place of the Metal Trades Award at the 
apex of this structure, two of the biggest developments at this initial stage seem to have 
been the mounting contradictions between the award as a vehicle of general and specific 
interests, introduced in chapter 5, and a change in tactics on the part of employers.  
Regarding the first point, Woodward opined in 1969 that:  
The developments of the last few years seem to have produced the result that 
award wages in the metal trades industry must now lag behind most others.  If 
all increases in the metal trades are to flow elsewhere … and if other industries 
are to receive additional increases periodically, there must be a tendency for 
workers in those other industries to move ahead of the metal trades.95 
 
In other words, the very ascendency of the Metal Trades Award as a tool of industrial 
regulation generally grated against its actual utility for workers employed in the metals 
sector, who sought to make good the shortfall through exacting greater over-award 
payments.96  Commissioner Winter, who was responsible for cases concerning the 
metals sector and had played a key role in the work value inquiry, made a very similar 
observation in 1971.  It is worth quoting him at length: 
For years the trade union movement in particular used the Metal Trades Award 
as a vehicle to seek adjustment of marginal rates but never sought, on an across-
the-board or even upon a division-by-division basis, to have wage rates 
examined by detailed consideration. 
Consequently, while large numbers of employees covered by other awards 
gained steadily and repeatedly by dint of applications for wage increases which 
did not ‘flow back’ to any area of the Metal Trades Award, those covered by the 
latter award remained relatively static.’97 
 
                                                          
95 Woodward, above n 87, 94. 
96 Armed with substantial statistical evidence, Dufty confirmed both that minimum award rates in the 
metal trades were often lower than other manufacturing industries and that substantial over-award 
payments were common in the sector: Dufty, above n 58, 151-194.  Indeed, as early as 1965, Justice 
Kirby noted, ‘I am inclined to think … that over-award payments obtain in the Metal Trades industry to 
such an extent that it is probable that all employees covered by the award are receiving them’: National 
Wage Cases of 1965 (1965) 110 CAR 189, 227. 
97 Metal Trades in C.P. Mills and E.G.A. Lambert (eds), Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 13(14) 
(28 May 1971) ¶278. 
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The intensified impulse to the traditional pattern of unions extracting over-award 
payments dovetailed with metal employers’ desire to diminish the national significance 
attaching to the award98 and to avoid the pitched industrial battle they had lost so badly 
in 1968.99  The result of this confluence of interests was a markedly different approach 
to the determination of what would become the new Metal Industry Award 1971.100  
Unlike previous cases, where respective claims were usually determined by the 
Commission after a protracted process of legal wrangling, both the unions and the Metal 
Trades Industry Association (MTIA)101 agreed to a process of direct negotiation without 
going to arbitration.102 The parties received guidance in the form of conciliation 
hearings before Commissioner Hood, and he made some determinations as to wages and 
conditions, but the interim award he handed down103 had largely been arrived at by 
consent.104  It granted metal industry employees an extra $6.00 per week, and was 
characterised by ‘the speed and lack of acrimony’ with which it was accepted by both 
sides.105  The fact that the pay-rises subsequently flowed-on to many other awards106 
and were not subject to the crucible of a National Wage Case hearing left many 
employers outside of the metal trades angry, with one commentator suggesting that the 
effect of Hood’s decision:  
                                                          
98 David Plowman, ‘Employer Associations: Challenges and Responses’ (1978) 20(3) Journal of 
Industrial Relations 237, 253-254; Frank T. De Vyver, ‘Employers' Associations Developments’ (1972) 
14(4) Journal of Industrial Relations 447, 450. 
99 Hutson, above n 29, 254. 
100 Unlike its predecessor, this Award applied primarily to private-sector employees.  Plowman states that 
‘[t]he rationale for this divide was to reduce public sector inhibitions on changes to employment standard 
in the MIA that still applies to public employers’: David H. Plowman, ‘Awards, Certified Agreements 
and AWAs – Some Reflections’ (Australian Centre for Industrial Relations Research and Teaching, 
Working Paper No. 75, 2002) 13. 
101 Which had come into being in 1970 after an amalgamation of the largely NSW-based Metal Trades 
Employers’ Association and the Metal Industries Association of Victoria.  This concentration of employer 
associations matched similar movements amongst union ranks, particularly the formation of the giant 
Amalgamated Metal Workers’ Union in 1973 from a merger of the AEU, Sheet Metal Workers’ Union 
and the Boilermakers’ and Blacksmiths’ Society.  Such a development reflected both the increasingly 
concentrated and nationally-oriented nature of Australian capitalism and the resource demands of the 
arbitration system, which more and more favoured co-ordinated, research-heavy, submissions to National 
Wage Cases. 
102 Despite the urging of the conservative McMahon government, which was concerned about the threat 
of wage inflation derived from negotiated settlements, not to do so: Commonwealth, Parliamentary 
Debates, Senate, 26 October 1971, 1451 (Arthur Gietzel). 
103 The Metal Industry Interim Award 1971. 
104 Hutson, above n 29, 254; De Vyver, above n 98, 449. 
105 Warwick Bracken, ‘Doubts on future of national wage case’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 10 May 
1972, 25. 
106 See, for example: Carpenters in C.P. Mills and E.G.A. Lambert (eds), Australian Industrial Law 
Review, vol 13(27) (1 October 1971) ¶647; ‘Full Bench gives carpenters $6’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 
29 September 1971, 1; ‘Employers’ Warning National wage cases ‘may be obsolete’’, Canberra Times 
(Canberra), 9 March 1972, 10. 
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[W]as to retain the nexus between movements in the metal trades award and 
other industry awards without giving other employer organisations the benefit of 
being able to oppose the metal unions’ claims as strongly as they might have if 
they had been the subject of a national wage case.107 
The reality of flow-on108 was evidence of the Metal Industry Award’s powerful role and 
entrenched institutional position at the peak of the award system.  However, the shift 
towards negotiated outcomes between metal unions and employers (a movement which, 
from the perspective of the former, was an attempt to redress the contradictions between 
metal awards as a tool of regulation for the sector and as pace-setter generally) took 
place in the context of the general upswing in de facto industry-level bargaining and 
wage rounds described in chapters 4 and 5.   
In such an environment, the aforementioned tendency of the Metal Trades and Metal 
Industry Awards to fall behind wage movements in other industries precisely because of 
its lead sector role was intensified.  Following the same pattern of direct negotiation 
employed in 1970-1971, metal unions and employers came to an agreement for a $15.00 
per week pay rise in May 1974.109  However, only six months later, Justice Moore felt 
compelled to increase rates by a further $9.00 due to large pay rises (usually of the order 
of $20.00 to $25.00 per week)110 granted in 118 awards since April 1974.111  Most 
importantly for the purposes of this thesis, he acknowledged that the judgment was 
recognition of the fact that pay rises in other industries were a threat to the stability of 
the metals sector.112  Crucially, he stated: 
I would emphasise that this is a ‘catching up’ by the Metal Industry Award 
because many other awards have already been varied in excess of $15.00.  This 
is not a spring board from which all other awards should move, even awards 
which may in the past have followed the Metal Industry Award.  The 
circumstances upon which I have acted demonstrate that the significance of the 
                                                          
107 Bracken, above n 105, 25.  See also: ‘Employer unity ‘destroyed’’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 4 
October 1971, 3. 
108 See, for example: National Wage Case 1971-1972 (1972) 143 CAR 290, 298, 302. 
109 Metal Industry Award in C.P. Mills, E.G.A. Lambert and J.G. Carroll (eds), Australian Industrial Law 
Review, vol 16(23) (13 September 1974) ¶565. 
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building workers; ‘Metal workers get $9-a-week rise’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 12 September 1974, 
1. 
111 Metal Industry Award in C.P. Mills, E.G.A. Lambert and J.G. Carroll (eds), Australian Industrial Law 
Review, vol 16(23) (13 September 1974) ¶565. 
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Metal Industry Award as a leader has to some extent declined though (my 
emphasis).113 
 
However, Justice Moore noted that the unions, employers and the state all desired some 
method of wage fixation more stable than that prevailing hitherto, with one possible 
answer being wage indexation.114  With that in mind, he declared, ‘it is my view that a 
firm base must be established before an effective stability in wage fixation can be 
achieved and it is also my view that such stability can be achieved only after there has 
been an increase in this award with any proper consequent flow’ (my emphasis).115  In 
other words, despite his recognition of the fact that the current proceedings stemmed 
from wage pressures originating elsewhere in the economy, he nevertheless realised that 
the stability of the award framework still rested largely on the Metal Industry Award 
retaining its benchmarking function. 
This confusing position, whereby an increasingly pluralistic industrial reality sat 
uneasily with the entrenched institutional position of metals atop the award pyramid, 
persisted throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s.  The pattern increasingly came 
to be that forward movements in other awards116 were used to buttress metal industry 
claims (which often took the form of negotiated agreements such as consent awards), 
which then flowed through to other segments of the economy.  In a sense, this 
represented something of a hybrid system, whereby the actual economic steam of the 
metals sector was diminished but its institutionalised lead-sector role nevertheless 
remained profound.  On the one hand, in 1975, the Commission was noting that the 
Metal Industry Award’s influence had ‘diminished’ and that its influence as a pace-
setter had been tarnished by recent events, including the upswing in rates in other 
awards.117  At a 1977 metal industry conference, both employers and unions ‘agreed 
that the metal trades had not for some years been pace-setters in wage levels.’118  This 
                                                          
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 During this period, more areas of the employment field came under the jurisdiction of the federal 
Commission, which further threatened the leading role of the Metal Trades Award and its successors: L. 
G. Matthews, 'Drafting of Federal Awards' (1970) 12(3) Journal of Industrial Relations 306. 
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development was not necessarily seen as a bad one; indeed, Australian Council of Trade 
Unions (ACTU) President Bob Hawke had commented in 1974 that ‘it might be of 
more benefit to the metal-trades unions if they were gradually phased out as the 
yardstick on awards.’119   
On the other hand, however, was the continued industrial aggression of the metal 
unions120 and the durability of comparative wage justice claims that took as their 
departure point the Metal Industry Award.  An event demonstrating both forces in 
action was the granting of a catch-up wage increase to General Motors Holden 
employees to bring them in line with the Metal Industry Award standard.121  Although 
there was a historic nexus between metal awards and those governing the automobile 
industry, the claims for flow-on were strengthened by what Commissioner Clarkson 
dubbed ‘guerilla tactics,’ such as the imposition of overtime bans.122  In the context of 
general union strength, industrial militancy could force the hand of the Commission 
regarding flow-on even where it was reluctant to grant it. 
Perhaps the best demonstration of the contradictory position of the metal trades as a 
lead sector in the increasingly dysfunctional antipodean Fordist model of development 
was the wage explosion of the early 1980s.  In chapter 5 I noted how the rise of work 
value claims represented a return to the industry-level collective bargaining of the early 
to mid-1970s.  In keeping with the pattern that had developed in that earlier period, the 
initial impulses towards higher wages appear to have largely arisen outside the context 
of the metals sector.  Plowman noted that ‘with the decline in the manufacturing sector's 
bargaining power, the pace setting role has been taken over by the road transport and 
warehousing industry awards.’123   In particular, work value cases in the waterside, 
warehousing and transport industries had awarded large wage increases to workers 
employed therein.124   
                                                          
119 ‘Metal workers get $9-a-week rise’, above n 110, 1. 
120 In 1975, for example, of the approximate 1.74 million working days lost in manufacturing industry 
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122 Ibid. 
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In the wake of the collapse of indexation, the ACTU pledged to an industry-by-industry 
campaign to lift wages.125  In an affirmation of the continuing relevance of the industrial 
clout of the metal unions, they were the first off the block in following the ACTU 
Congress’ determination,126 and reached a consent award with the MTIA that was 
ratified by the Commission in December 1981.  It provided, amongst other things, a 
$25.00 a week wage increase to the fitter (with proportionate rises to other 
classifications) and a reduction in the work week from 40 to 38 hours.127  The hours 
issue was particularly crucial, in that it represented a qualitative step forward for a 
general movement towards shorter hours, a movement which less than six months 
earlier had been in low waters after the Commission rejected a metal union claim for a 
35-hour week.128   
Another sense in which the Commission’s decision was critical was the reasoning 
behind it.  Although the Commission was by this time increasingly being subsumed by 
the economistic logic surrounding its institutional intensification, it and the parties 
coming before it remained beholden to certain norms and understandings, among them 
the centrality of the Metal Industry Award.  As was the case in late 1974, part of the 
justification for increases in the metal award was ‘movements in wage rates and 
conditions of employment in other industries’;129 in other words, a reversal of the 
typical post-World War II chain of causality.  On the other hand, the durability of the 
institutionalised channels linking the Metal Industry Award to others within the award 
framework was proven once again, in what was to be the last iteration of the typical 
antipodean Fordist process of flow-on.  The Commission accepted that there would be 
some flow consequent upon their decision to ratify the consent award between metal 
unions and the MTIA.130  Indeed, its continued de facto recognition of the legitimacy of 
the metal trades as a pace-setter was revealed by the reasoning underlying the 
ratification of a consent award between the Transport Workers’ Union (TWU) and the 
Australian Road Transport Federation only a few days after the metal industry 
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agreement.131  Multiple attempts by the TWU to have the Commission enforce the 
agreement were rejected on a number of grounds, including the fact that granting 
transport workers the wage increase would generate strong pressures for flow-on to 
other awards.132  However, the approval of the metal industry consent award threw the 
TWU’s claim in a new light.  The Commission in a sense expressed its own inability to 
control wage rates generally when it stated that ratification ‘would merely be expressing 
in an award a standard already in existence and accepted by the parties as 
appropriate.’133  Even more importantly, the Commission noted the variation to the 
Metal Industry Award and acknowledged ‘[a] $20 wage increase in the Transport 
Workers Award, 1972 could no longer be said to provide the basis for setting the pace 
for pay increases generally.’134  In other words, despite the wage pressures emanating 
therefrom, the Commission was not prepared to make a determination that would 
establish the transport sector as an institutionalised pace-setter.  Once the metal industry 
agreement had confirmed the metal trades in its historical position as the leader, 
however, the federal tribunal was open to granting the transport workers’ claims. 
The 1981 Metal Industry Award case would be the last turn of the traditional flow-on 
wheel, the final cycle of a process that, while once insuring the coherence of antipodean 
Fordism, had become dysfunctional.  The flow-on was strong, with what was dubbed 
the ‘metal industry standard’135 setting the parameters for a large number of awards in 
both the federal and state jurisdictions.136  In a major case involving car manufacturers 
Ford and General Motors-Holden, the employers claimed (rightly, in view of the 
Commission’s decision) ‘that there is overwhelming certainty that the metal trades 
settlement, once approved by the commission, will flow to all of the companies whom 
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we surveyed.’137  Mulvey notes that within a mere two month period after the December 
metals case, ‘it was estimated by both the ACTU and the Commonwealth that around 20 
per cent of all employees have received wage increases in line with those provided for 
in the Metal Industry Agreement.’138  Moreover, by the end of 1982 the metal industry 
standard of the 38-hour week had flowed through to two-thirds of the workforce.139  As 
was so often the case in the history of the federal tribunal, it too was forced to 
acknowledge the impact of the metal trades increases in the context of the 1983 
National Wage Case, set against the backdrop of ‘the worst economic recession since 
the 1930s.’140  Amongst the factors the Commission deemed responsible for the crisis 
was ‘[t]he sharp increase in labour costs’141 which had ‘resulted from general increases 
in pay and reductions in hours since the end of indexation flowing principally from the 
metal industry agreements of December 1981.’142 
The downturn of 1982 signalled the end of the post-war award hierarchy dominated by 
the metal award.  The fact that the Commission itself partially blamed the structure of 
flow-on for the crisis was significant in that it dovetailed with the demands of 
employers and the state (outlined in chapters 5 and 6) to bring an end to the wage 
rounds which the Metal Industry Award brought into effect.  A 1983 South Australian 
decision refusing increases to shop assistants on the basis of the metal industry standard 
was prophetic in its trenchant attack on the system of comparative wage justice centred 
on the metal trades: 
The fact that some other, totally different, employees receive an increase does 
not mean that everyone else in the work force is similarly entitled – the more so 
when non-tradesmen rates are sought to be equated or aligned in some manner 
with those paid to tradesmen.  The “me too” syndrome is the cancer in industrial 
relations which inevitably produces a leapfrogging effect which is detrimental to 
all and self defeating in the long term.143 
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Such a statement represents in essence an attack upon one of the central planks of 
antipodean Fordism’s mode of regulation and its mechanisms of coherence. 
1980s-1990s – The Accord and enterprise bargaining 
As explained in chapter 4, from the mid-1970s onwards, the manufacturing sector 
entered a period of decline from which it has never since recovered.  The metal industry 
was struck particularly hard.  In just three years, from November 1973 to November 
1976, nearly 100,000 jobs were lost in Australian factories.144  In the 1980s this process 
of dissolution went critical.  Plowman, drawing upon Metal Trades Federation of 
Unions (MTFU) figures, states, ‘[b]etween 1981 and 1983 nearly 100,000 jobs were lost 
in the metal and engineering sector.’145  The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 
although providing slightly different figures, similarly traces a dramatic decline.  
Whereas in 1979-1980 basic metals, fabricated metal products, transport and other 
machinery equipment sub-sectors employed some 499,404 people,146 by 1983-1984 this 
had declined to 415,364.147  Of the four metal trade sub-sectors just mentioned, the first 
two experienced only a very modest growth in gross product (at average 1983-1984 
prices) from 1981/1982 to 1990/1991, whilst the latter two declined absolutely.148   
The increasing disintegration of the Australian metals sector exerted a profound 
influence on the developments in the award framework in the 1980s, most specifically 
through convincing the metal unions to sign on to the Accord,149 the history of which 
was traced in chapter 6.  Given both the success and the historically entrenched 
character of post-World War II metal union tactics in securing over-award payments, 
the system of wage indexation represented by the Accord should prima facie have been 
repugnant to them.  Earlier attempts to impose Accord-like measures, such as no-strike 
clauses, had been roundly rejected by metal workers,150 whilst the 1976 Amalgamated 
Metal Workers’ Union (AMWU) national conference had declared that ‘[a]ll awards, 
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whether arrived at by consent, negotiation or agreement, must always leave our 
members free to struggle around their economic and social demands, including over-
award payments and conditions.’151  Moreover, the metal industry agreement of 1981 
had proven the coup de grâce of the Fraser’s government’s failed experiment with wage 
indexation.   
The severe economic crisis in the metal sector, the fundamentally nationalist character 
of the Australian left (which was strongly represented among the metal unions’ 
leadership) and the opportunity the Accord provided the union officialdom to wrest 
control from more militant rank-and-file groups,152 profoundly altered the attitude of the 
Amalgamated Metal Workers’ and Shipwrights’ Union (AMWSU)153 and other metal 
unions to an incomes policy with an ALP government.154  The wave of redundancies in 
the early 1980s meant that ‘[m]any former shopfloor militants were demoralised and 
became more open to the conservative argument that a continued wages push would 
simply exacerbate unemployment.’155  Against this backdrop, the Accord’s pledge to 
simultaneously control both wages and inflation in such a way as to hopefully restore 
full employment appeared attractive.156  Moreover, as seen in chapter 6, the Accord, in 
its original ‘Mark I’ format, was a wide-ranging document in which a wages policy was 
buttressed by a variety of other initiatives attractive to manufacturing unions in 
particular, such as industry planning, new occupational health and safety institutions, 
and the maintenance of industrial protection.157  The emphasis the Accord placed on 
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tripartite institutions of macroeconomic standing was significant in buying the support 
of left-wing unions like the AMWSU, who got the impression (or, as it turned out, the 
illusion) that they would be involved in determining the future course of Australian 
capitalism in a meaningful way.158   
Despite the seemingly logical reasons for which the ACTU struck an incomes policy, 
and bearing in mind the conviction seemingly shared by unions and metal employers 
that something had to be done to stem the developing crisis in that sector, the Accord 
inflicted enormous damage on organised labour generally, and on metal unions 
specifically.  These had the most to gain from employing their industrial muscle to grab 
what they could from capital.  By restricting wage-claims to the rate of inflation, the 
Accord applied a straitjacket to unions in the metals sector, disrupting their historical 
pattern of mobilisation, choking shop-floor organisation,159 and making them complicit 
in what amounted to large real-wage decreases for their members.160  Most importantly 
for my purposes, the Accord almost completely destroyed the pattern of metal sector 
flow-on and the hierarchy of awards and, with them, one of the central planks in 
antipodean Fordism’s mode of regulation. 
That this development was not merely incidental, but rather was a central purpose of the 
Accord, can be gleaned easily enough from the text of the agreement itself.  In speaking 
of the effort to maintain and improve living standards, the ACTU accepted (as noted in 
chapter 6) that ‘[t]he achievement of this goal via an incomes and prices policy 
approach will require a suppression of sectional priorities and demands’ (my 
emphasis).161  The document further provided that ‘[b]oth parties recognise that if the 
essential conditions of the centralised system are met that there shall be no extra claims 
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except where special and extraordinary circumstances exist’ (my emphasis).162  
‘Suppression of sectional priorities and demands’163 and ‘no extra claims’:164 these 
together represented a repudiation of the antipodean Fordist pattern of flow-on centred 
on the metal trades which, although sectional in origin, achieved general application.   
The practical result of this commitment was that a generally militant rank-and-file 
movement, well-schooled in the application of industrial pressure to obtain over-award 
payments, had to be restrained by the leadership of metal unions.   Bramble explores 
this in detail, with on-the-job action by militant workers often restrained by union 
leaders enforcing the ‘no extra claims’ provisions of the Accord.165  In the following 
chapter, it will be seen that smaller unions with historical links to metal awards, such as 
the Food Preservers’ Union and the Federated Confectioners’ Association, were sold 
out by the AMWU (in its various incarnations) and the ACTU when they refused to sign 
on to the Accord or attempted to subvert its wage-fixing principles.   
Not only did the Accord disrupt the historical relationship between the leading metal 
award and others within the framework, it also affected the structure and content of the 
Metal Industry Award itself.  In chapter 6 I looked broadly at the unfolding of the 
‘Efficiency and Restructuring’ and ‘Structural Efficiency’ principles in the late 1980s, 
the first attempts to decentralise wage fixation through granting access to ‘second-tier’ 
increases dependent upon industry and/or workplace-level negotiations.  Given the 
desire of the AMWU166 both to ensure the viability of the manufacturing sector and to 
retain some control over the decentralisation process, these principles took the form of 
national-level ‘blueprint’ agreements which were then tailored to the circumstances of 
individual enterprises/workplaces.167  The following chapter on food processing will 
explore concrete examples of just how these efficiency principles changed the structure 
and content of awards.  Suffice it to say here, the parent award was altered in a 
thoroughgoing fashion, with its 340-or-so classifications broad-banded into fourteen 
wage groups, important flexibilities in the use and deployment of labour introduced and 
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restrictive practices removed.168  Most important was the historical reversal of the metal 
trade motive chain; whereas before, the breakthrough in particularly militant ‘hot shops’ 
led to improvements for all metal workers (and from thence, many other employees), 
the movement towards award decentralisation promoted a more insular, inward-looking 
mentality, where, conceptually at least, the weak could be isolated from the gains of the 
strong. 
This mentality became explicit with the movement to enterprise bargaining, which was 
also traced in chapter 6.  It was seen there that left-unions, most particularly the 
AMWU, were growing increasingly restive under the Accord straitjacket, and saw in 
enterprise bargaining a way to return to something resembling the old over-award 
system.  Indeed, in rejecting the April 1991 application for enterprise bargaining, the 
Commission, agreeing with the MTIA (whose memory of the 1981-1982 wages 
explosion was apparently still raw) stated that premature adoption of such a system 
‘would cause a reversion to the wide scale pattern of direct action and leap-frogging of 
wage levels existing prior to 1982.’169  The Commission, along with the MTIA, thus 
feared that the old pattern of flow-on, led by the metal trades, persisted below the 
surface, and required only a change in the institutional environment to resurface.  This 
was a view that appears to have been held by some metal union leaders.  George 
Campbell, former secretary of the AMWU, stated ‘[w]e just couldn’t control a 
centralised wage structure anymore … Because of our delegate structure we’ve always 
had an ability to extract over-award payments.’170  Indeed, MTIA Chief Executive Bert 
Evans came close to describing the same situation from the perspective of capital when 
he stated that enterprise bargaining is really ‘a euphemism for the use of union 
muscle.’171  Even more tellingly, former AMWU Assistant National Secretary Laurie 
Carmichael regarded the movement to enterprise bargaining as simply one iteration of 
the historical flow-on cycle: ‘In the past, we had gone enterprise bargaining-
consolidation, enterprise bargaining-consolidation … we’ll run a campaign and then 
bring it back and make sure the whole class benefits’ (my emphasis).172   
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An over-award campaign by the metal unions in the early 1990s, dovetailing with the 
movement to enterprise bargaining, appeared to many to initially confirm the 
Commission’s suspicions.  In response to the MTIA proposal to make enterprise-based 
payments appendices to the Award (so as to cap pay rises at the industry level),173 the 
Commission declared, ‘[g]iven the coverage of the metal industry award and the 
existence of counterpart state awards, how could flow-on of the increases agreed to in 
those awards be contained to employers working under those awards?’174  As late as 
1992, the MTIA was deeply concerned about the strength of metal unions and their 
ability to win large increases, a belief that underpinned their desire for the Commission 
to retain a central role in determining enterprise agreements through imposition of a 
public interest test.175  Employers in other sectors were still fearful of the spectre of 
pace-setting agreements in the metal trades flowing through industry at large, with 
Confederation of Australian Industry Chief Executive Ian Spicer opining of 4% 
productivity gains being included in the metal award, ‘[i]t is the surest and quickest way 
for pay increases to flow throughout industry.’176  In an interesting link to the later 
chapter on retail, Coles Myer general manager for employee relations Elise Callander 
was in 1991 complaining ‘that the metal trades award is still the locomotive of change, 
setting the standard for other industries.’177 
The views of all these participants, unions, employers and arms of the state, 
demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of the scale of the transformation of the 
economy throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  Unemployment, declining union density, the 
atrophy of rank-and-file organisations and, perhaps most importantly, the increased 
corrosiveness of international competition, had fundamentally weakened the hand of 
organised labour.  The metal sector, and manufacturing more broadly, had continued to 
decline throughout the 1990s and 2000s.  In 1989-1990, 411,700 people were employed 
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in the four sub-sectors that mostly composed the metal trades.178  In 2010-2011, this had 
declined absolutely to 354,100 in the context of a much larger labour force, a decrease 
of approximately 14%.179  This process intensified during the recession of the early 
1990s, which, more so than any other sub-sector, hit basic metals, metal fabrication and 
transport equipment particularly hard, producing a crisis of profitability that helped 
determine the tenor of early enterprise bargaining.180   
Moreover, the rush of the union movement to embrace enterprise bargaining was hasty 
and ill-conceived, premised upon an underestimation of ‘their dependence on the 
existing arbitration system and legislation for their ability to run widespread over-award 
bargaining campaigns.’181  As Peetz has noted, the phenomenon of collective bargaining 
in union ‘hot shops’ spreading to other sectors of the workforce was largely dependent 
upon the architecture of the award system itself.182  Without this institutional buttress, 
enterprise bargaining would tend to promote the increasing intra- and inter-industry 
wage and conditions polarisation observed in the previous chapter and increase the 
tendency towards competition between union and non-union enterprises.183   
In the event, enterprise bargaining and associated legislative changes proved the death 
knell of the antipodean Fordist pattern of flow-on and the notion of comparative wage 
justice that lubricated it.  After enforced stagnation under the Accord, the devolution of 
bargaining to the enterprise level, and the associated degradation of awards as they were 
increasingly recast as a bare-boned minimum safety net, ensured that the differences in 
wage and conditions outcomes between the industrially strong and the weak became 
more pronounced, whilst the general movement was towards ‘a reduction in the power 
of workers and trade unions relative to employers singularly and collectively.’184  Peter 
Tighe, National Secretary of the Communication, Electrical and Plumbing Union and a 
member of the MTFU, noted in 2000 the dramatic impact of enterprise bargaining on 
the conduct of wage cases in the metal industry: 
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What we used to do in past … in the MTFU, we would have a national 
negotiating committee who would meet with the MTIA and the Australian 
Chamber of Manufactures … and negotiate about wages to try to get a consent 
variation to that award.  We’d put to the MTIA that we want, say, $30 a week 
for trade labour, and maybe $25 for non-trades.  They say, ‘nope, you’re not 
going to get it, get stuffed’.  So we would go out and campaign directly 
nationally … we would have a rolling campaign in key companies, and once we 
have commitments from those companies, we’d go back to the MTIA … and 
sometimes the deal would be done … It would be a consent award [so all 
workplaces in the industry would receive the increase gained directly in large 
workplaces], and in a lot of places, there would be a shop rate on that, an over-
award component … The difference is now that you don’t do that.  There are no 
industry negotiations.  It is all enterprise by enterprise … They do not want to 
sit down and have negotiations for a State, or national negotiations, for an 
industry outcome … The AiG185 say, “why should the non-unionised members 
of the MTIA get caught up in an industry outcome when they are quite happy to 
deal directly with their own employees?”.  That’s their view now (my 
emphasis).186  
 
The system just described placed immense strain on all segments of organised labour.187  
Whereas before the militancy of hot shops and a single national campaign could be used 
to force change in an award applying to the majority of metalworkers, now metal unions 
were faced with the necessity of organising, negotiating and concluding a myriad of 
separate agreements.188  Moreover, unlike awards, where unions were prima facie 
respondents to instruments covering workers within the ambit of their rules, the 
Commission determined that unions could only be parties to an enterprise agreement 
where they actually had members employed at the workplace concerned.189  Given the 
fact that, like most sectors, unionisation in the metals sector is most pronounced in large 
firms (with small firms being very difficult to organise),190 this movement helped break 
the potential for flowing-on the gains won in better organised shops to non-union 
counterparts.  
                                                          
185 The Australian Industry Group (AIG), formed by a merger of the MTIA and the Australian Chamber 
of Manufactures in 1998. 
186 Peter Tighe, cited in Mylett, above n 181, 154. 
187 See, for example: David Peetz, ‘The Impacts and Non-Impacts on Unions of Enterprise Bargaining’ 
(2012) 22(3) Labour & Industry 237, 249-250. 
188 A fact recognised by capital.  See, for example: Nicholas Way, ‘Metal Bid Follows a Familiar Pattern’, 
BRW (Australia), 7 November 1994, 32. 
189 Appeal re Morrison Knudsen Corp of Australia Ltd Certified Agreement 1993 in CCH, Australian 
Industrial Law Review, vol 36(12) (16 June 1994) ¶204.  
190 Mylett, above n 181, 157. 
 
 
241 
Changes in the legal framework surrounding enterprise bargaining also played their part 
in destroying the connective tissue binding the industrially strong and weak together.  
As explored in the previous chapter, enterprise bargaining in its formative years had the 
appeal of being all things to all people.  In particular, organised labour perceived in it an 
addendum to what was still a fundamentally collectivist system, seeing union 
involvement in the bargaining process as a necessary prerequisite.191  However, chapter 
6 demonstrated that the actual evolution of the process was one of the enforced 
degradation of awards (a theme of key significance for the chapters on the food 
processing and retail sectors), the fragmentation of bargaining and union difficulties in 
ensuring some kind of uniformity of wage and conditions outcomes.  The confluence of 
these factors ensured that those employees reliant only on awards increasingly fell 
behind those who struck enterprise agreements.192  As Briggs notes, ‘[i]nsulating awards 
from enterprise bargaining was considered essential to avoid another “wage breakout” 
and undoing the relationships established between minimum rate awards under award 
restructuring.’193  Stung by its sidelining at the hands of the ACTU and the ALP 
government, the Commission came onside through the formulation of new wage 
principles governing the relationship between enterprise agreements and awards.  On 
the one hand, it spoke of the necessity of equitable minimum standards implanted in 
awards; on the other, it noted that ‘the stability and viability of those awards can be 
undermined if the disparate outcomes of enterprise bargaining flow back into them’ (my 
emphasis).194  The result, in part, has been described by Mylett: ‘[t]he transmission 
mechanism between successful over-award campaigns and award wage increases was 
broken.’195 
                                                          
191 For a useful formulation of this problem, albeit from a pro-employer perspective, see: Judith Sloan, 
‘The Economic Implications of Enterprise Bargaining’ (1993) 4(1) Economic and Labour Relations 
Review 27. 
192 Chapter 6 provided the statistics proving this state of affairs.  It is also worth noting award rates as a 
percentage of total weekly earnings has trended up somewhat since, a product both of the process of 
creating modern awards and a slower increase in the rate of collective agreement wage increases.  See: 
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Trends Historical Table (14 October 2015) <https://www.employment.gov.au/trends-federal-enterprise-
bargaining>.  
193 Briggs, ‘The Rise and Fall of the ACTU’, above n 149, 313. 
194 Review of Wage Fixing Principles (1993) Print K9700, 14.  
195 Mylett, above n 181, 142. 
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Within the constraints of the early federal legislation, metal unions were more 
successful than most at initially securing better-than-average agreements.  Given the 
role of the AMWU in the transition to enterprise bargaining in the first place, it came as 
no surprise that enterprise agreements in the metals sector were both more numerous 
and higher-paying than in industry at large.196  As mentioned previously, a few high 
profile cases where metal unions were successful in getting large wage increases sent 
shivers through the business community.197  These came, however, in a context of 
increasing dispersion of wage and conditions outcomes, on both the intra- and inter-
industry level.198  In 1996, for example, agreements in the metal manufacturing sector 
provided for wage increases ranging from 8.6% to a miserly 0.7%.199  In 1997, it was 
found that non-union agreements in metals provided average annual wage increases 
nearly 2% lower than union agreements.200  Perhaps even more disturbing was the 
usurpation of the notion of comparative wage justice, which had historically been of 
central importance for metal unions.  As I elucidated above, metal workers, through the 
vehicle of margins cases, had established wage relativities between classifications 
dependent upon skill.  Although these often changed between margins hearings, they 
were broadly stable at any one point in time, a situation that persisted throughout the 
Accord period.201  Enterprise bargaining changed all this.  The Australian Centre for 
Industrial Relations Research and Training observed: 
During the 1980s wage relativities remained almost constant.  In 1983, for 
example, process workers under the Metal Industry Award earned 82 per cent of 
the fitter’s rate, a proportion that remained virtually unchanged in 1991.  In the 
1990s, however, this situation began to change … In the decade from 1986 to 
1995, male trades workers improved their wages by about 56 per cent (in 
nominal terms), but this outcome favoured the more highly paid workers … This 
                                                          
196 For example, in 1994, enterprise agreements covering metal manufacturing provided for an average 
pay rise of 4.3% (compared to an all-industry average of 3.8%), whilst 42% of agreements were 
committed to the development of training programs (much higher than the all-industry average of 27): 
Australian Centre for Industrial Relations Research and Teaching, ‘Agreements Database and Monitor’ 
(Number 3, University of Sydney, 1994) 6-7.   
197 Perhaps the best example is the early success metal unions had in obtaining comparatively large wage 
increases through bargaining with Email, the Australian-based whitegoods manufacturer.  For a useful 
overview of this period, together with employer reactions, see: Rob Lambert, Michael Gillan and Scott 
Fitzgerald, ‘Electrolux in Australia: Reregulation, Industry Restructuring and the Dynamics of 
Bargaining’ (2005) 47(3) Journal of Industrial Relations 261, 266-267. 
198 Mark Davis, ‘More diversity emerges in wage bargaining’, Australian Financial Review (Australia), 
31 March 1995, 12. 
199 Briggs, ‘The Rise and Fall of the ACTU’, above n 149, 321. 
200 Australian Centre for Industrial Relations Research and Training, Australia at Work: Just Managing? 
(Prentice Hall, 1999) 50. 
201 Ibid 79. 
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suggests that as the wages system has decentralised, wages have not risen as 
quickly for the male unskilled as compared to the male skilled.202 
 
The Workplace Relations Act and pattern bargaining 
Metal union apprehension of the danger posed by increasingly fragmented outcomes led 
to a reconsideration of tactics early on in the piece, with an emphasis on re-establishing 
de facto the industry-level negotiations which had been the norm prior to enterprise 
bargaining.  The MTFU, and particularly the AMWU,203 sought to do this through a 
canny campaign of striking similar enterprise agreements with common expiry dates, a 
strategy known as pattern bargaining.204  As early as 1994 this had been flagged as an 
option by the AMWU,205 which cited the use of similar tactics by US auto unions.206  
Two business friendly commentators complained in September 1994 of a metal workers 
campaign: ‘In a strategy similar to the old over-award campaigns before the accord, 
officials are using pattern bargaining – having a wages settlement secured at one plant 
adopted at every plant in the company, irrespective of the needs of each plant – to 
spread wage rises.’207  Capital recognised the goal well enough, with Way noting of the 
attitude of the AMWU to enterprise bargaining: ‘[I]t wants the Metal Industry Award to 
be the core of any agreement, and then to build on this in specific agreements. This is 
why pattern bargaining is so crucial to the union – it allows it to spread the same basic 
conditions across an industry sector or within a diversified company.’208  Of most 
                                                          
202 Ibid. 
203 Which by now was going through a series of name changes reflecting the wave of amalgamations in 
the 1980s and early 1990s.  In 1995 it came to its current title, the Australian Manufacturing Workers 
Union. 
204 John Buchanan et al, ‘Wages and Wage Determination in 1999’ (2000) 42(1) Journal of Industrial 
Relations 109, 130-131.  A United Services Union official describes a typical scene: ‘The metallies would 
bring representatives of the other unions on-site into the negotiations.  They would say to the 
management, “sure, we can negotiate – but here is the agreement we are working from.”  And, of course, 
this agreement was very similar, if not identical, to the agreements being presented at other sites’; 
Interview with NSW United Services Union Official (Wollongong, 2 June 2014). 
205 At this particular time known as the Automotive, Food, Metals and Engineering Union. 
206 David Clark, ‘Challenge of New Industrial Relations’, Australian Financial Review (Australia), 20 
April 1994, 30. 
207 Amanda Gome and Nicholas Way, ‘Wage Fixing’s New Deals’, BRW (Australia), 26 September 1994, 
48. 
208 Way, ‘Metal Bid Follows a Familiar Pattern’, above n 188, 32. 
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concern to employers was that the example of the metal unions was being followed in 
other industries, demonstrating the continued vanguard role played by the former.209  
Pattern bargaining occupied a legal grey area in the early to mid-1990s, which gave 
trade unions the space to achieve some impressive wage outcomes.  The success of 
pattern bargaining, in both metals and non-metals manufacturing,210 is evidenced by the 
acceleration of wage rises provided for by enterprise agreements in the mid to late 
1990s.211  Employer associations, including the MTIA, protested bitterly, petitioning the 
government to amend the Workplace Relations Act 1996 and outlaw the practice.212  
The ACTU, however, which by this point had also come to realise the danger posed by 
the wage and conditions polarity inherent in enterprise bargaining, took heart, and in its 
biennial 1997 Congress endorsed a focus on industry-level bargaining.213  Most 
significantly, Long notes that ‘[u]nions will also seek to channel pay rises won through 
bargaining back into the award system to arrest growing wage disparities.’214  The 
ACTU was thus attempting, in a sense, to re-invent the wheel, recreating the 
‘transmission belt’ whereby the gains of the industrially strong could be passed on the 
weak. 
The Victorian AMWU’s ‘Campaign 2000’ was the most ambitious exercise in pattern 
bargaining yet when swords were crossed in 1999-2000.  The Victorian branch of the 
AMWU, backed by seven other metal unions in the MTFU, sought to impose 
manufacturing sector-wide standards, including 6% annual pay rises, bans on 
contracting out and greater controls over the use of casuals.215  The MTFU had 
                                                          
209 Particularly in the transport and building industries.  See, for example: Nicholas Way, ‘Why TWU is 
going for the jugular’, BRW (Australia), 14 November 1994, 34; Mark Davis, ‘Construction wage talks 
fail’, Australian Financial Review (Australia), 6 September 1995, 5; Bob Mills, ‘Trouble ahead as 
industry struggles with agreements’, Australian Financial Review (Australia), 19 September 1995, 16. 
210 By 1995, the AMWU in its modern form had come about, covering workers from a great many 
manufacturing industries, including metals, vehicle construction, food processing, ship-building and 
white goods.  At this stage, therefore, it becomes more difficult to talk about metals in isolation and the 
story of pattern bargaining must include other sectors covered by the AMWU. 
211 Australian Government Department of Employment, Trends in Federal Enterprise Bargaining, above 
n 192. 
212 Stephen Long, ‘Metals group urges changes’, Australian Financial Review (Australia), 30 May 1997, 
3. 
213 Stephen Long, ‘Wage claims: ACTU goes industry-wide’, Australian Financial Review (Australia), 3 
September 1997, 1. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Nina Field, ‘Look who is trying to set the IR agenda – It’s the men from the manufacturing unions’, 
Australian Financial Review (Australia), 17 June 2000, 24.  As we shall see in the following chapter, 
unions resented the growth of the precarious forms of employment intrinsic to liberal-productivism.  
Where possible they tried to combat it. 
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explicitly declared that one of the objectives of Campaign 2000 was to ‘replace the 
current unfair, piecemeal system of enterprise bargaining with a single genuine 
industry-wide agreement.’216  Although the AMWU was unsuccessful in the latter 
regard,217 it nevertheless achieved formidable success, due in no small part to the 
ascension of the militant ‘Workers First’ faction to leadership within the AMWU.218  
Former State Secretary of the Victorian Branch, Craig Johnston, declared of the wage 
and conditions improvements: ‘We achieved those things with more than 1,000 
agreements covering 40,000 workers. In about 85% of cases we got the whole package 
[of demands].’219  The national campaign, although not as coherent, nevertheless 
experienced substantial success also.220   
It was at this moment, when the spectre of a return to industry-level bargaining 
appeared as a credible threat, that the Howard government showed its full hand.  This 
government had always regarded the antipodean Fordist integration of trade unionism 
into the fabric of labour law and industrial relations as a pathology to be excised.221  It 
took immediate action upon the campaign’s commencement in 1998-1999 to introduce 
legislation outlawing pattern bargaining.222  Although the Bill failed in the Senate, the 
AIG found a willing ally in the government, with whom it met several times to 
encourage the passage of the amendments.223  The Commission and Federal Court also 
revealed through their actions the tremendous change in the industrial relations 
landscape.  Whereas the Clarrie O’Shea affair in 1969 had essentially rendered the 
prosecution of union officials politically untenable, the Federal Court had no qualms in 
levelling contempt charges against Craig Johnston, Electrical Trades Union Victorian 
Secretary Dean Mighell and Australian Workers’ Union official Cesar Melhem when 
                                                          
216 Quoted in Michael Bachelard, ‘Unions strike out – Campaign 2000 is having some unexpected 
outcomes’, The Australian (Australia), 7 September 2000, 28. 
217 They did succeed in signing a framework agreement with a number of employers: Ibid. 
218 Sue Bull, ‘Victorian AMWU plans industrial campaign’ (12 June 2002) Green Left Weekly 
<https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/27378>.  
219 Ibid. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Indeed, when John Howard introduced the WorkChoices legislation, he trumpeted how ‘the era of the 
select few making decisions for the many in the industrial relations system is now over.’  His use of 
‘select few’ was a euphemism for trade unions and the Commission.  See: Commonwealth, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 May 2005, 43 (John Howard). 
222 Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (More Jobs, Better Pay) Bill 1999 (Cth).  See also: 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 June 1999, 7856-7857 (Peter 
Reith). 
223 Nina Field, ‘AIG fights metal union plan’, Australian Financial Review (Australia), 3 May 2000, 3. 
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they defied Commission injunctions against mass meetings held in the course of 
Campaign 2000.224  Fines of $20,000 were imposed on each of them225 in a case 
reiterating the claim of increased juridification, the re-assertion of law’s dominance over 
administration, made in the previous chapter.226    
Buoyed by the comparative success of Campaign 2000, the AMWU attempted to 
replicate its efforts with ‘Campaign 2003,’ which again sought common wage and 
conditions improvements through renegotiating a host of enterprise bargains at once.227  
This time, the employers and the state were better prepared.  Once again, the Howard 
Government came to the aid of the AIG with legislation, which this time successfully 
passed.  The Workplace Relations Amendment (Genuine Bargaining) Act 2002228 gave 
the Commission enhanced powers to terminate bargaining periods where it deemed that 
genuine agreement was not being sought.  This meant industrial action taken was not 
deemed as protected and could be subject to fines and common law industrial torts.  
Liberal Member of Parliament Don Randall made no bones about the object of the 
legislation: 
The unions claim that the bill will deny workers the right to strike. It will not do 
so, but it will put a serious dent in the side of irresponsible campaigns like the 
AMWU's so-called Campaign 2000 and Campaign 2003 … the unions, 
particularly the AMWU, advocate pattern bargaining because it gives them 
control over entire industries.229 
 
Then-Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations Tony Abbott added:  
[E]lements within the union movement have attempted to orchestrate a return to 
industry level bargaining through the process known as pattern bargaining … It 
                                                          
224 See, for example: Bradon Ellem, ‘Trade Unionism in 2000’ (2001) 43(2) Journal of Industrial 
Relations 196, 210; Melanie Sjoberg, ‘Who’s afraid of the AMWU?’ (July 18 2001) Green Left Weekly 
<https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/24655>.  
225 Ellem, above n 224, 210; ABC Radio National, ‘Union leader refuses to pay contempt fine’, PM , 29 
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represents an outdated, one-size-fits-all approach to workplace relations where 
union officials utilised the centralised system to dictate their agenda to both 
employers and employees (my emphasis).230 
Used in a number of cases,231 these new powers delighted the AIG.232  For its part, the 
AIG held a tighter front, preparing early for the union campaign233 and supported 
wholeheartedly by the federal government.234   
When combined with the internal machinations of the AMWU (the Victorian branch 
had been weakened through factional infighting that saw Craig Johnston removed in a 
coup orchestrated by the more moderate national leadership),235 Campaign 2003 was 
less successful than its predecessors.   Employers and the state were able to ensure the 
AMWU’s key common demands of shorter hours and a trust fund for employees in 
failed companies were not universalised throughout the industry.236  The attempt by the 
AMWU and other unions to ‘recentralise’ bargaining to the sector-level, to ensure fairly 
common up-trending standards throughout manufacturing generally (as opposed to the 
minimum safety net established by awards), had fallen foul of the changed 
circumstances of the Australian state and the instruments of industrial regulation.   
With pattern bargaining, most graphically demonstrated in the Campaign 2000/2003 
mobilisations, the AMWU attempted to reforge something resembling the industry-level 
regulation characteristic of antipodean Fordism.  It was this level of regulation that 
permitted the latter’s characteristic cycle of wage and conditions flow-on.  After playing 
a key role in the initial movement towards enterprise bargaining in the early 1990s, the 
union realised that the loss of industry-level regulation, historically revolving around 
the Metal Trades and Metal Industry Awards, seriously undermined organisational 
                                                          
230 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 20 February 2002, 504-505 (Tony 
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strength and encouraged a downward cycle of competition between union and non-
union shops.   Within the confines of the new system, the AMWU and other 
manufacturing unions tried to stop the rot and reclaim de facto industry-level 
arrangements, relying upon pattern bargaining leveraged through enterprises located in 
key sectors, particularly metals, whitegoods and vehicle-building.237  However, the 
political, economic and, most importantly for my purposes, legal landscape had changed 
too much for this attempt to achieve durable success.  When seriously threatened by the 
success of Campaign 2000, the government and employers closed ranks and enacted 
hostile new legislation designed to defeat pattern bargaining, arming the Commission 
with new powers to effect this result.238  The demise of pattern bargaining was made 
complete by the passage of the WorkChoices legislation.  Section 431(1) of the 
amended Act provided that the Commission must terminate a bargaining period if it was 
satisfied a party was engaged in pattern bargaining,239 whilst section 439 ensured that 
industrial action taken in support of it would not be protected.240   The repeal of 
WorkChoices and its replacement by the Fair Work Act 2009241 of the incoming ALP 
government did little to aid the union cause, maintaining as it did the former’s 
prohibitions against pattern bargaining in toto.242   
It may be argued that the fate of pattern bargaining is an example of law as reactive, 
being used instrumentally to achieve a pre-determined purpose.  This is partially true.  
The fact that I identify law as a juridic form that helps constitute the capitalist mode of 
production does not mean that it cannot be used by the state in an instrumental way.  
However, the demise of pattern bargaining went deeper than this.  Its outlawing was 
part of the broader logic of enterprise bargaining and individualisation, which I have 
demonstrated are key legal manifestations of liberal-productivism.  Pattern bargaining 
was corrosive of the ability of these forces these to serve their function within this 
model of development.  The assault on pattern bargaining was more than just capitalists 
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trying to augment their power and line their pockets; it was a vital moment in the 
liberal-productivist regime of labour law being purged of any revanchist tendencies on 
the part of organised labour.   
Conclusions 
This imposition of what amounts to an effective legislative ban on pattern bargaining is 
the perfect point on which to conclude the analysis of the destruction of the award 
hierarchy and the role of the metal trades within it.  I have traced the institutionalisation 
of the metal industry as a lead sector through the immensely important Metal Trades 
and Metal Industry Awards.  It has been demonstrated that as antipodean Fordism came 
to cohere fully in the aftermath of World War II, the Metal Trades Award came to 
dominate the award framework, with successive margins cases in the 1940s and 1950s 
increasingly taking national economic capacity and that of the metal trades as 
synonymous.  Based on the principle of comparative wage justice, pay and conditions 
improvements gained by metal unions flowed through the workforce readily, aided by 
the fact that respondents to the Metal Trades and Metal Industry Awards were not 
confined to one industry, but were instead found in a huge number and variety of 
workplaces.   
With the Total Wage and Work Value Cases of 1967 and 1968, the Commission and 
employers attempted to shape a new modality of industrial regulation, one in which 
opportunities for flow-on were reduced.  Full employment and the industrial militancy 
of metal unions, however, put paid to these designs, and instead set in motion an 
explosion of strikes that saw the defeat of absorption and powerful currents of flow-on.   
The crisis of antipodean Fordism that took hold in the early to mid-1970s hit metal 
workers hard, with the result that the metal award began to lose steam in its pace-setting 
role, with the impetus shifting to other industries such as transport and warehousing.243  
However, the durability of the institutionalised channels linking metal awards to others 
in the hierarchy ensured that large catch-up claims for metal workers, such as those 
granted in 1974 and 1981, were considered necessary for industrial stability and, once 
given, flowed through the wage structure. 
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It is only with the enforced wage stagnation of the Accord that a tipping point was 
reached, breaking the post-war pattern of upward pressure in the metal trades leading to 
improvements for other wage-earners.  The deleterious effect the Accord had on the 
earnings of semi-skilled blue collar workers eventually made the compact politically 
untenable, with the AMWU in particular advocating a movement to enterprise 
bargaining in the hope of being able to exploit its industrial strength and achieve better 
wage and conditions outcomes.  In the minds of some AMWU officials, and certainly in 
the nightmares of elements of capital, the government, the Commission and the press, 
this was conceived as a return to the kind of collective over-award campaigns of post-
World War II vintage.   
Such a perspective failed to appreciate the fundamental transformation in Australian 
capitalism, in particular the reduced role of the manufacturing sector within it.  
Globalised production and the imperatives of international competition had led to 
profound job-shedding, reorganisation of the production process and an increasingly 
militant anti-union attitude of the part of employers.  Combined with increasingly 
inhospitable governments (which became outright hostility with the election of the 
Liberal/National Party coalition in 1996) and chronic membership decline, unions found 
their bargaining power increasingly usurped.  In this context, the essential destruction of 
the award system and the movement towards enterprise bargaining made it almost 
impossible for metal unions to employ their post-war tactics of relying on the award 
framework to universalise gains won by militant ‘hot shops.’  Not only was the ability 
of metal unions to win gains for the workforce disrupted; indeed, the metals sector 
itself, along with manufacturing as a whole, became increasingly polarised as the 
favourable agreements obtained by strategically placed, well-organised workers were 
successfully quarantined from non-union shops.   
When the AMWU and its allies had realised the danger early in the history of enterprise 
bargaining, they attempted, with some initial success, to recentralise bargaining at the 
industry-level through pattern bargaining.  However, the state, by now thoroughly 
colonised by a productivity and low-wage ideology that saw in pattern bargaining only a 
return to an inefficient and antiquated past, enacted legislative change to outlaw such 
collective campaigns and raise the stakes for workers and unions considering 
undertaking them.  These legal developments marked the destruction of the last 
elements of the antipodean Fordist modality of metal sector flow-on, substituting its 
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tendency for universality with the liberal-productivist schema of decentralisation and 
polarity in the wage structure.  
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Chapter 8 
PRECARITY, INTENSIFICATION AND WORK RE-
ORGANISATION IN THE FOOD PROCESSING SECTOR 
The previous chapter was focussed on the role of awards, award restructuring and 
enterprise bargaining on the structure of the antipodean Fordist cycle of wage and 
condition flow-on.  The purpose of this chapter is to better understand the implications 
of these same processes on the actual content of awards and enterprise bargains, 
particularly insofar as they bear upon the liberal-productivist industrial paradigm and 
wage-labour nexus elucidated in chapter 4.  By investigating when and how these came 
to be implanted in the labour law regime, it can be better understood how this regime 
fulfils the abstract functions I have identified as according with it. 
These forces will be elucidated in great detail here as they have applied to the food 
processing sector. This sector is most useful as a case study for a variety of reasons.  
Firstly, it has been one of the most deeply affected by the liberal-productivist norms of 
precarity and intensified real subordination of labour to capital.  Being an industry 
which has retained something of a seasonal character (particularly where production is 
tied to harvest cycles and yearly changes in consumption levels), the presentation and 
profundity of these norms in especially sharp, and their manifestation through award 
restructuring and enterprise bargaining can be seen quite transparently.  The relevance 
of these norms for industry generally is also bolstered by the fact that food processing 
has always been one of the largest industries constituting the manufacturing sector in 
Australia in terms of employment, trailing only the metals sector for the majority of the 
post-World War II years.1  Indeed, in 2010-2011 ‘food product manufacturing’ was the 
single largest sub-sector within manufacturing industry, both in terms of employment, 
industry value-added and capital expenditure.2 
                                                          
1 See, for example: Commonwealth Census of Bureau and Statistics, Year Book Australia 1962 (1301.0, 
No. 48, 1982) 168; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia 1974 (1301.0, No. 60, 1974) 732. 
2 In 2010-2011, it employed some 203,900 people, accounting for approximately 20.1% of total 
manufacturing employment.  In 2009-2010, its contribution to the total value added by the manufacturing 
sector was 17.4%, whilst its share of capital expenditure was 17.4%.  This result was achieved despite the 
fact that the beverage and tobacco manufacturing group, with which food production was formerly 
aggregated, constituted a separate category: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia 2012 
(1301.0, No. 92, 2012) 614, 616. 
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Secondly, it will be seen that food processing has been hit hard by the exposure to 
international competition that has been a defining trait of liberal-productivism in 
Australia.  The incidence and depth of competition from lower-wage countries has been 
pronounced, enabling multinational corporations to play plants in different jurisdictions 
against each other3 whilst forcing an ever leaner production system on those sites 
remaining in Australia.  Food processing is thus an ideal sector for deeper study 
precisely because it has operated in the environment that has been reshaped most 
dramatically in the transition to liberal-productivism.  
Lastly, the analysis of this particularly affected manufacturing industry provides a 
highly useful partner to the following chapter, which explores much the same processes 
except in the context of the retail sector.  Indeed, the fact that very similar outcomes and 
patterns will be seen to emerge in two completely different industries4 strengthens the 
theory of transition forwarded in this thesis, demonstrating that liberal-productivist 
tendencies have taken hold of the workforce at large (even though they don’t 
necessarily affect all workers to the same degree). 
In order to demonstrate exactly what the formal and substantive impacts of award 
restructuring and enterprise bargaining have been on workers in food processing, it is 
necessary to briefly survey the nature of industrial relations and wage and conditions 
determinations in the sector during the phase of antipodean Fordist functionality.   
Award regulation in food processing – Antipodean Fordism en 
régulation 
Broadly speaking, the industrial relations field was dominated until the late 1970s by 
then-generally docile unions such as the Food Preservers’ Union (FPU), the Federated 
Confectioners’ Association (FCA) and the Manufacturing Grocers’ Employees’ 
Federation of Australia.  In line with the prevailing antipodean Fordist pattern of 
industrial regulation, these unions were respondents to a number of state5 and federal6 
                                                          
3 A strategy of capital’s that has been dubbed ‘whipsawing.’  See, for example: Ian Greer and Marco 
Hauptmeier, ‘Marketization and social dumping: management whipsawing in Europe’s automotive 
industry’ in Magdalena Bernaciak (ed), Market Expansion and Social Dumping in Europe (Routledge, 
2015) 125. 
4 Having different labour processes, contrasting exposure to international competition and different 
industrial relations histories, to name but a few. 
5 Such as the Confectioners (State) Award (NSW). 
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awards that were a comprehensive codification of the terms and conditions on which 
wage labour was to be exploited.  These awards were very much in keeping with the 
general pattern: composed of a myriad variety of finely gradated classifications, 
crystallising certain demarcation barriers and what in neo-liberal parlence would be 
considered ‘restrictive practices,’ and establishing strict controls on the engagement of 
casual and part-time labour.7  The position of the unions was often guaranteed by 
preference clauses,8 whilst industry-level logs of wage and conditions claims were 
common.9  The pattern of flow-on identified in chapters 5 and 7 provided crucial inputs 
to the sector, with metal trades margins typically determining the parameters for food 
processing employees, who also benefited from comparative wage claims premised on 
the Metal Industry standard in the mid-1970s and early 1980s.10  This conveyer belt 
served to compensate for the general lack of militancy amongst food processing unions 
into the 1970s.11   
Antipodean Fordism’s subsequent descent into crisis actually had a radicalising effect 
on key unions in the sector, namely the FPU and the FCA.  Food processing was on the 
hard edge of the crisis, deeply affected by profound technological innovation,12 
                                                                                                                                                                          
6 Such as the Food Preservers Award 1973, the Food Preservers Interim Award 1986 and the 
Confectioners Award 1959. 
7 For example, clause 8 of the Food Preservers Interim Award 1986 provided that casuals were only to be 
employed in situations of genuine need occasioned by absenteeism or special production demand and 
must only account for 15% of the total number of full-time employees.  Part-time employment was 
limited to 10% of total weekly employees, after not being a feature of the award at all in the 1980s: Letter 
to Tom Ryan, General Secretary of the FPU, from the Australian Chamber of Manufacturers, 20 April 
1988 (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Z628, Box 64).  Part-time employment in the various confectioners 
awards was typically dependent upon the employer seeking the written approval of the FCA.  See, for 
example: Confectioners (State) Award (NSW) cl 3A. 
8 See, for example: Confectioners (State) Award (NSW) cl 26; Food Preservers Interim Award 1986 cl 
36. 
9 See, for example: Federated Confectioners Association, ‘Report on Federal Wage Claim Put Before 
Employers on 11th of April 1973’ (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, N194/30, Box 4). 
10 See, for example: FCA General-Secretary’s Report (March 1968) (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, 
N194/29, Box 4); Application by Food Preservers’ Union to vary Food Preservers Award in CCH, 
Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 22(16) (6 August1980) ¶243.  
11 Indeed, the FPU had been regarded as a ‘tame cat’ union by employers, whilst FCA members in 
Victoria and Tasmania had last struck in 1910 before the upheavals in the 1970s and 1980s.  See: Tom 
Ryan, ‘Editorial’ (1985) 13(4) The Food Preserver 3; John Soreli, ‘Lolly leader sells a gentle line’ (Noel 
Butlin Archive Centre, N194/71, Box 8). 
12 See, for example: Transcript of Proceedings, Application by Federated Confectioners Association of 
Australia, New South Wales Branch for variation of the Confectioners (State) Award re wages 
(Confectioners (State) Conciliation Committee, Case  No. 277, Commissioner Dunn, 4/10 October 1977); 
South Australia Branch of the FPU, ‘Changes at Work’ (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Z628, Box 28); 
Jane Richardson, ‘Unions learn to survive as new technology takes over’, The Australian, 18 January 
1982. 
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rationalisation of production consequent upon high and increasing foreign ownership,13 
and, most importantly, the increased corrosiveness of international competition in the 
form of rapidly rising levels of food imports.14  These developments dovetailed with the 
election of a more militant leadership in both unions, particularly in the Victorian 
branches.  Indeed, the Victorian FCA had in 1976 and 1977 imposed overtime bans, 
limitations and had even engaged in strike action for over-award payments outside the 
indexation guidelines,15 whilst it and the Victorian FPU had, in a solitary stand, defied 
the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and refused to sign on to the Accord 
guidelines until late 1984.16  As the Accord process deepened into the restructuring and 
efficiency and structural efficiency principles in the late 1980s, food manufacturers 
were thus faced with comparatively powerful unions who expected meaningful input to 
the process of reform.  In this process, however, can be discerned the very norms of 
flexibility, precarity and work intensification which would be deepened by enterprise 
bargaining. 
Award reform in the 1980s 
Food processing industries proved particularly amenable to the species of change 
envisaged by the Commission when it laid down the restructuring and efficiency and 
structural efficiency principles.  Profound labour process changes, in particular the 
                                                          
13 See, for example: Letter from Nestle to staff at Abbotsford factory, 21 August 1981 (Noel Butlin 
Archives Centre, N194/102, Box 11); Maureen Murrill, Tom Mockridge, ‘Govt blocks Cadbury bid’, 
Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 23 April 1983, 28; Abe David, ‘Global merger trend hits Australian 
food industry’, 14 July 1999 (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Z628, Box 26); Bill Pritchard, ‘Foreign 
ownership in Australian food processing: the 1995 sale of the Pacific Dunlop food division’ (1995)(36) 
Journal of Australian Political Economy 26. 
14 See, for example: FCA Federal Conference (2-4 June 1976) 10 (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, N194/72, 
Box 8); Mark Lawrence, ‘Food for Thought’ (1985) 13(4) The Food Preserver 6, 6-8; FPU, ‘Submission 
to the Industries Assistance Commission concerning the Draft Report on Canned Fruit (Statutory 
Marketing and Interim Assistance Arrangements)’ (December 1985) 8 (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, 
Z628, Box 64). 
15 Indeed, Commissioner Clarkson had accused the FCA of being ‘prepared to throw indexation to the 
wind’: Transcript of Proceedings, Victorian Chamber of Manufactures v Federated Confectioners’ 
Association of Australia and also A.W. Allen Limited v Federated Confectioners’ Association of Australia 
(Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, Case No. 3923 & 4578, Commissioner Clarkson, 6 
December 1976) 10. 
16 In this stand they were sold out by the AMWU, which was the key body in holding the left-wing of the 
trade union movement to the Accord.  See, for example: Letter from the Manufacturing Confectioners 
Confederation of NSW, October 23 1984 (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, N194/129, Box 14), 2; Tom 
Ryan, ‘Editorial’ (1984) 12(3) The Food Preserver 8; Applications by Food Preservers Union to vary 
Food Preservers’ Award 1973 in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 26(7) (6 December 1984) 
¶415. 
 256 
deployment of more flexible and labour-displacing machinery,17 along with the fact that 
casual labour had always played a significant role, particularly in the important Food 
Preservers Awards, ensured that the flexibilities desired by the Commission had a 
ready-made material basis in the sector.   
In the initial stages of negotiations with the FPU over access to second-tier wage 
increases consequent upon structural efficiency agreements, the Australian Chamber of 
Manufactures (ACM), who represented employers subject to the Food Preservers 
Awards, made clear in a broad ambit claim the thoroughgoing changes it was after.  
Rejecting out of hand the FPU’s claims, the ACM noted that for their offer to even be 
considered further, they must agree to:  
 the introduction of stand-down provisions;  
 the removal of restrictions on the employment of casuals outside the defined 
season;18  
 an increased spread of ordinary working hours;  
 an increase in the length of a shift that could be worked without a break from 
five hours to six;  
 the removal of penalty rates for shifts that fell partly on public holidays; and  
 the introduction of part-time employment.19 
 
Such changes represented a profound corrosion of the standard employment model 
central to the antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus, as well as an intensification of 
labour through reducing the ‘porosity’ of the working-day.20   
Given the expected union opposition, the Commission was called upon to determine the 
dispute.  It did so in a way that gave the ACM virtually everything that it wanted: the 
                                                          
17 See, for example, the massive technological change, resulting in vastly improved productivity and 
labour-shedding, documented by the Commission at Kelloggs over the course of several years in the mid-
1980s: Kelloggs (Australia) Pty Ltd v Labor Council (NSW) in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, 
vol 29(21) (21 October 1987) ¶402. 
18 The Food Preservers Awards, in their various manifestations, had typically provided for weekly hire 
employees, seasonal employees dismissible with two days notice, and hourly-hire casuals.  They typically 
permitted the employment of the latter two categories only for specified ‘seasons’ for particular fruits and 
vegetables: Food Preservers Award in C.P. Mills and E.G.A. Lambert (eds) Australian Industrial Law 
Review, vol 9(9) (22 April 1967) ¶122; Food Preservers’ Award 1972 cl. 8(a)(1)(2)(3). 
19 Letter to Tom Ryan, General Secretary of the FPU, from the Australian Chamber of Manufactures, 20 
April 1988, above n 7. 
20 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume 1 (Ben Fowkes trans, Penguin Classics, 
1990) 534. 
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union application was dismissed out of hand for not fulfilling the goals of the structural 
efficiency exercise, particularly insofar as it did ‘not ensure that working patterns and 
arrangements would enhance the flexibility of the industry.’21  Amongst other things, 
the Commission granted the employers flexibility regarding employees and seasonal 
deployment, the extension of ordinary hours to the weekends and an increase in the 
minimum shift length without a break to 5.5 hours.22  State awards followed suit.23  At 
the macro-level, therefore, the initiative was in the hands of employers as they sought to 
effect the plant-level changes envisaged in the structural efficiency principle. 
The nature of structural efficiency agreements at individual workplaces took their lead 
from the framework determined at the award level.  A few representative agreements 
demonstrate the general trends of the increased spread of ordinary hours, relaxed 
restrictions on casual and part-time labour, increased flexibility in deploying labour and 
avoidance of disputes clauses.  In one company, the offsets given for second-tier wage 
adjustments included the introduction of casual labour, the abolition of walking and 
washing-up times, and adherence to a new disputes avoidance/settlement procedure.24  
An agreement for the Tasmanian Cadbury-Schweppes Drinks Division (struck with the 
Federated Liquor and Allied Industries Employees’ Union of Australia) saw attempts to 
improve productivity and efficiency at peak times by rostering leisure days, extending 
ordinary hours, reducing lost time and new changeover procedures.25  An enterprise 
award covering Nabisco Brands, a cereal and biscuit manufacturer, was varied to 
include an extension of the spread and flexibility of working hours and greater 
flexibility as to annual leave and meal breaks.26   
Confectionary workers fared similarly.  In much the same vein as the Food Preservers 
Awards, the federal Confectioners Award was varied primarily on the basis of the 
                                                          
21 Food Preservers Union of Australia, Australian Chamber of Manufactures, Food Preservers’ Interim 
Award 1986 (12 June 1990) Print J3010, 1. 
22 Ibid 2-4. 
23 See, for example: the NSW Food Preservers (State) Award (as varied on 26 June 1990) (Noel Butlin 
Archives Centre, Z628, Box 64); Application by the Labor Council of NSW on behalf of the Food 
Preservers Union of Australia (NSW Branch) in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 33(10) (16 
May 1991) ¶135. 
24 Application by Food Preservers’ (Interim) Award, 1986 in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 
30(7) (8 April 1988) ¶127. 
25 Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v FLAIEU in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 30(3) (11 
February 1988) ¶52. 
26 Application to vary Nabisco Brands Pty Ltd (Cereal and Biscuit Processing etc) Award 1985 in CCH, 
Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 32(25) (28 December 1990) ¶448. 
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application put by the ACM and other confectionary manufacturer associations.27  In 
particular, the Commission approved the employers’ truncated, four-level classification 
structure, granted added flexibility in the deployment of part-time and casual labour and 
endorsed greater flexibility in working hours and annual leave provisions.28  These 
changes framed developments at the plant-level.  At Allens Life Savers Lane Cove 
plant, off-sets included the voluntary substitution of Rostered Days Off (RDOs) to 
better match stock volumes, strict adherence to rest period times (presumably because 
they were not being tightly observed in practice), an avoidance of disputes and 
settlement procedures and the reallocation of a labelling task previously done by fitters 
to confectioners.29  In an agreement between Beatrice Foods and the FCA (by this time 
known as the Confectionary Workers Union), a disputes resolution clause accompanied 
greater flexibility in respect of RDOs and the implementation of a new computerised 
time clock costing system.30 
The patently pro-employer decisions handed down by the Commission in both cases 
were, without doubt, a function of the inhospitable climate the FCA and FPU were 
operating within.  Their stand against the Accord in 1983-1984 had won them few 
friends in the Commission,31 the ACTU and the broader labour movement.32  This 
resulted in generally equivocal support from other unions during a series of showdowns 
with employers in the mid-1980s.  As recounted in chapter 5, the FCA lost a bitter 1985 
dispute with Dollar Sweets, a small confectionary manufacturer, which became a cause 
célèbre of the New Right.  The FPU was also faced by increasingly militant employers 
                                                          
27 It is important to note at this point that the construction of arbitration as an administrative structure 
taking collectives of labour and capital as its subject should not be taken as a suggestion that it was 
destined to provide decisions friendly to workers.  Indeed, in chapters 3 and 4 it was argued that the 
particular configuration of the law-administration continuum centred on the arbitration system was 
designed to reconcile working-class strength with the abstract capitalist need to commodify labour-power.  
As these cases graphically demonstrate, the arbitral tribunals were perfectly capable of delivering openly 
pro-capital decisions.  This shall be seen again in the following chapter on retail.   
28 Confectionary Workers Union of Australia, Confectioners Award 1980 (6 December 1990) Print J5832, 
2-3. 
29 ‘Allens Life Savers Limited Confectioners-Lane Cove List of Agreed Offsets for 4% Second Tier 
Wage Increase’ (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, N194/169, Box 19). 
30 Confectionary Workers Union of Australia v Beatrice Foods in CCH, Australian Industrial Law 
Review, vol 30(7) (8 April 1988) ¶127. 
31 In a demonstration of how the Accord demanded unions to become industrial policemen, the 
Commission declared during the April 1984 National Wage Case that ‘[i]t is regrettable that the unions 
concerned did not see fit to give their members award protection by declaring their commitment to the 
Principles as required in the spirit of the Accord to which they are party’: National Wage Case – April 
1984 in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 26(7) (11 April 1984) ¶117. 
32 See, for example: Tom Bramble, Trade Unionism in Australia: A history from flood to ebb tide 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008) 132, 142. 
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from the mid-1980s onwards.  The union won a major dispute at Rosella Lipton in 
1984-85 after a three month strike, against the opposition of the Hawke ALP 
government who viewed it as an attack on the Accord.33  Large employers such as 
Heinz and Nestle also mobilised, locking out workers in wrangles over pay and 
conditions (in the latter relating to the flexibility of RDOs) in 1984.34  Although initially 
successful in rebuffing management intransigence,35 the employer effort continued 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, with an increasing focus on intensifying the use 
of casuals36 and expelling union militants.37   
These specific attacks on food processing unions dovetailed with the broader 
disempowering impact of the Accord, which the FPU in particular identified as a major 
factor in ‘weakening the structure of the trade union movement.’38  This reality underlay 
the food employers’ bold attitude in structural efficiency demands, which was described 
by the New South Wales branch of the FPU as a guise concealing an attempt to reduce 
conditions and over-awards whilst increasing the work week.39  A resolution passed by 
the same branch stated that members ‘strongly protest against the employers 
expectations of continual trade-offs of hard won working conditions for wage 
increases.’40   
Some workers at least thus realised the true nature of the restructuring and efficiency 
and structural efficiency exercises.  As was outlined in chapter 6, both principles 
essentially revolved around the enhancement of managerial prerogative over the control 
and deployment of employees and the organisation of the labour process (whilst 
maintaining the wage restraint of the Accord).  In particular, they encouraged the 
                                                          
33 See, for example: Tom Ryan, ‘Editorial’ (1985) 13(3) The Food Preserver 3; Gail Cotton, ‘The Rosella 
Dispute’ (1985) 13(3) The Food Preserver 20. 
34 Gail Cotton, ‘Gail’s Report’ (1984) 12(3) The Food Preserver 10. 
35 Ibid. 
36 See, for example: Food Preservers Union of Australia v H.J. Heinz Co Australia Pty Ltd, Food 
Preservers Award, 1973 (1991) Print J7693; Application by Australian Chamber of Manufactures to vary 
the Food Preservers’ Interim Award 1986 in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 33(18) (5 
September1991) ¶281. 
37 See, for example: Tom Ryan, ‘Report of General Secretary and Federal Council to Meeting of Federal 
Conference’, 7 December 1988 (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Z628, Box 64) 24-25. 
38 Letter from P. Decker on behalf of FPU Secretary Tom Ryan, 23 September 1991 (Noel Butlin 
Archives Centre, Z628, Box 28). 
39 Undated article from the NSW Branch in The Food Preserver (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Z628, Box 
64). 
40 Letter from NSW FPU Secretary Ray Warn to Tom Ryan, FPU General Secretary, 15 November 1989 
(Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Z628, Box 64). 
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intensification of labour whilst simultaneously corroding the standard employment 
model, compromising the trade-off which had sat at the heart of the antipodean Fordist 
wage-labour nexus.  Unfortunately for food processing workers, the movement to 
enterprise bargaining in the early 1990s would only serve to sharpen these processes. 
Enterprise bargaining 
The development of enterprise bargaining was not entirely without precedent in food 
processing industries.  Some of the larger enterprises within the sector, such as Darrell 
Lea, Cadbury-Schweppes and Kelloggs, had a history of enterprise and/or plant-level 
agreements, particularly when they fell within the jurisdiction of the states,41 whilst 
over-award bargains at individual workplaces were common.42  However, the timing 
could not have been worse.  It occurred in the context of a wave of union 
amalgamations: the FCA and FPU had amalgamated in 1992 to form the Confectionary 
Workers and Food Preservers Union of Australia (CWFPU), which then joined the 
Automotive, Metals and Engineering Union (AMEU) in 1994.  After further 
amalgamations, the old CWFPU became the Food and Confectionary Division of the 
AMWU.43  Although ideally designed to bolster union strength, the amalgamations 
created considerable infighting and institutional friction, particularly regarding the 
financial autonomy of the division and the status of its officials.44  This consumed time 
and resources that could have been better spent fighting for members’ wages and 
conditions.  
For both food preservers and confectioners, the situation was made worse by the fact 
that, nearly a decade after most other workers had won the 38-hour week, their awards 
had not been varied accordingly.  Although the majority of employees covered by the 
                                                          
41 See, for example: ‘Federated Confectioners’ Association of Australia, New South Wales Branch and 
Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty. Ltd.’ (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, N194/159, Box 18); ‘Cadbury 
Schweppes Pty. Ltd. Confectioners’ Industrial Agreement, (Tasmania) 1979 (Noel Butlin Archives 
Centre, N194/96, Box 11); ‘Cadbury Schweppes Pty. Ltd. Confectioners’ Industrial Agreement, 
(Tasmania) 1980’ (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, N194/96, Box 11); Kelloggs (Australia) Pty Ltd v Labor 
Council (NSW) in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 29(21) (21 October 1987) ¶402. 
42 An exemplar is the long-lived agreement between the FCA, FPU and Nestle at its Abbotsford plant: 
‘Confectioners’-Food Preservers’ Agreement, The Nestle Company (Australia) Limited-Abbotsford’ 
(Noel Butlin Archives Centre, N194/74, Box 9). 
43 Other unions involved in food processing, such as the Federated Millers and Manufacturing Grocers 
Union and the Federated Cold Storage and Meat Preserving Employees Union, had amalgamated with the 
National Union of Workers. 
44 See, for example: Freda Bogar, AMWU Food and Confectionary Division Bulletin (31 May 1995) 
(Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Z628, Box 2). 
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awards were already working a 38-week in practice, the Commission still demanded 
cost-offsets for the formal award variation.45  Although in the event the CWFPU was 
able to tender the results of the structural efficiency exercise as evidence of such 
offsets,46 the fact that the formal 38-hour week was achieved so late bespoke of a deeper 
problem: the fact that key federal awards, like the Food Preservers Award 1973, Food 
Preservers Interim Award 1986 and the Confectionary Award 1980 had been allowed to 
atrophy since the late 1980s, particularly concerning hours and various allowances.47  
This process of decay, although partially reversed by the mid-1990s,48 underpinned the 
rush to enterprise bargaining in the food processing sector. 
Broadly speaking, the enterprise agreements struck in the sector throughout the 1990s 
intensified the impulses towards flexibility, precarity and enhanced managerial power 
that had characterised the rolling-out of the structural efficiency principle.  They tended 
to further polarise the workforce between an ever-decreasing ‘core’ of full-time 
employees and a growing population of casual and part-time workers, established new 
and more comprehensive performance indicators, increased the spread of ordinary 
working hours, removed restrictive practices and demarcation barriers and subordinated 
labour to a ‘productivity culture.’49  The pattern was broadly similar to that which 
manifested itself in the retail sector, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter.50  
However, given the greater relative power of unions like the AMWU compared to the 
docile retail union, the process acquired a harder edge in food processing, particularly as 
aggressive multinationals (like American food giant Simplot) entered the industrial 
scene.  We will see below that the experience of the 1990s and 2000s was that food 
processing capital made greater recourse to outsourcing, labour hire arrangements and 
open confrontation to sideline unions and undermine their bargaining position in the 
enterprise bargaining process.   
                                                          
45 See, for example: Transcript of Proceedings, Food Preservers Interim Award 1986 (Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission, 30092, Full Bench, 7 June 1993) 3-4, 7. 
46 Ibid 3-5. 
47 Bogar, Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union Food and Confectionary Division Bulletin, above n 
44. 
48 Freda Bogar, ‘Report to AMWU National Conference’, undated (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Z628, 
Box 2), 3-4. 
49 Which, despite the aspirational tenor, was a euphemism for acceptance of constant technical and 
organisational restructuring under the corrosive impact of increased international competition. 
50 Which reiterates the fact that enterprise bargaining was not a limited species of change, but was integral 
to the evolving labour law regime and underwrote restructuring in a wide variety of industries. 
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A closer analysis of several representative agreements sharpens these general 
propositions.  Less than a year after the federal Commission’s adoption of enterprise 
bargaining principles in October 1991,51 a national-level enterprise agreement was 
signed with Edgell-Birds Eye, a major producer of canned vegetables and frozen foods, 
with a single-bargaining unit of concerned unions, including the FPU and the National 
Union of Workers.  The objectives of the agreement betray the neo-liberal logic that had 
infused labour relations in earnest after the passage of the Commission’s new wage 
principles in the late 1980s.  Key amongst them are a dedication to improve the 
efficiency and productivity of the enterprise,52 the creation of an environment conducive 
to flexible work organisation in response to new technologies and changing markets,53 
and an evinced desire to become ‘a world competitive manufacturing enterprise.’54  The 
‘productivity culture’ being sought explicitly required workers and their unions to 
reduce demarcation barriers through ‘the integration of all aspects of the production 
systems’55 and accept ‘total flexibility of jobs and duties across the Company.’56  
Importantly, the agreement also stipulated that ‘[a]t all times terms and conditions of 
employment will be based upon the specific needs of the enterprise,’57 a refutation of 
the notion of comparative wage justice and metal trades flow-on discussed previously.  
Additionally, no quantitative limit was placed to the employment of casual labour. 
Another enterprise agreement at canned fruit and juice producer Golden Circle 
synergised intensified flexibility with a profound review of work organisation.58  
Amongst the concessions being sought by the employer were flexible shift 
arrangements to match work patterns to enterprise needs, flexible starting and finishing 
times, increasing the daily maximum of work hours to 9.5, and staggering meal breaks 
and substituting public holidays to ensure continuity of production.59  A much broader 
and deeper system of performance indicators was outlined, whilst employees had to be 
willing to ‘accept total flexibility of jobs and duties across the Enterprise, subject only 
                                                          
51 National Wage Case October 1991 (1991) Print K0300. 
52 ‘Edgell-Birds Eye (Enterprise Bargaining) Agreement’, September 1992 (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, 
Z628, Box 3) 5.2(i). 
53 Ibid 5.2(iii). 
54 Ibid 5.2(iv). 
55 Ibid 5.3(ii). 
56 Ibid 5.3(iv). 
57 Ibid 5.3(viii). 
58 ‘Golden Circle Enterprise Agreement’ (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Z628, Box 111). 
59 Ibid 2. 
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to individual skills or abilities to perform particular tasks.’60  The desire to enforce 
flexibility and establish much more comprehensive performance indicators was equally 
apparent in a 1993 agreement at the Phoenix Biscuit Company, which also explicitly 
employed the language of ‘Total Quality Management,’ ‘Benchmarking’ and ‘Best 
Practice’ which was becoming commonplace at this time.61  
These trends, and the process of enterprise bargaining in the food processing sector 
generally, took on a harder edge as the 1990s drew on, a function of the entry of 
aggressive multinational companies into an already foreign-dominated scene.62  These 
engaged in wage and conditions whipsawing between different jurisdictions and proved 
more than willing to exploit the union-diminishing potential of the Howard 
Government’s Workplace Relations Act 1996, the architecture of which I traced in 
chapter 5.  American food giant Simplot acquired Edgell-Birds Eye in 1995 after it was 
divested by the Australian conglomerate Pacific Dunlop.  The company brought with it 
the aggressive attitude to unionism characteristic of its homeland.  The initial move to 
enterprise bargaining had helped divide workers at the sectoral level, but left individual 
work places more-or-less intact.  Simplot, in common with many other manufacturers, 
intensified the process by fragmenting workers within the workplace.  In a remarkable 
policy document, Simplot outlined a comprehensive strategy to wrest back the initiative 
from unions, who were perceived to be ‘getting the upper hand.’63  The scheme 
involved outsourcing key maintenance positions and the entire complement of casual 
workers to Manpower, an American-based labour hire and human resource consultancy 
multinational.  A Manpower official had stated to Simplot that ‘all the talk in the World 
has little affect [sic] on the Unions and at the end of the day actions speak louder and 
the Union tend to then get the message – Things must change.’64  The end goal of the 
plan was to completely outsource work sites, reduce worker levels, and use the new 
                                                          
60 Ibid 3-5. 
61 ‘The Phoenix Biscuit Company Enterprise Agreement 1993’ (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Z628, Box 
111) 3-5. 
62 For example, Simplot acquired Edgell-Birds Eye and Herbert Adams (a baking company) in 1995, 
Swiss-based Nestle purchased the ice-cream manufacturer Peters in the same year, and biscuit 
manufacturer Arnott’s was acquired by the American-based Campbell Soup Company in 1997. 
63 Letter from Peter Tighe, National Secretary of the Communications, Electrical and Plumbing Union of 
Australia, to Tim Pallas, Australian Council of Trade Unions Assistant Secretary, 25 March 1997 (Noel 
Butlin Archives Centre, Z628, Box 5). 
64 Letter from Chris McKay, Manpower official, to Ron Howell, General Manager (Human Resources) 
Simplot Australia, 9 October 1996 (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Z628, Box 5) 1. 
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industrial relations legislation to further isolate individual workers and work groups65 ˗ 
in short, a paradigmatic liberal-productivist arrangement, combining precarity, 
enhanced managerial prerogative and juridical atomism.   
The belligerent rhetoric was matched by action.  As early as December 1996, just over a 
year after Simplot’s acquisition of Edgell-Birds Eye’s operations, the company had 
outsourced casual labour to Manpower at its Ulverstone plant.66  In late 1997, all 
seasonal and casual work at Simplot’s Devonport factory was similarly outsourced.67  
And in 1997/early 1998, a major industrial dispute erupted at the Echuca site, with 
Simplot locking-out employees after threatening to terminate all their employment 
contracts and completely outsource their positions.68  This drastic action earned the 
rebuke of the federal tribunal, with Commissioner Tolley opining: 
I am also concerned that large multinational companies come into this country 
and try to foist, in my view, unacceptable human relations practices on people in 
this country.  I am severely limited by what I can do pursuant to the Workplace 
Relations Act but I can under the Workplace Relations Act make it very clear 
there are to be no further threats of termination (my emphasis).69 
 
The limitations referred to by Commissioner Tolley were those that limited the 
tribunal’s capacity to intervene in enterprise bargaining, a function of the Howard 
government’s desire to reduce the role of the Commission, which was so graphically 
seen in chapter 6.  Tolley is grasping, in a personal sense, the nub of the liberal-
productivist labour law regime so far as the Commission is concerned.  The recasting of 
the law-administration continuum, elucidated in chapters 4, 5 and 6, saw the range of 
the Commission’s responsibilities continually narrowed, whilst its discretion came to be 
increasingly fettered by statute.  Law was re-asserting itself strongly, whittling away at 
the administrative fabric of arbitration to such a degree that, even in the case of the 
major stoppage at Echuca, the Commission found its ability to act severely constrained.  
                                                          
65 Tighe, above n 63. 
66 Letter from Freda Bogar, National Secretary of the AMWU Food and Confectionary Division, to Noel 
Treharne, Regional Secretary AMWU Food & Confectionary Division, 19 December 1996 (Noel Butlin 
Archives Centre, Z628, Box 2). 
67 Letter from Anne Urquhart, AMWU Tasmania State Organiser, to C. McKay, Manpower Services, 21 
November 1997 (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Z628, Box 26). 
68 Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union, ‘”Simplot Lock-Out” Fact Sheet’ (Noel Butlin Archives 
Centre, Z628, Box 26). 
69 Transcript of proceedings, Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries 
Union and Another and Simplot Australia (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, Case Nos. 20032 
& 20072, Commissioner Tolley, 14 January 1998) 9. 
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Although the workers affected eventually rebuffed management’s attempts after the six 
week lock-out, the company succeeded in cutting the union’s pay claim from 8% to 3%, 
whilst the new enterprise agreement went a long-way towards removing what Simplot 
regarded as ‘restrictive practices,’ including new flexibility in the taking of RDOs,70 the 
introduction of 12-hour shifts,71 and the foisting of some maintenance responsibilities 
on production workers.72 
In the meantime, the outsourcing of groups of workers to Manpower meant that the 
AMWU, Communications, Electrical and Plumbing Union of Australia (CEPU) and 
other unions now had to devote resources to negotiations with that company.  The well-
observed tendency for the labour hire sector to have very low levels of unionisation,73 
together with the aforementioned fact that Manpower was party to a strategy of 
confronting unions, ensured that this was a task fraught with danger.  The ACTU had 
successfully struck a ‘heads of agreement’ document with Manpower, which basically 
involved the former accepting the flexibility and efficiency demands of the company in 
exchange for recognition and the development of consultative arrangements with 
appropriate trade unions.74  The AMWU came to a derivative agreement, which was 
broadly similar in tone.75  This replicated the broader effort of the AMWU to come to 
agreements with labour hire companies to try and reduce pay and conditions 
differentials with the parent company (and so presumably reduce the incentive for the 
latter to outsource in the first place).  Such efforts dovetailed with the movement to 
pattern bargaining in the mid to late 1990s, as unions sought to defend the standard 
employment model and re-establish some measure of uniformity at the sectoral level. 
                                                          
70 ‘Simplot Echuca Enterprise Bargaining Agreement 1998’ (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Z628, Box 5) 
6. 
71 Ibid 8(a). 
72 Ibid 5(b). 
73 Queensland Government, ‘Submission to Inquiry into independent contractors and labour hire 
arrangements’ (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment, Workplace Relations and 
Workforce Participation, Submission No. 66, 2005) 16.  For some of the reasons why labour hire workers 
are difficult to organise, see: Richard Hall, ‘Labour Hire in Australia: Motivation, Dynamics and 
Prospects’ (Working Paper No. 76, Australian Centre for Industrial Relations Research and Training, 
2002) 6-7. 
74 ‘Heads of Agreement Between Manpower and the ACTU’, 26 November 1997, (Noel Butlin Archives 
Centre, Z628, Box 26). 
75 ‘AMWU/Manpower Agreement’ (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Z628, Box 26).  Simplot and 
Manpower proved very adept at exploiting inter-union rivalries.  In October 1996, a decision to outsource 
electricians at Simplot to Manpower was known to the AMWU, but not the union which covered them, 
the CEPU: Stone & Others & C.E.P.U. v Simplot Australia Pty Limited (1996) (Noel Butlin Archives 
Centre, Z628, Box 26). 
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The results were inconsistent.  Unsurprisingly, given its role in Campaign 2000 and 
Campaign 2003, the Victorian branch of the AMWU experienced more success than its 
brethren in other states.76  The struggles over outsourcing and labour hire, however, 
informed the union effort to come to a national-level agreement with Simplot.  In this it 
was aided by the fact that union density across its four processing plants was very high.  
Moreover, the Food & Confectionary Division of the AMWU had identified the threat 
posed by labour hire and resolved to either regulate its use or drive it entirely from the 
industry.77  Although this was a very optimistic appraisal of union strength, particularly 
amongst smaller operators, the organisation of Simplot workers meant that the company 
vision was not fully realised.  Not only did the union achieve a national-level 
framework agreement (which set the parameters for agreements at the individual sites), 
it also successfully retained some of the proportions clauses on part-time and casual 
labour which were being phased out of awards, including the Food Preservers Award 
2000, generally.  It remained the case, however, that the national framework 
agreement78 gave the company the ability to minimise demarcation barriers, deploy 
labour ever more flexibly across different jobs, duties and times, and use labour hire 
arrangements provided certain conditions of consultation were observed.79 
The pressures facing unions involved in enterprise bargaining in the food sector became 
all the more difficult with the intensification of global competition.  As indicated in 
chapter 4, whereas the crux of antipodean Fordist protectionist policy was to shield 
Australian manufacturers from the vicissitudes of the international market, within 
liberal-productivism these vicissitudes are welcomed, as competition is recast as a 
crucible producing vigorous and efficient firms.  The newly open global space, together 
with the capacity to disaggregate and globally configure complex production networks, 
provided both the opportunity and the rationale for multinational companies to whipsaw 
                                                          
76 See, for example: Terri Mylett, The intensification of labour market polarisation in metals 
manufacturing in Australia in the 1900s (PhD Thesis, University of Wollongong, 2003) 266-272; Chris 
Spindler, ‘In defence of ‘throwback’ unionism’ (10 March 1999) Green Left Weekly 
<https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/20099>; Stuart Martin, ‘Can unions stop the spread of labour hire?’ 
(14 August 2002) Green Left Weekly <https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/26923>.  
77 AMWU, ‘Labour Hire and Casual Employment in the Food and Confectionary Industry’ (Noel Butlin 
Archives Centre, Z628, Box 24). 
78 Which has, in various iterations, continued to this day.  See: AMWU, CEPU and Simplot Australia Pty 
Limited National Collective Agreement 2014-2017 [2015] FWCA 727. 
79 ‘Simplot Australia Pty Limited (National Framework) Agreement 1999’ (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, 
Z628, Box 26). 
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between different jurisdictions in the hopes of encouraging a self-reinforcing cycle of 
wage and conditions undercutting.   
The activities of the Australian branch of the American-owned Heinz Company provide 
an instructive example.  Even under the award system, Heinz had demonstrated its 
commitment to enforcing flexibility in labour relations, using casual labour out of 
season (in defiance of the award) and re-employing full-time workers who took 
voluntary redundancies as casuals.80  The company, however, had in mind much greater 
changes.  In a revealing policy document in early 1993, it identified what it perceived as 
shortcomings and limitations to future growth, which included a poor industrial 
relations image, restrictive practices and a limited number of production days.81  The 
vision anticipated for the company in 1996, although couched in the aspirational 
language of unitarist human resource management, clearly anticipated substantial 
rationalisation of production, the development of a low-cost, flexible and export-
oriented manufacturing system, changed work practices, a predatory acquisition strategy 
and the potential relocation of factories;82 a union, in short, of the precarious, lean-
production industrial paradigm and global production logic of liberal-productivism. 
Heinz’s 1992 acquisition of New Zealand-based food processor Wattie’s armed 
management with the leverage to bargain towards these desired outcomes.  A variety of 
reports had found cost advantages of doing business in New Zealand,83 with the 
immediate result being that certain operations in Australia (namely the plant at 
Dandenong) were threatened with closure.84 AMEU National Organiser Neil Marshall 
noted of Heinz management, ‘[t]he Board will meet again in May to determine the 
                                                          
80 Food Preservers Union of Australia and H.J. Heinz Co Australia Pty Ltd, Food Preservers Award, 
1973 (1991) Print J7693. 
81 H.J. Heinz Pty Ltd, ‘H.J. Heinz Australia-Now and the Future’, 12 January 1993, (Noel Butlin Archives 
Centre, Z628, Box 111) 3-4. 
82 Ibid 7-9. 
83 It is significant to note that around this time New Zealand had embarked upon industrial relations 
reforms of its own.  Compared to the fairly steady, gradated process of labour law change in Australia, 
these were rapid and radical.  Until the mid-1980s, New Zealand’s labour law regime was broadly similar 
to Australia, with both countries’ systems revolving around compulsory arbitration.  After a series of 
legislative modifications which made arbitration non-compulsory, the passage of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 (NZ) dramatically abolished awards, outlawed the closed shop and provided for a 
voluntary system of individual and collective agreements.  The effects included a collapse in trade union 
membership and vicious employer cost-cutting when it came to wages and conditions.  Such 
developments undoubtedly increased the attractiveness of New Zealand to food manufacturers.  For more, 
see: David Peetz, Brave New Workplace: How Individual Contracts are Changing Our Jobs (Allen & 
Unwin, 2006) 50, 54, 91-92. 
84 Kevin Hart, ‘Heinz will switch some Aust activity to NZ’, New Zealand Herald (Auckland), 13 
February 1993. 
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future of the Dandenong plant, but the position has been made quite clear that if an 
Enterprise Agreement can’t be finalised before this meeting the Dandenong operation 
will be transferred to New Zealand.’85  In turn, Wattie’s management encouraged a 
highly casualised production workforce, the integration of skilled workers into 
management, the removal of trade unions and the intensification of greater inter-
Australasia competition, spurred by the fact that Heinz was internally comparing its 
Wattie’s and Dandenong facilities at monthly performance reviews.86   
The attempt by Heinz to play the two plants off against each other to strongarm the 
enterprise bargaining process was a complete success.  The FPU, which until this point 
had been more reluctant than other unions to bargain with Heinz,87 was sidelined by the 
ACTU, which had taken over the negotiations.88  The ACTU came to a radical 
agreement with Heinz in April 1993 over operations at the Dandenong factory, which 
provided, amongst other things, for: 
 130 immediate retrenchments, to be followed by another 90 over the following 
12 months; 
 the addition of a third shift, making for 24-hour production; and 
 the contracting out of some functions, including plumbing, boiler maintenance 
and electrical work.89 
 
It also established the framework for further enterprise agreements that sought to reduce 
costs even further.90  The historical irony was that these concessions wouldn’t be 
enough for Heinz management, who would go on to ultimately close the Dandenong 
                                                          
85 Letter to George Campbell, AMEU National Secretary, and Doug Cameron, AMEU Assistant National 
Secretary, from Neil Marshall, AMEU National Organiser, 25 February 1993 (Noel Butlin Archives 
Centre, Z628, Box 111).  Interestingly, in this letter, Marshall also suggested establishing 
communications with unions in the New Zealand plant to help minimise management’s ability to play the 
two against each other.   
86 ‘Watties Briefing Paper’ (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Z628, Box 111) 2-3. 
87 See, for example: Robert Gottliebsen, ‘Heinz ready to play the Wattie card’, BRW (Australia), 13 
November 1992, 20. 
88 ‘Heinz Jobs Cuts Sound A Warning’, The Age (Melbourne), 2 April 1993, 13. 
89 Cathy Bolt, ‘Heinz and ACTU in watershed pact to secure future’, Australian Financial Review 
(Australia), 27 April 1993, 7. 
90 Ibid. 
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plant in 2000 and relocate its products to New Zealand and two other Australian sites 
after running the factory down through lack of investment.91 
The story of Heinz is just the most instructive example of what was becoming a general 
trend in food-processing throughout the 1990s and 2000s, as multinational corporations 
whipsawed between different jurisdictions and plants, encouraging a competitive blood-
letting of wages and conditions and leveraging the enterprise bargaining process in their 
favour.  Companies such as Arnott’s, John West, Coca-Cola Amatil and Kerry 
Ingredients employed the tactic, on both intra-Australia and international scales, with 
factory closures and relocation of production cutting costs whilst serving as examples to 
other Australian food workers.92  Although I explore throughout this thesis the 
characteristics and tendencies of liberal-productivism and its labour law regime in 
Australia, this process of whipsawing makes clear the inherently global configuration of 
this model of development.  As stated in Chapter 4, Australia has gained from this 
model more than many other countries, but it is important to remember here that this is 
due in no small part to the advantageous terms upon which Australian capitalism 
articulated with the world economy.  The mass export of mining commodities to the 
growing Chinese economy, coupled with capital whipsawing, union repression and 
precarisation at home: these were key elements in the coherence of Australian liberal-
productivism made possible by the embrace of a global vista.  
Conclusions 
This case study has explored the unfolding of award restructuring and enterprise 
bargaining in the food processing sector, elucidating both the substantive content of 
agreements and the interaction of the bargaining process with broader political 
                                                          
91 See, for example, Damien Carrick, ‘Dandenong crushed by Heinz factory closure’, The World Today 
on ABC Local Radio, 19 July 2000, <http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/stories/s153786.htm>; Narelle 
Hooper, ‘Heinz Watties defends its closure’, The Word Today on ABC Local Radio, 19 July 2000, 
<http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/stories/s153797.htm>. 
92 See, for example: ‘Arnott’s to close biscuit factory’, The Australian (online), 29 April 2008, 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/arnotts-to-close-biscuit-factory/story-e6frg6nf-
1111116194132>; Nance Haxton, ‘Australia’s last tuna cannery closes’, PM with Mark Colvin on ABC 
Local Radio, 23 February 2010, <http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2010/s2828175.htm>; ‘Impact of 
sweet soft drink slowdown as CCA closes Bayswater soft drink bottling plant’, Australian Food News, 
November 5 2014, <http://ausfoodnews.com.au/2014/11/05/impact-of-sweet-soft-drink-slowdown-as-
cca-closes-bayswater-soft-drink-bottling-plant.html>; Stephen Drill, ‘More than 100 jobs lost as 
Melbourne food factory moves to Malaysia’, Herald Sun (online), 9 August 2012, 
<http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/national/more-than-100-jobs-lost-as-melbourne-food-factory-
moves-to-malaysia/story-fndo3ewo-1226446921234>.  
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economic developments, such as the growing internationalisation of production and 
increasing foreign ownership.  It has been demonstrated that the fundamental premise of 
enterprise bargaining within a liberal-productivist model of development, namely 
intensified precarity and flexibility, had their roots in the restructuring and efficiency 
and structural efficiency principles of the Accord years.  Award reform under these 
heads involved, amongst other things, removing restrictions on the employment of 
casual and part-time labour, extending ordinary hours, increasing the flexibility of shift 
hours and RDOs and changing the payment of penalty rates.  Importantly, at a time 
when the process was being painted as a progressive one leading to up-skilled, involved 
workers and career paths, food workers experienced, and acknowledged, that the 
principles were largely a cover for work intensification and the clawback of hard-won 
conditions. 
Enterprise bargaining intensified these developments, whilst also placing a premium 
upon the removal of demarcation barriers and the creation of a ‘productivity’ culture, a 
euphemism for employees being subordinated to the needs and requirements of their 
enterprise.  This lattermost was a refutation of the unifying tendencies operative within 
the award system, and helped break the unification of the wage structure headed by the 
metal trades explored in chapter 7.   
The general pattern of trade-offs required for enterprise bargaining-based wage 
increases were broadly similar to those in other sectors, as will be demonstrated when I 
come to the case of the retail sector.  However, it acquired a harder edge in the food 
processing sector because of the historic militancy of key unions and a growing 
exposure to international competition.  Whereas retailers, particularly food retailers, are 
often quite sheltered from global forces, Australian food workers increasingly had to 
compete against jurisdictions with lower wages and laxer regulations, such as New 
Zealand and Malaysia.  Large multinationals such as Heinz proved exceedingly adept at 
exploiting this situation, whip-sawing between different locations to leverage the 
bargaining process in their favour and extract ever greater concessions from companies 
and communities.   
This is the very stuff of the liberal-productivist model of development.  Premised on a 
global production system and the easy movement of capital across national boundaries, 
capital is now more-or-less free to seek the greatest valorisation opportunities, with little 
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regard for its ‘home.’  Whereas the labour law regime of antipodean Fordism obtained 
its logic and coherence in part from the synergy between high levels of industrial 
protection, the recycling of monopoly rents through the arbitration system and the 
standard employment model, the commensurate liberal-productivist regime relies 
instead upon the nexus between free trade, a polarised wage structure and employment 
precarity.  For Australian workers generally, and food processing employees in 
particular, enterprise bargaining in such a context (a context it has helped constitute) is a 
font of union weakness rather than strength.  Whilst continued union organisation in the 
food manufacturing sector has at times frustrated the realisation of management’s ideal 
vision, the overall trajectory has been one determined by capital. 
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Chapter 9 
PRECARITY AND MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVE IN 
THE NEW SOUTH WALES RETAIL SECTOR 
In the previous chapter, I studied how award restructuring and enterprise bargaining 
helped constitute a liberal-productivist labour law regime, particularly insofar as they 
crystallised the latter’s industrial paradigm and wage-labour nexus.  The current chapter 
explores much the same processes (with an additional focus on Australian Workplace 
Agreements) in the New South Wales (NSW) retail sector.  Specifically, taking 
precarity and enhanced managerial prerogative as central to the transformed wage-
labour nexus, I will focus specifically on the ways in which awards and, more lately, 
enterprise agreements have evolved in the transition to liberal-productivism.  Although 
the process has been protracted and uneven, these instruments of labour law have been 
denuded of virtually all restrictions, both quantitative and qualitative, on the use of 
casual and part-time labour.  At the same time the model of a five-day, regular-hours 
work-week for full-time retail staff has been substantially displaced, particularly as 
normal trading hours have been continually extended whilst associated wage premiums 
have been reduced.  In short, the standard employment model, central to the antipodean 
Fordist wage-labour nexus, has been largely destroyed.  The result today is an industry 
which, more so than any other save hospitality, is characterised by a precarious 
employment structure, where management enjoy broad powers to engage large pools of 
transient labour (in which women and students are over-represented) across a 
fragmented ‘time-regime’ of working hours.1 
There are a variety of reasons for selecting the NSW retail sector as a case study.  In the 
previous chapter it was noted that this current chapter should be read as a partner to it.  
By counter-posing a service industry to a manufacturing industry, I can trace similarities 
and differences in terms of the key processes identified.  Indeed, I argue in both 
chapters 8 and 9 that the fundamental likeness of the food processing and retail stories 
immensely strengthen the thesis of transition made in this thesis.  An equally important 
consideration, however, is the argument that sectors like retail can be thought of as new 
                                                          
1 Iain Campbell and Jenny Chalmers, ‘Job quality and part-time work in the retail industry: An Australian 
case study’ (2008) 19(3) The International Journal of Human Resource Management 487, 488. 
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lead sectors in the fabric of liberal-productivism.2  It will be recalled that in chapter 4 I 
defined lead sectors ‘as those industries in which outcomes disproportionately affect 
industrial, economic and social outcomes in other industries.’  Due to a combination of 
factors, including the flagging of the manufacturing sector and the increasing retailer 
domination of supply chains consequent upon a rapid concentration of retail capital,3 the 
retail sector can in a sense be regarded as a new lead sector.4  Employment security, 
trade union militancy and workplace activism; these features of antipodean Fordism 
made the least impression on the retail sector.  In the new world of liberal-productivism, 
employment precarity, a large, fragmented workforce and effete trade unionism became 
virtues with which the retail sector was liberally endowed.  In particular, I will 
demonstrate in this chapter that the retail sector precociously enshrined the liberal-
productivist wage-labour nexus of increased precarity and intensification of labour 
stripped of the quid pro quo of job security, rising remuneration and internal labour 
markets of antipodean Fordism.   
The decision to focus largely on NSW is a function of a number of considerations.  
Firstly, a spotlight on a state jurisdiction counterbalances the largely federal focus of the 
analysis thus far.  Secondly, in acknowledging the necessity of intimate analysis and the 
historically state-based character of retail awards,5 it makes sense to concentrate upon 
the concrete experience of one particular state.  Given the fact that NSW is the most 
populous state (and thus changes in retail awards affect a greater number of workers 
than is the case in other states) and a nexus existed between NSW retail awards and 
                                                          
2 Brett Heino, ‘Award Regulation and the New South Wales Retail Sector, 1971-1988: Crisis and 
Experimentation amidst Changing Models of Development’ (2015) 109 Labour History 75, 76-77.  Other 
scholars have grasped this fact without using the same words.  See, for example, the description of retail 
as one of the ‘IR pace-setters’ in the work of Justine Evesson et al, ‘‘Lowering the standards’: From 
Awards to Work Choices in Retail and Hospitality Collective Agreements’ (Synthesis Report, Workplace 
Research Centre, September 2007) 49. 
3 Heino, ‘Award Regulation and the New South Wales Retail Sector’, above n 2, 81. 
4 I say ‘in a sense’ due to the fact that it has certainly not assumed the economic role of the metals and 
broader manufacturing sectors during the period of antipodean Fordist functionality.  I mentioned in 
chapter 4 how sectors such as retail and hospitality account for a higher proportion of total employment 
than their contribution to GDP.  Moreover, unlike the positive feedback loop of lead sector manufacturing 
within antipodean Fordism, the pattern within liberal-productivism appears to be largely negative.  
Indeed, as we shall see here, retail employers are at the forefront of poor pay, precarious positions and 
award stripping.   
5 This was primarily a function of the requirement of an ‘inter-state dispute’ to enliven the Federal 
Government’s ability to arbitrate and make awards: Australian Constitution s 51(xxxv).  Well into the 
post-World War II years, Australian retailing remained a predominantly state-based affair, demonstrated 
most graphically in the association of major department store chains such as Myer, David Jones, Harris 
Scarfe and Aherns with Melbourne, New South Wales, South Australia and Western Australia 
respectively. 
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those in some other jurisdictions, such as Western Australia6 and the Australian Capital 
Territory,7 it has been selected for this analysis.  Where relevant, however, 
developments in other states will be described and integrated into the historical account.  
Also, when I come to consider the changes effected by WorkChoices, the inquiry will 
have to be generalised, given the mortal blow this legislation dealt to state-based 
industrial systems. 
To begin the analysis, an understanding of retail during the period of antipodean Fordist 
functionality must be reached.  As shall be seen, insofar as the antipodean Fordist wage-
labour nexus was concerned, this period in retail is notable for its brevity and 
belatedness. 
NSW retail awards – The beginnings 
The retail sector proved a laggard in terms of the diffusion of the antipodean Fordist 
wage-labour nexus, particularly regarding the pattern of a regular five-day work week 
central to the standard employment model.  For much of the first half of the twentieth-
century, retail was characterised by regular Saturday and Sunday work.8  Even after the 
advent of Sunday closing,9 full and, later, half-day trading on Saturday were considered 
normal working hours that could be worked as part of a six-day roster.10  In NSW, it 
was only in 1971-1972 that the five-day week was introduced for retail workers.11  By 
                                                          
6 Re Shop and Warehouse (Wholesale Retail Establishments) Award No. 32 of 1976 in CCH, Australian 
Industrial Law Review, vol 23(16) (12 August 1981) ¶377. 
7 Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees’ Association v Woolworths (Alice Springs) Ltd in CCH, 
Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 24(3) (10 February 1982) ¶53. 
8 For an excellent summary of the development of trading hours movements and legislation, particularly 
regarding the struggle over Saturday work, see: Beverley Kingston, Basket, Bag and Trolley: A history of 
shopping in Australia (Oxford University Press, 1994) 111-115. 
9 Which, incidentally, was a move strongly pushed by religious groups, concerned at the health of 
worker’s morals if church-going suffered at the hands of commerce. 
10 Saturday morning work was, however, specially recompensed in some circumstances.  For example, in 
the Shop Assistants (Newcastle) and (Metropolitan) Awards case (1955) AR 817, 885-886, Baun J 
provided for an allowance of 10 shillings for workers thus engaged.  It is telling, however, that this was 
awarded following a refusal by the Full Bench to grant a five-day working week, in essence representing 
a premium in lieu of the full benefits of the antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus: Re Shop Employees 
(State) Award in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 27(17) (5 September 1985) ¶314.  See also: 
Shop Assistants Metropolitan Case (1967) AR 337. 
11 By agreement with retailers, with the requisite awards being varied in 1971 and 1972.  See: Shop 
Employees (State) Award in C.P. Mills and E.G.A. Lambert (eds), Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 
14(11) (20 May 1972) ¶194; Re Shop Employees (State) Award in CCH, Australian Industrial Law 
Review, vol 27(17) (5 September 1985) ¶314.  The system was also subject to a long period of struggle 
over rostering arrangements, particularly regarding cycles and roster days.  In the initial period of 
operation, the five-day work week often resulted in longer daily hours for retail workers given that many 
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contrast, the majority of employees had won the five-day, 40-hour week in the wake of 
the federal Arbitration Commission’s 8 September 1947 decision, which was explored 
in chapter 5.   
The belated granting of the standard work-week, which was introduced by consent 
between workers and retailers, came amidst the intensifying class struggle of the late 
1960s and early 1970s, the ‘flood tide’ of working-class militancy.12  Particularly 
concerning for retail capital was the fact that left-wing unions, such as the 
Miscellaneous Workers Union, were making ground against the right-wing Shop 
Assistants’ and Warehouse Employees Union, today’s Shop, Distributive and Allied 
Employees’ Association (for simplicity, the union will be referred to as the SDA).13  
The peak retailers body, the Retail Traders’ Association (RTA), believed ‘that shop 
assistants were basically conservative in nature and tended to identify with the firm in 
which they working,’14 a mindset the RTA wished to keep free from left-wing union 
leadership.  The major retailers, such as Woolworths, Coles, Grace Bros, David Jones, 
Myer and Waltons, were especially vulnerable to disruption, given the fact that they 
were easier to organise and stoppages could wreak havoc given the perishability of 
many retail goods and the interdependent nature of supply chains.15   
In the event, both the union and the six major retailers aforementioned saw the benefit 
in a closed shop arrangement, whereby the SDA got 100% coverage, whilst the 
employers entrenched the conservative union to the exclusion of more militant 
competitors.16  The deal, struck in 1971, saw the membership of the NSW branch 
increase exponentially; whereas in 1968 its ranks numbered only 5,320, by 1973 it had 
swelled to 38,000 members.17  The agreement was also of key importance to the 
unfolding of the five-day work week for retail workers.  Mortimer notes that part of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
stores responded by deploying full-time staff over a four-and-a-half day week: Michael Johnston, 
‘Industrial Notes’ (1972) (2) Voice 8 (official journal of the Shop Assistants and Warehouse Employees 
Federation of Australia). 
12 Tom Bramble, Trade Unionism in Australia: A history from flood to ebb tide (Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) 41-71. 
13 Dennis Mortimer, ‘Trade Union and Management Strategy: A Case Study of Compulsory Unionism’ 
(2001) 1(2) Employment Relations Record 81. 
14 Ibid 86. 
15 A threat made very apparent by the preparedness of the Transport Workers’ Union to enforce boycotts 
to ensure compulsory unionism: Nikola Balnave and Dennis Mortimer, ‘Union Security in Retail: 
Legislative Intervention or Collective Agreement’ (2005) 13(1) International Journal of Employment 
Studies 81. 
16 Ibid 98-102. 
17 Voice (1973) 5(1) 3.  
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retail union strategy for winning this central feature of the antipodean Fordist wage-
labour nexus was ‘a long running and unsuccessful campaign to reduce shopping hours 
through Saturday closing.’18  The necessity of bringing the SDA into the fold in an era 
of heightened class struggle brought with it the need for retailers to make certain 
concessions, among them the five-day week, but employer acquiescence was premised 
upon the union accepting the legitimacy of Saturday and late night work.  Union official 
Michael Johnston noted that ‘[t]he 5-day-week campaign was successfully concluded 
because the union changed its attitude from one of complete opposition to late night and 
Saturday trading to one of controlling the number of Saturdays and late nights our 
members had to work.’19  Although such concessions were deemed necessary by the 
SDA, this method of accommodating employer demands, whereby every gain had to be 
offset by something relinquished, would increasingly undermine union bargaining 
power in the 1980s and 1990s and with it the ability of the union to shape the contours 
of the transformation in retail industrial relations. 
It was thus only at the zenith of antipodean Fordism that the NSW retail sector exhibited 
the typical working-time arrangements that characterised the Fordist wage-labour nexus.  
The fact that this was achieved on the cusp of Fordist dysfunction ensured that this 
nexus found fallow soil. 
The 1970s and 1980s – Crucial transitional decades 
I have elsewhere stated that ‘[t]he 1970s and 1980s were crucial transitional decades 
regarding the place of the retail sector within the fabric of Australian capitalism.’20  In 
particular, the dominance of manufacturers over retailers within antipodean Fordism 
was usurped.  Based on an industrial paradigm that tended towards the efficient 
manufacture of standardised commodities on long-production runs,21 oligopolistic 
manufacturers in the period of antipodean Fordist functionality were able to exert 
control over comparatively homogenous markets that established clear demarcations 
between elements in the distribution network.  Within these networks, the role of 
                                                          
18 Mortimer, ‘Trade Union and Management Strategy’, above n 13, 81. 
19 Michael Johnston, ‘Industrial Notes’ (1973) 5(2) Voice 8. 
20 Heino, ‘Award Regulation and the New South Wales Retail Sector’, above n 2, 81. 
21 This encompassed both industrial and agri-food commodities: David Burch and Geoff Lawrence, 
‘Supermarket Own Brands, Supply Chains and the Transformation of the Agri-Food System’ (2005) 
13(1) International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food 1,11. 
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retailers ‘was to buy goods from the range offered by the wholesaler or other 
intermediaries, and sell them on to the consumer…it was the manufacturers who 
decided what goods were available, and in most countries at what price they could be 
sold to the public.’22  In Australia, this latter most point was expressed most clearly by 
the ability of manufacturers to control prices through resale price maintenance 
practices.23     
As the manufacturing sector began to lose steam in the crisis of the 1970s, however, a 
number of developments changed the game.  From the 1970 and 1980s onwards, 
Australian retailers, particularly grocery and liquor retailers, gained the apex position in 
supply chains through the combination of a growing monopoly over the sale of 
consumer goods,24 the acquisition of direct interests in the manufacturing sector25 and 
the advent of retail ‘house brand’ products.26   
This control was a key moment in the repositioning of retail as a lead sector, 
particularly insofar as it opened the channels by which its wage-labour nexus could be 
flowed up the supply chain to manufacturers.27  Unfortunately for retail employees, this 
position of weightier industrial gravity coincided with the movement towards de-
regulated trading hours.  Large retailers sought to counteract stagnation in product 
markets, a product of antipodean Fordist crisis,28 by increasing consumption 
                                                          
22 Michael Reid, 'Change at the check-out' (1995)(7904) The Economist 3, 3-4.  See also: David Burch 
and Jasper Goss, ‘Global Sourcing and Retail Chains: Shifting Relationships of Production in Australian 
Agri-foods’ (1999) 64(2) Rural Sociology 334. 
23 Stuart Rosewarne, ‘The Political Economy of Retailing into the Eighties-Part 2’ (1984) 16 Journal of 
Australian Political Economy 75, 86. 
24 In the mid-1980s, some of the largest mergers seen in the Australian retail sector were taking place, 
namely the Coles/Myer and Woolworths/Safeway combinations.  The market share of both Coles and 
Woolworths increased by more than 15% between 1975 and 1987: National Association of Retail Grocers 
of Australia, ‘Submission to ACCC inquiry into the competitiveness of retail prices for standard groceries 
– Part B’ (13 March 2008) 6. 
25 Stuart Rosewarne, ‘The Political Economy of Retailing into the Eighties-Part 1’ (1983) 15 Journal of 
Australian Political Economy 18, 33. 
26 Ibid 33-34.  The existence of a similar transformation in other Fordist countries (albeit usually to a less 
extreme degree) demonstrates that the roots of these processes lay in the crisis of Fordism.  See, for 
example: Jagdish N. Smith, ‘Emerging Trends for the Retailing Industry’ (1983) 59(3) Journal of 
Retailing 6; Alexandra Hughes, ‘Forging New Cultures of Food Retailer-Manufacturer Relations?’ in 
Neil Wrigley and Michelle Lowe (eds), Retailing, Consumption and Capital (Longman, 1996) 90-115; T. 
Marsden, M. Harrison and A. Flynn, ‘Creating competitive space: exploring the social and political 
maintenance of retail power’ (1998) 30(3) Environment and Planning A 481. 
27 Christopher Wright and John Lund, ‘Supply chain rationalization: retailer dominance and labour 
flexibility in the Australian food and grocery industry’ (2003) 17(1) Work, employment and society 137, 
140. 
28 Rosewarne, ‘The Political Economy of Retailing into the Eighties-Part 1’, above n 25, 25-25. 
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opportunities and squeezing out smaller retailers29 (who were generally granted 
exemptions from trading hours legislation).  Given the fact that, in the context of 
considerable union strength, work outside of normal hours attracted a penalty rate for 
full-time staff,30 the progressive extension of trading hours encouraged retailers to 
intensify their use of casual and part-time labour.  This development required a 
transformation of retail awards, particularly to the effect of removing restrictions on the 
engagement of such workers, increasing the pool of potential labour and slowly 
undermining the privileged position of full-time employees.  What was required, in 
short, was a degradation of the standard employment model as it applied to the retail 
sector. 
In NSW, this process began in earnest in the 1980s.  After gaining in the slew of work-
value cases in the early 1980s (discussed in chapter 5),31 retail workers soon found the 
retail awards controlling their terms and conditions of employment becoming a 
battleground between employers and the SDA which, with some notable exceptions,32 
remained committed to pursuing outcomes through the arbitration system.33   
                                                          
29 Ibid 25.  This over-riding purpose of extended late night trading was recognised by opponents of 
trading hours de-regulation very early in the piece.  As early as 1979, Queensland retail unions were 
claiming that the ‘only beneficiaries of late night trading in Brisbane were major tenants in major 
shopping centres’: Application to vary Order Fixing Trading Hours in CCH, Australian Industrial Law 
Review, vol 21(13) (27 June 1979) ¶230.  
30 As well as the fact that full-time staff often proved reluctant to work outside their normal spread of 
hours. It was for this reason that many of the early efforts to extend trading hours were made conditional 
upon staff not being required to work outside of their hitherto normal hours.  In NSW, the introduction of 
Friday night and Saturday afternoon trading in 1984 was made conditional upon a savings clause being 
inserted in the Shop Assistants (General Shops) Interim (State) Award, which provided that full-time staff 
employed prior to the 23rd of July, 1984, could not be compelled to work outside their ordinary hours: 
Application for interpretation of cl. 8B of Shop Employees (General Shops) Interim (State) Award in 
CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 27(12) (26 June 1985) ¶215.   
31 In NSW, retail workers gained an extra $8.70 per week, a common figure as break-throughs in the 
transport and metals sector stoked the wage explosion of the early 1980s: In Retail Shops (State) Award in 
CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 22(18) (3 September 1980) ¶282.  They were also successful 
in lifting the minimum wage quite effectively: Brian O’Neill, ‘A New Minimum Wage of $225’ (Summer 
1981) Shop and distributive worker 3 (official journal of SDA NSW Branch).  However, militant metal 
unions pushed ahead, and it was not until 1983/1984 that NSW retail awards were varied in line with the 
prevailing metal industry standard: In re Shop Employees (State) Interim Award and Other Awards 
(April-June 1983, Pt 2) AR 283; Re Shop Employees (State) Interim Award in CCH, Australian Industrial 
Law Review, vol 26(7) (11 April 1984) ¶123. 
32 For examples of strike action in NSW, see: Sec 25A notification re company security in CCH, 
Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 21(9) (2 May 1979) ¶146; Damon Frith, ‘Business as Usual as 
Workers Protest’, Australian Financial Review (Australia), 10 November 1988, 6.  The fact that strikes 
remained limited in retail as a whole can be gleaned from the comparatively paltry strike statistics for the 
sector as a whole from 1975-1980 (the period for which we have specific data on the incidence of strikes 
in the retail sector specifically).  Generally speaking, retail strikes were small in number and usually drew 
in relatively few employees.  See: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Statistics 1975-1980 (6101.0).  
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The material premises of these debates were the accumulating symptoms of a changing 
industrial structure and employment relations in the 1970s.  As early as 1977, Justice 
Macken of the NSW Industrial Commission (whom we shall come to know well in this 
chapter) noted in a case regarding the formulation of a single Shop Employees (State) 
Award34 that ‘[t]he evidence established a trend in the industry, from 1969 to the present 
date, by which casual juniors had come increasingly to be employed.’35  He identified a 
variety of impulses tending towards this result, including filling employment gaps 
created by the five-day week and the impact of self-service technologies and new 
marketing procedures in allowing junior employees to perform the same duties as older 
workers.36  In a 1980 work-value case, Justice Macken further observed the fundamental 
shift towards casualised retail labour, noting how it had effected profound labour 
process changes for both full-time and casual/part-time employees.37  Convinced of the 
undesirability of retail casualisation, and under pressure from the union, Justice Macken 
had even taken some concrete steps in 1977 to combat the problem through requiring 
employers to pay casual employees penalty rates for work on public holidays, weekends 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Subsequent iterations of Labour Statistics do not specifically measure strike statistics for the retail sector.  
This in itself would appear to tell a story as to how negligible strike action in the sector really was. 
33 It is worth noting here that in 1974 the NSW branch of the SDA (then known as the Shop Assistants 
and Warehouse Employees Federation) amalgamated with the Australian Workers Union which, although 
similarly anti-communist, was considerably more militant industrially.  This led to an increasingly bold 
outlook and tactics in the 1970s, such as seen in the strike of Wollongong shop workers through 
September and October 1975: ‘Wollongong Strike’ (1975) 7(4) Voice, 7; and In re Shop Employees 
(State) Award (October-December 1976, Pt 4) AR 755, 758.  The amalgamation was anathema to the 
federal SDA, which, after several years of legal wrangling, successfully scuttled it, aided and abetted by 
large employers refusing to recognise the new union: Michael Easson, ‘Maher created a powerful force’, 
Sydney Morning Herald (online), January 4, 2010 < http://www.smh.com.au/comment/obituaries/maher-
created-a-powerful-force-20100103-ln9t.html>.  This development certainly strengthened the employers’ 
hand, particularly given the trenchant opposition of the amalgamated union to further trading hours de-
regulation: Barry Egan, ‘Thank You For Your Support’ (1977) 9(4) Voice 3. 
34 The history of NSW retail awards in the 1970s and 1980s is the history of the struggle between award 
universality and fragmentation, with the desire for a single Shop Award being stymied more than once in 
the Commission under the pressure of the evolving class struggle within the sector, with more powerfully 
organised workers in large retailers sometimes able to strike independent awards. 
35 In re Shop Employees (State) Award (No. 2) (July-September 1977, Pt 3) AR 555, 569.  It is worth 
noting that the initial trend towards retail precarity was one primarily of casualisation.  Unlike the well-
established categories of ‘full-time’ and ‘casual’, ‘part-time’ employees were a much rarer feature of 
Australian awards into the 1980s (as noted in chapter 5).  Indeed, the Shop Employees (State) Award of 
1982 provided that part-time workers could only be women or men over sixty: Shop Employees (State) 
Award (1982) 226 NSW Industrial Gazette 1716, 1722. 
36 In re Shop Employees (State) Award (No. 2) (July-September 1977, Pt 3) AR 555, 568-570.  Although 
Justice Macken does not phrase it in these terms, his implicit observation of the impact of self-service 
technology on the skill content of retail jobs in thoroughly consistent with the thesis of Taylorism in the 
tertiary sector advanced in chapter 4. 
37 In re Shop Employees (State) Interim Award and Another Award (July-September 1980, Pt 3) AR 555, 
556. 
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and after 6.00pm on weekdays.38  This represented a marked departure from the historic 
attitude to casual employees, which was succinctly captured by Chief Industrial 
Magistrate Williams in a 1972 case denying casual retail workers Sunday penalty rates: 
‘Whatever entitlements a casual employee may have, they do not approach in extent, 
those of a part-time employee to the same degree as those of a part-time employee 
approach those of a full-time employee.’39 
What was to be the first major institutional development in the reformulation of the 
retail wage-labour nexus, however, was the commencement of an inquiry in December 
1982 into the desirability of extending retail trading hours, carried out by Justice 
Macken.   Interestingly, the divide between large and small retailers was apparent 
immediately from the tenor of the submissions.  As intimated above, many small 
retailers have long been in favour of prescribed opening and closing times given the fact 
they are usually excluded from their operation.  The case was little different in NSW; 
most employers and the NSW RTA submitted to the Macken inquiry that no change to 
the trading hours regime was necessary.40  Indeed, Lyons notes that ‘[t]he only 
submissions to fully embrace extended trading came from the major grocery 
supermarket chains,’41 whilst the SDA ‘submitted that extended trading would result in 
more casual staff and a decline in full-time and permanent employment.’42  
In the event, Justice Macken recommended an additional evening’s trading and the 
extension of trading hours until 4.00pm on Saturdays,43 whilst affirming the desirability 
of permanent employment over casual status.44  More significant than these 
comparatively modest developments was his recommendation that a specialist retail 
                                                          
38 In re Shop Employees (State) Award (No. 2) (July-September 1977, Pt 3) AR 555, 575-584; 
‘Momentous Decision For Young Unemployed’ (1977) 9(4) Voice 7. 
39 Slattery v Kentucky Fried Chicken Pty Ltd in C.P. Mills and E.G.A. Lambert (eds), Australian 
Industrial Law Review, vol 14(30) (November 10 1972) ¶628. 
40 Indeed, the RTA noted that only 10% of their membership supported de-regulated trading hours, the 
same ten percent who supported Sunday trading, namely, large retailers: ‘Shopping Hours Inquiry’ 
(March 1983) Retail Traders’ News Bulletin 3 (official journal of the Retail Traders’ Association of 
NSW).  
41 Michael Lyons, ‘An Appealing Outcome? Industrial Arbitration and Extended Retail Trading Hours in 
New South Wales in the 1980s’ (2005) 13(1) International Journal of Employment Studies 107,113. 
42 Ibid. 
43 A move supported by NSW Premier Neville Wran: ‘Wran supports extended hours’, Canberra Times 
(Canberra), 29 August 1983, 3. 
44 A position Justice Macken held to in a 1984 ruling to apply penalty rates to casual pay so as not to 
disadvantage permanent and part-time staff: Applications for variation of Shop Employees (State) Award 
in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 26(18) (26 September 1984) ¶314. 
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industry tribunal be created, a proposal given effect by the Industrial Arbitration (Retail 
Trade) Amendment Act 1983.45  This move was key in securing union acceptance of the 
report; these had stated, ‘[w]e are of the opinion that the most appropriate manner in 
which the report can be implemented is through the establishment of an appropriate 
tribunal.’46   
The result was the Retail Trade Industrial Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’), a body composed of 
two members of the Industrial Commission (one as chair, the other as deputy chair) and 
two ‘assessors’ to provide advice, with one nominated by the Labor Council, the other 
by the RTA.  Despite being born in crisis, it was a creature of the antipodean Fordist 
law-administration continuum, essentially combining the juridical structure of 
arbitration with a quasi-corporatist practice.  It was very much in keeping with broader 
quasi-corporatist experiments to escape from the crisis of antipodean Fordism by 
intensifying its institutions.  Of particular note in this regard is the Accord, discussed in 
detail in chapters 5, 6 and 7.  Although the form of the Tribunal and the Accord were 
very different, the similarities in their constitutive contexts is instructive.  Both were 
developed in the same context of general economic crisis, yet were premised on the 
institutionalised power of the trade union movement and enhancing the authority of the 
arbitral tribunals.  Both were supported by Australian Labor Party (ALP) governments, 
and would attract the ire of intransigent employers.   
This body was to prove a central site for the intensifying struggle over retail awards: its 
eventual failure was simultaneously part of the failure of antipodean Fordism to rescue 
itself from its contradictions. 
The 1980s – The Retail Trade Industrial Tribunal era 
In 1984, the issue of newly de-regulated trading hours, and how to defuse the threat of 
retail employee resistance over them, was centre-stage of a number of legal 
developments.  Firstly, the SDA and major retailers struck two industrial agreements 
(arrived at by consent) to be certified by the NSW Industrial Commission.47  For 
                                                          
45 Industrial Arbitration (Retail Trade) Amendment Act 1983 (NSW). 
46 ‘Shop-hours proposals accepted by unions’, Canberra Times (Canberra), 22 October 1983, 8. 
47 Industrial Agreement no. 7249, Matter No. 1529 of 1984 bound Coles, Grace Brothers, Target, 
Safeway, Woolworths and Jack Butler.  Industrial Agreement no. 7258, Matter No. 1564 of 1984 bound 
Myer.  These agreements were understood as the quid pro quo for union acceptance of de-regulated 
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workers engaged by major retailers, the most important gain was the establishment of a 
38-hour week for full-time employees48 and the provision of time-and-a-half penalty 
rates for Saturday work.49  Additionally, the agreements limited casual employment to 
15% of total hours worked, provided proportions clauses limiting the employment of 
part-time and junior staff50 and sought to convert casual and part-time positions to full-
time where possible.51  In exchange, employers gained some of the flexibilities 
associated with the ‘cost offsets’ demanded by the arbitral tribunals in return for the 38-
hour week.  It is worth quoting the judgement at length in describing these changes: 
They include the enactment of radical changes to night-fill and non-selling staff 
employees’ conditions, including a reduction in the loading for the working of 
ordinary hours from 27% to 17½%.  The removal of tea money from employees 
who work ordinary hours past 6 p.m. on Thursday and Friday is in itself a saving 
of just on 1% in the case of Grace Bros and 1.68% in the case of Coles … Other 
offsets include the introduction of premium hours, a reduction in the minimum 
weekly hours of part-time employees from twenty to sixteen and an ability to 
roster permanent employees more flexibly (my emphasis).52 
 
It has always been the understanding in the retail industry that the levers of the sector 
are the bargains struck with the major retailers.53  These consent arrangements proved 
no different, with Lyons noting ‘[t]he lack of objectors to the certification of the 
agreements reflects the understanding between the government, major retailers, and 
RTA that the terms of the agreements would eventually apply to all employees in the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
trading hours: J. Taylor, ‘Extended Shopping Hours Have Been Delayed Again’, Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney), 3 August 1984, 3. 
48 As seen in chapter 5, the 38-hour week was at this time becoming commonplace throughout Australian 
workplaces, thanks to the pace-setting December 1981 consent award in the metal trades.  Indeed, the 
RTA noted rather sheepishly in early 1984 that ‘the retail industry is the last major employing industry 
maintaining a 40 hour week’: ‘38 Hour Week’ (March-April 1984) Retail Traders’ News Bulletin 5.  
49 Which, since the 1972 Shiftworkers’ case, was the prevailing standard in NSW.  See: In re Shift 
Workers Case 1972 (LXXII, Pt 8 1972) AR  633. 
50 Proportions clauses had a long history in NSW retail awards, with the very first award for shop 
employees, delivered in 1907, containing a clause restricting the ratio of employees under 23 to those 
over 23: Shop Assistants’ Union v Master Retailers’ Association and Mark Foy (1907) AR 139.  For a 
detailed overview, see: In re Shop Employees (State) Award (No. 2) (July-September 1977, Pt 3) AR 555, 
561-568. 
51 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 1 October 1985, 7374 (Robert 
Debus). 
52 SDA, New South Wales v Woolworths Ltd in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 26(18) (26 
September 1984) ¶312 
53 Interview with NSW SDA Official (Sydney, 22 November 2013). 
 
 
283 
industry.’54  The increasing concentration of retail capital,55 and the competition 
consequent upon it, however, almost threw these arrangements into turmoil.  The 
signing of the industrial agreements had split the RTA, with the President, a Mr Tate, 
siding with the major retailers in their interpretation of the Macken report, ranged 
against the Secretary, a Mr Lawrence, and other general shop operators.56  Only after 
protracted discussion was a workable agreement reached.  The Tribunal under Justice 
Macken thus made a new award to apply to all retail employees in shops employing 
fifteen or more employees, dubbed the Shop Employees (General Shops) Interim (State) 
Award.57  This was based in large part on the industrial agreements, recreating many of 
their key provisions.58  Of key significance for my purposes was the fact that the 
Tribunal found that the extension of Saturday penalty rates to casuals was a necessary 
step in the creation of this award.  Justice Macken stated: 
If casual employees can be employed on Saturday afternoons at a lower hourly 
rate than that applicable to part-time and permanent employees then the award 
would provide an inducement to employers to further causalise the industry.  
Although it is not ‘necessary’ to promote the employment of permanent and 
part-time labour by fixing a deterrent rate for casuals, in my view it is 
‘necessary’ to ensure that permanents and part-time employees not be positively 
disadvantaged by the terms of the award (my emphasis).59 
 
Although in this last sentence Macken J doesn’t expressly seek to disadvantage casual 
employment vis-à-vis permanent staff, he nevertheless recognises the necessity of 
protecting the integrity of the standard employment model against the continued 
casualisation of the retail sector. 
                                                          
54 Lyons, above n 41, 114.  See also: New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 
19 November 1985, 9844 (Pat Hills); New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 26 
November 1985, 10515 (P.F. Watkins). 
55 These arrangements were reached just prior to the aforementioned Coles/Myer and 
Woolworths/Safeway mergers.   
56 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 14 August 1984, 66 (Pat Hills). One 
of the key issues seems to have been the spread of penalty rates for Saturday work.  The agreements with 
the six major retailers provided for time-and-a-half rates for all Saturday work, a scheme unpalatable to 
other general stores: New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 20 November 
1985, 10101 (Pat Hills). 
57 Designated ‘small’, ‘special’ and ‘confectionary’ shops remained governed by the pre-existing Shop 
Employees (State) Award. 
58 The above-mentioned split between major and smaller retailers over the form of Saturday penalty rates 
was solved through adopting a differential rate in the award, with Saturday morning work recompensed at 
time-and-a-quarter whilst Saturday afternoon attracted time-and-a-half: New South Wales, Parliamentary 
Debates, Legislative Assembly, 20 November 1985, 10101 (Pat Hills). 
59 Applications for variation of Shop Employees (State) Award in CCH, Australian Industrial Law 
Review, vol 26(18) (26 September 1984) ¶314. 
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The cost-offsets established in the award (and agreed to by consent) are also revealing.  
Of particular importance was the radically recast status of part-time employment, which 
until that point had been restricted to women over the age of 21 and men over the age of 
60.  Age and gender were removed as impediments to part-time worker status, as was 
the requirement that part-time employees only be engaged if no suitable full-time 
employee is available.60 
In the 1984 industrial agreements and the first award of the Tribunal, therefore, we have 
a complex, dialectically evolving reality.  Embryonic moves towards increased 
workplace flexibility, such as the greatly increased scope of part-time employment, the 
reduction of part-time employee minimum hours and increased employer latitude in 
rostering co-exist with structures designed to buttress standard employment.  This 
understanding dovetails neatly with the idea of institutional searching, the piecemeal 
and anarchic effort to escape economic crisis discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6.61  
Attempts to escape crisis through the generation of new institutions and norms is 
typically not an abrupt, once-for-all process; rather, it revolves around the dialectical 
relationship between the old and the new within a decaying model of development.   
This process of institutional searching assumed a new form vis-à-vis retail awards with 
a major 1985 NSW Industrial Commission review of the retail industry in NSW, 
brought about in large part by RTA62 opposition to Justice Macken’s ruling awarding all 
classes of employees penalty rates for Saturday work.63  In the first of many moves by 
which the Tribunal was marginalised by internally fractured employer groups, the RTA 
appealed to the Commission in Court Session regarding the overtime issue.64  
Moreover, they argued before the Commission for the deletion of all penalty rates, no 
proportions clauses and the establishment of a new category of ‘regular’ employee 
                                                          
60 In re Shop Employees (State) Award (1984) AR 595, 586. 
61 Brett Heino, 'The state, class and occupational health and safety: locating the capitalist state's role in the 
regulation of OHS in NSW' (2013) 23(2) Labour & Industry 150, 160. 
62 At the time these developments were panning out, around 90% of the RTA’s membership was made up 
by small retailers employing less than 20 staff; RTA ‘Submission of the Retail Traders’ Association of 
NSW to the NSW Industrial Commission in respect to the Inquiry into Retail Trading Hours’ (1983) 14.  
For legislative recognition of the disjunction between major retailers and the RTA, see: New South 
Wales, Parliamentary Debates, 26 November 1985, 10537 (Barrie Unsworth). 
63 For a summary of this case, see: Re Shop Employees (State) Award in CCH, Australian Industrial Law 
Review, vol 27(17) (5 September 1985) ¶314.   
64 The significance of this case to the RTA is clear.  They opined that ‘[t]he proceedings are without 
doubt the most important that the industry has faced in recent times’: ‘Shop Award proceeding smoothly’ 
(May-June 1985) Retail Traders’ News Bulletin 5. 
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(substantively a precarious form of part-time work) whose minimum shift per week was 
only 8 hours.65  The essence of these arguments was no less than a rejection of the 
antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus, particularly insofar as it crystallised the standard 
employment model.  The RTA appeal coincided with a union application to flow-on the 
provisions of the aforementioned industrial agreements to other retail awards,66 with the 
result being a combined hearing that essentially amounted to a complete review of 
Justice Macken’s decision and the hierarchy of retail awards in NSW.   
The result of the employer’s forum shopping67 was considerably advantageous changes 
in the content and structure of retail awards, changes that represented the first 
unequivocal legal lubricants to retail precarity.  Structurally, the two existing retail 
awards, including the recently determined Employees (General Shops) Interim (State) 
Award, were collapsed into a single consolidated Shop Employees (State) Award.68  
From the perspective of retail employees, this could have been a progressive move if it 
had been on the basis sought by unions, that is, an extension of the industrial 
agreements throughout the retail award structure at large.  In the event, however, the 
unification of the two awards represented a lowest common denominator arrangement 
given the substantive changes inserted by the NSW Industrial Commission. 
The most significant development for the purposes of this thesis was the complete 
reversal of Justice Macken’s efforts to minimise the potential for casual labour to 
supplant full and part-time workers.  The lattermost lost out by seeing the Saturday 
afternoon penalty rate cut from the prevailing NSW standard of time-and-a-half to time-
and-a-quarter.69  Casuals, however, were denied the entitlement to penalty rates for 
                                                          
65 ‘RTA action to free Shop Award’ (March-April 1985) Retail Traders’ News Bulletin 3. 
66 Which, as outlined above, was the understanding between retail workers, employers and the state 
before the penalty rate issue became toxic. 
67 As their behaviour should rightly be regarded: Lyons, above n 41, 119-120. 
68  Re Shop Employees (State) Award in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 27(17) (5 
September 1985) ¶314.   
69 Various reasons were forwarded, including the need to protect the public interest in the amenity of 
Saturday afternoon shopping and the industrial interest in further employment opportunities free from 
undue cost burdens.  Interestingly, the Commission, in reaching this decision, noted the difficult and 
uncertain economics of Saturday trading, stating ‘[t]he evidence before us establishes that the extension 
of shopping hours into Saturday afternoons has not resulted generally in additional sales but rather a 
spread of the existing level of sales, at added cost to the industry … Further, the success of Saturday 
afternoon opening is unevenly distributed.  It has proved more successful in large shopping centres’: Ibid.  
This understanding undermines employer arguments that extended trading hours would result in greater 
consumer spending and supports the contention here, that they were pursued by large retailers as a 
competitive weapon against smaller operators. 
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Saturday afternoon work at all.70  The Commission maintained that, given the 
preference by full-time workers for weekly employment and statutory guarantees 
preventing employers coercing existing full-timers to work extended hours, the payment 
of Saturday afternoon penalty rates to casuals would not perform the standard 
employment-preserving function Macken J expected of it.71   
Whilst understandable in its own terms, this view of the Commission sits uneasily with 
another key development, namely the rejection of a union-supported proportions clause 
limiting casual employment to 15% of total working hours in retail establishments.  
Despite claiming that both employers and unions were in agreement as to the 
preferability of full-time weekly employment, the Commission noted the increasing 
prevalence of casuals in the industry.72  It noted of this tendency, 
Much of this has arisen from the necessity to staff shops through extended hours 
and as relief during peak or busy periods.  The need of employers to resort to 
causal employment has been exacerbated by seemingly inappropriate award 
limitations upon part-time employment (my emphasis).73 
 
The significance of this statement is twofold.  Firstly, it explicitly acknowledges the 
corrosive impact of trading hours de-regulation on the standard employment model, 
lately arrived as this was in the retail sector.  Secondly, the Commission astutely 
observes the connection between employment patterns, employer strategy and the 
contours of retail awards.  These do not operate in isolation from the other, but together 
constitute a dialectically evolving regulatory space, in which the needs of crisis 
resolution and an emergent model of development come up against established 
institutions, norms and understandings.74 
Just as important as the material decision to remove restrictions on casual employment 
was the methodology by which the Commission arrived at it.  Noting the considerable 
variation in patterns of utilisation of casuals across the industry, it went on to say that 
‘[i]n these circumstances we see some merit in the suggestion that the dynamics of the 
                                                          
70 In lieu, they were given a small allowance for shifts longer than four hours, which represented a return 
to the situation prior to Macken J’s 1977 decision originally extending penalty rates to casuals.  See: In re 
Shift Workers Case 1972 (LXXII, Pt 8 1972) AR 633, 655. 
71  Re Shop Employees (State) Award in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 27(17) (5 
September 1985) ¶314.   
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Heino, ‘Award Regulation and the New South Wales Retail Sector’, above n 2, 86. 
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industry may assist in the resolving of the problem of the proper role of casual 
employment.’75  In other words, the Commission endorsed a more de-centralised, self-
regulatory method, in which the circumstances of individual retailers took precedence 
over the need to control and restrict casual employment in a collective way through the 
award system.  The same attitude underlies the decision to remove proportions clauses 
governing the ratio between adult and junior retail workers in general shops, with the 
Commission declaring ‘[w]e are prepared … to meet the employers’ plea for flexibility 
… We think that the issue of proportions is one which the industry, is[sic] so far as 
general shops are concerned, can meet in a self-regulatory way’ (my emphasis).76 
Aside from departing from the antipodean Fordist modality of award setting which was 
explored so thoroughly in chapters 5, 6 and 7 (namely, awards being used as tools to 
universalise gains won from individualised victories), the attitude of the Commission 
both presupposes and encourages a managerialist turn in the conception of labour law.77  
The dressing of the casual and junior proportions issues in the language of flexibility 
and self-regulation78 is clearly derived from the emergent management concerns in the 
1980s to promote efficiency,79 control and value maximisation through greater control 
over the engagement and disposal of labour.  That this was an explicit concern of retail 
capital in particular can be gleaned from a remarkable submission in 1982 by the 
Australian Retailers Association (ARA) (a national body to which the RTA was 
federated) to a federal committee reviewing Australian industrial relations law and 
systems.80  At a time when most employer groups feared the potential of a wages 
explosion stemming from a de-centralised industrial relations systems, the ARA was 
submitting that compulsory arbitration was a failed system that should be replaced by a 
                                                          
75  Re Shop Employees (State) Award in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 27(17) (5 
September 1985) ¶314.   
76 Ibid.  The Commission also rejected a union claim for eliminating 15 year-old junior rates.  Employer 
hostility to the SDA claim demonstrated their desire to have the option to draw upon pools of young 
labour, although youth labour had not at that stage assumed the importance it would in later years. 
77 For a useful study of the ability of managerialist norms to infuse legal/administrative forms, see: 
Lauren B. Edelman and Robin Stryker, 'A Sociological Approach to Law and the Economy' in Neil J. 
Smelser and Richard Swedberg (eds), The Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton University Press, 
2005) 527-551. 
78 Re Shop Employees (State) Award in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 27(17) (5 September 
1985) ¶314.   
79 Indeed, the RTA stated that a necessary outcome of the case was heightened efficiency and flexibility, 
supposedly so retailers could maximise employment levels: ‘Shop Award proceeding smoothly’, above n 
64, 5. 
80 Australian Retailers Association, ‘Submission to the Committee of Review into Australian Industrial 
Relations Law and Systems’ (1982) (Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Z441, Box 30). 
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new modality of industrial regulation.81  This system was to be premised on a rejection 
of the notion of comparative wage justice, instead endorsing an industry-centred 
arrangement guided by the principle ‘that the establishment and variation of wages and 
conditions should be approached on an industry by industry basis with no reliance being 
possible on standards established in other industries.’82  Against this backdrop, the ARA 
lambasted the importation of standards developed elsewhere in the industrial structure 
to the retail sector, particularly penalty rates for work outside hitherto ordinary business 
hours.83  The reproduction of elements of this industry-centred ideology, along with 
some substantive provisions to enact it, within the Commission’s decision speaks of a 
new, intensified interpenetration of legal and managerialist norms in which the 
circumstances of concentrating and transforming retail capital infuse the legal realm.84 
The decision of the Commission, although delighting employers,85 sparked outrage 
amongst unions and retail workers, with the former declaring it ‘one of the worst 
inflicted upon the union movement in this State.’86  Justice Macken lamented that it was 
an ‘almost certain fact that, whichever way a decision goes before the Retail Trade 
Industrial Tribunal, an appeal will be brought to the Commission in Court Session.’87  
                                                          
81 The document is extraordinary in the way it presages the system that was eventually to arise, a reality 
which in itself strengthens the claim that the retail industry operates as a new lead sector, particularly 
insofar as the wage-labour nexus that holds there has come to characterise the working arrangements and 
experiences of a great many Australian workers.   Amongst other things, it called for a repudiation of the 
doctrine of comparative wage justice, an industry-based approach to wage and conditions determination, 
outlawing of solidarity strikes and boycotts, and the provision of notice in the event of strike action.  It is 
particularly vehement in its opposition to wage and conditions flow-on.  These are all features that have 
come to characterise Australian labour law, and it is highly pertinent that the ARA was calling for it well 
before most other employer groups.  Full told, and aside from the fact that industrial tribunals are retained 
in the schema, the document represents nothing less than a complete rejection of the antipodean Fordist 
wage-labour nexus.  Ibid 13-18, 25-26. 
82 Ibid 25. 
83 Ibid 15-16. 
84 Edelman and Stryker, above n 77, 532.  As noted in chapter 5, the traditional practice of armouring 
managerial prerogative against meaningful input from unions meant that the unity of legal and 
managerialist norms within Australian industrial relations was more complete than was the case in many 
other Western countries, particularly those of continental Europe.   
85 Lyons, above n 41, 115. 
86 E. Campbell, ‘Unions to Fight Pay Cut Flow-On’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 19 August 1985, 
2.  It is important to note at this point that the construction of arbitration as an administrative structure 
taking collectives of labour and capital as its subject should not be taken as a suggestion that it was 
destined to provide decisions friendly to workers.  Indeed, in chapter 3 and 4 it was argued that the 
particular configuration of the law-administration continuum manifested in the arbitration system was 
designed to reconcile working-class strength with the abstract capitalist need to commodify labour-power.  
As the 1985 decision of the NSW Industrial Commission and the early 1990s structural efficiency cases 
in food manufacturing (discussed in the previous chapter) demonstrate, the arbitral tribunals were 
perfectly capable of delivering very pro-capital decisions.   
87 Re Shop Employees (State) Award (1987) 15 Industrial Reports, 27. 
 
 
289 
In a timely demonstration of Jessop’s assertion that the state is a complex amalgam of 
various institutional apparatuses, the coherence and functionality of which can never be 
assumed,88 the SDA called upon the political capital it held with the NSW Labor 
Government.  The SDA has a long history on the right of the labour movement, heavily 
influenced by the post-War Industrial Group movement89 and Catholic social doctrine.  
Bramble notes that NSW was a bastion of the traditional Catholic Right faction of the 
ALP, which controlled the party apparatus and the NSW Labor Council.90  The SDA 
was thus in a position to wield its considerable influence over the legislative machinery 
to circumvent the decision of the Commission.91 
Government anger at the apparent betrayal of the quid pro quo arrangement over 
extended trading hours was palpable,92 compounded by the actions of certain retailers 
flouting the liberalised arrangements and opening on Sundays.93  Indeed, the notion of 
an agreement binding retailers, employees and the state was explicitly acknowledged by 
one government member, who stated of the worker response to the Macken Report: 
At a meeting of retail workers it was decided they would accept longer trading 
on the basis that the new working conditions would be fully applied.  This 
conditional acceptance, and this is a very important part, of Saturday afternoon 
trading was put to the Government and accepted.  What I am saying, in effect, is 
that the Government was part of that agreement and, further, that in this 
legislation they are honouring that agreement.94 
 
                                                          
88 See, for example: Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place (Polity Press, 
1990) 261. 
89 The main aim of these Industrial Groups was to expunge communist influence within the trade union 
movement by using a variety of means, fair and foul, to capture leadership positions.  See, for example: 
Ken Buckley and Ted Wheelwright, False Paradise: Australian Capitalism Revisited, 1915-1955 (Oxford 
University Press, 1998) 187. 
90 Bramble, above n 12, 55. 
91 Influence oiled by substantial financial contributions.  For example, in 1983 the SDA made a $20,000 
contribution to ALP head office, the largest such sum that year: New South Wales, Parliamentary 
Debates, Legislative Assembly, 20 November 1985, 10089, 10091 (Peter Collins). 
92 See, for example: New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 1 October 1985, 
7318 (John Davis Garland); New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 26 
November 1985, 10518 (P.F. Watkins).  The latter refers to the Commission’s ruling as ‘an outrageous 
decision.’ 
93 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 19 November 1985, 9843 (Pat 
Hills). 
94 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 26 November 1985, 10515 (P.F. 
Watkins). 
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The legislation referred to in the above extract was the Factories, Shops and Industries 
(Further Amendment) Act 1985.95  Amongst other things, this Act empowered the 
government to decree regulations fixing the penalty rate for Saturday work at time-and-
a-half.96  The Act was panned by retail employers97 and the conservative opposition 
parties, who variously claimed that the ALP was beholden to SDA interests98 and that 
the government had usurped the authority and standing of the Industrial Commission.99  
The legislation passed, however, and in due course the government enacted regulations 
re-instating the Saturday penalty rate schema established by Justice Macken’s original 
award.100 
The response of the major retailers to these developments is indicative both of the 
increasing corrosiveness of the competition principle and the power of concentrated 
retail capital.  Like most major employers, large retailers were generally happy to take 
wages out of competition, a desire that dovetailed with the relatively homogenous wage 
structure generated by the universalising tendencies of the arbitration system.101  This 
attitude certainly informed the willingness of major retailers to sign the industrial 
agreements with the SDA in the first instance, based on the understanding that the 
conditions they provided would be generalised in the industry.102  The 1985 
Commission decision, however, directly assailed the stability of these arrangements by 
providing for lower wages and inferior conditions to those obtaining in the industrial 
agreements.  The signatory employers claimed they had been conned by the 
government, the SDA and the Labor Council into providing higher Saturday pay, their 
anger intensified by perceived state and union laxity in prosecuting other retailers 
                                                          
95 Factories, Shops and Industries (Further Amendment) Act 1985 (NSW). 
96 Factories, Shops and Industries (Further Amendment) Act 1985 (NSW) s 4.  
97 See, for example: ‘Removal of Appeal Rights’ (June 1986) Retail Traders’ News Bulletin 1, in which, 
amongst other things, the RTA calls for Justice Macken’s removal from the Tribunal. 
98 See, for example: New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 20 November 
1985, 10089, 10091 (Peter Collins). 
99 See, for example: New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 20 November 1985, 
10535 (J.C.J. Matthews); New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 20 November 
1985, 10536-10537 (Elisabeth Kirkby).  The historical irony should not be lost on the reader, given the 
exploration in chapter 6 of the Howard government’s largely successful efforts to marginalise and 
degrade the Commission. 
100 Shops (Premium Rates of Pay) Regulation 1985 (NSW). 
101 See, for example, Margaret Gardner and Gill Palmer, Employment Relations: Industrial Relations and 
Human Resource Management in Australia (Macmillan, 1997) 129. 
102 Lyons, above n 41, 114. 
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breaching penalty rate provisions.103  Woolworths, Coles, Myer, Grace Brothers and 
Target demanded changes in the terms of the industrial agreements, changes that 
essentially represented a refutation of the consensus originally arrived at with the SDA.  
In particular, these five retailers sought provisions that directly intensified the flexibility 
of labour and lubricated employee precarity, including: 
 reducing the minimum hours of part-time employees from 16 to 8 hours a week; 
 reducing minimum shifts for casuals from 4 hours to 2 hours; 
 allowing school-aged children to be employed as casuals; 
 removal of proportions clauses governing the employment of casuals and the 
ratio of junior to adult workers; and 
 introducing fortnightly pay in arrears.104 
 
The substance of these demands was in fact a rejection of the late-blooming antipodean 
Fordist wage-labour nexus and its substitution by one that placed a premium on 
flexibility, the breakdown of labour-power into increasingly fragmented units and 
increased access to transient pools of labour, including the young workers who were  
increasingly found in them (as seen in chapter 6).  It contained, in short, several of the 
key planks of a cogent liberal-productivist wage-labour nexus. 
If these changes were not forthcoming, the major retailers made repeated threats to 
cancel the agreements, which, according to Justice Macken, ‘led to severe industrial 
instability in the industry.’105  Justice Macken attempted to provide something of a 
compromise solution, seeking to convert most of the terms of the original agreements 
into a new Shop Employees (Major General Shops)(State) Award whilst granting some 
concessions to employers, such as allowing the sought-after reduction in minimum 
casual shifts on an experimental basis.106  The major retailers, however, could not be 
mollified.  They challenged the Award in the NSW Court of Appeal,107 claiming that, 
                                                          
103 Helen Grant, ‘’Conned’ retailers seek redress over weekend wage bill’, Australian Financial Review 
(Australia), 22 April 1986, 36. 
104 Helen Grant, ‘SDA appeals to Wran as big five stand firm’, Australian Financial Review (Australia), 
23 April 1986, 37.  By the end of the analysis in this chapter, all these had demands had been conceded.   
105 Re Shop Employees’ (Major General Shops) (State) Award (1988) 17 Industrial Reports, 155. 
106 Brad Norington and Keith Martin, ‘Shops face new threat as stocks run out’, Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney), 13 November 1986, 3. 
107 A direct appeal from the Tribunal to the Commission was ruled out by the Industrial Arbitration 
(Further Amendment) Act 1986 (NSW).  In particular, this inserted a privative clause which provided that 
‘no appeal lies to the commission from any order, award, ruling or decision of the Tribunal.’  The 
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having been made in the absence of one of the assessors,108 it was made without 
jurisdiction.  Incredibly, the Court agreed and duly voided the award,109 a demonstration 
par excellence of the distinction between administration and the purer legal form in the 
conduct of industrial relations.  Whilst Macken J was more concerned about industrial 
stability in the retail sector, for the Court of Appeal the case turned upon the minutiae of 
procedural rules.   
As a result of the court’s decision, Macken J, who by this point was comparing the 
uncertainty surrounding the retail industry to the ‘Sword of Damocles,’110 was forced to 
make an interim award which, although it rolled over the terms of the industrial 
agreements, was explicitly temporary and would be replaced after a period of 
negotiation/arbitration between the SDA and the increasingly militant employers.111   
In light of these tensions, 1988 shaped up as a critical year.  Firstly, the Tribunal was 
reconstituted, with Justice Macken, who had earned the ire of employers,112 replaced by 
Deputy-President Wells.   Whilst not wishing to overstate the importance of individuals 
to the transformations of Australian capitalism, it is nevertheless the case that the nature 
of state personnel can impact upon the speed and order of historical change.113  This is 
particularly so in times of crisis when, as has been seen, emergent ideologies grate 
against established norms and understandings.  Justice Macken, although hardly a 
radical, was from a trade union background114 and, more importantly, was steeped in the 
history of the debates between retail unions and employers from their inception in the 
1970s.  Throughout his tenure as chair of the Tribunal, he had evinced a consistent view 
vis-à-vis the nature of the arrangements entered into, the bargains underlying them and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Government claimed that the legislation ensured ‘that the Retail Trade Industrial Tribunal shall be the 
final arbiter concerning industrial matters in the retail trade industry’: New South Wales, Parliamentary 
Debates, Legislative Assembly, 23 April 1986, 2556 (Pat Hills).  The peculiarity of this legislation, 
abolishing the right of appeal for a specific industry, goes someway to demonstrating the influence of the 
SDA on the Labor Government.  It also attracted the ire of the conservative opposition parties, with one 
National Party member describing it as ‘fascist legislation’: New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, 
Legislative Assembly, 24 April 1986, 2785 (Gerry Peacocke). 
108 The absent assessor was ironically the employer’s nominee, the aforementioned Mr Lawrence.  Even 
more ironically, Lyons notes that Lawrence ‘made no objection at the time to his absence, as this had 
been a common practice with the Tribunal’s proceedings since 1984’: Lyons, above n 41, 117. 
109 G J Coles & Co Ltd & Ors v Retail Trade Industrial Tribunal & Ors (1986) 7 NSWLR 503. 
110 Re Shop Employees’ (Major General Shops) (State) Award (1988) 17 Industrial Reports, 155. 
111 Ibid 157. 
112 ‘Monthly Update’ (June 1986) Retail Trader’ News Bulletin 1. 
113 Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution (Monad Press, 1980) 95, 100. 
114 Pittwater Online News, Hon. James J. Macken (Jim) (January 12-18 2014) 
<http://www.pittwateronlinenews.com/hon-james-joseph-macken--jim--profile.php>.  
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the role of the Tribunal broadly.115  Given the jurisdictional quarrels and the gulf 
between the respective awards of the Tribunal and the Commission, Justice Macken’s 
removal could not but help to change the terms of the debate.  Given his apparent 
sympathies for retail employees and firm view of the binding nature of the deals the 
major retailers had struck, this was unlikely to be a change for the benefit of workers. 
It was before this reconstituted Tribunal that a major case concerning the terms and 
conditions of retail employment, as well as ongoing confusion over contemporaneous 
but qualitatively different awards, was heard.  Of key concern for both parties was the 
inconsistency borne by the fact that the majority of the retail industry fell under two 
awards, the aforementioned Shop Employees (State) Award and the Shop Employees 
(Major General Shops) Interim (State) Award.  Both parties wanted to create a single 
award, but on very different bases: ‘[T]he unions wanted the new award to contain the 
same terms as the 1986 award whereas the RTA sought the provisions of the 1985 
award adjusted to incorporate certain provisions re shift work.’116  In essence, this 
distinction boiled down to an institutional clash; the unions wished to extend the 
decision of the Tribunal, whilst the employers looked to universalise the much less 
favourable conditions of the Commission’s 1985 award.117   
The Tribunal responded by once again collapsing the awards into a consolidated Shop 
Employees (State) Award.  Although the negotiations saw both parties come to 
consensus on certain issues, the key issues of Saturday overtime, penalty rates for 
casuals, junior rates and proportions clauses remained and had to be arbitrated.  The 
case represented a definitive victory for the employers on the first of these matters.  
Time-and-a-quarter rates would now apply for full-time and part-time employees118 and, 
unlike the case of the 1985 Commission decision, there was no longer a sympathetic 
                                                          
115 For an interesting insight into Macken J’s philosophy on employment relations generally, see: J. J. 
Macken, ‘Changing Patterns of Work and Industrial Relations’ (1984) 26(2) Journal of Industrial 
Relations 246. 
116 Shop Employees (State) Award in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 30(12) (16 June 1988) 
¶232. 
117 Indeed, the RTA showed a somewhat opportunistic attitude to award universality, with a stated desire 
for one award only firmly evinced after the low base of the 1985 Commission decision had been 
established.  Compare, for example, the attitude evinced in ‘Retail Trade Industrial Tribunal Visits 
Country Areas’ (June 1987) Retail Traders’ News Bulletin 1 with ‘Trading Hours/Working Hours’ 
(August 1984) Retail Traders’ News Bulletin 1. 
118 Shop Employees (State) Award in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 30(12) (16 June 1988) 
¶232. 
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ALP government willing to intervene.119  More broadly, Deputy-President Wells 
approved of the Commission’s methodology in the 1985 case of prima facie rejecting a 
link between shop assistants and shift workers generally,120 a move which certainly 
attacked the universalising wage-labour nexus of antipodean Fordism.   
In the context of ever-increasing use of casual labour within the industry,121 several 
other elements of the decision were also highly significant.  The union attempt to 
moderate the increasing resort of employers to casual labour by the elimination of 15 
year-old junior rates was again rebuffed.122  In light of the evidence of a deepening 
engagement of causal employees, the Tribunal surmised that the payment of penalty 
rates to causals for work outside ordinary hours, as provided in the industrial 
agreements, was ineffective in the deterrent role Justice Macken had intended and thus 
rejected them.123  Admittedly, the Tribunal did give some substantive effect to the 
alleged ‘mutually accepted concept that full-time employment was to be encouraged’124 
by the reinstatement of a proportions clause placing a ceiling on the share casual labour 
could take in total hours worked in general stores employing 13 or more employees.  
However, this clause would now cap the casual share of total hours worked at 25%, 
compared to the previous figure of 15%.125  Moreover, the Tribunal rejected the union 
claim for a quantitative restriction on part-time employees (namely, of no more than one 
                                                          
119 The Liberal/National Party Coalition under Nick Greiner had come to power in March 1988. 
120 Shop Employees (State) Award in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 30(12) (16 June 1988) 
¶232. 
121 A reality the Tribunal took into account in its deliberations.  Indeed, Deputy-President Wells noted, in 
prose charitable to the employers, that the evidence before him ‘indicated that in some instances there had 
been a tendency to take the easy way out of staffing problems by simply engaging casuals’: Ibid.  
Although grasping the empirical reality of employer behaviour, this sentiment reveals a judicial myopia 
regarding its underlying causes.  The increasing precarity of retail employment relationships, and the 
fragmentation of the model of standard employment, was not at base a matter of individual employers 
choosing to ‘take the easy way out.’  Rather, it was the essence of the fundamental change in the wage-
labour nexus underway, a transformation spear-headed in the retail sector. 
122 The struggle over junior rates is an instructive example of the gap between New Right ideology and 
practice.  The union plan, to substitute a uniform pay rate for workers under 18 in place of the existent 
gradated scale, was simpler and presumably imposed a smaller regulatory burden upon employers.  In the 
interests of maintaining access to pools of young, causal labour, however, employers argued for the 
retention of the extant system.  This demonstrates the often disingenuous nature of the New Right’s call 
for reduced regulation.  What was really sought was greater power to dispose of labour-power and 
flexibility/de-regulation was only sought when it gave effect to that end.  To perceive this reality par 
excellence, see: G.F. Carmody, Arbitration in Contempt: The Industrial Relations Pecking Order as 
shown in the NSW Retail Industry (1986) <http://archive.hrnicholls.com.au/archives/vol1/vol1-10.php>.  
123 Shop Employees (State) Award in CCH, Australian Industrial Law Review, vol 30(12) (16 June 1988) 
¶232. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 
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part-timer for every full-time employee).126  This decision thus presented retail 
employers with considerably enhanced opportunities to engage and exploit young, 
casualised labour at the same time it cut down remaining disincentives to employing 
it.127 
The year 1988 was most important, however, in an institutional sense.  History overtook 
the experiment that was the Retail Trade Industrial Tribunal in late 1988, when the 
conservative Greiner government enacted the Industrial Arbitration (Retail Trade) 
Amendment Act 1988,128 which abolished the Tribunal in its entirety and transferred its 
business back to the Industrial Commission.  The government’s stated rationale was that 
the jurisdictional nightmares that had beset the Tribunal imposed considerable costs of 
time and money on the parties, without real countervailing advantages to the industry.129  
In particular, the Minister of Industrial Relations and Employment, John Fahey, noted 
that both employers and unions complained of ‘the drain on their resources in the dual 
supply of persons as assessors to the tribunal and as advocates before the tribunal.’130  
That this appears to have been a truthful representation of the parties’ views is 
supported by the Labor Party’s support for the passage of the Bill, with ALP Councillor 
A. B. Manson stating that:  
The Retail Traders Association and the New South Wales branch of the Shop 
Distributive and Allied Employees Association – the union – have been 
consulted and are unanimous in their view that the interests of all parties will be 
better served by abolishing the Retail Trade Industrial Tribunal and having the 
Industrial Commission handle any industrial disputes that may occur.131 
  
There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of these claims.  The strife between the 
Tribunal and the Commission had imposed real costs on the time and resources of 
participants.  However, I have demonstrated that these burdens were essentially self-
imposed on the part of retail employers and the RTA, given their desire to circumvent 
the more employee-friendly decisions emanating from the Tribunal.  Indeed, benefits 
                                                          
126 ‘Success for R.T.A’ (Special Edition, 1988) Retail Traders’ News Bulletin 1. 
127 Employer joy at the decision can be gleaned from a triumphant special issue of the Retail Traders’ 
News Bulletin: Ibid. 
128 Industrial Arbitration (Retail Trade) Amendment Act 1988 (NSW). 
129 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 13 October 1988, 2270 (John 
Fahey). 
130 Ibid. 
131 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 7 December 1988, 4508 (A.B. 
Manson). 
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flowed for them upon the Tribunal’s dissolution almost immediately, with the 
Commission granting employer claims for a reduction of the minimum weekly hours of 
part-time employees from 16 to 12 hours.132   
The SDA, on the other hand, saw the effort to realise the favourable outcomes achieved 
through the Tribunal continually frustrated as the Commission and superior court 
system undercut its standing.  The SDA’s change of attitude, from making the demand 
for an industry tribunal the quid pro quo for trading hours extension to advocating its 
abandonment, is thus understandable, but nevertheless ill-inspired.  As explored in 
chapters 4, 5 and 6, the 1980s was a period of institutional searching for ways out of the 
developing economic crisis.  In the retail industry this process took on a form of 
juridified corporatism, with the role of worker and employer representatives (in the 
form of the assessors) woven into the specialist tribunal’s institutional fabric.  It was 
thus part of the effort to save antipodean Fordism from its crisis tendencies by 
intensifying its institutions.  The end of the Tribunal represented the closure of an 
industry-specific form of crisis resolution, creating a vacuum into which an 
unadulterated neo-liberal prescriptions would step. 
The 1990s – Award modernisation, enterprise bargaining and the 
ascendency of neo-liberalism 
In NSW, as in other jurisdictions, the catch-cries of the late 1980s and early 1990s were 
structural efficiency and award modernisation (the latter being derivative of the 
former).133  As was discussed in chapters 6 and 8, these processes were designed with 
the stated purpose of removing institutional impediments to increased productivity and 
efficiency in the workplace.  Mitchell and Wilson note that the structural efficiency 
principle sought ‘various improvements in work practices – many of which were 
concerned with existing award restrictions, or non-award practices, related to the 
scheduling of work and the organisation of the productive process.’134  Although 
formulated at the federal level, the state commissions followed suit in implementing the 
                                                          
132 ‘Industrial Commission Increases Wages’ (Special Edition, 1988) Retail Traders’ News Bulletin 1. 
133 See, for example: Carol B. Fox, William A. Howard and Marilyn J. Pittard, Industrial Relations in 
Australia - Development, Law and Operation (Longman, 1995) 611-613. 
134 Richard Mitchell and Margaret Wilson, ‘Legislative Change in Industrial Relations: Australia and New 
Zealand in the 1980s’ in Mark Bray and Nigel Haworth (eds), Economic Restructuring & Industrial 
Relations in Australia & New Zealand: A Comparative Analysis (Australian Centre for Industrial 
Relations Research and Teaching, 1993) 38, 50. 
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principle, including NSW.  Given the protracted disputes over rosters and working 
hours arrangements explored so far in this chapter, it is no surprise that the Shop 
Employees (State) Award proved a ripe target for the restructuring process, being 
overhauled in 1991.  The main axis of change included a further commitment to the 
principle of enterprise arrangements135 and substantive changes to how work was 
organised and labour engaged.  It is the latter that is of interest us here. 
The 1991 restructuring process dedicated both employers and the SDA to the concept of 
award modernisation, with the renovated award stating explicitly:  
The parties are committed to examining this industry award to ensure it reflects 
the needs of modern retailing and to eliminating or amending provisions which 
restrict the ability of retailers and mixed enterprises with retail outlets to adapt 
quickly and efficiently to changes affecting their business and the provision of 
service to the consumer (my emphasis).136 
 
It goes on to state that ‘the unions are prepared to discuss with employers all matters 
raised by the unions and the employers for increased flexibility’137 and that ‘[t]he unions 
will not unreasonably oppose agreement.’138  Although mitigated somewhat by 
assurances of union involvement in the process of change,139 the SDA and other unions 
involved in the retail sector were thus explicitly bound to lay open for negotiation long-
standing practices around rostering, casual loadings and award classifications which 
had, for the employers, proved an impediment to the task of enforcing retail precarity. 
The result of this agreed process of award modernisation essentially presaged the 
movement in enterprise agreements, except with fewer benefits and greater trade-offs, 
especially so far as causals were concerned.  In general shops, the minimum shift 
engagement for a casual fell from 4 to 3 hours, whilst they could now work 11 hours on 
one day, and 9 on every other, without attracting any overtime payment.140  Part-time 
                                                          
135 See, for example: Shop Employees (State) Award (1991) 265 NSW Industrial Gazette 1083, 1083-
1085. 
136 Shop Employees (State) Award (1991) 266 NSW Industrial Gazette 612.  The emphasis on efficiency 
and the implicit view that existing arrangements no longer accord with ‘modern’ retailing is part of the 
very language of neo-liberalism.   
137 Ibid 613. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 ‘Landmark Agreement Structural Efficiency’ (September, 1990) Retail Traders’ News Bulletin 1, 1-2.  
By way of historical contrast, a 1967 Retailers’ Association of Queensland application for a reduction in 
the minimum daily shift from 7½ to 4 hours was rejected outright by the Queensland Industrial 
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workers saw their minimum guaranteed daily and weekly hours drop, to 3 and 12 hours 
respectively.141  Ordinary trading hours were extended for all classes of shop, including 
up to 6.00pm on Saturdays (and thereby neutering the issue of Saturday penalty rates 
that had proved an almost insoluble problem in the different political-economic climate 
of the 1980s).142   
The flexibility of engagement was matched by a movement towards greater functional 
flexibility, with the modernised award providing that ‘[e]mployees within each 
classification are to perform a wider range of duties including work which is incidental 
or peripheral to their main tasks or functions,’143 whilst also preventing employees from 
imposing ‘any restrictions or limitations on a reasonable review of work methods or 
standard work times.’144  Although direct evidence is lacking, it seems highly likely that 
such a clause forestalled union opposition to the new technologies and Taylorist work 
forms that had increasingly taken hold in the industry.145  In particular, a process of 
‘digital Taylorism’146 had extended tendrils deeply into the organisation of work and 
deployment of labour in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, with scanning, electronic point-of-
sale and computerised stock-keeping and warehousing technologies fundamentally 
altering the structure of the labour process in the retail industry.147  Most significant for 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Commission: Shop Assistants (Retail Stores) Award in C.P. Mills and E.G.A. Lambert, Australian 
Industrial Relations Review, vol 9(34) (25 November 1967) ¶501. 
141 Shop Employees (State) Award (1991) 265 NSW Industrial Gazette 844, 845. 
142 ‘Landmark Agreement Structural Efficiency’, above n 140, 2. 
143 Shop Employees (State) Award (1991) 266 NSW Industrial Gazette 612, 613. 
144 Ibid 614. 
145 It is not by accident that the articles detailing the employment and industrial relations consequences of 
new technologies (such as scanning and computerisation) which feature in 1970s and 1980s issues of 
Voice and the Shop and distributive worker are missing from the pages of SDA News (official journal of 
NSW SDA Branch).  Indeed, an interview with a senior NSW SDA official revealed that the SDA is not 
particularly concerned with technological change in and of itself, placing it well behind wages and 
working hours in terms of importance.  See, for example: Brian O’Neill, ‘Automation is closer than you 
think’ (1977) 9(1) Voice 5; Brian O’Neill, ‘On the Shop Floor’ (1977) 9(2) Voice 10; Brian O’Neill, 
‘Scanning the Future’ (Winter 1981) Shop and distributive worker 6; Interview with NSW SDA Official 
(Sydney, 22 November 2013). 
146 Scott Fitzgerald, Al Rainnie and John Burgess, ‘Rediscovering Braverman? Political Economy, Skill, 
and Skill Shortages’ (2013) 39(1) Australian Bulletin of Labour 2, 11. 
147 See, for example: Russell Lansbury, ‘The Australian Product Number and Scanning: Implications for 
Employment and Industrial Relations in the Australian Retail Grocery Industry’ (Monash University, 
1980); Russell D. Lansbury, ‘New Technology and Industrial Relations in the Retail Grocery Industry’ 
(1980) 22(3) Journal of Industrial Relations 275; John Lund and Christopher Wright, ‘State Regulation 
and the New Taylorism: The Case of Australian Grocery Warehousing’ (2001) 56(4) Relations 
Industrielles/Industrial Relations 747; Wright and Lund, ‘Supply Chain Rationalization’, above n 27; 
Campbell and Chalmers, above n 1; Robin Price, ‘Technological Change, Work Re-organization and 
Retail Workers’ Skills in Production-Oriented Supermarket Departments’ in Irena Grugulis and Ödül 
Bozkurt (eds), Retail Work (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 88. 
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this thesis has been the development of a sophisticated nexus between point-of-sale 
scanning technologies and computerised rostering systems, allowing management to 
very closely align expected demand to labour supply.148  The result has been an ability 
on the part of retailers, particularly large retailers, to produce a ‘fragmented time-
regime,’149 whereby the working week can be broken into small, discontinuous 
components and reassembled, using the whole gamut of full-time, part-time and casual 
employees, to match the requirements of employers.150  This development in particular 
facilitated and encouraged the retailer drive for the deeper precarity and flexibility they 
sought in award restructuring and enterprise bargaining.  It is to the latter we now turn. 
In chapter 6 I noted that in the early 1990s the Commonwealth and various state 
governments began to qualitatively change the modality of industrial relations by 
undermining the long-established institutions of compulsory conciliation and 
arbitration.  In NSW, this process was founded largely on the prescriptions of a Green 
Paper on Industrial Relations in NSW, by John Niland.151  This was a highly ideological 
document that outlined a cogent neo-liberal alternative to the erstwhile dominant forms 
of industrial regulation.  In outline, it proffered a de-centralised system of direct, 
collective bargaining between workers and employers, with the resultant Enterprise 
Collective Agreements operating to the exclusion of awards and reviewable by the 
Commission only in tightly defined circumstances.152  O’Brien opined of this model:  
[T]he tribunal is permitted to intervene only when the employer is likely to be in 
an objectively stronger position vis-à-vis workers.  The structuring of state 
intervention … makes the tribunal even more of a ‘bosses’ court’ than the 
arbitration system, as historically regarded by unions.153   
 
                                                          
148 For checkout workers in large supermarkets, this alignment has been made on the basis of pre-
determined scan rates, allowing management to reduce the porosity of the work day through rostering on 
the minimum number of workers required to service demand: Robin Price, ‘Down the aisle: the effects of 
technological change on retail workers skills’ (Paper presented at 27th International Labour Process 
Conference, 6-8 April 2009) 8-9.   
149 Campbell and Chalmers, above n 1, 492. 
150 Ibid. 
151 John Niland, ‘Transforming Industrial Relations in New South Wales’ (Green Paper Vol. 1, NSW 
Government Printing Office, 1989). 
152 Ibid 31-40, 65-70. 
153 John M. O'Brien, ‘Regulating Decentralized Industrial Relations: The Niland Prescription’ (1990) 
32(4) Journal of Industrial Relations 544, 549. 
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The Green Paper provided the seedbed for the Greiner Government’s legislative 
overhaul of 1990 and 1991,154 which included the Industrial Arbitration (Enterprise 
Agreements) Amendment Act 1990155 and the much more wide-ranging Industrial 
Relations Act 1991.156  The latter Act was a watershed moment in the history of NSW 
industrial relations, introducing sweeping changes that definitively challenged the 
arbitration model.157  It was very much a product of its time.  As argued in chapter 6, the 
1990-1992 recession was in many ways the full-stop marking the end of the 
contradictory Australian experiment with corporatist and neo-liberal forms throughout 
the 1980s.  The latter now entered a period of ascendency, and infused into labour law 
and industrial relations practitioners a deep-seated conviction in the necessity for 
fundamental institutional change.  This was a nation-wide impulse, and the legislative 
developments in NSW were mirrored in other jurisdictions.158 
It is beyond the scope of this discussion to describe the legislation in detail, but broadly 
put it provided for ‘[t]he end of preference for unionists, the outlawing of closed shops, 
the creation of a new industrial court, a stronger enterprise focus and greater protection 
for awards and agreements’.159  For our purposes, the most important elements of the 
new system were the encouragement of enterprise agreements and the provision of 
statutory part-time work contracts.  Both served to intensify the development of 
employment precarity and undermine the bargaining power of retail workers. 
As mentioned earlier, the retail industry has typically been characterised by state award 
regulation, overseen by semi-autonomous state branches of the SDA.  Thus, although 
enterprise bargaining at the federal level did not really begin in earnest until the passage 
of the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993,160 the SDA state bodies were nevertheless 
compelled to confront the issue earlier than many other trade unions.161   
                                                          
154 For government acknowledgement of this ideological debt, see: New South Wales, Parliamentary 
Debates, Legislative Council, 15 October 1991, 1965 (E.P. Pickering). 
155 Industrial Arbitration (Enterprise Agreements) Amendment Act 1990 (NSW). 
156 Industrial Relations Act 1991 (NSW). 
157 For a useful overview, see: Joseph Catanzariti and Shawn Wytenburg, ‘Industrial Relations Legislation 
in 1991’ (1992) 34(1) Journal of Industrial Relations 128, 135-141. 
158 See, for example, Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act and Another Act Amendment Act 1987 
(Qld); Employee Relations Act 1992 (Vic); Workplace Agreements Act 1993 (WA). 
159 Catanzariti and Wytenburg, above n 157, 135. 
160 Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth).   
161 However, once the federal scheme of bargaining was on foot, enterprise agreements were increasingly 
located there.  NSW SDA state secretary Joe de Bruyn noted in 1994: ‘Two years ago, 95% of our 
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The disempowering effect of this development cannot be overstated.  The SDA is an 
archetypal example of the kind of bureaucratic and legalistic union which the arbitration 
system tended to produce.162  Lacking the kind of workplace organisation which 
allowed other unions to extract concessions from employers at the point of production, 
the SDA was heavily dependent upon formalised understandings with major retailers 
(usually bought at the price of industrial docility)163 and the award system to secure 
gains for workers, often through the vehicle of National and State Wage Cases.  The 
movement towards enterprise-level bargaining was thus one which the union regarded 
with foreboding,164 placing as it did a premium upon shop-floor organisation.   
Like the case in metals discussed in chapter 7, enterprise bargaining in retail encouraged 
increasing polarity in the sector, particularly between those who remained dependent on 
the increasingly inadequate award and workers able to strike enterprise deals.  For the 
latter, enterprise bargains and enterprise awards165 throughout the 1990s tended to 
intensify the trends towards retail precarity I have noted in exchange for headline wage 
increases.  Generally speaking, agreements further increased the spread of normal 
hours,166 shrank the size of minimum part-time weekly work hours at the same time 
they increased potential maximum hours167 and reduced penalty rates and casual 
loadings,168 offering instead higher rates of ordinary pay and comfortable union-friendly 
                                                                                                                                                                          
members were covered by industry awards, mostly in the State system.  Today, 70% of our members are 
covered by single-company agreements, mostly in the Federal system’; Joe de Bruyn, ‘SDA on a Winner’ 
(Winter 1994) Shop and distributive worker 1. 
162 David Peetz, Brave New Workplace: How Individual Contracts Are Changing Our Jobs (Allen & 
Unwin, 2006) 160-162. 
163 Robin Price, Janis Bailey and Amanda Pyman, ‘Varieties of collaboration: the case of an Australian 
retail union’ (2014) 25(6) The International Journal of Human Resource Management 748, 753-754. 
164 Particularly distressing to the union was the marginalisation of National Wage Cases, which had 
assured weaker unions like the SDA regular pay increases even in the absence of industrial strength.  See, 
for example: Greg Donnelly, ‘Another Pay Rise At Coles’ (Winter 1993) Shop and distributive worker 6. 
165 Enterprise agreements sometimes took the form of company specific awards, particularly in the early 
years of enterprise bargaining. 
166 See, for example: Joe de Bruyn, ‘SDA Wins $40 Pay Rise at Jewel’ (Autumn 1995) Shop and 
distributive worker 4, 5; Greg Donnelly, ‘New Agreement at Franklins’ (Spring 1996) Shop and 
distributive worker 6, 8; Greg Donnelly, ‘SDA Wins $93.30 at Coles/Bi-Lo Supermarkets’ (Autumn 
1997) Shop and distributive worker 5, 7. 
167 See, for example: Joe de Bruyn, ‘SDA Wins 6.4% Wage Rise at Woolworths’ (Summer 1993) Shop 
and distributive worker 4, 5; Greg Donnelly, ‘New Agreement at Country Road’ (Summer 1996) Shop 
and distributive worker 2, 3; Donnelly, ‘SDA Wins $93.30’, above n 166, 6. 
168 See, for example: Joe de Bruyn, ‘SDA Wins $36 Pay Rise at Franklins’ (Winter 1994) Shop and 
distributive worker 4, 5; Donnelly, ‘SDA Wins $93.30’ above n 166, 6; Greg Donnelly, ‘SDA Wins New 
Big W Agreement’ (Summer 1997) SDA News 3, 5. 
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clauses which entrenched the SDA to the exclusion of other unions.169  The similarities 
to the food processing enterprise bargains discussed in the previous chapter are 
striking.170  Closer examination of a few of these agreements which I deem 
representative is warranted. 
In early 1997, the SDA came to an agreement with Coles/Bi-Lo supermarkets, which, 
along with Woolworths and, to a lesser extent Franklins,171 had established a near 
stranglehold on the Australian grocery retail scene.172  The agreement, which operated 
for five years starting from March 1, 1997, provided for a series of staggered pay 
increases at six month intervals which, over the life of the agreement, amounted to 
$93.30 for full-time adult service assistants (an effective pay rise of 21.65% over the life 
of the agreement).173  A range of allowances, such as those for freezer work and first aid 
skills, were also increased by 4% per annum.174  Against these headline improvements 
in pay, however, were counterposed a suite of developments harmful to retail workers, 
most particularly part-time and casual staff.  The agreement reproduced the trends 
towards the de-regulation of trading hours playing out in the award system by further 
extending the spread of ordinary hours.  Ordinary hours Monday to Friday were now 
stipulated as 5.00am until midnight (previously 5.00am to 10.00pm) whilst the span of 
Sunday hours blew out to 7.00am until 8.00pm (previously 8.00am to 6.00pm).175  This 
extension of hours was accompanied by a degradation in the conditions of those who 
would primarily work these unsocial hours, namely casual and part-time employees.  
For the former, the casual loading was decreased from 22% to 20%, done so with the 
                                                          
169 For example, in an enterprise agreement forged with World 4 Kids, the latter promised to ‘maximise 
union membership for new employees on an ongoing basis and gives a commitment to strongly encourage 
SDA membership for existing employees’: Greg Donnelly, ‘Breakthrough at World 4 Kids’ (Summer 
1998) SDA News 14, 15.  SDA growth was often premised upon crossing historical demarcation lines, 
such as when they organised clerical employees in retail establishments at the expense of the Australian 
Services Union: Joe de Bruyn, ‘Another Pay Rise at Coles’ (Winter 1995) Shop and distributive worker 4.  
In one particularly egregious  case, the SDA connived with Pizza Hut to emasculate the Federated Liquor 
and Allied Industries Employees Union, with the employer gaining an agreement stripped of penalty 
rates: Jacquelyn Hole, ‘The Order of the Day is More Enterprise, Less Agreement’, Sydney Morning 
Herald (Sydney), 24 September 1991, 13. 
170 Given their history of militancy, however, food processing unions did not generally enjoy the union-
entrenching provisions the SDA achieved by dint of its cozy relationship with major retailers.  
171 Which was subsequently bought out by South African retailer Pick ‘n Pay in 2001, before becoming 
part of the Independent Grocers of Australia chain in 2010.  
172 See, for example: Alan Treadgold, ‘Food retailing in Australia – three retailers, three strategies’ (1996) 
24(8) International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management 6. 
173 Donnelly, ‘SDA Wins $93.30’, above n 166, 5. 
174 Ibid 6. 
175 Ibid 7. 
 
 
303 
explicit recognition that this was ‘[i]n line with many other agreements in retail and in 
industry generally.’176  For the latter, the maximum number of hours that could be 
worked in a four-week cycle before the attraction of penalty rates rose from 128 to 144 
(a 12.5% increase in the availability of part-time labour to be exploited at ordinary 
rates).177  Both casuals and part-timers suffered from the continued reduction in penalty 
rates.  Given the intensity of the issue of Saturday penalty rates we have explored in this 
chapter, it is a telling feature of this agreement that work from 5.00am until 10.00pm on 
a Saturday attracted no penalty rate at all.178 
The framework of change apparent in this agreement was very much the standard 
pattern of enterprise bargaining with major retailers.  It is reproduced almost exactly in 
two major enterprise agreements struck in 1997 and 2000 between the SDA and 
discount department store Big W (which has, since its inception, been a division of the 
Woolworths group).179  The 1 November 1997 agreement provided pay increases of 
between $41.35 and $47.85 for full-time adult employees (an effective rise of 9.9%), 
depending upon their classification grade.180  However, this headline pay increase for 
full-time employees was accompanied by a reduction in the loading for casual 
employees from 23% to 20%,181 whilst penalties for Saturday work were further 
eroded.182  Importantly, the agreement institutionalised precarity by including a 
temporary employment clause that vested management with ‘the right to engage 
employees on a temporary employment basis as either full-time or part-time 
employees,’183 so long as the period of employment was not less than a month and not 
longer than a year. 
                                                          
176 Ibid 6. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid 7. 
179 Donnelly, ‘SDA Wins New Big W Agreement’, above n 168; Greg Donnelly, ‘SDA Wins 10.12% at 
Big W’ (Summer 2000) SDA News, 2. 
180 Donnelly, ‘SDA Wins New Big W Agreement’, above n 168, 3. 
181 And again prefaced with an explanatory note stating that the reduction was ‘to bring the casual loading 
into line with the more common casual loading for department and discount stores’: Ibid 5. 
182 Previously, a 25% penalty rate was paid on work from 6.00pm until midnight for Saturday work.  The 
agreement provided that the 25% penalty now applied from 8.00pm until 10.00pm, followed by a double 
time loading after that: Ibid 6. 
183 Ibid 6. 
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The 2000 agreement closely resembled its predecessor in terms of the contours of 
change.  Full-time adult employees at the ‘Retail Associate’ grade184 saw their weekly 
pay packets increase by $48.90, or 10.12% over the two year life-span of the 
agreement.185  The usual trade-offs, however, applied with full force.  The span of 
ordinary hours was widened, now encompassing 6.00am to midnight week days 
(previously 7.00am to midnight) and 6.00am to 10.00pm on Saturday (a substantial 
increase on the preceding span of 8.00am to 6.00pm).186  The already scanty Saturday 
penalty rate existent in the previous agreement was further reduced; henceforth, the only 
rate that would apply would be a 25% loading on work from 10.00pm to midnight.187  
Perhaps most significant for my analysis were the new arrangements governing the 
deployment of part-time labour.  In particular, it was stipulated that:  
Maximum weekly hours have been increased from 32 hours (128 over four 
weeks) to 36 hours (144 over four weeks). 
Minimum hours have reduced from 10 to 9 a week, or 36 hours over four weeks. 
The additional hours loading has decreased from 20 to 15 per cent.188 
 
This clause came to the nub of changes in the retail sector in the transition from 
antipodean Fordism to liberal-productivism.  It combined within itself substantial labour 
intensification and increased insecurity at work.  Retail labour was forced to sell itself 
over a greater range of hours and with ever decreasing benefits/premiums at exactly the 
same time that the assurance of this labour was eroded.  Enterprise bargaining encodes, 
validates and facilitates the precarious wage-labour nexus of liberal-productivism, and 
forms an important plank in the latter’s labour law regime. Given the fact that both of 
these representative agreements achieved at the stroke of a pen employer demands 
which had served as the basis of intense disputes in the 1980s, it is both a logical and a 
historical point that enterprise bargaining in the context of union decline is a central, as 
opposed to casual, structure in this transition phase, a reality elucidated in chapters 6 
and 8.   
                                                          
184 Now dubbed, in true Walmart fashion, ‘associates.’  Presumably, the connotations of submission and 
hierarchy lacing the term ‘employee’ can be wished out of existence by a change in nomenclature.   
185 Donnelly, ‘SDA Wins 10.12% at Big W’ above n 179, 2. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Ibid. 
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It is also worth mentioning here the incidence of a new form of employment 
arrangement established by the 1991 Act,189 namely statutory part-time work contracts 
that could formally derogate from the award.  These agreements could be made prior to 
any pre-existing employment arrangement (in other words could be stipulated as a 
condition of employment)190 and provided that:  
An employee may work part-time under this Division despite any other 
provision of any relevant award or agreement which limits or restricts the 
circumstances in which part-time work may be worked or the terms upon which 
it may be worked, including provisions: 
(a) limiting the number of employees who may work part-time; or 
(b) establishing quotas as to the ratio of part-time to full-time employees; or 
(c) prescribing a minimum or maximum number of hours a part-time employee 
may work.191 
 
The Minister for Industrial Relations, John Fahey, tried to paint the availability of these 
arrangements as an outcome beneficial to both employers and workers, claiming the 
latter would be able to better balance their working and family/social life.192  However, 
in elaborating the situation the part-time contracts were meant to address, he implicitly 
acknowledged that precarity is a central characteristic of a liberal-productivist model of 
development and that juridic fetters to its development (such as quotas, ratios and 
award-stipulated union input) must be removed.  He stated: 
While there has been a strong growth in the incidence of part-time work in 
recent years, many awards either make no provision for part-time work or 
impose substantial restrictions on part-time work. Such provisions may, for 
example, limit the number of employees who can work part-time, establish 
quotas as to the ratio of part-time to full-time employees, prescribe a minimum 
or maximum number of hours a part-time employee may work, or require 
consultation with, consent of, or monitoring by a union. These restrictions not 
only limit the amount of part-time work available; they also mean that part-time 
work is often only available on a casual or temporary basis.193 
 
                                                          
189 Industrial Relations Act 1991 (NSW). 
190 Industrial Relations Act 1991 (NSW) s 78(2). 
191 Industrial Relations Act 1991 (NSW) s 82. 
192 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 28 August 1991, 724 (John Fahey). 
193 Ibid 725. 
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An ALP parliamentarian succinctly grasped the elemental relationship between 
increased precarity and the changing labour law regime when he asked of the 
legislation: ‘[I]f common interests are so satisfactorily served by part-time work, why is 
it necessary to remove award protections?’194   
Given the increasing incidence and insecurity of part-time retail work, it comes as no 
surprise that retail employers made numerous attempts to avail themselves of this new 
instrument.  The SDA quickly appreciated the danger, with NSW State Secretary Joe de 
Bruyn stating that ‘[p]art-time contracts have emerged as the most serious threat to shop 
employees from the State Government’s industrial legislation.’195  In particular, the 
agreements threatened the increasingly scanty minimum and maximum limits of weekly 
part-time employment, the minimum daily engagement period of 3 hours, and opened 
the door for split-shift rostering on the part of retailers.196   
In the event, the SDA appears to have been able to successfully hold the line against 
wide-scale deployment of part-time contracts.197  Attempts in this direction by major 
retailers such as David Jones resulted in court action, which served to clarify the rights 
of retail employees and made it incumbent upon employers to make known to workers 
the entitlements they were sacrificing.198  The true significance of the part-time contract 
provisions was institutional, in that they validated and extended spaces that existed 
largely outside the regulatory reach of the NSW Industrial Commission.  For the first 
time, the principle was established that individual employees (as opposed to collective 
groups of workers engaged in enterprise bargaining) could have terms and conditions of 
employment that effectively derogated from the prevailing award; an award, I have 
demonstrated, that was itself being degraded under the impulses of structural efficiency 
and modernisation.  Given the discussion throughout this thesis of the contrast between 
the collective subjects of administration and the individual subject of the abstract legal 
                                                          
194 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 10 September 1991, 940 (David 
Bowman). 
195 Joe de Bruyn, ‘Part-Time Contracts Winning the Fight’ (Summer 1992) Shop and distributive worker 
6. 
196 See, for example: Joe de Bruyn, ‘Don’t be fooled! Say NO! to part-time contracts’ (Spring 1992) Shop 
and distributive worker 6. 
197 Although there were distinct victories for employers, such as a court case in which Hungerford J found 
that a supermarket employee could work 34 hours a week under a part-time contract when the prevailing 
award maximum was 30 hours: ‘Industrial Relations News’ (December, 1993) Retail Traders’ News 
Bulletin 5. 
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form, it is unsurprising that this early effort at individualisation was a statutory one, 
overseen by the ordinary court system as opposed to the traditional arbitral tribunal. 
Instruments like the NSW part-time contracts were essentially precursor elements of a 
broader process of national labour law change, institutional experiments that presaged 
the development of the notorious federal scheme of Australian Workplace Agreements 
(AWAs) that was explored at length in chapter 6.  As seen there, these had been in 
existence since 1996, but it was only with the passage of the WorkChoices199 legislation 
that their existence took on the parameters of an existential threat to the award system.  
For this and other reasons, WorkChoices and its successor, the Fair Work Act,200 marks 
the end-point of my investigation into the evolution of precarity in the NSW retail 
sector. 
2006 onwards – WorkChoices & after 
In chapter 6 I examined the WorkChoices legislation generally, noting how it was a 
watershed moment in the history of Australian industrial relations.  Here I am 
concerned with the specific features of the regime that were of significance for the 
instruments and modality of labour law regulation of the NSW retail sector, particularly 
insofar as these developments further entrenched retail precarity.  Of central importance 
in this regard was the recasting of the constitutional basis upon which federal industrial 
relations regulation was erected, a further undermining of the award system as the basis 
for enterprise bargaining, and a qualitative and quantitative intensification of AWAs.  
Combined, these forces did not so much amount to a revolution for retail as an 
extension and deepening of the structural changes elucidated in this chapter. 
The first, and perhaps most important, impact of WorkChoices on the retail sector was 
its recasting of industrial regulation on the basis of the corporations power, which was 
explored extensively in chapter 6. Reliance on the corporations power meant that 
Federal government legislation could now capture all employees of constitutional 
corporations, save that residue of employees directly employed by state governments 
and local councils.201  For the first time in Australian industrial history, the national 
state could now ‘regulate employment conditions and labour relations for a majority of 
                                                          
199 Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth). 
200 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). 
201 Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (The Federation Press, 2010) 32. 
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the workforce.’202  It definitively foreclosed the long chapter of state-based regulation of 
the retail sector, as the vast majority of retail establishments now came within the 
purview of the Commonwealth.  Although the reformulation of industrial relations in 
the NSW retail sector was deeply imbricated in the evolution of the mode of regulation 
at a national level, it had exhibited its own unique character, a product of the path-
dependencies and cultural frames of the supporting institutional fabric, particularly the 
NSW Industrial Commission.  WorkChoices radically swung the centre of industrial 
gravity to the federal level, and from this point on, the key determinants of industrial 
outcomes for the NSW retail sector were to be located there.   
The venerable Shop Employees (State) Award did not die immediately, however.  State 
awards that had effectively entered the national system through the enlargement of the 
federal sphere of regulation were preserved as so-called ‘notional agreements preserving 
State awards.’203  These generally reproduced the conditions of the state award and had 
the force of federal law,204 but only covered employers bound by the originating state 
award immediately before March 27, 2006 (the date WorkChoices became law).  For 
employers starting up after this date, or those that engaged their employees in fresh 
rounds of enterprise or individual bargaining, the WorkChoices regime offered new 
possibilities for intensified flexibility and exploitation of retail labour. 
The impact of WorkChoices on the content of enterprise agreements in the retail sector 
has been explored extensively by the Workplace Research Centre.205  A major study of 
WorkChoices-era retail and hospitality collective agreements206 from New South Wales, 
Victoria and Queensland revealed just how corrosive the majority of agreements were 
for employees’ pay and conditions, with the majority discarding or reducing previously-
obtaining entitlements.207  Of the 339 agreements analysed, 80% removed annual leave 
loading, 76% removed Saturday penalty rates, 71% did away with Sunday penalty rates, 
68% disposed of overtime rates and 60% removed public holiday penalty rates, all 
                                                          
202 Ibid 86. 
203 Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) sch 8 pt 3. 
204 Subject to certain limitations, such as the modification or exclusion of clauses dealing with dispute 
resolution: Creighton and Stewart, above n 201, 259. 
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notionally ‘protected award conditions.’208  Certain other non-protected conditions 
suffered a similar fate, particularly those that fettered the deployment of casual and part-
time labour and/or placed a premium upon its use.  For example, a staggering 74% of 
agreements decreased the loading paid to casuals,209 62% expunged limits on part-time 
hours, 62% removed one- to four week hours averaging,210 and 56% removed minimum 
part-time daily hours.211  The authors of the study pithily noted of the impacts on 
vulnerable part-time and casual employees, ‘[o]ver time the award system has devised a 
number of basic standards designed to give such workers enforceable rights.  Under 
Work Choices, none of these are guaranteed.  Agreements in retail and hospitality have 
largely removed those protections.’212  
The removal of these protections not only changed the terms upon which casual and 
part-time labour was deployed; it imposed a real cut to the earnings of retail workers.  
Modelling ten different scenarios based upon commonly used rosters in the retail sector, 
falls in pay of between 1-12% occurred across the three categories of full-time, 
permanent part-time and casual employees.213  When disaggregated on the basis of 
classification, the results are even starker, with ‘part-time workers and casuals generally 
doing far worse than permanent full-time workers.’214  The three casual scenarios saw a 
maximum percentage loss of earnings of 14.9%, 37.4% and 38.2%, and embraced 
75.3%, 85.4% and 84.6% of agreements respectively.215  Although the percentage of 
agreements cutting earnings for permanent part-time workers was marginally lower than 
was the case for casuals (ranging between 64.9% and 87.7%), the average fall in 
earnings was even worse, on account of the removal of the casual loading.216   
                                                          
208 Ibid 33. 
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Perhaps the most graphic demonstration of the continued significance of retail 
unionism, pliable as this had proven in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, was the gross 
disparity in the terms and conditions of enterprise agreements negotiated by a union 
compared to those that did not have union input.  Evesson et al note, ‘[u]nion Collective 
agreements have overwhelming [sic] retained the protected award matters.  About 90 
percent of union agreements have kept most of these provisions.’217  Among other 
things, the pay obtaining in union agreements was:  
[C]onsistently superior to that prevailing for those covered by non-union 
agreements.  The gains in union agreements have, however, been modest.  Few 
Work Choices union agreements deliver increases greater than 3 percent per 
annum … For non-union agreements in retail the best achievement was an 
increase of 0.3 percent.  All other retail scenarios resulted in a fall in income, 
some as low as minus 17.9 percent on average.218 
 
The SDA was even successful in retaining many of the clauses rendered unenforceable 
by WorkChoices (such as those surrounding dispute resolution and union rights), 
persuading some employers to sign memoranda of understanding (potentially 
enforceable in common law) preserving rights and entitlements.219 
Perhaps it was the case that the major retailers, with whom the majority of the union-
negotiated enterprise agreements were struck, had squeezed enough out of the SDA in 
the award modernisation and enterprise bargaining rounds of the 1990s and early 2000s 
to avoid risking the industrial relations troubles that could have resulted from large-
scale efforts to sideline the union.220  Given that the union density rate in food retailing 
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in 2006 was approximately 32.4% (much higher than the prevailing general rate in retail 
of 18.7%),221 an outright confrontation with the SDA made little sense when so much 
had already been achieved with their active co-operation.222   
Outside the sphere of collective bargaining, we are confronted by AWAs, the statutory 
individual contracts which were given a much wider and more flexible sphere of 
operation under the WorkChoices regime.  The evidence of the wage and condition-
degrading character of AWAs is abundant and damning, as was demonstrated in chapter 
6. There is also a plethora of examples of retail employers attempting to avail 
themselves of the cost-cutting potential of AWAs, with NSW workplaces being well-
represented amongst them.223  However, the quantitative incidence of AWAs in the 
retail sector, and the impact of WorkChoices upon it, is less than clear, thanks largely to 
the secrecy of the Office of the Employment Advocate and the comparative opacity of 
the figures collected by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.224  However, the federal 
Workplace Relations Minister, Kevin Andrews, noted in the July of 2005 (several 
months before WorkChoices was passed) that 16% of AWAs approved in the previous 
three months had been in the retail sector.225  Moreover, figures released demonstrated 
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Women in Low Paid Employment’ (Report to the NSW Office of Employment Relations, Women and 
Work Research Group, 2007). 
224 As discussed in chapter 6, the ABS data on ‘methods of pay-setting’ has to be taken with a degree of 
caution.  Employers who pay anything above the award without having a collective agreement in place 
are defined as having ‘individual arrangements.’  Individual arrangements at this time could thus describe 
AWAs, common law contracts or over-award systems still based on the award.  This definition obviously 
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225 ‘Andrews urges retailers to take on AWAs’, Workplace Info (online), 20 May 2005 
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that the retail sector in 2007 had the highest number and concentration of AWAs of any 
industry.226  
Despite the explosion of AWAs in the sector, however, aggregate ABS figures 
demonstrate the continued importance of award-only dependents and collective 
agreements.  Although the secular pattern since figures were first collected in 2000 
suggests a gradual diminution in award-only dependence, this level remains well above 
almost every other industry, whilst there has been a steady increase in the proportion of 
workers covered by collective agreements.227  Given the fact that the latter included 
non-union agreements (which, as has been seen, produced poor wage and conditions 
outcomes for retail workers),228 it is not surprising that many retail employers appeared 
nonplussed in the dying days of WorkChoices, when renewed interest in non-union 
bargains appeared to forestall an anticipated rush on the part of retail employers to sign 
workers on to AWAs.229 
Regarding the continued prevalence of awards in the sector, this result is actually quite 
easily explicable.  Firstly, it has been demonstrated that retail capital had already 
achieved fundamental changes in the structure and content of industrial regulation 
through the vehicle of awards and collective agreements.  Together with the broader 
degradation of the award system across state and federal jurisdictions seen in chapter 6, 
retail awards were thus rendered much less than what they had once been.  Secondly, 
the structure of the industry itself ensures that individual agreements would have a very 
hard time displacing awards entirely.  Although controlled by large retailers in terms of 
market share, the retail sector remains dominated quantitatively by small enterprises in a 
highly competitive environment, businesses with few resources to dedicate to a 
specialised understanding of the legal architecture within which workplace bargaining 
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operates.  Burgess, Sullivan and Strachan note that ‘[f]or such small businesses … 
awards are a convenient framework for determining pay and conditions.’230 
The repeal of WorkChoices and its replacement by the Fair Work Act231 is the end-point 
of the analysis here.  In terms of the forces of retail precarity and enhanced managerial 
prerogative traced in this chapter, nothing was fundamentally changed by the passage of 
the legislation.  Institutionally, the greatest innovation was the process of award 
modernisation, which saw the creation of approximately 120 modern awards, including 
the General Retail Industry Award232 and the Fast Food Industry Award.233  Based on 
the corporations power, these essentially had common rule effect, and definitively 
supplanted the state-based retail awards, including the Shop Employees (State) Award, 
from 1 July 2010.  Conspicuously absent were the proportions clauses governing 
juniors, part-timers and casuals, part-time minimum hours, Saturday penalty rates and 
official recognition of the SDA as the relevant union which had characterised the Shop 
Employees (State) Award.  
Perhaps the most graphic example of the changed fortunes of retail workers over the 
course of the study period is the continual degradation of minimum shift provisions.  It 
has been seen that minimum shifts for part-time and casual retail workers were reduced 
from 4 hours to 3 in NSW, with the new modern awards reproducing the latter state of 
affairs.  As if this were not enough, retailers have since at least 2010 been arguing for a 
decrease in the minimum shift duration, claiming ‘the three-hour minimum did not 
accommodate young workers who could work for only two hours between the end of 
school and closing time’234 and ‘that it is excluding a number of young people from 
participation in the workforce.’235  Although rebuffed by the Fair Work Commission in 
the first and second instance236 (much to employer chagrin),237 three times proved a 
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charm for the retailers, who were granted the right by the tribunal to schedule 
secondary-school students for mere 90 minute shifts.238  The case demonstrated just 
how thoroughly the language and ideology of neo-liberalism had colonised the 
fundamentally transformed federal tribunal.  Despite only calling one employer witness 
(the director of the National Retail Association) and being faced by the testimony of a 
host of SDA witnesses (including the damning views of retail experts Dr Iain Campbell 
and Dr Robin Price),239 Vice-President Watson accepted the thoroughly neo-liberal 
prescription that the degradation of standards would encourage employers to increase 
employment, despite acknowledging that the strength of this change, and its impact on 
other employees, was ‘unclear’.240  
Few examples can better demonstrate the evolution of the wage-labour nexus in the 
retail sector, and its crystallisation in the mode of regulation.  From the late-flowering 
of the standard employment model in retail in the early 1970s, we have arrived at a 
point where an institution which played a leading role in the fabric of antipodean 
Fordism has codified in the recast award system a particularly rabid form of precarity, 
whereby the most vulnerable (and cheapest) group of employees are accorded scant 
protection in terms of their working hours.  Such a state of affairs would simply have 
been unthinkable in the 1970s and 1980s, bound as they were by the declining but still 
significant structures and understandings of the antipodean Fordist model of 
development. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have traced the complex history of the matrix of award and legislative 
regulation surrounding the wage-labour nexus in the NSW, and later national, retail 
sector.  In the former, the process has been a long and convoluted one, with the surface 
clamour of politics and jurisdictional disputes sometimes clouding the nature of the 
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fundamental transformation underway.  The most basal axis of change has been the 
substitution of a liberal-productivist wage-labour nexus for its antipodean Fordist 
predecessor.  If the essence of this change could be distilled into one word, it is 
‘precarity’: the degradation of the model of standard, full-time employment and the 
crisis tendencies it set in motion for capital through the dialectical evolution of 
antipodean Fordism.241  Associated with this development has been the enhancement of 
managerial prerogative over the control and engagement of workers in the organisation 
of the labour process. 
In the NSW retail sector, this process has taken varying forms since the 1980s, but 
always moving, albeit unevenly and at times haltingly, towards the end of greater 
flexibility and insecurity for retail workers. By the late 1970s, it was becoming clear 
that the labour utilisation and employment portfolios of retailers was changing rapidly, 
with an increased reliance upon casual, and often junior, labour manifesting itself.  It 
was only in the very late 1970s and 1980s, however, that the transformations of this 
industrial structure assumed a legal form.  In a context of general union strength, a 
sympathetic ALP state government, divisions in the ranks of retail capital and an SDA 
somewhat more militant than it would later become, the flexibilisation of employment 
was partially handled by a unique institutional configuration, the Retail Trade Industrial 
Tribunal.  This unique body, which combined the juridical structure of the arbitration 
system with a corporatist practice, was part of the broader intensification of antipodean 
Fordist institutions to negotiate an escape from crisis.242  The Tribunal attempted to 
reconcile new employment practices, such as extended trading hours and broadened 
part-time work, with a continued dedication to the basic pattern of standard, full-time 
work, confined within reasonably social hours.   
In the event, the Tribunal proved to be one of Lipietz’s ‘crippled monstrosities,’243 
actively subverted by retail employers who were dissatisfied with its awards.  Any 
potential the Tribunal possessed of encouraging a new modality of retail industrial 
relations was frittered away in jurisdictional squabbles with the NSW Industrial 
Commission and the Court of Appeal, both of which tended to be forums more 
receptive to employer demands for lower penalty rates, reduced fetters on the 
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employment of casual and junior workers, and easier access to part-time labour.  The 
vehicle of these changes, however, remained the traditional award system, even when 
employers sought to bypass the Tribunal through accessing courts of ordinary standing. 
It was not until the early 1990s that a new modality of industrial relations for the retail 
sector started to cohere.  The processes of structural efficiency reform and award 
modernisation substantially degraded the Shop Employees (State) Award, intensifying 
precarity through the spread of ordinary trading hours, reducing minimum shift lengths 
for casuals and cutting daily and weekly minimum hours for part-timers.  This pattern 
was essentially reproduced, albeit usually with a wage premium, in the enterprise 
bargaining encouraged by the Industrial Relations Act, Industrial Relations Reform Act 
and Workplace Relations Act.  Such agreements in the 1990s and 2000s were 
underpinned by a progressively stripped-down award and increasingly supplemented by 
forms of individual agreements, like the NSW part-time agreement contracts and 
AWAs. 
WorkChoices and the Fair Work Act both marked the end of the state-based character of 
retail regulation, which had been progressively diluted from the early 1990s anyhow, as 
enterprise bargaining increasingly took place in the federal sphere.  The apotheosis of 
this new modality is the modern retail and fast-food awards, which frame bargaining in 
the now nationally-regulated retail sector.  Compared to the Shop Employees (State) 
Award’s quantitative controls of junior and casual labour, guarantee of reasonable 
minimum and maximum hours for part-time workers, wide array of penalty rates for 
unsocial work, and institutionalised union role, the silence of modern awards on these 
matters is deafening.  The antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus, so lately implanted in 
the retail sector, was attacked before it had a chance to fully take root.  It is the irony of 
history that it is this belatedness that has positioned an industry like retail as a new 
liberal-productivist lead sector.  The pattern of precarity perfected in these sectors has 
ramifications far outside their boundaries, reflected in their new role as ‘IR pace 
setters.’244  As early as the late 1970s, retail carried within itself the essence of the 
liberal-productivist wage-labour nexus.  The realisation of this essence through the 
patterns of labour law change is a central, organic plank in the transition to liberal-
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productivism, an understanding that reiterates the defining thread of this thesis: that the 
process of transition is an inherently legal phenomenon.   
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Chapter 10 
CONCLUSION 
I began this thesis with a quote from the renowned labour law scholar, Otto Kahn-
Freund.  He stated that: 
The ever-changing forces of society incessantly mould and transform the law 
and yet it pretends to stand aloof and prides itself on its immutability in a 
tumultuous world. While it seems to be a spectator of the great social drama, 
serene and imperturbable, it suffers all the agonies and fights all the struggles of 
an actor in the play.1 
 
Within this statement there are two central, dialectically-related points.  On the one 
hand, there is the notion that law, despite the pretence of its form, is moulded by its 
social context; on the other, that it is not just an observer of social change, but is instead 
one of its actors.   
In this thesis, I have demonstrated the truth of both of these contentions so far as post-
World War II Australian labour law is concerned.  I have shown that a labour law 
regime is deeply imbricated in the model of development of which it is part.  The 
specific ways in which the abstract function of labour law, the commodification of 
labour power, are exercised within different capitalist epochs is inexplicable without an 
understanding of the architecture of those epochs.  In particular, it is very hard to 
elucidate the concrete roles of a labour law regime without grasping the mechanisms of 
coherence and trajectories of crisis opened by the model of development of which it is 
part.  At the same time, an account of a model of development that does not include 
consideration of labour law is necessarily incomplete, precisely because law, as a juridic 
form of capital, has a central role in constituting it.    
Having nearly come to the end of the analysis, it is necessary to reflect upon the 
implications of the approach taken and the utility of the theoretical model of labour law 
I have constructed. 
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The utility of the Parisian Regulation Approach for periodising 
Australian capitalism 
In chapter 2, I described the spiralling method of theory construction that lies at the 
heart of sophisticated regulationist work.  This method demands a dialectical interaction 
between the abstract and the concrete, with theoretical concepts serving to elucidate key 
causal structures and relationships, whilst empirical study comments upon the adequacy 
of these concepts.2  This is an iterative process, whereby the initial theoretical departure 
point serves as a focussing device, justifying what to study and, more importantly, how 
to study it.  In turn, the facts thus generated reflect on the soundness, and possible 
shortcomings, of the theoretical approach, which can then be modified if necessary.   
This exercise has been a guiding thread of this thesis.  Chapters 2 and 3 represented the 
most abstract departure point.  In chapter 2, I explored the history, methodology and 
concepts of the Parisian Regulation Approach (PRA), emphasising how it could provide 
theoretically rigorous mid-range studies of particular capitalist epochs, cognisant of the 
longer-term crisis tendencies of capitalism yet accounting for stabilising forces in the 
short to medium term.  I discussed the more serious criticisms of the approach, most 
importantly increasingly loose ties to its roots in Marxism and an inadequate conception 
of law and the state.  I noted the importance of restoring to the regulation approach its 
Marxist foundation.  Just as significantly, I constructed law and the state as juridic 
forms of capitalist production and exchange relations, and as such part of the basket of 
invariant features characterising the capitalist mode of production.  This understanding 
is perfectly commensurable with regulationist analysis, and provides the tools to 
overcome what is perceived as an historic neglect of the law and the state. 
Chapter 3 was dedicated to further expounding this theory of law as a juridic form.  It 
was demonstrated that, although the rudimentary legal form is implicit in commodity 
exchange, its full development into an axiomatic system of abstract, universal and 
formal norms regulating juridically equal citizens is a specifically capitalist 
phenomenon.  This abstract legal form, however, is constantly proved inadequate in the 
commodification of labour power as the law of ‘things,’ contract and property law, 
attempts to subsume the living, breathing and thinking proletarian.   Class struggle can 
                                                          
2 Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience (NLB, 1979) 15; Gerry Treuren, 
‘State theory and the origins of federal arbitration legislation in Australia’ (1997) 13 Policy, Organisation 
and Society 56, 60-61. 
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tear holes in this abstract legal form, which can force the state to plug these gaps with 
administrative solutions, producing institutions and practices which take as their 
reference point collective subjects such as industrial organisations, and whose subject 
matter is often specific.  I argued law and administration form two poles of a law-
administration continuum, whose exact configuration is intimately tied to a model of 
development.  In particular, the method by which the latter handles and orders the 
contradictions of capitalism, derives coherence and embeds or excludes working-class 
power to varying degrees fixes the nexus point of this continuum. 
In chapter 4, I took key concepts, namely the Fordism and liberal-productivist ideal-
typical models of development, and sensitised them to the Australian context, revealing 
two more concrete models: antipodean Fordism, stretching from 1945 to the early 
1970s; and liberal-productivism, which had begun to cohere in the late 1980s and early 
1990s and remains on foot today.  I then illuminated the abstract roles and functions of 
labour law within these models of development.   
Chapters 5 and 6 provided the concrete history of the general evolution of post-World 
War II Australian labour law.  Utilising a ‘slice’ approach, the state of four key themes 
(wage fixation, forms of employment/flexibility, collectivism/individualism together 
with the scale of industrial relations, and the broader legal matrix) was investigated at 
key dates coinciding with coherence and crisis of antipodean Fordism and the 
emergence and coherence of liberal-productivism.  I demonstrated that both antipodean 
Fordism and liberal-productivism possessed their own regimes of labour law, which 
clearly executed the key functions of labour law within the ideal-types, yet did so in 
unique ways.   
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 focussed even closer on certain sectors as case studies to sharpen 
some of the more important claims.  In chapter 7, I traced the ascent and decline of the 
antipodean Fordist cycle of wage and conditions flow-on centred on the metal trades, 
one of its central dynamics.  The institutionalisation of this process between the end of 
World War II and the early 1960s, and its subsequent destruction from the 1980s 
onwards, were key moments in the constitution of antipodean Fordism and liberal-
productivist labour law respectively.  Chapter 8 studied the emergence of the precarity, 
intensified managerial prerogative and work reorganisation central to the liberal-
productivist wage-labour nexus and industrial paradigm in the food processing sector.  
After first accounting for the emergence of Fordist forms in the New South Wales retail 
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sector, chapter 9 studies much the same processes as chapter 8.  Taken together, chapter 
8 and chapter 9 demonstrate the similarity of outcomes and patterns of change in two 
completely different industries, strengthening the theory of transition forwarded in this 
thesis by demonstrating that liberal-productivist tendencies have taken hold of the 
workforce at large. 
The findings in chapters 5-9 demonstrate the soundness of the theoretical concepts 
forwarded in chapters 2-4, as well as indicating that the sensitisation process of chapter 
4 accurately captured both the specificity of Australian capitalism and the fact it was 
bound by the general logic of the abstract Fordist and liberal-productivist models of 
development.   
Below I will discuss the specific relevance of this theoretical soundness for legal theory.  
What is more significant here is the fact that the regulationist periodisation schema I 
have deployed has been validated, at least as far as this study has gone.  The periods of 
antipodean Fordist and liberal-productivist functionality clearly accord with distinct 
labour law regimes, whilst the phase of most dramatic legal change closely matches the 
proposed timeline of institutional searching.  To echo Treuren, empirical study has thus 
established the adequacy of the theory.3   
This validation has implications outside of the study of labour law.  Antipodean 
Fordism and liberal-productivism depended for their coherence on a whole basket of 
legal, industrial, technological, political and cultural structures and practices.  Having 
outlined in a rigorous and systematic manner the internal structure of these models of 
development, particularly regarding their underlying industrial paradigms, accumulation 
regimes and modes of regulation, the interrelationship of these structures and practices 
becomes much clearer.  More broadly, the utility of the PRA for studying Australian 
capitalism has been affirmed.  Given the generally limited impact the PRA has made in 
Australian scholarship, my work joins that of researchers like Lloyd,4 Chester,5 
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Broomhill6 and Treuren7 in clearly demonstrating the utility of the approach in studying 
Australian capitalism.  By firmly re-attaching the PRA to its Marxist roots, I can match 
the empirical richness and useful modelling of these authors with greater theoretical 
rigor.  
The union of the PRA and a theory of juridic forms 
In chapters 2 and 3, I made the case that unifying the PRA with a theory of law as a 
juridic form of capital created a powerful theoretical synthesis that addressed 
shortcomings both approaches suffer from singularly.  On the first score, the realisation 
that capital has a juridic, as well as economic, existence compelled us in chapters 2 and 
3 to acknowledge that the state and law were part of the basket of invariant features of 
the capitalist mode of production, in the absence of which it would be incorrect to speak 
of a capitalist society.  This understanding should serve as a useful corrective to the 
relative historical neglect of law in PRA-inspired work.  If a mode of regulation is a 
concrete arrangement of juridic forms, as I stated in chapter 2, then law must become a 
central focus of regulationist work.  Moreover, this work cannot merely study law as a 
derivative institution regulating a broader capitalist economy.  Rather, law must be 
studied as a form of capital’s contradictions in and of itself, with its own capacity to 
impart disequilibria within a model of development.  The result is a considerably 
deepened legal perspective within the PRA, particularly regarding the mode of 
regulation concept. 
On the other hand, much Marxist-inspired jurisprudence has tended to operate at a high-
level of abstraction, emphasising the abstract basis and functions of law within the 
capitalist mode of production.  Such accounts have difficulty grasping how these 
abstract functions are exercised in concrete societies.  It is at this point that the 
intermediate-level analysis of the PRA, best represented by the model of development 
concept, can be of immense value to the explanatory power of the notion of juridic 
forms.  In particular, it has been demonstrated that different models of development do 
not deal with all of capitalism’s crisis tendencies in the same way or to the same degree.  
                                                          
6 See, for example: Ray Broomhill, ‘Australian Economic Booms in Historical Perspective’ (2008) (61) 
Journal of Australian Political Economy 12 
7 See, for example: Gerrit Treuren, ‘Regulation Theory and Australian Theorising of Institutional Change 
in Industrial Regulation’ (Paper presented at 11th AIRAANZ Conference, Brisbane, 30 January-1 
February 1997). 
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Instead, they exhibit a hierarchised pattern of institutional forms, which focusses on 
some crisis tendencies more than others and achieved coherence in specific ways.  An 
appreciation of this reality allows us to specify with much greater clarity the roles and 
functions of labour law within a particular capitalist epoch. 
From chapters 4-9, I have demonstrated the value of this theoretical synthesis in the 
case of Australian labour law.  Both antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism in 
Australia had and have a unique regime of labour law corresponding with them, a 
regime that not only derives its dynamic from the model of development of which it is 
part, but helps constitute it.  In both models of development, the most abstract function 
of labour law, the commodification of labour power, remains constant.   This will ever 
be the case so long as the capitalist mode of production endures.   
Each model of development, however, had its own mechanisms of coherence and 
trajectories of crisis.  Antipodean Fordism had its roots in the ruination of the Great 
Depression, a worldwide crisis that was a function, in large part, of working-class 
underconsumption and disproportionality between large-scale capitalist production in 
Department I and the continued importance of petty bourgeois arrangements in 
Department II.  It thus crystallised the wage-labour nexus as the site of primary 
contradiction, and demanded for its coherence the placement of adequate purchasing 
power in the hands of the proletariat.  In this fact is one of the keys to understanding the 
logic and structure of the Australian labour law regime during the antipodean Fordist 
phase.  Chapter 4 demonstrated that for this nexus to both take shape and function, a 
series of legal conditions was necessary, namely those that allowed for the diffusion of 
wage increases from lead sectors, permitted collective and connective bargaining, 
encouraged the organisation of labour and developed a notion of a standard employment 
model.   
These requirements undergirded the key features of this regime, namely a permissive 
attitude towards organised labour, bargaining between capital and labour at a broad 
occupational level, the diffusion of wage gains from leading sectors through the award 
framework and the growth of administrative fixes to heightened worker power.  I 
demonstrated that the arbitration system was the central pivot of the whole regime, 
precociously institutionalising the antipodean Fordist wage-labour nexus, and was 
emblematic of a law-administration continuum where, so far as labour law was 
concerned, the latter was predominant.  In particular, compulsory arbitration at this time 
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facilitated the pattern of flow-on from the industrially strong to the industrially weak, 
further developed and diffused standard employment, and strongly integrated organised 
labour into the fabric of the law and the state, all essential planes of coherence in 
antipodean Fordism.   
In the 1970s and early 1980s, however, these same features of compulsory arbitration 
had become deeply dysfunctional, setting in motion large, destabilising wage-rounds 
and entrenching trade union power at a time when it was pressing against and outside 
traditional arbitral channels.  Liberal-productivism in Australia was thus born of a crisis 
rooted at least partially in the power of organised labour and its integration into the 
labour law regime, as well as the grating of national state boundaries against growing 
transnational capital.  Within this model of production, the antipodean Fordist wage-
labour nexus is displaced, reconstructed as a cost of international production and 
predicated on precarity.  The liberal-productivist labour law regime, combining hostility 
to trade unions, a destruction of the conciliation and arbitration system in favour of 
individualisation, a severing of the institutional links homogenising the wage structure, 
erosion of the standard employment model and intensified juridification, helps 
constitute the fabric of the new model of development.  The law-administration 
continuum is reconfigured, as the administrative structures of arbitration give way to the 
purer legal form, with the latter’s focus on abstract, juridically equal citizen-subjects 
marginalising administration’s collective subjects and practices. 
It is the synthesis of these two bodies of theory that has allowed the generation of a 
theoretically rigorous yet empirically rich account of the evolution of Australian labour 
law.  Counterposed to the traditionally abstract nature of Marxist jurisprudence is the 
theoretical impoverishment of most contemporary work on Australian labour law.  This 
has generally not gone beyond the descriptive point that the rise of neoliberalism has 
been associated with legal change that has disempowered organised labour, promoted 
individualism and generally intensified employment precarity and greater inequality in 
outcomes.8  Accounts in this tradition generally rest upon a conspiratorial view of 
labour law change, whereby economic rationalists hijacked the state in the 1980s and 
1990s and were able to pass laws (which are typically depicted as passive and reactive) 
                                                          
8 For a useful compendium of such work, see: Christopher Arup et al (eds), Labour Law and 
Labour Market Regulation (Federation Press, 2006). 
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reflecting their ideological world view.9  By uniting the PRA with a theory of law as a 
juridic form of capital, I have been able to integrate the economic, political and 
legal/state dimensions of Australia’s evolving political economy in a deeper, more 
organic fashion.  This, in turn, has elucidated actual causal relationships between labour 
law and models of development, far beyond the traditionally descriptive accounts of 
labour law and industrial relations scholarship.10 
Importantly, the union of the PRA and the theory of juridic forms has a much wider 
application than the study of Australian labour law.  The process of sensitising ideal-
typical models of development to particular contexts reveals a myriad of concrete 
instantiations, each with their own unique institutional path-dependencies, differing 
states of productive forces, and histories of class struggle.  Even within the framework 
of a common model of development, these idiosyncrasies act as a refractive layer, 
ensuring that no two societies experience the model in the same way.  At the same time, 
the realisation that different societies are bound by the logic of an ideal-typical model of 
development focusses attention on similarities in evolution and outcomes.  
Labour law is a particularly striking example of this reality.  As outlined in chapter 4, 
the abstract Fordist wage-labour nexus required a number of legal preconditions to 
function.  However, an appreciation of the diversity of labour law regimes of Fordist 
countries demonstrates that more than one concrete form was compatible with these 
functions.  For example, although the Australian arbitration system and the traditional 
Swedish pattern of national-level wage and conditions negotiations fulfilled roughly the 
same functions of wage and conditions flow-on and homogenisation of the wage 
structure,11 they had very different modes of operation and institutional histories.  An 
even better example can be found closer to home.  New Zealand was the only country in 
the world that shared with Australia an industrial relations system premised on 
compulsory arbitration, industrial tribunals and awards.  Moreover, it explicitly turned 
to Australia as an exemplar of Fordist development.12  Nevertheless, due to a host of 
institutional peculiarities and economic differences, the crisis of New Zealand 
                                                          
9 A prime example is: Andrew Mack, ‘Class, Ideology and Australian Industrial Relations’ (2005) 56 
Journal of Australian Political Economy 156. 
10 Treuren, ‘State theory’, above n 2, 59; Treuren, ‘Regulation Theory’, above n 7, 358. 
11 Harry C. Katz, ‘The Decentralization of Collective Bargaining: A Literature Review and Comparative 
Analysis’ (1993) 47(1) Industrial and Labor Relations Review 3, 4-5. 
12 See, for example: Mark Rolfe, ‘Antipodean Fordism: Postwar Americanisation down under’ in John 
Wood & Michael Wood (eds) Henry Ford: critical evaluations in business and management Volume 2 
(Routledge, 2003) 323-353. 
 326 
Fordism’s labour law regime and its replacement by a liberal-productivist successor 
assumed a far more rapid and violent character than was the case in Australia.13  There, 
the destruction of awards, outlawing of the closed shop and the creation of a voluntary 
system of individual and collective agreements were achieved virtually at the stroke of a 
pen with the passage of the Employment Contracts Act 1991.14  The same developments 
in Australia generally occurred in a more gradated fashion over a period of years.  Even 
in the case of two countries that shared a unique institutional heritage, therefore, 
substantial differences in the tempo and degree of labour law change resulted.   
However, the fact that broadly similar fundamental changes have been observed across 
Fordist countries indicates that there are common impulses at play.  Despite the 
institutional differences and varying economic structures of Australia, the UK and the 
USA, for example, the overall pattern of increased precarity, marginalisation of trade 
unions, the erosion of administrative structures and worsening inequality and polarity in 
the wage structure is common to all three.15  Collins’ description of the emergence of 
business competitiveness as the dominant theme of labour law echoes throughout these 
countries, an indicator of the repositioning of competition as a site of dominant 
contradiction within liberal-productivism.16  
                                                          
13 See, for example: Michael Barry and Nick Wailes, ‘Revisiting the Australia-New Zealand Comparison’ 
(2005) 30(3) New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations 1; Gaby Ramia and Nick Wailes, ‘Putting 
Wage-Earners into Wage-Earners’ Welfare States: The Relationship Between Social Policy and Industrial 
Relations in Australia and New Zealand’ (2006) 41(1) Australian Journal of Social Issues 49, 55-56; 
Russell D. Lansbury, Nick Wailes and Clare Yazbeck, ‘Different Paths to Similar Outcomes? Industrial 
Relations Reform and Public Policy in Australia and New Zealand’ (2007) 28(4) Journal of Labor 
Research 629. 
14 Employment Contracts Act 1991 (NZ). 
15 See, for example: Jamie Peck, Work-Place: The Social Regulation of Labor Markets (The Guilford 
Press, 1996) 119-152, 185-231; Andy Danford, ‘The “New Industrial Relations” and Class Struggle in the 
1990s’ (1997) 21(1) Capital & Class 107; Arne L. Kalleberg, Good Jobs, Bad Jobs: The Rise of 
Polarized and Precarious Employment Systems in the United States, 1970s to 2000s (Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2011); William Brown, ‘Industrial Relations in Britain under New Labour, 1997-2010: A 
Post Mortem’ (2011) 53(3) Journal of Industrial Relations 402; John Krinsky, ‘Neoliberal Times: 
Intersecting Temporalities and the Neoliberalization of New York City’s Public-Sector Labor Relations’ 
(2011) 35(3) Social Science History 381; Susan Bisom-Rapp, Andrew Frazer and Malcolm Sargeant, 
‘Decent work, older workers and vulnerability in the economic recession: a comparative study of 
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States’ (2011) 15(1) Employment Rights and Employment 
Policy Journal 43; Thomas A. Kochan, ‘Collective bargaining: crisis and its consequences for American 
society’ (2012) 43(4) Industrial Relations Journal 302; Kris Warner, ‘The Decline of Unionization in the 
United States: Some Lessons from Canada’ (2013) 38(2) Labor Studies Journal 110; John Buchanan et 
al, ‘Unsustainable employment portfolios’ (2013) 27(3) Work, employment and society 396; Matt Vidal, 
‘Postfordism as a dysfunctional accumulation regime: a comparative analysis of the USA, the UK and 
Germany’ (2013) 27(3) Work, employment and society 451. 
16 Hugh Collins, ‘Regulating the Employment Relation for Competitiveness’ (2001) 30(1) Industrial Law 
Journal 17. 
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This dual reality demonstrates two crucial points: the logic of a model of development 
encourages a degree of convergent evolution in labour law regimes; and, the latter 
nevertheless retain their own unique, historically-conditioned character.  The process of 
sensitising the ideal-typical models of Fordism and liberal-productivism to the 
Australian context reveals labour law regimes that clearly execute the key abstract 
functions of labour law in both models, yet do so in concretely unique ways.  The same 
reality would hold for other countries subsumed by the logic of these models of 
development.  Indeed, this must necessarily be the case, given the fact that in chapters 2 
and 4 I noted that a model of development, when pitched at the ideal-typical level, does 
not grasp the concrete experience of any one society.  The method of sensitisation I 
have adopted in this thesis to describe Australian labour law in a theoretically rigorous 
and empirically rich fashion is perfectly capable of application in other contexts, and is 
demonstrative of one of the greatest virtues of the PRA – the ability to plot the 
relationship between broad capitalist epochs and specific instantiations.  Such an ability 
both demands its middle-range analysis and presupposes the reconnection with a 
Marxist political economy I have elucidated. 
The union of the PRA and a theory of juridic forms could also be employed in 
describing the characteristics of law more broadly.  I have focussed on labour law as 
one of the most crucial subsets of law, the nexus point where the abstract legal form, 
pressed into service to commodify labour power, attempts to incorporate and regulate a 
living, breathing and thinking subject, the proletarian.  However, as chapter 3 
illuminated, the developed legal form itself is implanted in capitalist production and 
exchange relations.  Law is an invariant feature of a capitalist society, yet I have 
determined, using the PRA, that some of its key predicates, such as the extent of the 
commodity form, the valency of market forces and, most importantly, the state and 
structuring of class struggle, vary between different capitalist epochs.  Law generally 
will thus vary between these epochs.  For example, the theoretical model of legal 
change I have developed in this thesis could quite easily take as its subject social 
security law, investigating how this body of law articulated with the broader antipodean 
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Fordist/liberal-productivist dynamic.  The same could be said of taxation law and 
occupational health and safety legislation.17 
Most broadly, the synthesis of the PRA and the theory of juridic forms promises a 
sophisticated Marxist theory of law that overcomes the abstraction that has typically 
characterised even the best Marxist jurisprudence.  This unified theory allows a dual 
movement, recognising the roots of the abstract legal form within capitalist social 
relations whilst at the same time accounting for the over-determination of its concrete 
manifestations.  Schematically, this process begins, as I did in chapters 2 and 3, by 
tracing the most abstract features of the legal form within the capitalist mode of 
production. These features are to be considered the structural horizons of capitalist law, 
determining broadly what it can and cannot be whilst at the same time affording a wide 
space for the historical contingency consequent upon the interactions and over-
determinations of capitalism’s tendencies. Moving down the hierarchy of abstraction, 
the next step in the analysis involves ascertaining how concrete manifestations of these 
forms are ordered and hierarchised within distinct epochs of development, the subject 
matter of chapter 4.  It is at this level that the PRA comes into its own, particularly 
through the model of development concept, which can grasp the place of law within this 
order of forms. Finally, at the most concrete level of investigation (as seen in chapters 
5-9), an understanding must be gained as to how the concrete law of a model of 
development simultaneously crystallises its own unique configuration of capitalism’s 
abstract tendencies, and relates to the trajectories of crisis it opens.  
I have demonstrated the application of this theory in regards to Australian labour law, 
but with the appropriate sensitisation of the ideal-typical model, an understanding of the 
history of the particular area of law to be studied, and the specification of the means by 
which concrete laws articulate with the abstract goals and functions of the legal form, it 
could conceivably be used as an analytical tool of much broader legal compass. 
Political implications 
Theory is necessarily and always political.  For those of us working in the Marxist 
tradition, Marx’s exhortation that the point of philosophy is not merely to describe the 
                                                          
17 Indeed, my first foray into using the PRA as a tool of legal analysis concerned occupational health and 
safety law: Brett Heino, ‘The state, class and occupational health and safety: locating the capitalist state’s 
role in the regulation of OHS in NSW’ (2013) 23(2) Labour & Industry 150. 
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world, but to change it,18 puts the political implications of our work centre-stage.  This 
thesis unashamedly holds to the view that the exploitation of the proletariat is the 
central dynamic of capitalism.  Although it has been demonstrated that labour law can 
be made to register working-class power through recourse to administration, its most 
abstract and irreducible function, the commodification of labour-power, is already and 
always a class measure, allowing the expropriation of surplus value from the worker.  
Even the most accommodative, administrative regime of labour law can never escape 
this central fact, that it is a vital moment in the process of capital arrogating to itself the 
fruits of the workers’ labour.  The concern I have for the political implications of my 
approach, therefore, is only the extent to which it could be used to the betterment of the 
working-class.   
Given the fact that my thesis is an historical study, it deals mainly with accomplished 
facts.  However, the interpretation of the past is itself political, and the understanding of 
Australian labour law generated could be of value to the working-class going forward.  
An understanding of the physiology of a labour law regime, and how it articulates with 
the broader dynamic of a model of development, can allow organised labour to better 
formulate strategies for navigating, negating and/or exploiting the limitations and 
opportunities presented by it.  The dangers of lacking a clear vision, or sharing a vision 
that has been largely determined by capital, were painfully exposed in chapters 6 and 7.  
By committing itself to the Accord process and enterprise bargaining, the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions was buying into a conception of Australian capitalism’s crisis 
that saw the only solutions as wage restraint, halting of the antipodean Fordist cycle of 
wage and conditions flow-on, decentralisation, precarity and, perhaps most importantly, 
the restoration of profitability to capital.  The vague conception of a Scandinavian-style 
social democracy envisaged by some elements of the union movement19 rapidly wilted 
in the face of governments and employers who saw with increasing clarity and focus the 
real thrust of the reforms they were implementing.  Australian Manufacturing Workers’ 
Union official Doug Cameron stated tellingly: 
We have sought real partnerships and been betrayed; we have promoted co-
operation, not capitulation; we have benchmarked; we have introduced teams; 
                                                          
18 Karl Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology 
(International Publishers, 1970) 121, 123. 
19 Peter Kriesler and Joseph Halevi, ‘Australia Deconstructed’ (1997) 39 Journal of Australian Political 
Economy 106; Lloyd, ‘Australian Capitalism Since 1992’, above n 4, 49 
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we have talked endlessly about training and competency with almost no results 
for the bulk of our members; we have innovated; we have been flexible; we have 
restructured the Award; we have simplified the Award; we have strived for best 
practice in manufacturing workplaces; we have bargained and bargained and 
bargained.  None of this has been enough for government or employers … the 
workers have been abandoned to market forces and the latest fads, such as 
downsizing, contracting out and re-engineering.20 
 
A fuller understanding of the nature of the transformation underway could have helped 
organised labour perceive that the acts of flexibility, enterprise bargaining, 
benchmarking and workplace co-operation identified by Cameron were almost certainly 
going to result in the outcomes he observed, precisely because the overall vision of 
crisis resolution was one determined by employers and an increasingly neoliberal state.  
If award restructuring, for example, had been perceived for what it was, an essential 
element of the roll-back of antipodean Fordist labour law and a precursor to the award 
system’s marginalisation within liberal-productivism, unions might have been more 
willing to draw a line in the sand and fight harder for alternatives.  The same could be 
said of the whole gamut of legal change in the 1980s and 1990s.  Had unions and their 
members realised the overall direction and tenor of change, they may well have better 
foreseen the historic weakness they currently suffer from.  Although some may argue 
that such a realisation is a counter-factual point of little current relevance, this is far 
from the truth.  Appreciating the source and nature of past misapprehensions of legal 
development can help prevent future occurrences. 
The mapping of models of development and their labour law regimes also has a more 
direct relationship to the future.  Take liberal-productivism for instance.  I have noted 
throughout the course of this thesis that, although it is bound by the same basic 
tendencies and invariant features characterising all capitalist societies, it nevertheless 
has its own unique dynamic, range of institutions and trajectories of crisis.  Given that 
antipodean Fordism imploded and liberal-productivism remains on foot today, it has 
been easier to trace the opportunities and limits the former posed to the working-class.  
However, as noted in chapters 2 and 4, no model of development is capable of 
absolving capitalism of the contradictions inscribed in its DNA.  Liberal-productivism 
is no exception.  It is true that, both in Fordist countries generally and Australia 
                                                          
20 Doug Cameron quoted in Stephen Long, ‘The new Australian militancy’, Australian Financial Review 
(Australia), 18 March 2000, 22.   
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specifically, liberal-productivism was premised upon, and reproduces, an historic 
weakness in organised labour.  Chapter 6 showed in no uncertain terms that the union 
movement in Australia is in crisis, beset by chronically dwindling density, the collapse 
of the standard employment model and a legal framework that constrains its ability to 
mobilise and engage in industrial action.  However, this should not be taken to mean 
that class struggle is futile, or that it must be directed to the end of restoring antipodean 
Fordism.    
Chapters 4 and 5 in particular demonstrated that the antipodean Fordist labour law 
regime was characterised by the degree to which trade unions were integrated into its 
fabric.  Although this secured a privileged institutional position for organised labour, it 
also encouraged the growth of bureaucratic and moderate ‘arbitral unionism.’21  To gain 
access to the system through registration, unions had to make themselves subject to a 
profound level of state regulation over their industrial behaviour and internal workings.  
Moreover, arbitral unionism engendered an industrially lazy, dependent attitude on the 
part of many unions, who depended for their strength not on thorough, organic 
organisation of the rank-and-file, but instead on their standing before the Commissions 
and closed-shop arrangements.  We saw the weaknesses this system bred in chapters 6 
and 9. 
Liberal-productivism, by contrast, has transformed the tight embrace between labour 
law and trade unionism into a cool, often hostile, arms-length relationship.  Although 
unions have not been de jure expelled from the system, they have been relegated to the 
role of unwanted third parties who are faced with the same (if not greater) imposts of 
registration without anything like the rewards that accrued in the antipodean Fordist era.  
Liberal-productivism would thus seem to be more vulnerable to a militant, community-
centred trade unionism that deliberately chose to remain outside of the system.22   
It has also been made clear that, despite some genuine instances where the links 
between the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the union movement affected the form 
and degree of change, the relationship has become an increasingly fallow one for trade 
unions.  The Hawke and Keating governments introduced many of the labour law 
                                                          
21 David Peetz, Brave New Workplace: How Individual Contracts are Changing our Jobs (Allen & 
Unwin, 2006) 161-162. 
22 The best example of this globally is the explosion of minimum wage campaigns in the United States, 
where activist unions like the Service Employees International Union have managed to create broader 
community coalitions to spearhead legislative change. 
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changes that would inflict grievous damage to union strength.  Moreover, as explored in 
chapter 6, the ALP’s legislative baby, the Fair Work Act 2009,23 has reproduced almost 
all of the key provisions of the draconian WorkChoices,24 such as its limitations on 
industrial action, bans on solidarity strikes, a tough right of entry code for union 
officials, a regime of largely individualistic rights and a reliance on the corporations 
power of the Constitution.  Affiliation to the ALP thus seems no longer capable of 
effecting positive change, either in the labour law regime specifically or the broader 
course of Australian capitalism.25  In such a context, unions would be better served by 
disaffiliating from the ALP and using the money freed up for organising purposes.26   
More broadly, the particular crisis tendencies of liberal-productivism render it far less 
stable than its Fordist predecessor.  In Australia, the system is fuelled by debt, has tied 
the country’s fortunes ever closer to the unstable currents of international production 
and competition, and has produced a potentially dangerous (to both itself and capital) 
underclass of precarious workers, what Standing has dubbed the ‘precariat.’27  The 
fragility of the whole edifice was revealed by the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, whilst 
the continued slow-down of manufacturing in China has seen the hitherto high terms of 
trade, fuelled by mining commodity exports, decline precipitously.  It may be that the 
boom time of liberal-productivism in Australia has come to an end; stagnation is 
creeping in, and crisis may be close to hand.28  As with the decay of antipodean 
Fordism, such developments tend to open phases of institutional searching, periods in 
which competing institutions and ideologies grate against each other, and when attempts 
to change society’s tack (short of a revolution) are most easily effected.  If such a period 
is indeed upon us, a clear and informed conception of where we have come from is 
absolutely crucial to the working-class.   
By elucidating the labour law regimes of antipodean Fordism and liberal-productivism, 
and the transition between them, I hope to have made one small contribution towards 
this clearer vision.  The rise of liberal-productivism has been devastating for organised 
                                                          
23 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). 
24 Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth). 
25 Particularly since business and public funding have reduced the relative significance of union affiliation 
fees: Tom Bramble and Rick Kuhn, Labor’s Conflict: Big business, workers and the politics of class 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011) 186. 
26 As the Victorian branch of the Electrical Trades Union voted to do in 2010. 
27 Guy Standing, The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class (Bloomsbury, 2014). 
28 In the case of Europe and the USA, there is a strong argument that crisis is already underway, 
particularly in the former. 
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labour and the working-class.  They cannot afford a repeat in the tumultuous times to 
come.  
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